defendant's rights unit 1

4th amendment

Illinois v. Gates

(1983) - issue warrant from tip was reasonable, totality of circumstances test considering basis of knowledge and veracity of information

Katz v. U.S.

(1967) - recording outside phone booths was unreasonable, new factual circumstance of objectively reasonable expectation of privacy

Kyllo v. United States

(2001) - thermal imaging outside house is a search and is unreasonable without warrant, home = high expectation of privacy, technology gains info that couldn’t otherwise be obtained without physical intrusion (search)

Florida v. Jardines

(2013) - drug dog without warrant is an unreasonable search, curtilage of house is protected, dog was used with intention of gathering evidence so = search

Carpenter v U.S.

(2018) - law turning over CSLI cell phone tracking records is unreasonable because legitimate expectation of privacy, breadth and automatic nature make it too severe

Chimel v. California

(1969) - incident to lawful arrest can search area “within immediate control”, to remove weapons or prevent destruction of evidence, overrules Harris and Rabinowitz which let search entire place arrest occurs

Riley v. California

(2014) - police cannot search contents of cell phone without warrant, can secure to prevent destruction of evidence, have substantial privacy interests

Cupp v. Murphy

(1973) - search not incident to arrest, prevent destruction of evidence is reasonable by extending Chimel, based on probable cause, limited intrusion, and evidence was easily destructible

Ferguson v. City of Charleston

(2001) - non-consensual drug tests on mothers unreasonable, weigh the intrusion on individuals privacy against “special needs”, invasion of privacy here is substantial, the policy’s main purpose cannot be distinguished from crime control

Safford School District v. Redding

(2009) - strip search of a middle schooler unreasonable, went too far, school searches do not require probable cause but require “reasonable suspicion” (schools have “special needs”), a school search is permissible when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction

U.S. v. Matlock

(1974) - third-party consent to search is valid if they possess common authority over the premises or effects to be searched

Georgia v. Randolph

(2006) - A warrantless search of a shared dwelling over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified based on consent of another resident

Terry v. Ohio

(1968) - stop and frisk needs “specific and articulable” facts available to the officer at the moment of the search or seizure to warrant a person of “reasonable caution” to believe the action was appropriate

Hibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada

(2004) - Stop and identify laws, Stop is based on reasonable suspicion and statue is narrow and precise, requiring suspects to provide only their name, The balancing test in Terry permits a state to require a suspect to disclose their name in the course of a Terry stop because “it serves important government interests”

U.S. v. Ross

(1982) - Exception to warrant requirement allows searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe there’s contraband, Because vehicles can be quickly moved, allow warrantless searches because of time constraints, but need probable cause, The scope of the search is defined by the object of the search, Privacy expectations are no longer a relevant fact in determining the scope of the search

Arizona v. Gant

(2009) - search incident of an arrest when in/near a vehicle Chimel exception applies only when the “arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search” OR When it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle” (Thornton)