COMM 394 - Midterm

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129 Terms

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Rationality

Selfishly maximizing your own anticipated utility

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Utility

The satisfaction or wellbeing an agent gets from an outcome

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Surplus

The difference between the utility of having the good and the utility of the transaction price; both buyer and seller can gain surplus

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Social welfare

The sum of everyone's utility

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Free market

A market where transactions are voluntary

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The core problem with rational agents in free markets

A rational agent participating in a free market may fail to maximize social welfare

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Pareto efficiency

An outcome where no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off; there is no deadweight loss

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5 situations where trade outcomes will NOT be Pareto efficient

Imperfect competition, information problems, externalities, public goods, and other situations (e.g. coordination problems)

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Redistribution of a Pareto efficient outcome

Even if an outcome is Pareto efficient, we might still want to redistribute the surplus

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Course assumption about the role of government

The role of government is to maximise social welfare

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Why redistribution can raise social welfare

The marginal utility of wealth decreases as wealth increases (a dollar means more to a poor person than a rich one)

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Why trade in free markets generally increases social welfare

Both buyer and seller must be better off or they would not agree to the transaction (absent market failures)

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Market failure

When markets fail to reach an efficient outcome; institutions are needed to fix it

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Institutions

Rules and organizations we create to govern how transactions take place and to redistribute wealth

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Tradeoff in creating institutions

Creating institutions and implementing policies is costly, so gains from fixing market failures must be weighed against these costs

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Policy

A set of rules created and enforced by a governing body

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Normative analysis

What policy makers SHOULD do (the focus of this course)

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Positive analysis

What policy makers actually DO

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Incentives

Linking an agent's utility to some action or outcome

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Opportunity cost (course definition)

  • The utility an agent would get from doing the best alternative with their time or effort

  • The amount of Y given up to get X, where Y is the best alternative to X


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Willingness to pay (WTP)

The total utility an agent gets from a good, expressed in dollars

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Transfer seeking

Any activity that tries to increase one's share of wealth without creating new wealth

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Moral hazard (core concept)

Behaviour changes because the agent does not bear the full cost of their actions

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Implicit vs. explicit costs (Jericho Garrison)

Owning an asset doesn't make using it free; the implicit cost is what it could earn in its best other use

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Jericho Beach Park lesson

Opportunity cost logic doesn't mean selling all land; the park provides more social welfare than a sale would, and the right mix is set at the margin (Marginalist Principle)

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Sunk cost

A cost already incurred that cannot be recovered; opportunity costs EXCLUDE sunk costs

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Marginal benefit (MB) / marginal cost (MC)

The benefit or cost of one additional unit

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Paradox of Value

Why goods that are not essential to life can command a much higher price than goods that are essential to life. (water/diamonds)

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Typical shape of marginal benefits and costs

Most activities have diminishing marginal benefits and rising marginal costs

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Marginalist principle

Carry out a policy as long as overall benefits exceed costs; spend on it until the benefit of the last dollar equals the cost of raising that dollar (MB = MC)

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Dividing a resource with multiple uses

Divide it (e.g. a government budget) so that the marginal benefits are equal across uses

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Krugman takeaway 1: MB = MC across the whole budget

A disaster raises the marginal benefit of relief, so all other marginals (spending cuts and tax increases) should adjust, not just spending

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Krugman takeaway 2: smoothing temporary shocks

Since government can borrow and should balance its budget in present value terms, a one off disaster should be largely financed by a temporary deficit, following the theory of war finance going back to Ricardo

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Krugman takeaway 3: effect on taxes and deficits

Deficits rise in the short run, with future taxes slightly higher and future spending slightly lower; key question: does this create moral hazard or pressure to label everything an "emergency" and never repay the debt?

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Incentive

When an agent's utility depends on some action or outcome; people do more of what is rewarded and less of what is penalized

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Examples of incentive effects (tennis juniors)

The demand curve: when something gets more expensive, people buy less of it, and the reverse. Free tennis memberships for juniors drop the price to zero, so more juniors play.

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Laffer curve

Raising tax rates does not always raise revenue because of the increasing marginal cost of taxation (people work and earn less)

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Peltzman effect

People adjust their behaviour to a regulation in ways that counteract its intended effect (e.g. safer cars lead drivers to take more risks)

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Law of Unintended Consequences

Policies often fail to help their intended beneficiaries because of perverse incentives (e.g. policies to help employees push firms to use contractors; making eviction harder reduces rental supply)

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Cobra effect

A reward meant to reduce a problem ends up increasing it (e.g. a bounty on dead cobras led people to breed cobras)

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Crowding out (motivation)

Financial incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation (doing something because it is right or enjoyable); e.g. paying for blood can reduce voluntary donations

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Invisible hand (Adam Smith)

Individuals pursuing their own gain are led, unintentionally, to promote the public interest

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Smith's conclusions about markets

Markets are very effective at providing sophisticated goods; little role for government in competitive business ("Why can't the private sector do it?"); but government should reduce monopoly power and provide public goods

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First welfare theorem

Under perfect competition, markets achieve Pareto efficiency

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3 requirements of perfect competition

  • Prices are set by the market (no one can set prices)

  • entry and exit drive profits to zero

  • buyers and sellers have all relevant information


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Efficiency (general)

The absence of waste; getting the most out of what you put in

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Management / production efficiency

A given output is produced with the lowest input use (lowest cost)

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Allocational / Pareto efficiency

The appropriate amount of each good is produced

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Why economists focus more on Pareto efficiency

They assume competition forces firms to minimize costs and drives inefficient firms out of business

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X inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966)

When management efficiency is NOT achieved; e.g. an Egyptian oil refinery with half the productivity of a nearby one improved dramatically under new management with the same workforce

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Why X inefficiency can persist

Weak competition (monopoly, regulation, subsidies), poor management incentives, or information problems between owners and managers

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Pareto improvement

At least one person is better off and no one is worse off

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Potential Pareto improvement

Net gainers could fully compensate net losers and still be better off (total gains exceed total losses); e.g. removing rent control, reducing the cheese tariff

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Competitive equilibrium and efficiency

At the equilibrium where supply meets demand, total surplus is maximized, so the outcome is Pareto efficient

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Deadweight loss (DWL)

The measure of deviation from Pareto efficiency; "money left on the table" because mutually beneficial trades did not happen; usually a triangle on a supply and demand diagram

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Cases to practice drawing DWL

Price ceilings (rent control), price floors (minimum wage), quotas, and sales taxes

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Second welfare theorem

Social welfare can be maximised through redistribution of endowments

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Benevolent social planner

How most policy economists see themselves; they try to maximize social welfare

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Pareto improvement vs. social welfare increase

A Pareto improvement must increase social welfare, but an increase in social welfare is not necessarily a Pareto improvement

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Choosing among Pareto improvements

Choose the one that maximizes social welfare

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Game

Players, actions and payoffs

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Strategy

A complete contingent plan; for every possible action of the other player, you know what you would do

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Outcome (game theory)

Specified by the strategies of the players

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Nash equilibrium

A Nash Equilibrium is a stable state in a game where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy, as long as every other player keeps their strategy unchanged

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Strategic form game

A payoff table where moves are simultaneous; in each cell (x, y), Player 1 (row) gets x and Player 2 (column) gets y

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Prisoner's dilemma

The welfare maximizing outcome is (Cooperate, Cooperate), but following selfish incentives both players Defect; e.g. arms races, doping in sports, price wars, overfishing

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Solutions to the prisoner's dilemma

Repeated games (Tit for tat or Grim strategies), institutions that enforce rules, outside intervention that restructures payoffs, signalling, and trust or social conventions

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Tit for tat strategy

In a repeated game, punish defection in the next round

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Grim strategy

In a repeated game, punish defection forever

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Rule enforcing institution example (prisoner's dilemma)

Banning athletes who take drugs

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Outside intervention example (prisoner's dilemma)

A mob boss who kills anyone who talks

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Signalling example (prisoner's dilemma)

The "Split or Steal" game show (Golden Balls)

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4 ways markets can fail

Imperfect competition, public goods, externalities, imperfect information

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Imperfect competition

Market structures where perfect competition assumptions break down (buyers or sellers control prices, or entry/exit is blocked)

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Market power

The ability of a seller or buyer to influence price

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General defect of imperfect competition

Firms produce too little and prices are too high

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Monopoly

A single seller

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Cartel

Multiple sellers who collude on price (e.g. OPEC)

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Oligopoly

A few sellers large enough to affect price (e.g. Airbus and Boeing)

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Monopolistic competition

Many sellers of differentiated products with low entry/exit costs; each has a "mini monopoly" on its brand (e.g. golf balls, Vancouver dim sum restaurants)

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Monopsony

A single buyer; leads to prices (e.g. wages) BELOW the competitive level

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Natural monopoly

Average cost falls over the whole range of demand, so one firm can supply the market more cheaply than two

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Policy responses to natural monopoly

Public corporation (BC Hydro) or regulation (Fortis)

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Monopsony examples

A rural town with one mill or mine; single payer health systems (nurses paid by the health authority); the Air Force buying military aircraft

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Walmart, Amazon and Starbucks (monopsony)

Not true monopsonists, but they have strong bargaining power

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Policy responses to monopsony

Minimum wage, unions, "fair trade"

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Monopsony clicker: incorrect match

UBC as a monopsony labour market (C), because Vancouver has many other employers

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Nonrival

One person's benefit does not reduce the benefit available to others

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Nonexcludable

It is prohibitively costly to prevent people from using it

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Public good

Both nonrival and nonexcludable; some goods are nonrival only up to a congestion point

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Caution about public goods

Something is not a public good just because it is free or provided by government

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Private good

Rival and excludable

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Commons good

Rival and nonexcludable

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Club good

Nonrival and excludable

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Policy response by good type

Private and club goods are mostly left to the market; public goods are often provided by government because the market underprovides them due to free riding

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(Real) externality

A byproduct of an activity that creates an unpriced cost or benefit for third parties

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Third party

Anyone (individual or organisation) who is not the buyer or seller

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Pecuniary externality

An effect on others that works through prices (e.g. demand raising prices for others); not a market failure

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Negative externalities

Overprovided by the market (e.g. pollution, congestion, loud music)

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Positive externalities

Underprovided by the market (e.g. vaccination, education, nice gardens)