1/19
Purdue Fall 2026, Prof. Sarah Robins
Folk Psychology
Aka: commonsense psychology
Everyday practice of explaining or predicting people’s behavior by appealing to their mental states and characteristics (rather than what’s physically happening in brain like in cognitive science)
Ex: beliefs, values, desires, reasoning, priorities
Scientific Realism
Philosophical position that science is describing what is actually going on in the world, not just providing useful predictions
Explainable by science = actually exists
Challenges to Scientific Realism
Scientific theories change over time - things that used to be widely believed have been rejected now; how do we know our current theories are correct?
Limits of observation - things like electrons can’t be directly observed, so how do we know they actually exist?
Theoretical Terms
Terms used in scientific theories to refer to entities, forces, or processes that the theories propose exist in order to explain observable phenomena.
Usually unobservable, but proposed to exist to explain what is observable
Ex: Gravity itself is unobservable, but it’s used to explain its effects
Scientific realists would say that these entities actually exist
Propositional Attitudes
Psychological relations that someone has toward a proposition.
Propositions - something that can be evaluated as true or false
Attitudes - psychological relationship someone has toward a proposition
These are central to the mental states used to explain/predict behavior in folk psychology
Ex:
I believe the exam will be hard
I hope the exam will be hard
I fear the exam will be hard
False Believe Task
Psychological test that examines whether someone recognizes another person’s beliefs may be false and still guide their behavior.
Sally-Anne Experiment
Sally places marble inside basket
Sally leaves room
While Sally is gone, Anne moves marble from basket to box
Sally returns to room and wants her marble
Question: Where does Sally look for her marble?
Answer: Someone who understands false beliefs can predict Sally’s behavior from her POV even though her beliefs are wrong
Eliminative Materialism
Thinker: Paul Churchland
Folk psychology is deeply flawed theory that should eventually be entirely replaced with neuroscience, eliminating its categories of mental states (i.e. beliefs and desires)
Argument for Eliminative Materialism
Thinker: Paul Churchland
Folk psych is just an empirical theory
Folk psych fails to explain important psych phenomena (i.e. sleep, mental illness, memory)
Mature neuroscience will be able to explain mental phenomena better
Neuroscience won’t preserve folk psych categories (i.e. beliefs, desires), it’ll have entirely different categories
Therefore, folk psych should be eliminated completely
Inconceivability/Incoherence Objection
Thinker: Baker
Eliminative materialism doesn’t work since it seems to rely on the very mental states it claims don’t exist.
How can someone believe that beliefs don’t exist?
Churchland’s counter:
There’s a distinction between using language of folk psychology and the actual underlying processes behind it.
Ex: “I believe eliminativsm is true” - the underlying process is neurological, while we describe it using folk-psych language
Jerry Fodor
Defended realism about propositional attitudes and folk psychology, directly opposing Churchland.
Propositional attitudes are genuine internal mental states that cause behavior
Folk psych is very good at predicting people’s behavior base on their beliefs and desires
Explains behavior through complex relationships among mental states, not just simple observations
Describing behavior without these concepts is extremely difficult and incomplete
Language of Thought
Thinker: Fodor
Internal system of mental representations in which thinking occurs. Thoughts have a language-like structure with symbols arranging according to syntactic rules.
Mind contains internal representation of thought, aka Mentalese
Exists within cognitive system internally
Mentalese is structured
Distinct form natural language
This system is also innate
Support:
A priori considerations - philosophical reasoning about how thought and language work
Empirical considerations - successful theories already rely on internal representations, which supports folk psych
Objections:
Folk psych’s generalizations aren’t always true (i.e. people don’t always avoid things they fear)
Does mental representation require an innate language?
Ceteris Paribus Clauses
Latin for “all other things being equal”. Qualification added to a generalization to acknowledge that it generally holds only when other relevant factors don’t intervene.
Used by Fodor to explain the exceptions to the generalizations of folk psych
False or Empty Problem
Without ceteris paribus qualifications, folk psych’s generalizations may be false
With unrestricted qualifications, generalizations risk becoming trivial
Representational Theory of Mind (RTM)
Thinker: Fodor
Propositional attitudes are realm causally effective mental states that involve functional relationships to internal sentence-like representations
Core commitments:
Representations have syntactic structure and semantic context (Mentalese)
A proposition has a single representation, attitudes involve separate functional relationships toward the same content
Mental states don’t just describe behavior, they cause behavior
Minds perform computations over structured mental representations
Instrumentalism
Thinker: Dennett
Position that a theory or explanatory framework is valuable because it can predict phenomena, without needing to literally describe their underlying mechanisms
On folk psych: It’s very good at predicting behavior even though it doesn’t accurately describe the mind’s internal computation structure
He’s not saying there’s no physical mechanism behind behavior, just that it doesn’t need to mirror the folk psych explanation
Ex: Center of gravity isn’t necessarily a separate physical thing or component, but still scientifically legitimate and useful
Objections:
Are beliefs just subjective to the observer’s imagination? For example, does my computer genuinely “want” to install an update?
Dennett’s response: If we attributing desire to something allows us to effectively identify patterns in behavior, that’s what matters. He questions if there’s even a distinction between this abstracted desire and some separate internal desire.
The possible interpretations are constrained by how good they are at predicting the pattern and the objectivity of the pattern.
If beliefs and desires are abstract entities, how can they cause physical things?
Dennett’s response: Abstract things can still cause physical things. Using Clark’s scattered causation, we see that a recession causes employment even though it’s not a single object/event.
Intentional Systems Theory
Thinker: Dennett
The intentional stance is interpreting a system as a rational agent with beliefs, desires, and intentions to predict its behavior. The patterns recognized through this are objectively real even if the system doesn’t have the internal systems proposed by Fodor
3 Stances via baseball:
Physical - predicting via physical laws
Ex: Predict baseball’s trajectory using gravity and velocity
Design - predicting based on object’s intended function
Ex: Expecting a pitching machine to throw strikes
Intentional - predicting by attributing beliefs and desires
Ex: Pitcher will throw curveballs because he thinks the batter struggles with them
Real patterns of behavior are enough justification for intentional interpretations
As-If Intentionality
Thinker: Dennett
Interpreting system’s behavior as if it has beliefs, desires, intentions without assuming it literally has them.
Dennett challenges the traditional distinction between genuine intrinsic intentionality (humans) and intentionality attributed to things like computers.
Gradualism
Thinker: Dennett
Some properties exist along a continuum rather than a sharp all-or-nothing boundary.
Intentionality works similarly:
What’s the point where something goes from as-if intentionality to genuine?
There’s no sharp principled point where it transitions
Idealization
Thinker: Dennett
Practice of simplifying a system by ignoring certain details to make it easier to explain or predict.
Ex: Center of gravity is a useful idealization. We don’t need to calculate every particle’s position to know how an object will balance.
Folk psych uses idealizations to predict behavior without needing to understand the underlying physical/neurological processes.
Externalism
Aspects of the mind depend on factors outside the brain/body. It challenges the notion that everything about the mind is contained within the skull.
Passive externalism
Thinkers: Putnam and Kripke
Content of thoughts influenced by environment, but the representations remain in our head
Active externalism
Thinkers: Clark and Chalmers
External objects can literally become parts of our cognitive processes and mental states
Components of mental states exist outside our head
Ex: A notebook used for remembering things can function as literally part of your memory system, not just a tool. As long as it’s functional role is for memory (i.e. it’s trusted, easily accessible, etc)
Parity Principle
Thinkers: Clark and Chalmers
If an external process performs a function that we would recognize as cognitive, it should be considered part of our cognition (location shouldn’t restrict cognition)
Conditions for Parity:
External device is almost always available
Info is easily accessible
Regularly accessed in relevant situations
Fully trusts the info, as if it’s memory
Ex: If Alice’s notebook is used the same way as Bob’s biological memory, the notebook should be considered part of Alice’s cognitive system
Extended Mind Theory - mind can extend beyond the brain (supported by Parity Principle)
Objections:
External devices are made of a different material → material < actual cognitive function
External devices are passive not active → memories can also be inactive until retrieved
External devices require deliberate access → some memories require conscious effort to retrieve
External devices can be tampered with → biological memory can also be inaccurate or altered
Occurrent vs. Standing Beliefs
Occurrent beliefs - beliefs you’re consciously thinking about right now
Ex: “I have a philosophy exam soon”
Standing beliefs - beliefs you possess but aren’t currently thinking about
Ex: You always believe that Dallas is in Texas even if you’re thinking about something totally different right now