Intro to International Politics Midterm

Anarchy

-no higher authority over the states in the international world

-causes states to try to become the most powerful state in the world to avoid weak and being on the off-end of the anarchic system

-requires “self-help”

-power is the key variable / states are the key actors

Realism

-anarchy / self-help

-key variable is power / key actors are states

-international structure —> competition

Liberalism

-Cooperation is possible, even under anarchy

-State preferences and institutions are the key variables

-States / IOs are the key actors

Classical Liberalism

human nature drives cooperation

Neo-liberal Institutionalism

institutions create opportunities for states to cooperate in their self-interest

Constructivism

-international system is socially constructed

-ideas, norms and identities are the key variables

-states and other social actors are important

-actors identities and interests are not fixed; shaped through social interaction

-Material power matters, but its meaning depends on shared understandings

Feminism

-Gender shapes international Politics and how we understand it

-Gendered power relations are the key variable

-Focus extends beyond states and entitled to individuals and everyday life

-Traditional IR often treats masculine experiences and assumptions as universal

-Broadening what counts as “security’ reveals forms of power and insecurity traditional theories overlook

Marxism

-International politics is embedded in a global capitalist system

-Class and economic relations are the key variables

-States and international Institutions often reflect the interests of dominant economic classes

-Capitalism produces inequality, exploitation and conflict within and between states

Polarity

the number of power centers in the international system at a given time

Rationalism

-approach that makes assumptions about the motivations and capabilities of actors in world politics

Level of Analysis

Individual - People

Domestic - Within States

Transnational - Across Borders

International / Systemic - Among States

-different places to look causes of IR outcomes

The Three I’s

Interests, Interactions, Institutions

Interests

What do actors want?

-security, wealth, power, autonomy, ideology, domestic political goals

Interactions

How do actors’ choices affect one another

-cooperation, bargaining, conflict, coordination, strategic, behavior

Institutions

What rules and organizations shape those interactions

-Treaties, international organization

Theories

a casual hypothesis (x causes y) plus an explanation of this relationship

-answer the “why” question

Models

-theoretical and empirical models simplify the world

-requires that we make assumptions

Independent Variable

The cause of something, or the thing doing the work

Dependent Variables

What is being caused, or the outcome of interest

Correlation vs. Causation

something that can be attributed to a cause of an event vs something that is attributed to a cause of an event

Collective Action

Game Theory

a way of modeling strategic interactions—situations in which one party’s decision may be based on what another party does

Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

-has a dominant strategy: utility maximizing players will always choose to defect

-both players would be better off if they could reach an equilibrium where all cooperate

-Both stay silent: both receive a light sentence

-One talks, one stays silent: the talker goes free: the silent prisoner gets a harsh sentence

-Both talk: both receive a substantial sentence

Chicken Game

-a competition in risk taking

-the winner is the party willing to take the greater risk

Stag Hunt Game

-an assurance game

-best outcome for everyone is cooperation, but you need to trust the other player

Bach or Stravinsky Game

-coordination game

-A prefers Bach but B prefers Stravinsky but neither A nor B want to go to a concert alone

Dominant Strategy

utility maximizing players will always choose to defect

Equilibrium

a situation in which no player can do better by changing their move

Security Dilemma/Spiral Model

-credible threats (building up troops on the border (ex.) makes you less secure

Bargaining Model of War

Bargaining Range

Private Information and Incentives to Misrepresent

Mutual Optimism

Cheap Talk

Costly Signals

Commitment Problems

Issue Indivisibility

Principal-Agent Problem

Diversionary War

a conflict whose purpose is to generate a rally effect

Rally Effect

the phenomenon in which leader approval goes up during war

Democratic Peace

Is an empirical pattern that mature Democratic states rarely engage in war w/another

-Democracies are less likely to fight each other

-Democracies are no less likely to fight than other states

Gambling for Resurrection

-a phenomenon that is a result of the information asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship

Face-to-Face Diplomacy

IR scholars skeptic of this as talk is cheap and nothing said privately in a room constrains future behavior

-state interests come from security or power or ideology, not rapport btw leaders

Signals vs. Indices

Signals: explicitly chosen, strategic, and easy to fake

-speeches, press statements

Indices: leak out accidentally and outside of speaker’s control

-Expressions, tones, hesitation, gestures, eye movements, body language

Security Dilemma Sensibility

The ability to see how one’s own actions might be seen as threatening

-the idea that pursuing one’s own security can be perceived by others as a threat, making one less secure

Alliance

a continuing, legalized security commitment between states

Coalition

usually temporary and organized around a particular crisis or conflict

Alignment

shared interests between parties in at least one area

Collective Security

everyone promises to oppose aggression by anyone

Alliance Credibility

-alliances only deter if adversaries believe alliance commitments will actually be honored

-state makes alliance commitments believable: formal treaty commitments, troop deployments/tripwires, military integration and joint planning, reputation for honoring commitments

Tripwire

Abandonment

risk of alliances, you can count on your ally but they bail on you

Entrapment

risk of alliances: your ally drags you into a conflict you wouldn’t have chosen

Emboldenment

risk alliances: your ally becomes more aggressive knowing you have their ack

Balancing

Bandwagoning

Balance of Power

Balance of Threat

Burden Sharing

The puzzle of nuclear proliferation

Security Model of Proliferation

Nuclear weapons (powerful deterrent) can help protect states from external security threats in the anarchic state of the world

Nuclear Domino Theory

nuclear proliferation drives more nuclear proliferation for countervailing capability

Domestic Politics Model of Proliferation

Norms model of proliferation

Demand-side drivers of proliferation

Institutional Drivers of Proliferation

Nuclear Umbrella

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Nuclear Latency

Nuclear Hedging

Nuclear Breakout

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

-war between nuclear states would be so costly that we won’t do it

First-strike advantage

Secure Second Strike

Limited War

Stability-Instability Paradox

Brinksmanship

a competition in risk-taking and the winner is the party with the most resolve (not necessarily the most power)

Terrorism

-a political act and actors have incentives to categorize their adversaries as “terrorists”

Terrorism and Rationality

rationality (purposive behavior) - goes with terrorism as we see selected targets, a strong link between grievances and terrorism

Who are Terrorists?

-predominantly male, generally young adults, drawn from the middle or upper parts of the socioeconomic distribution available to the organization, tend to be employed, better educated, wide variety of motives

Strategies of Terrorism

Coercion, Provocation, Spoiling, Outbidding, Intimidation / Control

Civil War Risk Factors

-lack of a strong state

-individual grievances

-collective action problems

Bargaining and Civil War

Panda Diplomacy

AI Alignment

Pacing the Frontier