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Define Property Dualism
Property dualism is the view that there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
Explain Chalmer’s Zombie Argument
P1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (no contradiction arises in the conception of them).
P2. What is conceivable is metaphysically possible (exists in a possible world).
C1. Therefore, philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible (they exist in a possible world).
P3. If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible, phenomenal properties of consciousness are not reducible to nor supervenient on physical properties.
C2. Therefore, property dualism is true.
Issue 1: Zombies are not conceivable
The issue that a ‘philosophical zombie’ is not conceivable
A physicalist can respond that if physicalism is true, a zombie world is not conceivable. Anyone who thinks they are conceiving of a physical duplicate of a conscious person with no consciousness is confused. This confusion results from their ignorance of how certain physical systems and processes just are consciousness (e.g. type/token identity theory).
A full account of how certain physical systems are consciousness will include an explanation of how phenomenal properties of consciousness are not irreducible qualia but reduce to or supervene on physical properties. Anyone who has that full account will be unable to conceive of a duplicate of that physical system without consciousness. So, it is only if physicalism is false that zombies are conceivable.
Integration: this issue attacks premise 1, that zombies are conceivable, for begging the question. This is because P1 is only true if physicalism is false. The zombie argument fails as it presupposes that physicalism is false to reach the conclusion that physicalism is false.
Issue 1: Response
However, we do not have a full physical account of consciousness. So, we cannot credibly claim to know that conceiving of a philosophical zombie is confused. We can only deny P1 and claim that zombies are not conceivable if we know physicalism to be true, which as a response to the zombie argument is a question-begging assumption itself.
All we currently have to go on is whether there seems to be anything self-contradictory in the conception of a zombie. Chalmers argues that there is not.
Issue 2: Conceivability does not prove metaphysical possibility
We know that in this world water is H2O, but it seems that we can conceive of water without H2O. It seems that we can imagine a possible world in which there is a substance with the same properties as water yet is not H2O.
However, Kripke claims that if we conceive of water without H2O, what we are conceiving of would not be water because H2O is the essential property of water. An essential property is one which cannot be removed without altering the concept or definition of a thing. If water is identical to H2O, there cannot be a possibility that it isn’t H2O, as that would lead to the absurd result that something could possibly not be what it is.
Applying this to the zombie argument. If phenomenal properties are identical to physical properties, then (like with water and H2O) they must be identical in all possible worlds. If physicalism is true, there is no possible world in which a physical duplicate of a conscious person could exist without consciousness; a zombie world is not possible.
Integration: this issue attacks P2 for begging the question. So again, the zombie argument presupposes the truth of its conclusion (physicalism being false) for its premise that what is conceivable is possible (P2) to be true.
Issue 2: Response
Property dualists can respond that water and consciousness are crucially different. Water is indeed the sort of thing which has a chemical formula as its essential property, but phenomenal properties have qualia or what it is like to experience them as their essential property, not some physical property. If this is correct, that phenomenal properties do not have physical properties as their essential property, then their relation to the physical is not one of identity. The physical could exist without the phenomenal, so zombies are possible and the conclusion that physicalism is false is maintained. As such, to compare water with consciousness is disanalogous.
Issue 3: Metaphysical possibility tells us nothing about the actual world
The issue that metaphysical possibility tells us nothing about our world
Physicalists could argue that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality. This requires Physicalism to restrict what it claims to what is physically possible in this world, i.e., that in this world any physical duplicate must share all its properties. It could then be open to there being possible worlds in which physicalism is false and others in which it is true. So Physicalism could attempt to accept that there is a possible world in which a physical duplicate does not have phenomenal properties, even though that would be impossible in this world. So Physicalism only claims to be true in this world, whereas there are possible worlds where property dualism is true.
Integration: this issue attacks P3, that the metaphysical possibility of zombies means that phenomenal properties of consciousness are not reducible to nor supervenient on physical properties.
Issue 3: Response
However, this cannot be correct under Kripke’s theory of ridged designators. Nothing can be what it is not. If Physicalism is true then the essential property of consciousness is something physical, as of yet not completely discovered, much like how once the chemical formula of water had not been discovered. In that case, consciousness cannot something else, i.e., non-physical.
If dualism is true, then the essential property of consciousness is some non-physical property that does not reduce to nor supervene on physical properties. In that case, consciousness cannot be something else, i.e., physical.
Whatever it is, consciousness has to be what it is. Physicalism can’t claim that consciousness could be or be supervenient on one thing (physical) in one world (like this world) yet non-physical in a another possible world.
Integration: Physicalists therefore cannot restrict their claim to what is physically possible in this world. They have to claim that consciousness is identical to or supervenient on physical properties in all possible worlds, otherwise they would be saying that it is metaphysically possible for something to not be what it is. They would be saying that it’s metaphysically possible for something physical to be non-physical. In that case, physicalists cannot deny P3. Physicalists have to deny P1, the conceivability of zombies or C1, the metaphysical possibility of zombies.
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
P1. A person who has never experienced the phenomenal property of red could have learned all the physical facts about colour perception.
P2. If they then experience red for the first time, they gain new knowledge, i.e., of what it is like to see the colour red.
C1. Therefore, knowledge about phenomenal properties is knowledge about something non-physical.
C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties are non-physical, i.e., they are neither reducible to nor supervenient on physical properties.
C3. Therefore, property dualism is true.
Ability Knowledge
There is more than one kind of knowledge. Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts whereas ability knowledge is not. For example, knowing how to ride a bike is not knowledge of a fact. Only propositional knowledge captures facts about the world. Jackson’s argument requires not just that Mary learns something new, but also that what she learns is propositional knowledge in order to justify the conclusion that there are facts which cannot be reduced to nor explained in terms of supervenience on physical facts.
Integration: This issue rejects the inference from P2 to C1. It accepts P2, that Mary gains new knowledge. However, to claim that this knowledge must be about something non-physical (C1), that knowledge must be propositional.
The ability knowledge response suggests that when Mary learns what it is like to see red, she only learns the ability to imagine or recognize the colour red. In that case, there are no facts that Mary didn’t know and so her previous knowledge hasn’t been proven (factually) incomplete and thus the knowledge argument fails.
Dualist Response: Ability
However, while there may indeed be ability knowledge involved, arguably there is still propositional knowledge. Mary learns not just the ability to imagine red, but also knowledge of what having that ability is like. She could then ask whether the ability of others to see red involves the same qualia as her ability. That is propositional knowledge.
Acquaintance Knowledge
There is more than one kind of knowledge. Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts whereas acquaintance knowledge is not. Acquaintance knowledge involves knowing of a person or place through direct contact in experience. For example, acquaintance knowledge of London is not knowledge of a fact. Only propositional knowledge captures facts about the world. Jackson’s argument requires not just that Mary learns something new, but also that what she learns is propositional knowledge in order to justify the conclusion that there are facts which cannot be reduced to nor explained in terms of supervenience on physical facts.
Integration: This issue rejects the inference from P2 to C1. It accepts P2, that Mary gains new knowledge. However, to claim that this knowledge must be about something non-physical (C1), that knowledge must be propositional.
The acquaintance knowledge response suggests that when Mary learns what it is like to see red, she only becomes acquainted with the colour red through direct contact in experience. In that case, there are no facts that Mary didn’t know and so her previous knowledge hasn’t been proven (factually) incomplete and thus the knowledge argument fails.
The issue argues that Mary initially had only propositional knowledge about all physical facts (propositional knowledge about colour perception – neurons firing, etc), and that when Mary leaves the room, she gains new acquaintance knowledge as she becomes acquainted with the process of colour perception when she undergoes such process within her own brain.
Dualist Acquaintance
We could defend the Knowledge argument by pointing out that acquaintance knowledge can involve propositional knowledge. For example, in addition to acquaintance knowledge of red, Mary also gained new propositional knowledge such as knowing that ‘this is what red looks like’ is true and knowing that ‘other people experience this when they see red’ is true.
The New Knowledge/Old Facts Objection
According to this objection, Mary does not learn new facts, she apprehends a fact she already knew but in a new way. Phenomenal concepts are those which your imagination derives from your experience (similar to Hume’s impressions/ideas, see epistemology notes). Physical concepts are those informed by science (i.e. wavelengths of light, neurons, light sensitive cells, etc).
It is possible in the case of red for both the phenomenal concept of red and the physical concept of red to be two different ways of conceptualizing the same thing. Just as it’s possible for the phenomenal concept of water and the physical concept of H2O to refer to the same thing. The new knowledge/old fact argument claims that Mary had a physical concept of red but gained the phenomenal concept of red which was a new concept that nonetheless was of the same old fact.
D. Papineau claims that while our brains are only capable of forming a phenomenal concept from sense experience, it is theoretically possible for an organism to exist with the ability to imagine phenomenal concepts like colours that it has not sensed.
This is strengthened by Dennett’s argument that Jackson has snuck in the idea of being omniscient about physical facts as if it were possible for us to understand what that would involve. Perhaps the kind of mind capable of knowing all physical things would be the sort of being Papineau mentioned.