McC Test 3

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134 Terms

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Hazard analysis
A process to identify system hazards and their potential causes
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Purpose of hazard analysis
Systematically accumulates knowledge about system safety and draws attention to gaps in knowledge
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Why hazard analysis matters
New technology and scaling up systems in size increase the possibility of introducing new hazards
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Role in system safety program
Central to establishing the basic goals for the system safety program
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Hazard
A system state or set of conditions that together with a particular set of environmental conditions will lead to an accident or mishap
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Loss
Accidents mishaps and incidents or adverse events
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Hazard versus loss
The former is a system state that can lead to an adverse event while the latter is the adverse event itself
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System state
A set of properties describing a system at a given time
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Hazardous system states
A subset of the total number of system states defined as capable of leading to losses
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System environment
A set of components and properties not part of the system but that affect system states
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System goals
Reasons the system is being created or constructed
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Requirements
Concrete and verifiable statements specifying what the system must achieve
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Constraints
Acceptable ways by which goals or requirements can be achieved
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Starting point of hazard analysis
Stakeholders identify potential losses along with system goals and constraints
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Scope and system boundaries
Must be defined before identifying hazards because hazards exist within the boundary
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System boundary considerations
Deciding what is within the developer design space and whether operators social structures and management structures are included
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Hazard identification guidance
Start from losses and include only system-level states rather than listing component failures or hazard causes
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Brainstorming limitation in hazard analysis
Generates an unstructured list with duplicates or causes rather than system hazards and can omit critical factors
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Abstraction and refinement
Begin with a small set of high-level hazards and refine them into a more detailed list
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High-level hazard list size
Contains no more than 5 to 10 entries that must be disjoint
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Refinement rule
Return to a higher level of abstraction if too many entries are generated in one step
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Aircraft system-level hazard example
The aircraft stalls and does not have adequate airspeed to provide lift
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Automobile system-level hazard example
The automobile violates minimum separation requirements from the car ahead
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Chemical plant system-level hazard example
Explosion and fire in a chemical plant
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Non-system-hazard cause example
Engine malfunction or pilots not keeping the angle of attack down or brake failure
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Design constraints and criteria
Very general goals identified after hazards to prevent accidents which are later refined into specific system component requirements
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Design constraint wording rule
States what is to be achieved while leaving the specific design decisions for later development
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Pressure system design constraint
A way to reduce pressurization on components when pressure exceeds an identified critical level
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Aircraft collision avoidance constraint
Avoid maneuvers that result in objects crossing paths
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Causal scenarios
Associated with each hazard and identified as part of the design process showing how components working together lead to hazards
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Component failure limitation
Relying on models that only consider individual component failures results in the omission of important causal scenarios
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Forward or inductive search
Starts with an initiating event and traces forward in time to explore resulting conditions and states
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Forward search purpose
Looks at the effect on system state of an initiating event and later events not necessarily caused by that initiating event
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Forward search limitation
Tracing an event forward can generate a large number of states and is often limited to component failures
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Backward or deductive search
Starts with a hazardous final state and traces back in time to the initiating events
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Backward search efficiency
Most efficient when exploring the precursors of a specific hazard or accident
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Top-down search
A basic event task or system is broken down into more basic events conditions tasks or subsystems
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Top-down search practicality
Starting from a hazardous system behavior is more practical than exhaustive decomposition
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Bottom-up search
Subcomponents are reconstructed or put together in different ways to determine the result
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Bottom-up search utility
Useful when the relationship being investigated is structural or whole-to-part
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Search method result differences
Forward and backward searches find different states and top-down and bottom-up searches produce different results
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Ground deceleration hazard examples
Deceleration is insufficient upon landing or rejected takeoff or taxiing as well as deceleration occurring after the V1 point during takeoff
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Ground acceleration hazard examples
Acceleration is insufficient during takeoff or excessive while taxiing or applied during landing or parking or continuing during a rejected takeoff
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Ground steering hazard examples
Maneuvering off the taxiway runway or apron taxilane or insufficient steering to turn along intended ground paths
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Air Canada Flight 759 incident
An A320 on approach aligned with an occupied taxiway holding four aircraft instead of its assigned parallel runway and initiated a go-around at 60 feet above ground level
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Air Canada Flight 759 system boundary scope
Included the aircraft and its flight management systems the air traffic control tower and tracking tech airport protocols regulatory agencies and operational personnel
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Air Canada Flight 759 Hazard 1
Loss of situational awareness on the part of the flight crew
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Air Canada Flight 759 Hazard 2
Loss of separation between the arriving aircraft and other aircraft on the airfield
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Air Canada Flight 759 Hazard 3
Incorrect application of final approach procedures constituting a procedural failure
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Air Canada Flight 759 Hazard 4
Ineffective monitoring of navigational equipment and surveillance systems for the airspace and airfield
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Air Canada Flight 759 staffing constraint example
Rules required two controllers present in the tower at all times but only one was present because the second had taken a break
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Review guide written question example
Prompts the student to describe an aviation system for which a hazard analysis may be conducted and use abstraction and refinement to identify one high-level hazard and two related lower-level hazards
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Review guide written question rubric
Full credit requires addressing the prompt clearly and concisely without omitting important information or repeating the question
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Review guide multiple-choice question example
Asks which option is NOT a reason for hazard analysis and lists leaving a paper trail determining system improvements eliminating undesirable environmental conditions and preventing missed considerations
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Review guide multiple-choice question rule
Points are deducted for incorrect answers on multiple-answer questions
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Problem
A state of desire to reach a definite goal from a present condition
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Solution
The management of a condition in a way that successfully meets the goals set for treating it
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Brainstorming appropriate use
Appropriate for identifying creative solutions to problems but not structured enough for hazard analysis
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Complement strategy
Examining or exploring the opposite of what is being considered
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Divide and conquer strategy
Partitioning a large task into smaller steps that are solved independently and then joined together to form the overall solution
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Estimation strategy
Forming an approximate response or solution to a given situation
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Extreme case strategy
Focusing on the absolute high and low extremes to evaluate their impact and then working toward the middle
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Common sense strategy
Using practical judgment grounded in personal experience instead of formal study
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Patience strategy
Taking time to think through a problem before acting or persevering when barriers emerge
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Working backward strategy
Starting at the end and working toward the beginning
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Trial-and-error strategy
Presenting an educated guess testing it and establishing a new guess based on the results repeatedly until solved
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Exhaustion strategy
Examining the complete set of possibilities relative to a given situation and selecting those that represent a solution
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Checklists appropriate use
Useful in the design of well-understood and simple hardware systems
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Checklists hazard analysis weakness
Contributes to false confidence that a system is safe simply because every item has been marked off
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5 Whys technique
Involves asking why five times in succession when trying to understand the root cause of an issue
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Need for sophisticated causality models
Linear conceptions cannot explain undesired events in complex systems and lead to unexplained behavior and unknown unknowns
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STAMP
System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes which applies concepts of emergence control hierarchy communication and abstraction
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STAMP safety concept
Treats safety and other emergent system properties as a dynamic control problem rather than a failure prevention problem
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Four causality types in STAMP
Linear chains multiple independent causal factors conditions and systemic factors impacting multiple events and circular loops
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Control in systems engineering
Influencing behavior directly via engineered systems and management or indirectly via policies procedures and shared values
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STAMP control loop
A decision-making controller issues control actions to a controlled process and receives feedback about the process state
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Incomplete mental models
Inconsistencies between the internal process model used by a controller and the actual state of the controlled process leading to accidents
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Controller adaptation differences
Software controllers vary behavior in predetermined ways while human controllers adapt flexibly to circumstances
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Hierarchical control structures
Multi-tiered organizational levels where higher entities such as dispatch and air traffic control sit above operational software
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STPA
System Theoretic Process Analysis which is a backward hazard analysis technique based on STAMP starting with hazards rather than component failures
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STPA Step 1
Define the scope and purpose of the analysis by specifying losses system boundaries high-level hazards and system constraints
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STPA loss categories
Loss of life or injury loss of or damage to vehicle loss of or damage to objects outside the vehicle and loss of mission
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STPA hazard syntax example
An aircraft violating minimum separation standards in flight
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STPA constraint syntax example
An aircraft must satisfy minimum separation standards from other aircraft and objects
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STPA Step 2
Model the high-level and refined safety control structures
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STPA Step 3
Identify unsafe control actions and link them to hazards for traceability
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Unsafe Control Action
A control action that will lead to a hazard in the context of the system and worst-case environment
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Four UCA types
Not providing a control action providing an unsafe action providing an action too early too late or in wrong order or having an action last too long or stop too soon
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UCA documentation syntax
Linking the specific action condition and operational context directly to a system-level hazard
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STPA Step 4
Identify loss scenarios describing causal factors that lead to unsafe control actions or prevent safe execution
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Loss scenario evaluation areas
Investigates why unsafe actions occur and why safe control actions might be improperly executed or omitted
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Component safety limitation
Assuring individual components in isolation does not guarantee total system safety because emergent interactions cause system hazards
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Safety case
Applying formal logic to the design of a system to assure overall safety
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Safety case development issues
The logical argument may be flawed and large complex systems possess millions of physical parts and tens of millions of lines of code
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Safety-by-construction
Evaluating system design throughout the entire development process and using the findings to drive further design
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Safety-by-construction certification advantage
Makes formal certification much simpler by building safety into the system from conception with a continuous argument
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Aircraft certification scope
Must evaluate hardware software human operators and the operating environment
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Prescriptive certification method
Relying on rigid standards or specific guidelines for product features and development processes
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Performance or goal-based certification
Relying on desired or quantifiable outcomes rather than dictating specific design features
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ICAO certification role
Establishes international technical standards for aircraft airworthiness flight crew licensing communications and radio navigation aids