PHIL 25501 Exam 2

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Purdue Fall 2026, Prof. Sarah Robins

20 Terms

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Folk Psychology

Aka: commonsense psychology

Everyday practice of explaining or predicting people’s behavior by appealing to their mental states and characteristics (rather than what’s physically happening in brain like in cognitive science)

Ex: beliefs, values, desires, reasoning, priorities


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Scientific Realism

Philosophical position that science is describing what is actually going on in the world, not just providing useful predictions

Explainable by science = actually exists

Challenges to Scientific Realism

  1. Scientific theories change over time - things that used to be widely believed have been rejected now; how do we know our current theories are correct?

  2. Limits of observation - things like electrons can’t be directly observed, so how do we know they actually exist?


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Theoretical Terms

Terms used in scientific theories to refer to entities, forces, or processes that the theories propose exist in order to explain observable phenomena.

Usually unobservable, but proposed to exist to explain what is observable

Ex: Gravity itself is unobservable, but it’s used to explain its effects

Scientific realists would say that these entities actually exist

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Propositional Attitudes

Psychological relations that someone has toward a proposition.

  1. Propositions - something that can be evaluated as true or false

  2. Attitudes - psychological relationship someone has toward a proposition

These are central to the mental states used to explain/predict behavior in folk psychology

Ex:

I believe the exam will be hard

I hope the exam will be hard

I fear the exam will be hard


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False Believe Task

Psychological test that examines whether someone recognizes another person’s beliefs may be false and still guide their behavior.

Sally-Anne Experiment

  1. Sally places marble inside basket

  2. Sally leaves room

  3. While Sally is gone, Anne moves marble from basket to box

  4. Sally returns to room and wants her marble

Question: Where does Sally look for her marble?

Answer: Someone who understands false beliefs can predict Sally’s behavior from her POV even though her beliefs are wrong


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Eliminative Materialism

Thinker: Paul Churchland

Folk psychology is deeply flawed theory that should eventually be entirely replaced with neuroscience, eliminating its categories of mental states (i.e. beliefs and desires)


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Argument for Eliminative Materialism

Thinker: Paul Churchland

  1. Folk psych is just an empirical theory

  2. Folk psych fails to explain important psych phenomena (i.e. sleep, mental illness, memory)

  3. Mature neuroscience will be able to explain mental phenomena better

  4. Neuroscience won’t preserve folk psych categories (i.e. beliefs, desires), it’ll have entirely different categories

  5. Therefore, folk psych should be eliminated completely


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Inconceivability/Incoherence Objection

Thinker: Baker

Eliminative materialism doesn’t work since it seems to rely on the very mental states it claims don’t exist.

  • How can someone believe that beliefs don’t exist?

Churchland’s counter:
There’s a distinction between using language of folk psychology and the actual underlying processes behind it.

Ex: “I believe eliminativsm is true” - the underlying process is neurological, while we describe it using folk-psych language

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Jerry Fodor

Defended realism about propositional attitudes and folk psychology, directly opposing Churchland.

  • Propositional attitudes are genuine internal mental states that cause behavior

  • Folk psych is very good at predicting people’s behavior base on their beliefs and desires

  • Explains behavior through complex relationships among mental states, not just simple observations

  • Describing behavior without these concepts is extremely difficult and incomplete


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Language of Thought

Thinker: Fodor

Internal system of mental representations in which thinking occurs. Thoughts have a language-like structure with symbols arranging according to syntactic rules.

  • Mind contains internal representation of thought, aka Mentalese

  • Exists within cognitive system internally

  • Mentalese is structured

  • Distinct form natural language

  • This system is also innate

Support:

  • A priori considerations - philosophical reasoning about how thought and language work

  • Empirical considerations - successful theories already rely on internal representations, which supports folk psych

Objections:

  • Folk psych’s generalizations aren’t always true (i.e. people don’t always avoid things they fear)

  • Does mental representation require an innate language?


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Ceteris Paribus Clauses

Latin for “all other things being equal”. Qualification added to a generalization to acknowledge that it generally holds only when other relevant factors don’t intervene.

  • Used by Fodor to explain the exceptions to the generalizations of folk psych

False or Empty Problem

  • Without ceteris paribus qualifications, folk psych’s generalizations may be false

  • With unrestricted qualifications, generalizations risk becoming trivial


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Representational Theory of Mind (RTM)

Thinker: Fodor

Propositional attitudes are realm causally effective mental states that involve functional relationships to internal sentence-like representations

Core commitments:

  1. Representations have syntactic structure and semantic context (Mentalese)

  2. A proposition has a single representation, attitudes involve separate functional relationships toward the same content

  3. Mental states don’t just describe behavior, they cause behavior

  4. Minds perform computations over structured mental representations


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Instrumentalism

Thinker: Dennett

Position that a theory or explanatory framework is valuable because it can predict phenomena, without needing to literally describe their underlying mechanisms

On folk psych: It’s very good at predicting behavior even though it doesn’t accurately describe the mind’s internal computation structure

  • He’s not saying there’s no physical mechanism behind behavior, just that it doesn’t need to mirror the folk psych explanation

Ex: Center of gravity isn’t necessarily a separate physical thing or component, but still scientifically legitimate and useful

Objections:

  1. Are beliefs just subjective to the observer’s imagination? For example, does my computer genuinely “want” to install an update?

    1. Dennett’s response: If we attributing desire to something allows us to effectively identify patterns in behavior, that’s what matters. He questions if there’s even a distinction between this abstracted desire and some separate internal desire.

    2. The possible interpretations are constrained by how good they are at predicting the pattern and the objectivity of the pattern.

  2. If beliefs and desires are abstract entities, how can they cause physical things?

    1. Dennett’s response: Abstract things can still cause physical things. Using Clark’s scattered causation, we see that a recession causes employment even though it’s not a single object/event.


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Intentional Systems Theory

Thinker: Dennett

The intentional stance is interpreting a system as a rational agent with beliefs, desires, and intentions to predict its behavior. The patterns recognized through this are objectively real even if the system doesn’t have the internal systems proposed by Fodor

3 Stances via baseball:

  1. Physical - predicting via physical laws

    1. Ex: Predict baseball’s trajectory using gravity and velocity

  2. Design - predicting based on object’s intended function

    1. Ex: Expecting a pitching machine to throw strikes

  3. Intentional - predicting by attributing beliefs and desires

    1. Ex: Pitcher will throw curveballs because he thinks the batter struggles with them

Real patterns of behavior are enough justification for intentional interpretations


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As-If Intentionality

Thinker: Dennett

Interpreting system’s behavior as if it has beliefs, desires, intentions without assuming it literally has them.

Dennett challenges the traditional distinction between genuine intrinsic intentionality (humans) and intentionality attributed to things like computers.

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Gradualism

Thinker: Dennett

Some properties exist along a continuum rather than a sharp all-or-nothing boundary.

Intentionality works similarly:

  • What’s the point where something goes from as-if intentionality to genuine?

  • There’s no sharp principled point where it transitions


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Idealization

Thinker: Dennett

Practice of simplifying a system by ignoring certain details to make it easier to explain or predict.

Ex: Center of gravity is a useful idealization. We don’t need to calculate every particle’s position to know how an object will balance.

Folk psych uses idealizations to predict behavior without needing to understand the underlying physical/neurological processes.

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Externalism

Aspects of the mind depend on factors outside the brain/body. It challenges the notion that everything about the mind is contained within the skull.

Passive externalism

  • Thinkers: Putnam and Kripke

  • Content of thoughts influenced by environment, but the representations remain in our head

Active externalism

  • Thinkers: Clark and Chalmers

  • External objects can literally become parts of our cognitive processes and mental states

  • Components of mental states exist outside our head

  • Ex: A notebook used for remembering things can function as literally part of your memory system, not just a tool. As long as it’s functional role is for memory (i.e. it’s trusted, easily accessible, etc)


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Parity Principle

Thinkers: Clark and Chalmers

If an external process performs a function that we would recognize as cognitive, it should be considered part of our cognition (location shouldn’t restrict cognition)

Conditions for Parity:

  1. External device is almost always available

  2. Info is easily accessible

  3. Regularly accessed in relevant situations

  4. Fully trusts the info, as if it’s memory

Ex: If Alice’s notebook is used the same way as Bob’s biological memory, the notebook should be considered part of Alice’s cognitive system

Extended Mind Theory - mind can extend beyond the brain (supported by Parity Principle)

Objections:

  • External devices are made of a different material → material < actual cognitive function

  • External devices are passive not active → memories can also be inactive until retrieved

  • External devices require deliberate access → some memories require conscious effort to retrieve

  • External devices can be tampered with → biological memory can also be inaccurate or altered


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Occurrent vs. Standing Beliefs

Occurrent beliefs - beliefs you’re consciously thinking about right now

  • Ex: “I have a philosophy exam soon”

Standing beliefs - beliefs you possess but aren’t currently thinking about

  • Ex: You always believe that Dallas is in Texas even if you’re thinking about something totally different right now