1/48
Looks like no tags are added yet.
Name | Mastery | Learn | Test | Matching | Spaced | Call with Kai | Chat |
|---|
No analytics yet
Send a link to your students to track their progress
Trend in social spending
rising for most OECD countries
Largest share of Spending
old age and health
Recent trends of the welfare
1) globalization
2) demographic change
3) increased female labor force participation
4) technological change
5) Flexwork, gig economy
6) COVID
Why is there a welfare state (2 functions)
1) Redistribution (Robin Hood)
2) Market failures (piggy-bank function)
Redistribution is about …
allocation of the pie (equity)
Parts of redistributive function of the welfare state
1) poverty relief
2) reducing inequality
3) social inclusion
Social welfare function (SWF)
aggregates utility functions of all individuals
Utilitarian social welfare
maximise the sum of individual utilities
Utilitarian social welfare function
W = U1 + U2 + U3 + … Un
Rawlsian social welfare
maximise the utility of the worst-off person in society
Rawlsian social welfare function
W = min(U1,U2,… Un)
Alleviating market failures is about …
the size of the pie (efficiency)
Parts of alleviating market failures
1) Externalities
2) Bounded rationality
3) Information asymmetry
Expected consumption (formula in words)
E(C) = probability of bad outcome * consumption in bad outcome + 1-probability of bad outcome * consumption in good outcome
Utility of expected consumption (formula)
U(E(C))
Expected utility in risky situation (formula words)
E(U) = probability of bad outcome * Utility function(consumption in bad outcome) + 1-probability of bad outcome* Utility function(consumption in good outcome)
Loss of utility due to risk (formula)
U(E(C)) - E(U)
Interpretation C*
with certain consumption C*, I am equally well of as in the risky situation (same utility)
Deriving Consumption with same utility (C*) - words
Expected Utility in risky situation = Utility of C*
Deriving Consumption with same utility (C*) - formula
Utility function(C*) = probability of bad outcome * Utility function(consumption in bad outcome) + 1-probability of bad outcome* Utility function(consumption in good outcome)
Willingness to pay for certainty (words)
= monetary value of utility loss
Willingness to pay for certainty (formula)
E(C) - C*
Willingness to pay for certainty (formula in words)
Expected consumption - C*
Three objectives when designing the welfare state
1) Equity
2) Efficiency
3) Administrative feasibility
Equity includes
1) poverty relief
2) reducing inequality
3) social inclusion
Def. efficiency
making the best use of limited resources given people’s tastes (or preferences) and the available technology
Administrative feasibility
1) system should be simple, easy to understand and cheap to administer
2) benefits should be as little open to abuse as possible
Types of government intervention
1) cash transfer
2) subsidies and taxes
3) production
4) regulation
Relationship of three objectives of the welfare state
cannot reach all three objectives together = always a trade off
Types of government intervention - cash transfers
1) unconditional
2) contribution-based
3) means-tested
Unconditional cash transfers example
child benefits
Contribution-based cash transfers
unemployment or disability benefits
Means-tested cash transfers
social assistance, housing benefits
Types of government intervention - subsidies and taxes
child care, taxes on cigarettes
Types of government intervention - production
of health or education
Types of government intervention - regulation
1) Quality standards
2) Quantity
3) Price
Regulation - Quality
consumption, health care, education
Regulation - Quantity
schooling
Regulation
minimum wage
Empirical tools to evaluate design of the welfare state
1) randomized trials
2) quasi-experiment
3) structural modelling
why government intervention is needed in the form of the welfare state
address redistribution issues and market failures
Why do people want insurance?
Risk/Loss aversion
Why does the government need to provide insurance in some cases?
asymmetric information
Actuarially fair premium (formula)
probability of bad situation x amount insurance firm hast to pay in bad situation
Willingness to pay for insurance (formula in words)
Willingness to pay for certainty + actuarially fair premium
Deductible in Insurance exercise
how much individual has to pay themselves
Def. Actuarially fair premium
How much insurance firm should ask so they do not go bankrupt
In situation with asymmetric information, how will insurance firm operate?
use the average probability of bad outcome of all groups
Calculating average probability of bad outcome
0.5* bad probability group 1 + 0.5*bad probability group 2