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Big picture: what is the professor's central question for the midterm?
How the Court's interpretation of federal power changes over time: the dual-federalist line (two separate sovereign spheres; 10th Amendment as a limit; production is local) vs. the nationalist / cooperative line (broad implied and commerce powers; national supremacy; inherent sovereignty)
Define dual federalism (as the cases use it)
Nation and states occupy separate, fixed spheres; the 10th Amendment reserves local matters (manufacturing, mining, labor, police power) so Congress may not reach them even through commerce. Cases: Miln, Willson, Knight, Hammer, Carter Coal, Barron, Slaughterhouse, Fuller's Champion dissent
Define the nationalist line (as the cases use it)
Federal power is broadly construed: implied powers (McCulloch), commerce "complete in itself" (Gibbons, Champion), inherent sovereignty beyond the text (Kagama, Curtiss-Wright, Neagle, Prize). The check on Congress is political, not judicial (Gibbons)
Marshall Court cases on the NATIONALIST side
McCulloch (implied powers, supremacy), Gibbons (broad commerce), Marbury (judicial supremacy over Congress), Dartmouth (federal Contract Clause limits states)
Marshall Court cases that concede ground to the STATES
Willson (state dam OK when Congress is silent, dormant commerce), Barron (Bill of Rights doesn't bind states)
Taney Court cases and their federalism posture
Miln (state police power over persons "complete, unqualified and exclusive"), Charles River Bridge (community rights, public grants strictly construed), Luther (political question, deference), Dred Scott (limits on Congress in territories). Moderation and state autonomy, with judicial sovereignty intact until 1857
Post–Civil War cases expanding NATIONAL power
Prize Cases (presidential war power), Neagle (implied executive power), Kagama (plenary power over Indian affairs), Champion (federal police power via commerce), Curtiss-Wright (inherent foreign-affairs power)
Post–Civil War cases limiting NATIONAL power (dual federalism)
Slaughterhouse (14th Amendment doesn't nationalize civil rights), Knight (manufacturing not commerce), Hammer (10th Amendment brake), Carter Coal (production not commerce), McCardle (Congress limits the Court, not federalism but judicial retreat)
Contrast: E.C. Knight vs. Champion v. Ames
Knight (1895, Fuller): manufacturing / local / dual federalism; effect on commerce "indirect." Champion (1903, Harlan): interstate traffic in lottery tickets / nationalist; Congress may prohibit, quoting Gibbons "complete in itself"
Contrast: Champion vs. Hammer
Champion: Congress may bar harmful things (lottery tickets) from interstate commerce. Hammer: Congress may not bar "ordinary commercial commodities" made by child labor, because the real target is manufacturing hours, "a purely state authority." Holmes: once goods cross the state line the state's rights end
Contrast: Gibbons vs. Miln vs. Willson (the exclusivity question)
Gibbons: exclusivity has "great force" but not decided; state law falls on supremacy. Willson: Congress silent, so a state dam stands ("dormant state"). Miln: state passenger law is police power, not commerce; exclusivity left open a third time (until Cooley 1851)
Contrast: Marbury vs. McCardle vs. Luther (limits on judicial power)
Marbury: courts say what the law is and may void acts of Congress. McCardle: Congress controls the Court's appellate jurisdiction (Exceptions Clause). Luther: some questions (Guarantee Clause) belong to the political branches. Judicial power is real but bounded by jurisdiction and political questions
Contrast: Prize Cases vs. Milligan
Prize (1863, mid-war): defer to the President; whether there is a war "is a question to be decided by him." Milligan (1866, post-war): "a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace"; no military trials of civilians where courts are open. Timing matters
Contrast: Milligan vs. Schenck
Milligan: constitutional guarantees hold in war as in peace. Schenck: "the character of every act depends upon the circumstances"; wartime changes what will be endured. Civil liberties in wartime cut both ways
Contrast: Dartmouth vs. Charles River Bridge
Dartmouth (Marshall): a charter is a contract; vested rights protected against the state. Charles River Bridge (Taney): public grants strictly construed; no implied monopoly; "the community also have rights." Story dissents in Charles River Bridge holding Marshall's line
Contrast: Charles River Bridge vs. Blaisdell
Both let states act against contract claims, but Charles River Bridge reads the grant narrowly (no impairment because nothing was promised), while Blaisdell admits the contract is affected and upholds the law anyway because the reserved police power "is read into all contracts" and the emergency furnishes the occasion
Contrast: Lochner vs. Nebbia vs. West Coast Hotel
Lochner (1905): Court judges whether the law is "unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary"; bakers' hours law falls. Nebbia (1934): "no closed class" of regulable businesses; courts "incompetent and unauthorized" to judge wisdom. West Coast Hotel (1937): "The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract"; Adkins overruled; rational basis
Contrast: Slaughterhouse majority vs. Slaughterhouse dissents
Miller: P or I covers only national rights (seaports, high seas, petition, habeas); otherwise the Court becomes "a perpetual censor" of the states. Field/Bradley: the Amendment protects the common rights of all citizens including the right to choose a calling. The dissents become Lochner
Contrast: Barron vs. Near
Barron (1833): the Bill of Rights does not limit the states. Near (1931): freedom of the press binds a state through 14th Amendment liberty. Slaughterhouse (1873) sits between them, refusing to carry rights through Privileges or Immunities
Contrast: Slaughterhouse vs. Bradwell
Decided a day apart, both by Miller. Slaughterhouse: butchers' right to a calling is not a national privilege. Bradwell: bar admission "in no sense depends on citizenship of the United States." Bradley reads the clause broadly for butchers (dissent) and narrowly for a woman (concurrence)
Contrast: Plessy majority vs. Harlan dissent
Brown: the 14th Amendment secures political, not social, equality; separation is reasonable under custom; any "badge of inferiority" exists only because "the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Harlan: "Our Constitution is color-blind"; as pernicious as Dred Scott
Contrast: Kagama vs. Curtiss-Wright (inherent powers)
Both find federal power outside the enumerated list. Kagama: power over tribes "must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else." Curtiss-Wright: external powers passed from the Crown to the Union as "necessary concomitants of nationality"
Contrast: Curtiss-Wright vs. Carter Coal (same year, 1936, same author)
Sutherland limits federal power at home (Carter Coal: production is not commerce) but finds it unlimited abroad (Curtiss-Wright: inherent sovereignty). The enumerated-powers rule is "categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs"
Which dissents later became the law?
Harlan in Knight (Wickard) • Holmes in Hammer (Darby 1941) • Cardozo in Carter Coal (Jones & Laughlin 1937) • Holmes in Lochner (post-1937 rational basis) • Field/Bradley in Slaughterhouse (Lochner-era due process, later abandoned) • Harlan in Plessy (Brown 1954)
The 1937 turn: which two cases in the deck mark it, and what changed?
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (due process: Adkins overruled, rational basis) and the abandonment of Carter Coal in Jones & Laughlin (commerce). Nebbia (1934) and Blaisdell (1934) were the first cracks. Roberts is the swing vote; the Four Horsemen dissent
Timeline: put the 29 cases in decision order
1803 Marbury • 1819 McCulloch, Dartmouth • 1824 Gibbons • 1829 Willson • 1833 Barron • 1837 Miln, Charles River Bridge • 1849 Luther • 1857 Dred Scott • 1863 Prize • 1866 Milligan • 1869 McCardle • 1873 Slaughterhouse, Bradwell • 1886 Kagama • 1890 Neagle • 1895 Knight • 1896 Plessy • 1903 Champion • 1905 Lochner • 1918 Hammer • 1919 Schenck • 1931 Near • 1934 Blaisdell, Nebbia • 1936 Curtiss-Wright, Carter Coal • 1937 West Coast Hotel
Which cases were decided while the Court had a 5-4 split?
Prize (1863), Slaughterhouse (1873), Champion (1903), Lochner (1905), Hammer (1918), Near (1931), Blaisdell (1934), Nebbia (1934), Carter Coal (1936, on labor provisions), West Coast Hotel (1937). Also Milligan 5-4 on reasoning only
Which cases were unanimous?
Marbury (4-0), McCulloch, Gibbons (6-0, Johnson concurring), Willson, Barron, Dartmouth (5-1, not unanimous), McCardle (8-0), Kagama, Schenck (9-0), Milligan on the result (9-0)
Marshall wrote which cases in the deck?
Marbury (1803), McCulloch (1819), Dartmouth (1819), Gibbons (1824), Willson (1829), Barron (1833)
Taney wrote which cases in the deck?
Charles River Bridge (1837), Luther v. Borden (1849), Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Miller wrote which cases in the deck?
Slaughterhouse (1873), Bradwell (1873), Kagama (1886), Neagle (1890)
Hughes wrote which cases in the deck?
Near (1931), Blaisdell (1934), West Coast Hotel (1937)
Sutherland wrote which cases in the deck, and dissented in which?
Wrote Carter Coal and Curtiss-Wright (1936). Dissented in Blaisdell (1934) and West Coast Hotel (1937)
Harlan (the first) wrote or dissented in which cases in the deck?
Wrote Champion v. Ames (1903). Dissented in Knight (1895), Plessy (1896), Lochner (1905)
Holmes wrote or dissented in which cases in the deck?
Wrote Schenck (1919). Dissented in Lochner (1905) and Hammer (1918)