1/13
Exam 3
WeWork
We work, a private “tech” company (debatable if it’s actually tech), sought to go public.
The corporation creates and leases office spaces for individuals who belong to many different companies. It tries to build a fun, productive community among independent workers.
The public documents required by the SEC listed numerous troubling things:
The corporation is riddled in debt
WeWork’s Founder and CEO, Adam Neumann, had engaging in a host of conflict transactions
he personally owns real estate that he leases to WeWork, placing himself on both sides of the deals
He rebranded the corporation “WeCompany” for the IPO. He ”personally” developed the name and then sold it to his own corporation for $5.9 million.
He personally borrowed money from WeWork at little to no interest
Excess spending
Neumann was a minority owner, but his class of stock provided him 20 votes per 1 vote of common stock. This allowed him to control the corporation as a minority shareholder.
Neumann controlled enough votes to replace the Board
Investors went broke. The corporation fired Adam Neumann, giving him over $1.7 billion in severance
The corporation, to clean up Neumann’s mess, sold numerous assets and laid off employees.
The IPO was permanently postponed
Discussion of WeWork
Why did WeWork see to go public if it would threaten to expose their secrets?
It’s said that WeWork needed the money. They had few other choices.
Lying in the SEC documents would have expose everyone to massive criminal and civil liability
Notice the exposure brought by the IPO process
Notice also the potential problems of a controlling shareholder/founder running a corporation. That said, people invested in WeWork because of Neumann, not despite of him
Perhaps due to his control over the corporation, the Board failed to reign him in or reject his self-dealing, conflicted transactions.
Theranos
The company Theranos claimed that blood be tested with one drop with their “Edison Machine” but it was all a sham. The machine could be found in Walgreens
Many of Theranos’ claims were outright lies
Day-to-day operations were run by Elizabeth Holmes’ boyfriend who was the President of the corporation. He had no experience in this field, and fired dissenters.
The corp refused to disclose key information, citing “trade secrets”
Elizabeth Holmes and the President went to prison
“One of the most epic failures in corporate governance in the annals of American capitalism. [The Board] did nothing to verify that [Holmes’] claims were true.”
Millions of medical tests were invalidated. The stock went to near $0
Who’s to blame? What should have happened?
Are Caremark duties too deferential?
Is this just common greed that occurs sometimes?
Is this truly a corporate law problem?
What does this example say about the founder/CEO?
Martha Stewert
ImClone was a pharma company, which had a promising drug that would ultimately fail its trials. Martha Stewart’s broker tipped her off that she should sell her stock as did the CEO of ImClone
The SEC charged Martha Stewart with violations of 10(b)5 but ultimately settled, convicting her only of lying and obstructing justice
The misrepresentation involved making misleading statements to slow the sell off of her own stock in MSLO to keep the price inflated after selling ImClone
In essence, she lied that her ImClone sale was legal in order to avoid people selling their shares in MSLO, fearing that the figurehead had committed a crime.
Beam v. Martha Stewart Living - Facts, Issue, Court, and Holding
Facts: The Board violated their fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to monitor Martha Stewart and preventing her from breaking federal laws.
Issue:
Caremark violation?
Court:
It’s novel to think that a board should monitor to the CEO’s personal life even if s/he’s tightly related to the corporation: “it seems patently unreasonable to expect the Board, as an exercise of its supervision of the Company, to preemptively thwart a personal call from Stewart to her stockbroker or to fully control her handling of the media attention that followed as a result of her personal actions.”
The board lacked a reason to believe it should monitor Martha Stewart
Holding: No liability
FTX
SBF trumped “effective altruism” where he claimed his wealth could promote good
SBF founded both Alameda Research and FTX (majority shareholder of both). FTX was incorporated in the Bahamas due to its friendly regulatory environment of especially tech and crypto
A leaked document showed that Alameda claimed $14.6 billion, most of which constituted FTX token. Alameda’s CEO, Caroline Ellison (SBF’s girlfriend) sought to dispel rumors
I turned out that FTX had funded risky bets made by Alameda, using FTX’s costumers’ money
FTX had essentially transferred billions to Alameda
FTX and Alameda filed for bankruptcy
Discussion
What does this case say about the Founder corporation if anything?
Was it a red flag when FTX reincorporated in the Bahamas?
What, if anything, could be done?
Or is this the nature of business where some bets hit, some lose?
Does this case provide any suits about the stakeholder v. shareholder debate?
History of Antitrust
The historical concern involved “trusts” or large monopolies which dominated certain industries. For example, the “sugar trust”
Historically, a trust was a collection of competitors who placed controlling shares of their corporations into a ”trust” or corporation whose board of directors could control output and prices.
This used the corporate form to prevent rivals from competing but instead allowed them to form a cartel/monopoly
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to ban “restraints of trade” and ”monopolizations of the market”
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act to ban illegal mergers.
For the first few generations:
Antitrust’s goals were plentiful: the enterprise condemn large trusts for creating social, political, and economic harms. Or even for being too large.
Antitrust employed a “structural” framework wherein it assumed that many competitors was always better than fewer competitors.
The DOJ and FTC can enforce the antitrust laws along with private parties
Antitrust is meant to prevent behaviors that a typical, profit-maximizing corporation would do if it were legal. In fact, many monopolies are LEGAL—and it’s often LEGAL to eliminate your competitors—so corporations must carefully balance maximizing value and defeating rivals without violating antitrust laws.
The Sherman Act
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act
Section 1 bans“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise… in restraint of trade or commerce”
This entails AGREEMENTS—requires two parties—which reduce competition Section 2 makes it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize… any part of the trade or commerce.”
Enforced by 1) Private Litigants, and 2) the government (DOJ and Federal Trade commission)
So when does an agreement constitute an illegal restraint of trade?
Crash Course
Keep in mind the concept of barriers to entry.
Some monopolies are natural
Other monopolies, cartels, and trade restraints persevere because the corporations have made it hard for new competitors to enter.
But typically, markets are supposed to ”self-correct,” meaning that high prices should attract new competitors seeking to underselling the monopolist and corner the market; and this should force prices down naturally.
Antitrust Revolution
Today
Antitrust is meant to protect consumers and markets
Antitrust is an economic doctrine
As a result, the typical antitrust case focuses on prices since consumers are primarily concerned by the prices they pay.
Also salient is quality, innovation, and privacy, perhaps consumer choice
Antitrust protects competition for consumers, NOT individual competitors
Market Power: the power to PROFITABLY raise prices
Note that competition and anticompetitive conduct can threaten the survival of firms.
For an act to be anticompetitive, it must actually be anticompetitive rather than an act of competition
It is thus NOT anticompetitive to dominate a market by offering consumers a superior good at cheap prices.
The assumption is that markets self-correct if harm was actually present. A monopoly might even benefit consumers. For this reason, antitrust is only supposed to intervene when ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT has prevented new competitors from arising and correcting the market
Section 1
Restraints of Trade are illegal if they exert an UNREASONABLE influence on markets
An act is anticompetitive if it prevents rivals from entering the market, or eliminates them, using means NOT on the merits (e.g., product quality)
Not-Anticompetitive: Patents, Speech, Innovation, Refusals to Deal
A restraint of trade requires an agreement among at least two parties
Two Standards of Analysis:
Per Se Illegal: Illegal every time. No justification can save it
Rule of Reason: Illegal after assessing whether the firm can justify the anticompetitive effects with procompetitive justifications
Types of Illegal Agreements:
Price Fixing
Horizontal (always illegal under Per Se)
Vertical (sometimes illegal under the Rule of Reason)
Horizontally Dividing Markets (per se illegal)
Horizontal Group Boycotts (per se illegal)
Tying (Generally, Rule of Reason)
Exclusive Dealing (Rule of Reason)
Horizontal means among direct competitors, Vertical is between suppliers.
Section 2
Ban monopolization and attempts to monopolize the market
Like Section 1, the courts have reduced it to economic injuries resulting from anticompetitive efforts (one may dominant a market on the merits)
The plaintiff must critically identify a market in which the defendant has monopolized. If the defendant does not have an actual monopoly (or serious chance of doing so) in a defined market, then no Section 2 claim is possible.
Why does it not violate antitrust for a monopolist to charge high prices without IDENTIFIABLE anticompetitive conduct?
A temporary monopoly is considered the reward of ingenuity
Without anticompetitive behavior, a monopoly is supposed to be temporary since competition is expected to emerge to challenge the high prices.
The Predatory Price Conundrum
Low prices benefit consumers.
Selling at below cost is not necessarily problematic--legitimate reasons to do so.
It violates the Sherman Act only when the firm is very likely to raise prices once it undersells and eliminates competitors.
SEC v. Rocklage - Facts
Facts: Mr. Rocklage was the CEO of a pharmaceutical company. When one of the company’s drugs failed an approval test, he phoned his wife to tell her, instructing her not to tell anyone or to react “in front of the limo driver.” She then told her husband of her desire to tell her brother in a “wink and nod,” ignoring her husband’s please not do so. The brother immediately sold his stock and alerted a friend before the info tanked the stock price (they each avoided $100,000 in losses).
Securities liability?
Mr. Rocklage?
Mrs. Rocklage?
Brother?
Friend?
SEC v. Rocklage - Court, Ruling, and Holding
Misappropriation theory: Liability under that theory is based on deception of the source of the information, rather than on deception of the shareholders. Here, a fiduciary deceives the trusted source.
Classical Theory: § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when an insider trades in a corporation's securities based on material, nonpublic information that he has acquired. So long as that insider owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the Supreme Court has deemed such trades to be deceptive because they constitute a breach of that fiduciary duty. However, when the trading individual owes no fiduciary duty to the stockholders of the traded-in corporation, and he has not obtained the information from one who has breached such a duty, there can be no insider trading liability under the classical theory.
Notice that Mrs. Rocklage owes no fiduciary duties
Court:
Mrs. Rocklage's acquisition of information: We agree that this acquisition of information was deceptive… before her husband's initial disclosure about the clinical trial, Mrs. Rocklage did absolutely nothing to correct his mistaken understanding that she would keep the trial results confidential. This was so even though Mrs. Rocklage knew that her husband had this (mis)understanding, and even though she had a preexisting arrangement to disclose certain confidential information to her brother
she induced her husband to reveal material negative information to her about Cubist, knowing full well that in obtaining that information she would enable her brother to execute a securities transaction.
Ruling:
Mrs. Rocklage had deceptively received information from her husband for the purpose of trading. Her brother and friend knew that her husband had an obligation to keep the information quiet, and deception was used (“the wink and nod agreement) and thus were also guilty of insider trading via a misappropriation theory.
Holding: Mrs. Rocklage, Brother, and Friend were guilty