1/30
Looks like no tags are added yet.
What does Sumner think the standard pro-choice and standard pro-life positions are?
Pro-choice: Before Birth: OK! After Birth: BAD! (Equivalent to killing a RHA)
Pro-life: Before Conception: OK! After Conception: BAD! (Equivalent to killing a RHA)
What is Sumner’s criticism of these positions?
In both views moral status just suddenly happens in both takes (either after birth or after conception)
Sumner believes that moral status comes i.) gradually and ii.) in degrees
What are two examples of Sumner’s criticism for each take?
Inheritance: Killing the baby of your rich uncle right as it comes out his mother’s womb (technically before birth)
Drunks: Drunk nurse killed the most people (after conception)
Drunk driver (Killed a family)
Drunk CDC technician (Released ebola into the neighborhood)
Drunk nurse (Knocked sperm and egg into a dish and threw them away)
What are Sumner’s Criticisms of the “life” and “rationality” criteria for when it’s inherently bad to kill something
Life: i.) Too broad 2.) Non gradual/by-degrees
Rationality i.) Too narrow
What is Sumner’s view?
The degree to which it’s inherently bad to kill something is proportional to the degree to which it’s sentient
What are Marquis’s objections to the standard pro-choice and pro-life arguments?
Pro-Choice
Take 1: Rational/social (fetuses not rational and not members of social community → NO right to life → CE: Babies and Hermits)
Take 2: Human being (a fetus isn’t a person yet → NO right to life
Pro-Life
Take 1: Human Genetic Code (fetuses do have a human genetic code → right to life → CE: Cancer cells and Sperm cells
Take 2: Human being (fetus es are human being so they have a right to life)
What is the Problem with both Take 2’s of the Standard Pro-choice and Pro-life arguments according to Marquis?
Unclear What Counts (What counts as a person or a human being?)
Unmotivated (Why are these what we look to for the right to life?)
What is Marquis’s account of when it’s inherently bad to kill something?
The degree to which it’s inherently bad to kill something is proportional to the degree to which it’s deprived of a valuable future like ours
What are some advantages of Marquis’s account?
Explains why killing is so bad
Explains why euthanasia isn’t as bad as “normal” killing
Explains why killing non-humans can be bad
Explains why killing babies is at least as bad as killing RHAs
Consider what we should assess the valuable futures of on Marquis’s account. Why might one worry about saying “everything”?
Fertile vs Infertile woman
Fertile woman → Saving valuable futures of her children and her children’s children’s vs. Infertile woman → Saving only one life
Alternatively when women hit menopause they are not longer fertile
BOTH are equal in value
Consider what we should assess the valuable futures of on Marquis’s account. Why might one worry about saying “anything that already exists”?
Frankenstein’s monster
Frankenstein’s monster would have a valuable future like ours but a horrible future → The monster already exists but you think it wouldn’t be a good idea so you turn off the machine
Not wrong because you are saving the monster from having a miserable life/horrible future
Consider what we should assess the valuable futures of on Marquis's account. Why might one worry about saying “anything that’s already alive”?
Contraception (Chastity)
Contraception = sperm cell and egg cells meeting together (both alive) and contraception “kills that” unpair with murder
Chastity = depriving cells of being able to create life by not having sex
Doesn’t seem right
What is Tooley’s account of what having a right to something entails?
Right to X entails all and only that if you want X under normal circumstances, others shouldn't deprive you of X
Why does Tooley include the clauses he does in his account?
You need to say “if you want X” because if it’s just: Right to X entails all and only that others shouldn’t deprive you of x → Doesn’t allow people to willingly give up certain rights
Ex.) Ugly lamp and Masochism
You need say “under normal circumstances” because if it’s just: Right to X entails all and only that if you want X others shouldn’t deprive you of X → Allowed to be taken advantage of
Ex.) Depression, Coma, Hypnosis
What are the consequences of Tooley’s account on what can have a non-trivial right to something (and on what can have a non-trivial right to life)?
You can only have a non-trivial right to X if you desire X under normal circumstances
You only have a non-trivial right to life/desire to live you need to understand yourself as a continuing being through time
What is Tooley’s argument against potentiality views, like Marquis’s?
Smart Cat Serum: The serum makes the cat as smart as a RHA but the neutralizing system if injected before 9 months will flush the serum out of the cat’s system and it won’t be smart
P1: Kill RHA = Kill Cat
P2: Kill Cat = Injecting → Neutralizing → Kill Cat
P3: Injecting → Neutrializing → Kill Cat = Killing Injected Cat
C: Kill RHA > Kill I-Cat → Potentiality views are false
What is the Argument from Humane Intuitions?
P1: If cocoamone farming is wrong, then factory farming is wrong
P2: Cocoamone farming is wrong
C: Factory Farming is wrong
What are the options for replying to this argument?
Option 1: Reject P1 - There’s an important moral difference between cocoamone and factory farming
Option 2: Reject P2 - Animal suffering doesn’t matter
Option 3: Accept C - Factory farming is wrong
What is the Argument from Marginal Cases?
P1: If NRHA farming is wrong than factory farming is wrong
P2: NRHA farming is wrong
C: Factory Farming is wrong
Why might one worry about the following reply to arguments against factory farming: “comparing suffering between different species is impossible”?
Cutting cat in half vs Poking you → Obviously the cat suffered more than we do so this argument doesn’t make sense
Why might one worry about the following reply to arguments against factory farming: “what I do won’t make a perceptible difference”?
100 bandits and 100 villages: The bandits take all the beans from the villages under the argument (99 beans isn’t that much of a difference 100 beans) → The bandits steal all the beans and the village starves
Why might one worry about the following reply to arguments against factory farming: “we need meat in order to be healthy”?
It’s implausible and not a sufficient reason → Baby grill: You would eat babies on a grill if it’s the only meat available because “you need it to be healthy?”
Why might one worry about the following reply to arguments against factory farming: “our ancestors ate meat, so it’s OK for us to eat meat”?
Our ancestors also killed each other a bunch and did a lot of stuff we deem morally horrible and also ate a lot of stuff that was bad for us (raw food/uncooked food) → Why should we do anything based on the fact that our ancestors do it?
Why might one worry about the following reply to arguments against factory farming: “animals eat other animals, so it’s OK for us to eat animals”?
Animals mate with other animals → Does that mean we should mate with animals too?
At first glance, what rights does it seem a Rawlsian Contractualist would give to non-rational beings, like animals or severely mentally handicapped human adults?
Rawlsian Contractualism would not give non-rational beings, such as animals or mental ppl because according to rawlsian contractualism, they are self interested rational agents. Animals and the mentally ill are not rational so they would receive no rights
How does Carruthers attempt to respond to the argument from humane intuitions?
Animals don’t have rights/morally don’t matter
RHAs have right/matter
Some activities can make RHAs more likely to harm RHAs
Why might one worry about this response?
Are they different?
Is this the right kind of reason for thinking cocoamone farming is bad?
Strips moral responsibility?
What is the Social Stability Argument that Carruthers offers to respond to the argument from marginal cases?
P1: If our immediate relatives were “marginal,” and had no rights the state could seize them whenever it was in society’s interests to do so
P2: If that state could do this, society would become unstable
P3: Rawlsian agents wouldn’t agree to rules that make society unstable
C: Rawlsian agents would agree to give “marginal” human rights
What worries might one have for the social stability argument?
Worry 1.) Invalid At best can conclude that “marginal” humans who are immediate relatives of RHAs get rights → Not a reason to reject P1 of the AFMC
Worry 2.) Is P2 true?
Worry 3.) Is P3 true? (Are all unstable societies worse stable ones for Rawlsian agents?)
Worry 4.) P1 seems false
Rigid Property Rights, (A “rigid right” can’t be trumped)
Option 1: Give themselves rigid property rights
Option 2: Give rights to “marginal” humans
What is Cohen’s account of when it’s inherently bad to kill something?
It’s inherently bad to kill something if and only if it belongs to a kind whose typical member is rational
What worries might one have for Cohen’s account?
Worry 1: What’s the right way to divide things into kinds? (And justifies this choice?)
Mammals? Baby?
Worry 2: What’s “typical of your kind” doesn’t seem morally relevant
Heaven and Hell
Worry 3: Implausible Consequences
Fido the Genius Dog and Pluto People Pasture