spanish politics midterm

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110 Terms

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Before the Republic, Spain was a

monarchy under King Alfonso XIII

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Elections of 1931

  • Municipal elections in April 1931 were perceived as a major vote on the monarchy itself.

  • Although monarchists won in rural areas (due to local bosses / caciquismo), republican coalitions swept the major cities.

  • Suspended from his duties, the King left for exile to avoid bloodshed, leading to the peaceful proclamation of the Second Republic on April 14, 1931.


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The Reformist Agenda (1931-1933)

  • Agrarian reform: Land redistribution in the South

  • Educational/Religious reform: Secularization of schools, reducing Church power

  • Military reform: Reducing the size of a macrocephalic officer corps

  • Territorial reform: Drafting a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia

  • The Reaction: These reforms severely threatened traditional power structures (Church, Army, Landowners).


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The Conservative Turn (1933-1935)

Center-right coalition wins elections and paralyzes previous reforms

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October 1934 Revolution

Major uprising by miners in Asturias violently suppressed by the army, deepening the political divide

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The Popular Front (February 1936) + The Breakdown of Democracy

  • A narrow victory for the left-wing coalition leads to extreme polarization

  • Institutional deadlock, street violence, and a lack of moderate consensus paved the way for the military coup in July 1936


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The Non-Intervention Agreement

Western democracies (UK, France) refused to intervene, fearing a broader European war

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Who aided the The Rebels (Nationalists)

Received massive, decisive military aid (troops, planes, weapons) from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy

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who aided the republic

  • Soviet Union (which created internal political conflicts) and volunteer International Brigades


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When was the military coup proceeding the civil war

  • July 17-18, 1936

  • It failed to take the whole country, splitting Spain in two

  • •Republicans: Loyalists, urban workers, secularists, regional nationalists

  • Nationalists (Rebels): Military, conservative Catholics, monarchists, Falangists.


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The Francoist Dictatorship (1939–1975)

  • Nationalists win war

  • Institutional Foundations

    • No political parties allowed (except the state party: Movimiento Nacional)

    • Systematic repression of political dissidents

    • Strict censorship and Catholic moral control (National-Catholicism)

    • Absolute suppression of regional languages (Catalan, Basque, Galician) and identities


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Phases of the Franco Regime

  • The Autarky (1940s-1950s)

    • Economic isolation, poverty, rationing, and international ostracism

  • The Cold War Shift (1953)

    • The US signs military agreements with Spain. The regime gains international recognition as an anti-communist ally

  • The Technocratic Era (1960s):

    • Technocrats drive economic liberalization following the 1959 Stabilization Plan.

    • The "Spanish Economic Miracle" (tourism, industrialization, migration to cities).


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Economic Modernization vs. Political Stagnation

  • Mass migration from rural villages to cities

  • Expansion of university education

  • Millions of European tourists bringing foreign ideas

  • The creation of a large, urban middle class

  • By the time Franco died in 1975, the society had modernized, but the political structure remained frozen in the 1940s


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Collective Memory

How society constructs, shares, and uses interpretations of the past for present purposes

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Amnesty Law (1977)

Forgave political crimes of the dictatorship but also prevented the prosecution of human rights abuses by the Franco regime.


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Social Transformations 70s Spain

  • Urbanization & Internal Migration

  • Birth of the Middle Class

  • Generational Shift

  • Secularization


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The Vatican II Shift (1962–1965)

  • The global Church began championing human rights, causing a deep internal fracture in the Spanish clergy.

  • contrary to previous support for the dictatorship

  • Cardinal Taracon distanced from Francoism


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25th of April

Portugal (1974): The Carnation Revolution dismantled dictatorship via a military coup, causing panic among Spanish elites about radical left army takeovers

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Pressure of “3rd wave democratization”

  • Greece (1974): The collapse of the Regime of the Colonels highlighted the vulnerability of Mediterranean autocracies

  • EEC Pressure: The European Economic Community made full democratic institutions an explicit requirement for economic integration.


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Assassination of Carrero Blanco

  • Assassination of Carrero Blanco 1973

  • ETA killed Franco’s designated successor, shattering the regime’s continuity plans


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Arias Navarro’s Failure (1974-1976)

  • Attempted timid reforms (Espíritu del 12 de febrero) but remained a prisoner of the hardliners (El Búnker)


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"De la Ley a la Ley"

  • Torcuato Fernández-Miranda (Suárez’s mentor and President of the Cortes)

  • The Dilemma

    • How to create a democracy without breaking the legal continuity of the authoritarian state (which would provoke a military coup)

  • The Solution

    • Using Article 10 of the Francoist Fundamental Laws, which allowed constitutional amendments via the Francoist Cortes and a national referendum

  • The Outcome

    • Authoritarian institutions legally voted themselves out of existence without creating a legal vacuum.


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Terrorist Threats from Multiple Fronts

  • ETA (Basque Separatists): Escalated assassinations targeting military officers to provoke a army coup

  • GRAPO (Far-Left): Executed high-profile kidnappings and bombings to disrupt stability

  • Far-Right Violence: Neo-fascist paramilitaries (Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey) targeted left-wing activists.


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Death of Franco

  • 1975

  • King Juan Carlos I becomes Head of State.

  • Arias Navarro cannot lead the reform→ Adolfo Suárez is appointed


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The Atocha Massacre

  • 1977, far-right gunmen murdered 5 labor attorneys in Atocha Street, Madrid

  • goal was to trigger violence from the left, forcing the military to impose martial law

  • PCE (communist) Response: Carrillo organized a silent, disciplined funeral march

  • Proved to Suárez, the King, and public opinion that the Communist Party was responsible, disciplined, and essential for stability.


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The "Black Week"

  • Extreme tension. Far-right terrorists murdered five left-wing labor lawyers (Atocha massacre)

  • PCE responded with massive, peaceful, and highly disciplined protests

  • Suárez realized a true democracy was impossible without the main anti-Francoist opposition force


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Legalization of the PCE

  • Holy Saturday (April 1977): Suárez unexpectedly legalizes the Communist Party (PCE) while the military leadership was on holiday.

  • in exchange for legalization, PCE leader Santiago Carrillo accepted the Monarchy and the traditional red and yellow Spanish flag.


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The 1977 Elections: "Alphabet Soup"

  • UCD (Center): Led by Suárez. A moderate coalition of former reformist regime officials, liberals, and Christian democrats

  • PSOE (Center-Left): Led by young Felipe González. Pushed for a modern, European social democracy

  • PCE (Left): Led by Carrillo. The historical anti-Francoist resistance

  • AP (Right): Led by Manuel Fraga. Represented conservative, former regime figures.


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Results of the 1977 Elections

  • Held on June 15, 1977

  • The electoral system (D’Hondt method, provincial districts) favored moderate and large parties, avoiding extreme fragmentation in parliament

  • Suárez and UCD win


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The Moncloa Pacts (1977): Economic Stabilization

  • 1977 — all major parliamentary parties, trade unions, and employers

  • Left unions accepted wage growth caps tied to expected (lower) inflation, not past inflation

  • Business and government agreed to progressive tax reform, welfare expansion, and job creation controls.

  • Proved political consensus could solve economic emergency

  • Established the foundations of the modern Spanish welfare state


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Ponencia Constitucional (Drafting Committee-7)

  • UCD (3 seats): Gabriel Cisneros, Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca

  • PSOE (1 seat): Gregorio Peces-Barba. (UC3M founder)

  • PCE/PSUC (1 seat): Jordi Solé Tura.

  • AP (1 seat): Manuel Fraga Iribarne.

  • Catalan Nationalists (1 seat): Miquel Roca i Junyent

  • Glaring Absence: The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was excluded from the committee, causing long-term legitimacy debates in the Basque Country.


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Key Compromises of Constitution

  • Form of State: Parliamentary Monarchy (concession by the left)

  • Religion: Non-confessional state, but acknowledging cooperation with the Catholic Church

  • Territorial Model: The highly ambiguous "State of Autonomies" to balance national unity with historical regional demands (Catalonia, Basque Country).


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Article 2 of spanish constitution

  • Article 2: "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation... and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions..."

  • The term "Nationalities" (Nacionalidades) was insisted upon by Catalan and Basque representatives

  • The Military High Command saw the term as an explicit step toward national dissolution.

  • A delicate ambiguity that allowed consensus but left territorial sovereignty permanently contested.


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Rationalized Parliamentarism

  • Structural mechanisms to guarantee executive stability and avoid legislative paralysis

  • Inspired by the German Grundgesetz (1949) to prevent the instability of the Second Republic (where governments fell constantly)

  • It is intentionally made easy to form a government, but difficult to overthrow one.

  • A political system strongly skewed toward Executive Dominance over the legislative branch.


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Mechanism I: The Investiture Process (Art. 99 CE)

  • The King consults parliamentary leaders and proposes a candidate

  • First Vote: Candidate needs an Absolute Majority (176/350 seats)

  • Second Vote (48 hours later): Candidate only needs a Simple Majority (more YES than NO votes)

  • Parliament invests the person of the Prime Minister, not the cabinet. The PM alone chooses, appoints, or dismisses ministers without parliamentary approval


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Mechanism II: Constructive Vote of No Confidence (Art. 113 CE)

  • To bring down a sitting Government, Parliament cannot simply vote "No" to the PM

  • Requirements for a Moción de Censura:

    • Must be proposed by at least 1/10 of Deputies (35 seats)

    • Must explicitly propose an alternative candidate for Prime Minister

    • Must achieve an Absolute Majority (176 votes) to succeed

  • Prevents "negative majorities" (far-right and far-left combining to defeat a government without agreeing on a successor)

  • Only one successful moción de censura in modern Spanish history (Pedro Sánchez against Mariano Rajoy in June 2018).


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Historical Record: Motions of No Confidence in Spain

  • Since the adoption of the 1978 Constitution, 6 motions of no confidence have been presented, with only one succeeding

  • 1980 — Felipe González (PSOE) vs. Adolfo Suárez (UCD): • Failed (152 in favor). Projecting PSOE as the primary governing alternative

  • 1987 — Antonio Hernández Mancha (AP) vs. Felipe González (PSOE): • Failed (67 in favor). Attempted to consolidate right-wing leadership

  • 2017 — Pablo Iglesias (Podemos) vs. Mariano Rajoy (PP): • Failed (82 in favor). Denounced corruption cases affecting the incumbent PP

  • 2018 — Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) vs. Mariano Rajoy (PP): • SUCCESSFUL (180 in favor). First PM ousted after the Gürtel sentence

  • 2020 & 2023 — Santiago Abascal / Ramón Tamames (Vox) vs. Pedro Sánchez (PSOE): • Failed (52 and 53 in favor). Used as opposition platforms during polarized periods.


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Question of Confidence (Cuestión de Confianza, Art. 112 CE)

  • The PM can ask Congress for support on their political program or a general declaration

  • Requires only a Simple Majority to pass. If lost, the PM must resign


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Dissolution of Cortes (Art. 115 CE)

  • The PM holds the exclusive power to dissolve Congress, the Senate, or both, and call snap elections

  • A powerful strategic weapon used by the Executive to discipline rebellious parliamentary allies or time elections for partisan advantage.


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Question of Confidence in Spain

  • Initiated exclusively by the Prime Minister (upon deliberation by the Cabinet) on a political program or policy statement

  • Proposed only twice since 1978, both resulting in success:

    • 1980 — Adolfo Suárez (UCD): • PASSED

    • 1990 — Felipe González (PSOE): • PASSED


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Decree-Laws (Real Decreto-Ley, Art. 86 CE)

  • The Executive can enact immediate legislation in cases of "extraordinary and urgent necessity."

  • Takes effect immediately, but must be ratified by the Congress of Deputies within 30 days.

  • Cannot affect core constitutional rights, regional autonomy statutes, or electoral law.

  • Originally designed as an exceptional tool, Decree-Laws have become a primary method of ordinary governance for both PSOE and PP administrations, bypassing long parliamentary debates.


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Free Mandate vs. Party Discipline

Prohibition of Imperative Mandate (Free Mandate):

  • Legal Principle (Art. 67.2 CE): MPs represent the entire nation, not just their party or district.

  • Constitutional Doctrine: The parliamentary seat (escaño) belongs to the individual MP, not to the party. An MP cannot be legally forced to resign or vote in a specific way

  • Party Discipline (Disciplina de Partido):

    • Political Reality: Internal party regulations enforce strict voting cohesion on parliamentary groups. •

    • Enforcement Tools: Fines for rebellious MPs, removal from committee posts, and exclusion from future electoral lists (descarte en listas)

    • Total legal freedom vs. near-total political obedience in closed-list party systems.


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Asymmetric Bicameralism

Spain has a bicameral parliament (Cortes Generales), but power is heavily asymmetric.

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Parliamentary Groups

  • Governance in Congress is structured around Parliamentary Groups (Grupos Parlamentarios), not individual MPs

  • Closed-List Proportional System: Party leaders control candidate selection on electoral lists. Defying party leadership means political career termination

  • Spokesperson Model (Portavoz): Party whips control parliamentary speaking time, committee assignments, and voting directions

  • Financial and Bureaucratic Resources: State subsidies and parliamentary resources flow to parliamentary groups, not individual deputies.


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Office-Seeking Politicians

  • Interested in the intrinsic benefits and power of holding ministerial posts (portfolios)

  • A formateur can get other parties to join the government primarily by giving them office


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Policy-Seeking Politicians

  • Driven by the desire to shape public policy and legislative outcomes

  • A formateur gets other parties to join by making policy concessions.


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Gamson’s Law

Cabinet portfolios will be distributed among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats each party contributes to the government’s legislative seat total

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Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC)

A coalition in which there are just enough seats to controll congress

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Least Minimal Winning Coalition

Among all possible MWCs, the formateur will choose the MWC with the lowest number of surplus seats to maximize their own share of office

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Types of Minority Executivies

Single-Party Minority: A single party holds office without commanding a legislative majority.

Minority Coalition: Multiple cabinet parties that together still short of a majority.

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A minority government must always rely on an implicit majority in the legislature in one of two ways:

Public Support Pacts: External parties publicly state they will support the government in investiture/no-confidence votes.


Ad-Hoc Majorities: The government builds legislative majorities on a bill-by-bill basis

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Surplus Majority (Oversized) Government:

Comprises more parties than are strictly necessary to control a legislative majority

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Why form an Oversized Cabinet?

  • Formed during national emergencies or post-war periods (unity governments)

  • Constitutional Reforms: Required when passing amendments that demand supermajorities (e.g., qualified 2/3 or 3/5 votes)

  • Strategic Protection: Prevents any single small party from holding single-handed veto power over the cabinet


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The "Open List" Model

The Constitution did not create the Autonomous Communities (CCAA); it merely established the right for territories to form them

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Nationalities v Regions

  • Nationalities: Refers historically to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. Territories with their own distinct language, history of self-government (statutes approved during the Second Republic), and strong nationalist movements

  • Regions: The rest of the Spanish provinces (e.g., Castilla y León, Extremadura, Murcia) which shared a common Spanish identity and had no historical claims for self-government prior to 1978.


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The Andalusian Exception

  • However, mass mobilizations on February 28, 1980, demanded access to autonomy via the Fast Track (Art. 151), refusing to be a "second-class" region

  • Despite the UCD government’s attempts to stop it, Andalusia succeeded, completely disrupting the original plan of reserving the fast track only for the historical nationalities.


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Exclusive Institutions of nationalities and regions

  • Police Forces + Civil Law


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The LOAPA (1982)

  • Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA)

  • Following the failed military coup of 1981 (23-F), the two main national parties—UCD (in government) and PSOE (in opposition)—panicked about the speed of decentralization

  • Through the Pactos Autonómicos (1981), they agreed to pass the LOAPA to "harmonize" (slow down and rationally control) the transfer of powers to the regions

  • Constitutional Court Ruling (1983): Struck down the core of LOAPA, ruling that the State could not unilaterally rewrite the constitutional distribution of powers via an ordinary law. The decentralization train could not be stopped.


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The Constitutional Court

• The Constitutional Court (TC) became the de facto architect of the Territorial State

• Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the TC had to resolve hundreds of jurisdictional conflicts between the central government and the Autonomous Communities

• Spain’s territorial model was not settled in 1978; it was built sentence by sentence through constitutional jurisprudence over 40 years.

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"Café para todos"

  • The political decision to generalize the creation of Autonomous Communities across the entire Spanish territory, rather than granting autonomy only to the historical nationalities

  • Manuel Clavero Arévalo (UCD) argued that asymmetrical autonomy would create unacceptable inequalities between Spaniards

  • 17 Autonomous Communities and 2 Autonomous Cities (Ceuta and Melilla), covering 100% of the national territory


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Why Spain is NOT formally a Federation

  • The 1978 Constitution locates sovereignty exclusively in the "Spanish people as a whole", not divided among constituent units.

  • Federations usually form by independent states joining together (bottom-up). Spain decentralized from a unitary state (top-down)

  • The Spanish Senate is not a true chamber of territorial representation (as we talked last week)

  • Autonomous Communities cannot veto national constitutional amendments


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Why Spain ACTS like a Federation

  • Expenditure: The Spanish central government controls less public spending than the federal governments of the USA or Germany. The CCAA manage Healthcare and Education (the biggest welfare budgets)

  • Constitutional Adjudication: The Constitutional Court acts exactly like a federal supreme court, resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the center and the regions.

  • Intergovernmental Relations: Sectoral conferences (State + Regional ministers) operate like federal coordination bodies


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The "Moreno Question"

  • Dual Identity

  • Citizens are asked how they identify themselves


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The Foral Regime (Régimen Foral )

  • Acknowledged in the 1st Additional Provision of the Constitution

  • The Basque Country and Navarre collect 100% of all taxes in their territory (Income tax, Corporate tax, VAT)

  • They do not participate in the financial solidarity pool with the rest of Spain

  • Tremendous fiscal autonomy and significantly higher per-capita funding.


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The Common Regime (Régimen Común)

  • Applies to the rest of Spain

  • The Central Government collects most major taxes.

  • The funds go into a complex Solidarity Pool

  • Wealthier regions pay more into the system than they receive back

  • Poorer regions receive more than they collect, ensuring equal funding for public services across Spain.


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The Basque Country

  • Marked by ETA’s terrorism and a heavily divided society

  • The Ibarretxe Plan (2003-2005)


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Catalonia

  • Dominated for decades by CiU (Convergència i Unió), a center-right nationalist coalition

  • "Pactism" Strategy: CiU acted as a moderate kingmaker in Madrid (supporting both PSOE and PP governments) in exchange for gradual transfers of power and resources to Catalonia. Secession was not on their agenda.


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I Legislatura (1979–1982): Decentralization & Autonomy

  • Government: Adolfo Suárez / Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo (UCD, Minority - 168 seats)

  • PSA-PA forced the historical Art. 151 referendum for Andalusia (1980)

  • Approval of LOAPA (1981)


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II Legislatura (1982–1986): Absolute Majority & Institutionalization

  • Government: Felipe González (PSOE, Absolute Majority - 202 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (25 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (12), ERC (1)

    • Basque Country: PNV (8), HB (2), EE (1)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • Period of consolidation of regional institutions (first regional elections, launch of TV3 and ETB)


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III Legislatura (1986–1989): Regional Expansion

  • Government: Felipe González (PSOE, Absolute Majority - 184 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (35 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (18)

    • Basque Country: PNV (6), HB (5), EE (2)

    • Canary Islands & Valencia: AIC (1), UV (1)

    • Galicia & Aragon: CG (1), PAR (1)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • First major expansion of non-state parties.

    • CiU expansion, 4th position overall.


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IV Legislatura (1989–1993): The Return of Short Majorities

  • Government: Felipe González (PSOE, 175 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (36 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (18)

    • Basque Country: PNV (5), HB (4), EE (2), EA (2)

    • Valencia & Canary Islands: UV (2), AIC (1)

    • Aragon & Andalusia: PAR (1), PA (2)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • PSOE required ad-hoc negotiation with CiU and PNV to pass state budgets and secure parliamentary committee majorities, anticipating the kingmaker era


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V Legislatura (1993–1996): The Golden Era of "Pactism"

  • Government: Felipe González (PSOE, Minority - 159 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (32 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (17), ERC (1)

    • Basque Country: PNV (5), HB (2), EA (1)

    • Canary Islands, Valencia & Aragon: CC (4), UV (1), PAR (1)

  • Legislative Relevance (Pivotal Kingmakers):

    • Formal governance agreement between PSOE and CiU

    • Transfer of 15% of Income Tax (IRPF) collection to Autonomous Communities.


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VI Legislatura (1996–2000): The Majestic Pact

  • Government: José María Aznar (PP, Minority - 156 seats)

  • • Non-State Representation (32 seats):

    1. Catalonia: CiU (16), ERC (1)

    2. Basque Country: PNV (5), HB (2), EA (1)

    3. Canary Islands, Galicia & Valencia: CC (4), BNG (2), UV (1)

  • Legislative Relevance (Pivotal Kingmakers):

    • Pacto del Majestic (1996): PP secured investiture with CiU, PNV, and CC.

    • BNG entered Congress for the first time


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VII Legislatura (2000–2004): PP Absolute Majority & Regional Growth

  • José María Aznar (PP, Absolute Majority - 183 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (34 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (15), ERC (1), ICV (1)

    • Basque Country: PNV (7), EA (1)

    • Canary Islands, Andalusia, Aragon & Galicia: CC (4), PA (1), CHA (1), BNG (3)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • PP’s absolute majority caused severe central-regional friction.

    • The Ibarretxe Plan (2003): The Basque Parliament proposed a "Free Association" model, which was formally rejected in Congress in 2005

    • High diversification: Regionalist parties from Aragon (CHA) and Andalusia (PA) gained seats.


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VIII Legislatura (2004–2008): Statute Reforms & ERC Surge

  • Government: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE, Minority - 164 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (33 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (10), ERC (8)

    • Basque Country & Navarre: PNV (7), EA (1), NaBai (1)

    • Canary Islands, Galicia & Aragon: CC (3), BNG (2), CHA (1)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • Wave of Statutes of Autonomy reforms (Catalonia 2006, Valencia, Andalusia, Aragon, Balearic Islands)

    • Entry of Nafarroa Bai (NaBai) in Navarre


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IX Legislatura (2008–2011): Economic Crisis & 2010 Statute Shock

  • Government: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE, Minority - 169 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (26 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (10), ERC (3)

    • Basque Country & Navarre: PNV (6), NaBai (1), UPN (2)

    • Canary Islands & Galicia: CC-PNC (2), BNG (2)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • During the 2008 financial crisis, PNV and CC became indispensable for passing state budgets in exchange for active employment policy transfers

    • June 2010: Constitutional Court ruling on the Catalan Statute (TC 31/2010), altering the territorial consensus.


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X Legislatura (2011–2015): Fiscal Centralization & The Catalan Pivot

  • Government: Mariano Rajoy (PP, Absolute Majority - 186 seats)

  • Non-State Representation (38 seats):

    • Catalonia: CiU (16), ERC (3)

    • Basque Country: Amaiur (7), PNV (5), Geroa Bai (1)

    • Galicia, Canary Islands, Valencia, Asturias: BNG (2), CC-NC (2), Compromís (1), FAC (1)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • Strict fiscal control over regions

    • 2012 Pivot: CiU shifted from autonomism/kingmaking to open secessionism following Rajoy’s refusal of the "Pacto Fiscal."


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XI & XII Legislaturas (2015–2019): End of Bipartisanship & 2018 Motion

  • Government: Mariano Rajoy (PP, 2016-18) / Pedro Sánchez (PSOE, 2018-19)

  • Non-State Representation (25-29 seats)

    • Catalonia: ERC (9), CDC / PDeCAT (8)

    • Basque Country: PNV (5), EH Bildu (2)

    • Valencia & Canary Islands: Compromís (4 in XI), CC (1), NC (1) •

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • Collapse of the two-party system; 2017 Catalan referendum & invocation of Article 155.

    • June 2018 Motion of No Confidence: Pedro Sánchez ousted Rajoy with votes from PSOE, Podemos, ERC, PDeCAT, PNV, EH Bildu, Compromís, and NC — first successful motion of no confidence in modern Spanish history.


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XIII & XIV Legislaturas (2019–2023): Peak Fragmentation & Coalition

  • Government: Pedro Sánchez (PSOE-Unidas Podemos Coalition)

  • Record Non-State Representation (11 Formations, 40 seats):

    • Catalonia: ERC (13), Junts (8/4), CUP (2)

    • Basque Country: PNV (6), EH Bildu (5)

    • Galicia, Canary Islands, Valencia, Cantabria, Teruel: BNG (1), CC (2), NC (1), Compromís (1), PRC (1), Teruel Existe (1)

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • First coalition government in modern Spain based on external regional support.


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XV Legislatura (2023–Present): Total Leverage & Legislative Friction

  • Government: Pedro Sánchez (PSOE-Sumar Coalition)

  • Non-State Representation (27 seats):

    • Catalonia: ERC (7), Junts (7)

    • Basque Country: EH Bildu (6), PNV (5)

    • Galicia, Canary Islands, Navarre: BNG (1), CC (1), UPN (1) •

  • Legislative Relevance:

    • Investiture tied to the 2024 Amnesty Law

    • Recent Crisis: Junts vetoed government decrees (e.g. Housing Law decree), showing that non-state parties hold absolute blocking power over state legislation


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Peripheral Nationalists

  • Parties: PNV, EH Bildu (Basque); ERC, Junts/CiU, CUP (Catalonia); BNG (Galicia).

  • Core Identity & Goals: Strong distinct national identity. They typically seek self-determination, structural redefinition of the State, or independence.


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Regionalist / Provincial Parties

Parties: UPN (Navarra), Coalición Canaria, PRC (Cantabria), Foro Asturias, PAR (Aragón).

Core Identity & Goals: Dual identity (regional and Spanish). They focus on securing better territorial funding, local investments, and decentralization

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Catalan 2006

  • The Catalan Parliament drafted a new Statute of Autonomy to secure a better financial deal and symbolic recognition

  • It was approved by the Spanish Parliament (with cuts) and ratified by Catalan voters in a legal referendum.


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Catalan 2010

  • After a 4-year legal battle initiated by the PP, the Constitutional Court struck down 14 articles and rewrote the interpretation of 27 others.

  • Most crucially, it ruled that the term "Nation" used in the preamble to describe Catalonia had no legal validity

  • The ruling broke the "constitutional pact" for many Catalans. If maximum autonomy was impossible within the 1978 framework, secession became the perceived alternative.


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The 2012 Diada (National Day of Catalonia)

Over a million people marched in Barcelona demanding "Catalonia, next state in Europe."

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October 2017 - Catalonia

  • October 1, 2017 — Unconstitutional referendum held despite suspension by the Constitutional Court. • State security forces were deployed under judicial order to prevent voting at polling stations

    • Turnout was recorded at approximately 43%, with 90% of votes cast in favor of independence

  • October 27, 2017: The Parliament of Catalonia passed a resolution declaring an independent Catalan Republic.


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State response to Catalonia 2017

  • Constitutional Intervention (October 27, 2017):

    • The Spanish Senate authorized the application of Article 155 of the Constitution

    • dismissed the Catalan Executive (Govern), dissolved Parliament, and called regional elections for December 21, 2017

  • Judicial Proceedings:

    • The Public Prosecutor filed charges of rebellion, sedition, and misuse of public funds against leading political figures

  • Key political and civic leaders were placed in pre-trial detention, while others moved abroad

    • December 2017 Regional Elections: Pro-independence parties retained a parliamentary majority (70 of 135 seats), though Ciudadanos became the most-voted single party.


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2019 Supreme Court Verdict:

Nine leaders were convicted of sedition and misuse of public funds, receiving prison sentences ranging from 9 to 13 years.

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Elite Negotiations in the Transition

  • Context of 1977–1978: Elites drafting the rules feared electoral fragmentation

  • Interests during Negotiations:

    • UCD (Center-Right): Demanded a system favoring rural, conservative areas where they had strong electoral footing

    • Left-wing opposition (PSOE / PCE): Demanded strict proportional representation to ensure equal representation

  • The Compromise: Formally adopt a Proportional Representation system (to satisfy the Left), but embed strong majoritarian mechanics within it (to satisfy UCD and guarantee executive stability).


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The Cube Root Law

  • Taagepera→ the size of a national assembly (S) tends to approximate the cube root of the country’s active population (P)

  • Formula: S ≈ √3 P


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Ballot Structure

  • Voters cast a single vote for a pre-ordered party list as an indivisible unit, with no power to alter candidate rankings or select individual representatives.

  • Pros:

    • Promotes party cohesion and discipline (MPs rely on party leadership for re-election).

    • Enables guaranteed descriptive representation (e.g., gender quotas via zipper systems).

  • Cons:

    • Severely weakens direct candidate-voter accountability.

    • Centralizes power within party elites ("partitocracia").


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Spanish Congress Ballot

  • Indivisible Choice

    • The voter selects a single party paper (papeleta) and places it inside the envelope.

    • Zero Voter Personalization:

      • Candidate order is fixed strictly by party leadership.

      • No checkboxes or ranking options exist for individual candidates.

    • Seat Allocation: Seats won by the party in the province are assigned strictly top-down (from Candidate #1 downwards).


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District Magnitude (M)

  • District Magnitude (M): The number of seats allocated to a specific electoral district.


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The Allocation Rule in Spain


  • Every province receives an initial fixed minimum of 2 seats (Ceuta and Melilla get 1 each) = 102 seats.

  • The remaining 248 seats are distributed strictly proportional to population.

  • The Resulting Asymmetry:

    • Large M districts: Madrid (M ≈ 37), Barcelona (M ≈ 32). • Small M districts: Over 30 provinces have M ≤ 5 (e.g., Soria M = 2, Teruel M = 3)


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D’Hondt vs. District Magnitude

  • Public debate often blames the D’Hondt formula for electoral disproportionality in Spain.

  • D’Hondt has a minor effect on seat distribution.

  • The main driver of disproportionality is the small magnitude of most electoral districts (M) combined with the initial 2-seat minimum allocation.


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D’Hondt rule in spain

  • The D'Hondt rule is a mathematical formula used in Spain to convert votes into legislative seats proportionally in general, regional, local, and European elections

  • Parties must win at least 3% of the valid votes in a general election (or 5% in local elections) to qualify for seat distribution


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The Three Mechanical Biases of the LOREG

  • Bipartisan/Majoritarian Bias:

    • Overrepresents the top two nationwide parties (historically PP and PSOE) by awarding them bonus seats in small provinces.

  • Spatial Concentration Bias:

    • Regional and nationalist parties (e.g., PNV, EH Bildu, Junts, ERC) receive a PROPORTIONAL share of seats because their vote is concentrated in a few medium/large provinces.

  • Penalty on Third Nationwide Parties:

    • Parties with nationwide support but no geographic concentration (historically IU, UPyD, and later Ciudadanos/Vox) suffer severe seat loss in small/medium provinces


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Malapportionment

  • Discrepancy between the share of population and the share of legislative seats assigned to a district.

  • Because less populated provinces get 2 fixed seats regardless of population, rural areas are systematically overrepresented relative to urban centers

  • Conservative parties historically benefited from higher support in rural, smaller districts, granting them a structural advantage in legislative seat conversion.


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Limited Vote system

  • District Magnitudes & Voting Limits:

    • Provinces (M=4): Voters can select up to 3 candidates.

    • Major Islands (M=3): Gran Canaria, Mallorca, Tenerife. Voters select up to 2 candidates. • Ceuta & Melilla (M=2): Voters select up to 2 candidates. • Minor Islands (M=1): Ibiza-Formentera, Menorca, etc. Voters select 1 candidate.

  • Result: Plurality rules. In a 4-seat province, the most voted party typically takes 3 seats, and the second party takes 1 (a 3-1 split).


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Single Unified Ballot ("La Sábana"):

Contains all candidates from all competing parties on one sheet