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Why does Larch argue for central-bank independence, and what form does it take?
• Historically, governments used monetary policy for political purposes, often contributing to high inflation.
• Parliament sets the mandate, while an independent central bank chooses instruments, notably interest rates, to fulfil it.
• Independence spread from the late 1980s, including New Zealand in 1989 and several European central banks in the 1990s.
How does the historical inflation evidence support central-bank independence?
• The 1970s oil shocks affected many countries, yet inflation exceeded 20% in Italy and the UK while remaining much lower in Germany.
• Larch partly attributes this difference to the Bundesbank's greater independence and forceful monetary response.
• Independence is not the only explanation, as energy exposure, institutions and mandates also differ.
How do monetary and fiscal dominance relate to EU economic governance?
• Monetary dominance allows the central bank to pursue price stability, provided fiscal policy remains sustainable.
• Under fiscal dominance, debt or financial-stability concerns may force monetary accommodation at the cost of higher inflation.
• EU central-bank independence and fiscal rules seek to protect monetary dominance, while national budgets remain democratically controlled.
What is the central bank's loss function, and how does beta affect its preferences?
• L = (Y − Ye)² + β(π − πT)², where Ye is equilibrium output and πT the inflation target.
• Deviations from either target generate losses, with the minimum at Y = Ye and π = πT.
• β > 1 implies greater weight on inflation objective, β = 1 equal weight, and β < 1 greater relative concern for output.
How do the loss circles and Phillips curve determine optimal monetary policy?
• Loss curves represent equally costly combinations of output and inflation around the central bank's ideal point.
• The Phillips curve π = πe + α(Y − Ye) limits the combinations the economy can attain.
• The bank selects the tangency between the lowest attainable loss curve and the Phillips curve.
How is the monetary rule derived, and what is its economic meaning?
• Minimise L = (Y − Ye)² + β(π − πT)² subject to π = πe + α(Y − Ye).
• The correct monetary rule is Y − Ye = −αβ(π − πT), tells twhich output gap to choose when π away from target
• Inflation above target requires output below equilibrium, and a larger β implies a flatter monetary rule.
How do the three equations of the extended macro model fit together?
• IS: Y - Ye = A − a·(rt−1 - rs), so current output depends on the previous period's real interest rate.
• Phillips curve: π = πe + α(Y − Ye), linking inflation to expectations and the output gap.
• Monetary rule: (π − πT)= −1/αβ(Y − Ye), determining the central bank's preferred inflation–output trade-off.
How does after a fiscal expansion?
• Higher G shifts IS right and increases output before the central bank's interest-rate change takes full effect.
• With adaptive expectations, the resulting inflation feeds into future expected inflation and shifts the Phillips curve upward.
• The bank may raise rates above the new long-run stabilising rate to create temporary slack, then reduce rates as inflation falls.
How do rational, adaptive and anchored inflation expectations differ?
• Rational expectations incorporate available information and the anticipated policy response, potentially allowing immediate adjustment. • Adaptive expectations use past inflation, typically πe_t = πt−1, creating inflation persistence. • Anchored expectations remain near πT because the central bank is credible, limiting the output cost of disinflation.
How does credibility affect disinflation when the central bank reduces its inflation target?
• With fully rational and credible expectations, the Phillips curve adjusts immediately to the new target, potentially without output loss. • With adaptive expectations, expected inflation falls gradually, so the bank must temporarily keep output below equilibrium. • Thus the same announced target can require very different interest-rate paths and economic sacrifices.
How does Larch model partial anchoring, and what does chi represent?
• Expected inflation is πe_t = χπT + (1 − χ)πt−1, with χ between zero and one. • χ = 1 means expectations are fully anchored at the target, while χ = 0 corresponds to fully backward-looking expectations. • A larger χ means less inflation persistence and a smaller output sacrifice after a shock.
Why can wage indexation make inflation more persistent after a supply shock?
• Indexation raises wages automatically in response to past price increases, transmitting past inflation into future costs. • After an imported-energy shock, the economy is poorer in real terms, yet indexed wages can sustain price pressures. • The central bank may therefore need stronger tightening and greater output losses to restore inflation to target.
What is inflation bias, and how can politically motivated fiscal expansion generate it?
• A policymaker may seek output above equilibrium, for example through expansion before an election. • Once expectations adjust, attempts to maintain above-equilibrium output produce higher inflation rather than a lasting output gain. • This time-inconsistency problem supports credible monetary commitments and central-bank independence.
Why is broad fiscal stimulus problematic after an adverse energy-supply shock?
• Higher imported-energy prices reduce the economy's real purchasing power and can lower equilibrium output. • Untargeted fiscal support boosts demand without reversing the supply constraint, adding to inflationary pressure. • The central bank must tighten more, illustrating the conflict between fiscal support and price stabilisation.
How do you establish the initial equilibrium of Larch's numerical IS–PC–MR model?
• Parameters are Ye = 100, πT = 2, α = 0.5, β = 10 and IS: Y = 150 − 5rt−1. • Setting Y = Ye gives the stabilising rate r = (150 − 100)/5 = 10. • At equilibrium π = πe = 2, and the correctly signed monetary rule is Y − 100 = −5(π − 2).
What happens immediately when government spending rises by 50 in the numerical exercise?
• The fiscal expansion raises autonomous demand A from 150 to 200 in the IS equation. • At the previously set interest rate r = 10, output jumps to Y = 200 − 5×10 = 150. • If expected inflation initially equals 2, the Phillips curve gives π = 2 + 0.5(150 − 100) = 27.
How does the central bank restore equilibrium when inflation expectations remain anchored?
• With πe = 2, the Phillips curve stays unchanged and the optimal point returns to Y = 100 and π = 2. • The new stabilising interest rate solves 100 = 200 − 5r, so r = 20. • Higher rates fully offset the fiscal demand shock in this model, crowding out interest-sensitive private demand.
What changes in the numerical exercise when inflation expectations are adaptive?
• Expected inflation becomes last period's inflation, so the initial jump to π = 27 shifts next period's Phillips curve upward. • Combining π = πe + 0.5(Y − 100) with MR gives Y − 100 = −5(πe − 2)/3.5. • The bank initially chooses output about 64.3 and a rate about 27.1, before converging toward Y = 100, π = 2 and r = 20.
What are the main pitfalls in solving the numerical three-equation exercise?
• Use the negative sign in MR, since higher-than-target inflation requires a negative output gap. • Respect the IS timing: current Y depends on the interest rate set in the previous period. • Increase A by ΔG and use the appropriate expectations assumption to determine each period's Phillips curve.
How does the permanent income hypothesis change the Keynesian consumption assumption?
• Keynesian hand-to-mouth consumers spend a fraction of current disposable income, C_t = c(Y_t − T_t). • Forward-looking households instead base consumption on assets and expected lifetime labour income net of taxes. • They smooth consumption over time by borrowing when income is low and saving when income is high, if credit markets permit.
How do forward-looking investment decisions differ from those in the simple Keynesian model?
• In the simple model, investment rises with current output and falls with current interest rates. • In dynamic models, firms consider the present value of expected future profits, depreciation and future interest rates. • Expectations about future conditions therefore influence investment and aggregate demand today.
Why can forward-looking households weaken the impact of fiscal expansion?
• Households anticipate that higher current spending or lower current taxes may require future taxes or spending cuts. • They may save more today instead of increasing current consumption by the full amount of fiscal support. • The IS shift and fiscal multiplier are therefore smaller than in the pure hand-to-mouth Keynesian case.
What is Ricardian equivalence, and why are government bonds not net wealth?
• Government borrowing today must ultimately be matched by future primary surpluses under its intertemporal budget constraint. • A bond held by a household is an asset offset by the present value of the taxes needed to service public debt. • Under strict assumptions, choosing debt rather than lump-sum taxation to finance a given spending path does not change consumption.
How do the household and government budget constraints underpin Ricardian equivalence?
• The present value of household consumption equals initial assets and the present value of lifetime after-tax income. • The government's outstanding debt equals the present value of future taxes minus future government spending, under a no-Ponzi condition. • Substitution cancels government bonds and taxes, leaving private consumption resources dependent on government spending itself.
Which assumptions are needed for the strong Ricardian-equivalence result?
• Households are rational and forward-looking, with infinite horizons or altruistic links to future generations. • Financial markets are perfect, allowing unconstrained borrowing and lending, and taxes are non-distortive lump sums. • Government spending does not raise productivity, and public debt cannot be rolled over indefinitely through a Ponzi scheme.
How does the effect of fiscal policy change when Ricardian assumptions are relaxed?
• Distortive future taxes affect work and investment incentives, so fiscal expansions may reduce future output. • Liquidity-constrained households respond to current income, making fiscal stimulus effective in the short run. • Larch's zero-multiplier claim describes the strict neoclassical benchmark, while a temporary spending rise may still raise current output in the textbook's intertemporal treatment.
What is tax smoothing, and why can temporary deficits be optimal?
• Distortive tax costs rise more than proportionally with the tax rate, so large tax fluctuations are inefficient. • Governments can keep tax rates relatively stable while allowing deficits during temporary expenditure peaks and surpluses in quieter periods. • This creates a normative reason for debt fluctuations, distinct from political-economy deficit bias.
How do New Keynesian DSGE models combine the Keynesian and Ricardian approaches?
• They use forward-looking households and firms, intertemporal decisions and microeconomic foundations. • They also introduce frictions such as sticky prices and credit-constrained households. • Fiscal multipliers then depend on the share of constrained consumers, nominal rigidities and the monetary-policy response.
What determines the size of fiscal multipliers in Larch's empirical overview?
• Estimates range roughly from zero to two, with large variation across studies and identification methods. • Relevant factors include spending versus tax measures, openness, labour-market rigidities and the exchange-rate regime. • The business-cycle position, monetary accommodation and sovereign financing conditions also matter.
What does the evidence show about fiscal multipliers across the business cycle?
• Batini et al. report larger multipliers in recessions than expansions, although estimates differ across papers. • For example, one study finds spending multipliers of about 0 in expansions and 1.7 in recessions. • Where comparable, spending multipliers generally exceed revenue multipliers in the cited studies.
Why can fiscal multipliers be especially large at the zero lower bound?
• When policy rates cannot fall further, fiscal stimulus can raise demand without the usual offsetting monetary tightening. • Larch cites model estimates such as Christiano et al.: 1.1 outside the ZLB versus 3.7 at the ZLB. • Implementation delays and the size or duration of the intervention can substantially reduce the effect.
Does the pandemic increase in household saving prove Ricardian equivalence?
• Euro-area household saving rates rose sharply in 2020 while governments provided exceptional fiscal support. • One interpretation is that households expected future taxes to finance higher debt and therefore saved more. • But lockdowns, uncertainty and precautionary motives also explain the increase, so the evidence is suggestive rather than proof.