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Rationality
Selfishly maximizing your own anticipated utility
Utility
The satisfaction or wellbeing an agent gets from an outcome
Surplus
The difference between the utility of having the good and the utility of the transaction price; both buyer and seller can gain surplus
Social welfare
The sum of everyone's utility
Free market
A market where transactions are voluntary
The core problem with rational agents in free markets
A rational agent participating in a free market may fail to maximize social welfare
Pareto efficiency
An outcome where no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off; there is no deadweight loss
5 situations where trade outcomes will NOT be Pareto efficient
Imperfect competition, information problems, externalities, public goods, and other situations (e.g. coordination problems)
Redistribution of a Pareto efficient outcome
Even if an outcome is Pareto efficient, we might still want to redistribute the surplus
Course assumption about the role of government
The role of government is to maximise social welfare
Why redistribution can raise social welfare
The marginal utility of wealth decreases as wealth increases (a dollar means more to a poor person than a rich one)
Why trade in free markets generally increases social welfare
Both buyer and seller must be better off or they would not agree to the transaction (absent market failures)
Market failure
When markets fail to reach an efficient outcome; institutions are needed to fix it
Institutions
Rules and organizations we create to govern how transactions take place and to redistribute wealth
Tradeoff in creating institutions
Creating institutions and implementing policies is costly, so gains from fixing market failures must be weighed against these costs
Policy
A set of rules created and enforced by a governing body
Normative analysis
What policy makers SHOULD do (the focus of this course)
Positive analysis
What policy makers actually DO
Incentives
Linking an agent's utility to some action or outcome
Opportunity cost (course definition)
The utility an agent would get from doing the best alternative with their time or effort
The amount of Y given up to get X, where Y is the best alternative to X
Willingness to pay (WTP)
The total utility an agent gets from a good, expressed in dollars
Transfer seeking
Any activity that tries to increase one's share of wealth without creating new wealth
Moral hazard (core concept)
Behaviour changes because the agent does not bear the full cost of their actions
Implicit vs. explicit costs (Jericho Garrison)
Owning an asset doesn't make using it free; the implicit cost is what it could earn in its best other use
Jericho Beach Park lesson
Opportunity cost logic doesn't mean selling all land; the park provides more social welfare than a sale would, and the right mix is set at the margin (Marginalist Principle)
Sunk cost
A cost already incurred that cannot be recovered; opportunity costs EXCLUDE sunk costs
Marginal benefit (MB) / marginal cost (MC)
The benefit or cost of one additional unit
Paradox of Value
Why goods that are not essential to life can command a much higher price than goods that are essential to life. (water/diamonds)
Typical shape of marginal benefits and costs
Most activities have diminishing marginal benefits and rising marginal costs
Marginalist principle
Carry out a policy as long as overall benefits exceed costs; spend on it until the benefit of the last dollar equals the cost of raising that dollar (MB = MC)
Dividing a resource with multiple uses
Divide it (e.g. a government budget) so that the marginal benefits are equal across uses
Krugman takeaway 1: MB = MC across the whole budget
A disaster raises the marginal benefit of relief, so all other marginals (spending cuts and tax increases) should adjust, not just spending
Krugman takeaway 2: smoothing temporary shocks
Since government can borrow and should balance its budget in present value terms, a one off disaster should be largely financed by a temporary deficit, following the theory of war finance going back to Ricardo
Krugman takeaway 3: effect on taxes and deficits
Deficits rise in the short run, with future taxes slightly higher and future spending slightly lower; key question: does this create moral hazard or pressure to label everything an "emergency" and never repay the debt?
Incentive
When an agent's utility depends on some action or outcome; people do more of what is rewarded and less of what is penalized
Examples of incentive effects (tennis juniors)
The demand curve: when something gets more expensive, people buy less of it, and the reverse. Free tennis memberships for juniors drop the price to zero, so more juniors play.
Laffer curve
Raising tax rates does not always raise revenue because of the increasing marginal cost of taxation (people work and earn less)
Peltzman effect
People adjust their behaviour to a regulation in ways that counteract its intended effect (e.g. safer cars lead drivers to take more risks)
Law of Unintended Consequences
Policies often fail to help their intended beneficiaries because of perverse incentives (e.g. policies to help employees push firms to use contractors; making eviction harder reduces rental supply)
Cobra effect
A reward meant to reduce a problem ends up increasing it (e.g. a bounty on dead cobras led people to breed cobras)
Crowding out (motivation)
Financial incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation (doing something because it is right or enjoyable); e.g. paying for blood can reduce voluntary donations
Invisible hand (Adam Smith)
Individuals pursuing their own gain are led, unintentionally, to promote the public interest
Smith's conclusions about markets
Markets are very effective at providing sophisticated goods; little role for government in competitive business ("Why can't the private sector do it?"); but government should reduce monopoly power and provide public goods
First welfare theorem
Under perfect competition, markets achieve Pareto efficiency
3 requirements of perfect competition
Prices are set by the market (no one can set prices)
entry and exit drive profits to zero
buyers and sellers have all relevant information
Efficiency (general)
The absence of waste; getting the most out of what you put in
Management / production efficiency
A given output is produced with the lowest input use (lowest cost)
Allocational / Pareto efficiency
The appropriate amount of each good is produced
Why economists focus more on Pareto efficiency
They assume competition forces firms to minimize costs and drives inefficient firms out of business
X inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966)
When management efficiency is NOT achieved; e.g. an Egyptian oil refinery with half the productivity of a nearby one improved dramatically under new management with the same workforce
Why X inefficiency can persist
Weak competition (monopoly, regulation, subsidies), poor management incentives, or information problems between owners and managers
Pareto improvement
At least one person is better off and no one is worse off
Potential Pareto improvement
Net gainers could fully compensate net losers and still be better off (total gains exceed total losses); e.g. removing rent control, reducing the cheese tariff
Competitive equilibrium and efficiency
At the equilibrium where supply meets demand, total surplus is maximized, so the outcome is Pareto efficient
Deadweight loss (DWL)
The measure of deviation from Pareto efficiency; "money left on the table" because mutually beneficial trades did not happen; usually a triangle on a supply and demand diagram
Cases to practice drawing DWL
Price ceilings (rent control), price floors (minimum wage), quotas, and sales taxes
Second welfare theorem
Social welfare can be maximised through redistribution of endowments
Benevolent social planner
How most policy economists see themselves; they try to maximize social welfare
Pareto improvement vs. social welfare increase
A Pareto improvement must increase social welfare, but an increase in social welfare is not necessarily a Pareto improvement
Choosing among Pareto improvements
Choose the one that maximizes social welfare
Game
Players, actions and payoffs
Strategy
A complete contingent plan; for every possible action of the other player, you know what you would do
Outcome (game theory)
Specified by the strategies of the players
Nash equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium is a stable state in a game where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy, as long as every other player keeps their strategy unchanged
Strategic form game
A payoff table where moves are simultaneous; in each cell (x, y), Player 1 (row) gets x and Player 2 (column) gets y
Prisoner's dilemma
The welfare maximizing outcome is (Cooperate, Cooperate), but following selfish incentives both players Defect; e.g. arms races, doping in sports, price wars, overfishing
Solutions to the prisoner's dilemma
Repeated games (Tit for tat or Grim strategies), institutions that enforce rules, outside intervention that restructures payoffs, signalling, and trust or social conventions
Tit for tat strategy
In a repeated game, punish defection in the next round
Grim strategy
In a repeated game, punish defection forever
Rule enforcing institution example (prisoner's dilemma)
Banning athletes who take drugs
Outside intervention example (prisoner's dilemma)
A mob boss who kills anyone who talks
Signalling example (prisoner's dilemma)
The "Split or Steal" game show (Golden Balls)
4 ways markets can fail
Imperfect competition, public goods, externalities, imperfect information
Imperfect competition
Market structures where perfect competition assumptions break down (buyers or sellers control prices, or entry/exit is blocked)
Market power
The ability of a seller or buyer to influence price
General defect of imperfect competition
Firms produce too little and prices are too high
Monopoly
A single seller
Cartel
Multiple sellers who collude on price (e.g. OPEC)
Oligopoly
A few sellers large enough to affect price (e.g. Airbus and Boeing)
Monopolistic competition
Many sellers of differentiated products with low entry/exit costs; each has a "mini monopoly" on its brand (e.g. golf balls, Vancouver dim sum restaurants)
Monopsony
A single buyer; leads to prices (e.g. wages) BELOW the competitive level
Natural monopoly
Average cost falls over the whole range of demand, so one firm can supply the market more cheaply than two
Policy responses to natural monopoly
Public corporation (BC Hydro) or regulation (Fortis)
Monopsony examples
A rural town with one mill or mine; single payer health systems (nurses paid by the health authority); the Air Force buying military aircraft
Walmart, Amazon and Starbucks (monopsony)
Not true monopsonists, but they have strong bargaining power
Policy responses to monopsony
Minimum wage, unions, "fair trade"
Monopsony clicker: incorrect match
UBC as a monopsony labour market (C), because Vancouver has many other employers
Nonrival
One person's benefit does not reduce the benefit available to others
Nonexcludable
It is prohibitively costly to prevent people from using it
Public good
Both nonrival and nonexcludable; some goods are nonrival only up to a congestion point
Caution about public goods
Something is not a public good just because it is free or provided by government
Private good
Rival and excludable
Commons good
Rival and nonexcludable
Club good
Nonrival and excludable
Policy response by good type
Private and club goods are mostly left to the market; public goods are often provided by government because the market underprovides them due to free riding
(Real) externality
A byproduct of an activity that creates an unpriced cost or benefit for third parties
Third party
Anyone (individual or organisation) who is not the buyer or seller
Pecuniary externality
An effect on others that works through prices (e.g. demand raising prices for others); not a market failure
Negative externalities
Overprovided by the market (e.g. pollution, congestion, loud music)
Positive externalities
Underprovided by the market (e.g. vaccination, education, nice gardens)