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What is the problem with Aristotles life works?
They got lost/ went extant. Everything we know about him is through some preserved work in a cave/ cut and pasting.
Where is Aristotle from
Athens Greece
What does Aristotle discuss?
Aristotle talks about how our human minds are set up to grasp/intuit or seize upon
the forms, or the universal content, of sensible things in the natural world
What is Aristotle’s perspective on the forms?
The forms are not in a separate world but, in some way, present to and operative on the sensible things we perceive in the world; hence, the forms are incipiently or potentially intelligible content for the human mind
WHAT are the forms?
Instead, the forms, being immaterial, are nowhere (being immaterial, they are entirely non-spatial)—the forms, rather, simply are; they are immaterial, universal principles of being
What is Aristotles perspective on the human mind?
For the human mind, the universal forms are present to it in the natural world
(the world we experience) as a kind of inchoate, incipiently intelligible content which can be brought out through empirical, scientific investigation, induction, and ultimately grasped through intellectual intuition (nous)
What is the purpose of the form as act/actuality (energeia)
The forms are acts of being present to the world and have an
operative role in actualizing the being and becoming of sensible things:
-The forms inform the whatness or definition of the thing, i.e., provide the sensible with its act of being (being a human, being a cat, being a tree)
-The forms also direct (as ends= teloi) the sensible thing's coming-to-be, growth, and
development as the good, end and purpose of the thing (as if to draw the sensible thing to itself; the child growing into an adult, a seed into a tree)
What is the purpose of the form as potential/potency
Sensible things by virtue of their materiality, have the potential/potency/power (dunamis) to change, grow, and develop… i.e., to become/realize themselves by virtue of their specific formal nature
Form (energeia)
actualizing principle/act of being
Matter (dunamis)
potentially/potency of the thing
The Value of the Natural World:
For Aristotle, the forms, as they are responsible for actualizing the sensible things we
experience, are present to us in the world. This means the natural world itself, despite the fact that it is a changing, physical reality, nonetheless is for us a source of universal, ideal truths (universal forms) which human reason is able to grasp from the changing, material reality of sense particulars. Nature, being the locus of the forms, is super important to Aristotle: it is the source of all meaning and value. Nature tells us what we are and the reasons for our existence and the existence of everything around
What are Aristotles Four Causes?
Form/formal cause, Matter/material cause, Efficient Cause, Final Cause
What do the first two causes explain (Form and Material)
the form and the matter, each explain a different sense in which a thing is
What do the last two causes explain (Efficient and Final)
Explain the coming-to-be (becoming) of things, or their movement or change in being
What is the form/formal cause?
the whatness of something which can be grasped in a definition ("humans are risible beings")
What is the Matter/Material Cause?
What the thing is made of (the wood is the material cause of the table)
What is the Efficient Cause?
What physically causes the thing to come into being or to move or change
(Parents are the efficient causes of the child; the snowplow moving the snow, or my hand waving a flag, are also examples of efficient causes)
What is the Final cause?
The reason/purpose/end/good either of some action (eg., having a child for the
purpose of starting a family, moving the snow plow with the intention of clearing the driveway) or simply re. what the thing is, i.e., the thing's purpose, end, ultimate good, what the thing is for, its telos. (the lungs are for breathing, the heart is for beating; the human being is for thinking rationally). Actions are done; things exist always for some good/end (telos)
What is the general definition of Act:
The actualizing principle which causes something to be actualized
What is the general definition of potency?:
The principle which has the capacity(power/potency) to receive an act of being actualized
What is the Ontological definition of Act?:
Form (the whatness of a thing), without being a “kind”(human, tree, cat), a thing can not “be”. The form (universal) is specifically the cause of being in particular sensible things. The Form makes beings be.
What is the Ontological definition of Potency?:
Matter (the intuitive potential to receive acts of being- human, tree, cat), Matter is the sheer potentiality or capacity to be. The matter is the capacity to be.
What is the Epistemological definition of Act?:
The agent/active intellect. The agent intellect also makes something be, but not be a thing( like its ontological correlate, the Form). Rather, it makes the mind “be” by making it think. (The light which enables the mind to “see”- intellectually grasp- universal meaning/forms in the natural world) The Agent intellect makes the mind think.
What is the Epistemological definition of potency?:
The potential intellect. Like its ontological correlate, it, too, is a pure/infinite capacity to receive. But what is received is not just an act of being (like becoming a cat, human, etc.), but information about the acts of being in the natural world (human, cat, etc.). The potential Intellect is the capacity to become informed (in its own mode of being) by the universal content/forms in the natural order. The potential intellect is the capacity to think.
What does Act/Potency in ontology explain?
How sensible things come to be
What does Act/Potency in the Epistemology explain?:
Explains how the mind comes to think (universal content)
What are the two characteristics that distinguish the soul?:
Movement in space and thinking/judging/perceiving
What is the difference between perception and thinking?
Perception of objects is always true and common to all animals, but thinking, which involves reasoning, involves “being right” or “being wrong”; i.e., it is possible to think falsely.
***I can't perceive falsely...I just see what I see; but when, for example, I make a judgment, I'm combining things, humans are risible, your shirt is blue—I could be mistaken in combining “humans” with “risible”; I can question whether that combination is true.
What is imagination?
Different from both perceiving and thinking, it implies perception and is implied by judgment. I can call up images at will, but not opinions; rather, my opinions have to be true or false.
Potential Intellect
Is one part of the thinking soul. Nous pathetikos= the passsive intellect
It must be acted upon by what is thinkable
Must be receptive of the form as an object
It is the “place of forms”, not actually, but potentially (The soul is potentially all the forms of things)
Active/Agent intellect
The other part of the thinking soul. Nous poetikos= literally, the making mind, from poiesis, to make
As the art is to the material, the agent intellect is to the potential intellect- while the potential intellect is potentially all the forms of things, something else must as a cause or agent, make the intellect actually be them- “ I must make myself think”
The agent intellect makes the mind think by making things. Similar to how light makes potential color into actual color
Prior in general to the potential intellect (my potentially knowing something is only prior in time to my actually knowing it)
Is imortal and everlasting
Aristotle calls the mind a “form which employs forms”
Nicomachean Ethics
The life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man
The main goal of human life is eudaimonia- happiness or human flourishing
The contemplative life (dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom and the exercise of intellect) is presented as the highest form of human happiness
Ambrose of Milan
In the Eudemus, the dialogue he wrote on the soul, he says that the soul is a
form, and he praises those who say that the soul receives forms, but not the
whole soul, rather only the intellective soul, as it can know [γνωριστικήν]
the true forms in a secondary manner; but the true forms correlate only with
the intellect, which is superior to the soul
Tertullian, de. Anima
He (Aristotle) himself puts off providing a definition of intellect and meanwhile, he puts forth as one of the two classes of intellect that divine one which he considers to be impassible and which he removes from all association with the soul (anima)
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata
Far from being excluded from the divine activity of intellection is the human being who, as is in Genesis, participated in the inbreathing, having been entitled to a purer essence than the other animals. From this, the view of the Pythagoreans is that the intellect comes into the human being by divine providence—a view with which both Plato and Aristotle are in agreement
Iamblichus, Protrepticus
Now that which is by nature more capable of being the ruler and principle is better, just as man is relative to other animals; thus, soul is better than body (being more of a principle), and better than soul is that which has reason (λόγον) and thought (διάνοια), for such is what commands and forbids and says what we should and should not do. That which is the excellence then of this part is of necessity the most desirable for all things and for us in particular; for certainly, I believe that one would maintain that this part is either only or especially what we are
Tertullian, de Anima
First of all, we must find out whether there is in the soul some highest principle of vitality and intelligence which they call the ἡγεμονικόν, that is, the (ruling) principal, for if its existence is denied, the entire state of the soul is put into jeopardy. Indeed, those who deny the principal (part in the soul) have considered the soul itself to be nothing. Some, such as Dichaearchus of Messena, and among the medical writers, such as Andreas and Asclepiades, have so destroyed the principal (part in the soul), while they want the senses to be in the intellect, which they claim to be the principal. […] But there are many philosophers who are opposed to Dicaearchus, such as Plato, Strato, Epicurus, Democritus, Empedocles, Socrates, and Aristotle; and the physicians opposed to Andreas and Asclepiades are Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diocles, Hippocrates, and Soranus himself, and now even more Christians
Christan Philosophy?
Christianity and philosophy were one in the same until they got separated into two different practices
Christians transformed/incorporated the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle:
1. into the defense of their faith
2. into their own salvation history—eg. Clement of Alexandria (150-215) who presented philosophy as a providential preparation for Christian wisdom, or Justin (100-165) presents Christianity as the fulfillment of the philosophical search for the divine Logos, or Origen (185-253) develops theology/philosophy as a rational, ecclesial, ascetic and contemplative reading of Scripture
3. into their reading of the Bible/use of philosophical argument and intellectualism—eg. Origen's literal(historical/physical) as well as nonliteral reading of scripture which brings out the moral (soul training) and allegorical/mystical dimensions of scriptural exegesis. Why does Scripture speak in this way? Scriptural exegesis resembling Socratic questioning. Unity of scholarly labor with spiritual life
The Fathers didn’t form a single school but generally
1. reacted against the dogmatism of the Hellenistic schools (Stoicism, Epicureanism,
Skepticism, Cynicism)
2. attempted to return to a Socratic method of doing philosophy
3. understood truth, of course, as an historical reality…hence, had the view that truth is not gained simply through a successful argument, that it requires more than cleverness… also needs faith, moral purification, prayer, obedience and a willingness to suffer for what one knows—Socrates a model for this (“Saint Socrates”) (Tertullian- (155-220) “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem”—not a statement of fideism (see below), just arguing against the academic clever arguments of the Hellenistic schools which were attacking the positions of the Christians)
Fideism
Relying only on faith in matters of belief: sometimes regarding reason as contrary to faith
Sui Generis
One of a kind
Gnosis
Knowledge, cult like
Sine qua non
Necessary condition