International Politics Real

What did mercantilist state-backed monopolies require of colonies, and what did colonies get back?

Colonies could only buy from and sell to the colonial power. The power paid low prices for colonial goods and charged high prices for its own. Colonies got military protection in return. Class example: Virginia tobacco could only be exported to England, and Virginians could only buy industrial goods from England.

What is imperialism, as used in class?

Transferring political authority from local rulers to the imperialist home country. How much local institutions were suppressed or kept depended on factors like climate. Lack of self rule fed demands for independence. By 1870, UK income was 5 to 6 times higher than in most of Africa and Asia.

What did the Peace of Westphalia give the member states of the Holy Roman Empire?

Dominance within their own borders (sovereignty), the right to make foreign alliances, and the right to pick their religion. It ended the Thirty Years' War (1618 to 1648) and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch Republic.

How did the Asian tribute system differ from the Westphalian system?

It ran on hierarchy, not equal sovereign states (6th to 19th century). China sat at the center. Korea, Japan, and Vietnam kept autonomy in exchange for deference, through investiture (recognition and titles) and missions (envoys and trade). Constructivists call it another valid order.

What does hegemonic stability theory say (Kindleberger 1973)?

A global hegemon benefits everyone by providing public goods: stability, commerce, the gold standard, and punishment of defectors. Class example: Britain during Pax Britannica (1815 to 1914), when it was the most powerful state.

What were the cracks in US hegemony (Pax Americana)?

Overreach (Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Second Iraq War). Blowback against economic integration (NAFTA, the global financial crisis, China joining the WTO). Populism (Trump, Brexit). China is now the largest exporter and is building alternative institutions.

What is power transition theory (Organski 1958)?

War is more likely when one country's international influence is waning and another's is rising. Class example: the shifts before WWI, with the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires declining and Germany, Japan, and the US growing.

What did nuclear weapons do to US-Soviet competition in the Cold War?

Both had atomic and hydrogen weapons by 1954. Mutually assured destruction pushed the competition elsewhere, first Korea and then Vietnam.

Why is the prisoner's dilemma a commitment problem, and which outcomes are Pareto optimal?

Both do best at Mum/Mum (2,2), but each gets 3 by confessing against a Mum partner. Fess/Fess (1,1) is the only equilibrium and leaves both worse off, because neither can commit to staying Mum. Every outcome except Fess/Fess is Pareto optimal.

How does the security dilemma fit the prisoner's dilemma?

Two rival states can only get safer by arming, but arming makes the other state less safe. With no authority above them (anarchy), neither can commit to holding back, so they end up in an arms race.

Why is the battle of the sexes a distribution problem?

Both players want to match (a mismatch pays 0,0) but disagree on which match. DUC/DUC pays 3,2 and Den/Den pays 2,3. Both matches are equilibria and both are Pareto optimal. The fight is over who gets the better split.

What are the class examples of a distribution problem?

International Telegraph Union (1865): non-European countries wanted one-word fees and European countries wanted 20-word fees. The fix was 20-word fees for European traffic and one-word fees for extra-European traffic (Morrow 1994). Climate agreements: who cuts emissions and who pays for adaptation. Developing countries say rich countries grew without restraint. Rich countries say they can't do it alone and middle income countries are now top emitters.

How does the assurance game (stag hunt) differ from the prisoner's dilemma?

In the stag hunt (Stag/Stag 6,6 and Hare/Hare 1,1), both outcomes are equilibria, so cooperating works if you trust the other player to cooperate. The problem is assurance. In the PD, defecting is dominant, so cooperation isn't an equilibrium in a one-shot game.

What's the difference between proximate and ultimate causes of war?

Proximate cause is the underlying disagreement: territory, policy, or preferred government (regime change). Ultimate causes are why that disagreement isn't settled by a deal. Fearon (1995) gives three: indivisibility, information, and commitment.

How big does a conflict have to be to count as war, and what types exist?

Organized force that passes a minimum severity, often over 1,000 casualties. Riots don't count. Interstate war is between states and intrastate war is within a state (civil war). War is rare, though conflict defined more broadly is common.

What does war cost beyond battle deaths?

A disrupted economy, plus civilian deaths from military action and from disrupted supplies and services (starvation and disease).

What was the indivisibility example in class (Golan Heights)?

Israel took the Golan Heights in the 1967 Six Day War. It's a high plateau with a view of any attack from Syria, and Israel built bunkers, fences, mines, and tunnels. Returning to the pre-1967 border would cost Israel access to the east side of the Sea of Galilee, a key freshwater source. The other class example was Jerusalem's Western Wall and the Dome of the Rock.

What are the two sources of the information problem in Fearon's account?

Different beliefs about the outcome of war, and difficulty of signaling.

What are the two sources of the commitment problem in Fearon's account?

Power shifts and first strike advantage.

What was the Pearl Harbor example of a commitment problem?

Japan attacked the Pacific Fleet on Dec 7, 1941. It sank or damaged 18 warships, destroyed almost 200 planes, and killed over 2,000 Americans. Japan needed resources for its empire and knew the US wouldn't give in, so it attacked to cut American naval power. The US got lucky that its aircraft carriers weren't in the harbor.

In crisis bargaining, what's the difference between credible and effective coercion?

Credible: Actor A will follow through on the threat. Effective: the threat gets Actor B to concede. A threat is often effective if it's credible, so making threats credible is the main goal.

How can an actor make a threat credible?

Do things only an actor willing to attack would do: shows of force, brinkmanship (risk war), tying hands, and raising audience costs by making the threat clear.

What did 9/11 do to Bush's approval, and why does that create a diversionary incentive?

Approval jumped from just over 50 percent to over 80 percent. Conflict can raise national unity (rally around the flag), make political opponents suspend criticism, and distract from other problems. So leaders may start a crisis to rally opinion.

When does a rally gamble backfire?

When the conflict gets long or costly. Bush's approval fell as the war dragged on. In the Falklands/Malvinas conflict (1982), Argentina's Galtieri invaded to rally support, lost, and was removed from office. How removal looks depends on political institutions.

What is the democratic peace, and what is it not?

Democracies are much less likely to fight other democracies. They aren't more pacifist, and they fight other kinds of countries just as often.

Democratic peace rationale 1: norms. What's the problem with it?

Shared democratic ideals and peaceful conflict resolution. But democracies are just as war prone against other states, so maybe the norm only applies to like-minded states.

Democratic peace rationale 2: the public pays the costs. What's the problem with it?

Democratic leaders are more likely to be removed over costly wars. But autocratic leaders face higher costs of removal, and democracies are still as war prone overall.

Democratic peace rationale 3: information and transparency. How does it work?

It's harder for democracies to back down. The political opposition sends a second signal, which gives a better idea whether threats are credible. The opposition also constrains leaders, so they bluff less (Schultz 1998).

What happened in the Fashoda Crisis (1898)?

Britain and France both claimed Fashoda (now in South Sudan). Their forces met and awaited orders. Britain's Conservative government got backing from the Liberals ("no doves in Britain"), and France backed down. It's the class example of opposition support making a threat credible.

Does the democratic peace logic apply to authoritarian regimes (Weeks 2012)?

Military and unconstrained authoritarian regimes initiate more militarized disputes than democracies do.

Why be careful about causation in the democratic peace?

Omitted variables: wealth (makes countries democratic and better at war) and shared strategic interests (Triple Entente in WWI, Allied Powers in WWII, NATO). Reverse causality: war could cause democracy, since citizens demand influence in exchange for revenue.

What was the class example of an offensive alliance?

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. A ten year pledge of peace and neutrality with a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe. It ended in 1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. Offensive alliances are rare.

What was the class example of a defensive alliance?

US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960). Each defends the other if attacked in territories under Japan's administration, and the US gets the right to base troops in Japan.

Balancing vs bandwagoning in alliances: what's the difference?

Balancing: weaker states join to offset a stronger state and protect their security (Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921). Bandwagoning: joining to divide the spoils of war (Molotov-Ribbentrop). Alliances also allow coordination, where each partner specializes, so not every partner needs nuclear weapons.

How does entrapment work in an alliance, and who bears the risk?

The alliance shifts the bargaining range in favor of the ally, who may take riskier, opportunistic actions that trap its partner in a conflict. The risk falls mostly on the stronger partner.

How does the credibility (abandonment) problem work in an alliance, and who bears the risk?

Will the partner actually follow through? Alliances are sometimes just scraps of paper. The risk falls mostly on the weaker partner. Poland is the class example.

What's the arms versus allies tradeoff (Morrow 1993)?

Arms: building your own military is costly and may not be enough. Allies: signing on with a more powerful country gets you security, but it will likely ask for policy concessions, which costs you autonomy.

What are the sections of the Global Challenge write-up?

Summary of the challenge (actors, interests, interactions, institutions), activity discussion (did the group resolve it and why), literature review (where it fits and falls short), theory (explains the interactions where the literature fell short), and predictions. Under 5 pages, double spaced, graded out of 10.

Where might the literature fall short in the Global Challenge write-up (professor's ideas)?

Norms like equality, characteristics of leaders like personal relationships, other leader incentives like corruption, and assassination of leaders and the resulting power vacuum.

How does class define civil war, and what is the 5% rule?

Armed conflict between organized actors within a state that meets a minimum severity, typically the government against a rebel group. To separate wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of the fatalities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Why is civil war an international issue?

Rebel groups are often transnational, there are territorial claims, and outside states give support.

What are the grievance motives for civil war?

Some groups are excluded from politics (ethnic, religious, or ideological exclusion) and face political repression.

What factors make opportunity (greed) motivated civil war more likely?

Illegal drugs or mining, no economic opportunities, a weak state that can't suppress illegal activity, mountainous terrain, a large diaspora to tap, and hostile foreign governments that offer support (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

In the rebel versus government bargaining model, what do greed and grievance map to?

Greed is the value of b, the prize from fighting. Grievance is the value of -e, the cost of the status quo for the excluded group. Better seen as a continuum, since conflicts mix opportunity and injustice. Both explain the proximate cause, not the ultimate cause.

What did the class slide quote from the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement?

Accelerated release of prisoners, but only for groups with an established ceasefire. Total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. Northern Ireland stays part of the UK unless a majority of its people vote otherwise. Approval by referendum in both Ireland and Northern Ireland.

How does the Belfast Agreement reduce greed and grievance?

Greed: prisoner release only for groups that hold a ceasefire rewards stopping, and disarmament takes away the means to fight. Grievance: the consent rule lets Northern Ireland's people decide its status, so no side is shut out of that decision. The votes gave it legitimacy.

What were the referendum results on the Belfast Agreement?

Ireland: 56% turnout, 94% yes. Northern Ireland: 81% turnout, 71% yes.

How did the FARC conflict start in Colombia?

La Violencia (1948 to 1958) killed 1 in 50 Colombians. Afterward, peasants kept control of many villages, tied to Communism and land reform. In 1964, US-backed Colombian troops tried to oust them with violent repression. The backlash created FARC-EP, and coca revenue in the 1980s and 90s funded its expansion.

What were the six parts of the 2016 Colombia-FARC peace agreement?

Comprehensive rural reform, political participation, end of the conflict (disarmament), a solution to the illicit drug problem, an agreement on victims, and implementation and verification. Signed Aug 24, 2016. A referendum failed, then a revised deal passed.

Why is it so hard to end civil wars?

The loser must disarm, outside support keeps the fight going, and extremists can spoil a deal by using violence to undermine it.

Which rationalist explanation fits civil war best, and which fits worst?

Worst: information. Civil wars drag on and the sides probably know each other's capability, so miscalculation isn't convincing. Indivisibility: the homeland can't be split and one actor will make policy. Commitment: once rebels disarm, the government can't credibly commit to the settlement (an extreme power transition, Walter 1997).

How does outside support affect civil wars (Regan 2002)?

It's counter-cyclical, rising when the outsider's partner is losing. That makes victory unlikely and extends the war. An internationalized intrastate war is a civil war in which at least one outside state sends troops.

What roles does ethnicity play in civil war?

Grievances: elites exclude ethnic groups. Opportunity: shared ethnicity eases collective action. Commitment: groups can't credibly commit to protect other ethnic groups once those groups disarm. Class example: Nigeria, where Biafran secessionists declared independence in 1967, over a million died, and they surrendered in 1970. External support and oil revenue mattered too.

Why are civil wars often asymmetric, and what do rebels do about it?

The government is much stronger, so rebels would be destroyed in a conventional fight. They hide among the population and use insurgency or guerrilla warfare, meaning hit-and-run attacks on military, government, or civilian targets. Terrorism is the specific term for attacks on civilians.

How does class define terrorism?

Premeditated threat or use of violence against noncombatants by individuals or subnational groups to get a political or social objective through intimidation of a larger audience. Political demands are required, otherwise it's criminal behavior. Roughly 89% is domestic. It's a conflict strategy.

In what year was the term "terror" first applied to political violence?

1793, during the French Revolution, when thousands of suspected enemies were executed by guillotine.

Why is terrorism a form of costly signaling (Kydd and Walter)?

Weak actors can't make credible threats, so they show publicly how far they'll go. Terrorists use it to change beliefs about power, resolve, and trustworthiness, for two audiences: the target state's government and population, and their potential supporter group.

Which audience does each terrorist objective aim at?

Target audience: coercion and spoiling. Potential supporters: provocation and outbidding.

What is blowback in the context of provocation?

An unforeseen, negative cost of an operation. Provocation baits the state into a disproportionate response, which drives potential supporters away from moderates, so the state's use of force can backfire.

Does terrorism work?

Abrahms (2006): terrorist organizations achieved their objectives only 7% of the time. It's hard to know the right counterfactual.

Why might provocation work on target populations?

Availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1974): people judge probability by whether an example comes to mind. Terrorism is built to incite fear and trigger a response. Fear makes people want to prevent attacks, anger makes them want vengeance, and anger dominates in countries where terrorism is uncommon.

What are the four counter-terrorism strategies from class?

No negotiating with groups that use terrorism (deterrence and reputation for resolve). Preemption: disrupt groups before they attack. Prevention: improve the conditions that make supporters back extremists, by raising the cost of support and improving outside options. Punishment of individuals or groups that use terrorism.

What did Lyall (2009) find about indiscriminate violence by a government?

Indiscriminate violence could make people more supportive of insurgents, but shelled villages had a 24 percent reduction in post treatment mean insurgent attacks relative to control villages.

How are terrorist groups organized, and why does it matter?

Cells are loosely connected and operationally independent. They hide among civilians, which brings material support and makes them less likely to be targeted, since strikes risk provocation.

What's the most significant difference between collective security organizations (CSOs) and alliances?

Alliances have fewer members and involve more like-minded states. Alliances form when states want to coordinate during war. CSOs form among all states to reduce the common threat of violence among members, and they facilitate collective action to deter, end, and prevent conflict.

Describe the League of Nations and the UN.

League: created after WWI, 42 founding members without the US, unanimity rule, functions moved to the UN in 1946. UN: founded 1945 with 51 members, now 193. Security Council has 5 permanent members with veto power (US, UK, France, Russia, China) and 10 rotating members, and needs 9 of 15 votes. General Assembly is one country one vote with non-binding resolutions.

How can CSOs help resolve conflict?

If the threat of force against aggression is credible, they can prevent war because states know disputes can't be settled by violence, solve commitment problems by enforcing agreements, and reduce information problems by acting as neutral observers.

Peace-enforcement vs peacekeeping: what's the difference?

Enforcement imposes peace by force on warring parties. It targets the aggressor, uses heavily armed troops expected to fight, and is rare (Korea, Gulf War). Peacekeeping usually follows a war, with an agreement already in place. It relies on impartiality, host country consent, light arms, and civilian protection.

Why didn't the Soviet Union veto the UN operation in Korea?

It was boycotting the Security Council in 1950 over China's seat, so it wasn't there to cast a veto.

What are the five principles of peacekeeping operations?

Primacy of politics (the sides already agreed to stop fighting), impartiality, consent of the host country, non-use of force (lightly armed), and civilian protection.

How much does UN peacekeeping cost?

$5.6 billion for July 2024 to June 2025, down 8.2% from about $6.1 billion. That's under 0.5% of world military budgets. The US spent $6 billion per month on the 2003 to 2011 Iraq War. Soldiers are paid by their own governments, and the UN reimburses $1,428 per soldier per month (as of 2019).

Why is peacekeeping a collective action problem?

International peace and stability is a public good, so states free ride, and the UN depends on government contributions. In the class game (benefit 2 per contribution, cost 3 to contribute), Don't contribute is dominant, but both contributing (1,1) beats neither (0,0). It's a prisoner's dilemma.

What is the joint decision-making problem in peacekeeping?

States disagree on which acts are aggression and which are self-defense, and CSO members have varying and opposing interests. The fix is letting the largest states (the UNSC) decide, but that opens actions to veto. Russia blocked actions condemning its attack on Ukraine, and the US blocked actions condemning Israel's operations in Gaza.

What is the principal-agent problem in peacekeeping?

The UN struggles to control its peacekeepers. Failures to protect civilians include Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995), where peacekeepers turned refugees over to Serbian forces and over 8,000 men and boys were killed. There are also sexual abuse allegations, and peacekeepers' home governments have criminal jurisdiction over them.

What happened in Sierra Leone's peacekeeping mission?

The 1999 Lome Agreement set a ceasefire, power-sharing, and amnesty, and peacekeepers were sent to enforce it. In 2000 fighting resumed and several hundred peacekeepers were captured by the RUF. The UN raised troop numbers several times. By 2002 it had disarmed over 75,000 ex-fighters, including child soldiers, and held democratic elections. The mission ended in 2005, and 2007 elections were held without peacekeepers.

What were the high profile failures to protect civilians that shaped the 1990s?

Black Hawk Down in Mogadishu (1993): two American helicopters shot down and 18 US soldiers killed. Rwanda genocide (1994): Hutu extremists killed 800,000 to 1 million Tutsis. Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995).

Does peacekeeping work, and what's the catch?

Fortna (2008): peacekeeping cut the yearly chance a ceasefire breaks down by 85 percent in interstate wars and 60 percent in civil wars. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013): with no troops, about 106 civilians die per month, and with 8,000 UN troops about 1.79. The catch is that peacekeepers aren't deployed randomly, so results can reflect where missions go rather than what they do.

What are the four types of cooperation problems (0901/slide 25)?

Class slide lists broad interaction types: bargaining (divide something both want), then under cooperation: commitment problem (prisoner's dilemma), coordination or assurance problem (stag hunt), distribution problem (battle of the sexes), and information problem (don't know the other actor's interests).

What are the three main challenges for international peacekeeping?

Collective action problem (peace is a public good, so states free ride). Joint decision-making problem (states disagree on aggression versus self-defense, and UNSC control opens actions to veto). Principal-agent problem (the UN struggles to control peacekeepers).

What conditions make producing public goods easier (0908/slide 26), and why does it matter for domestic politics and war?

Repeated interactions (repetition enables punishment), small groups (more likely to interact again), observable free riding, a larger actor or small privileged group willing to pay while others free ride, and linkage to other issues. It matters because small, motivated groups organize and push policy easily, while large, dispersed groups with small individual stakes are hard to organize.

When and how could an alliance partner attempt to increase the credibility of an alliance?

When partners doubt the other will follow through. Class ways: issue linkages (closer policy coordination, trade, or side payments), joint military exercises to improve the ability to fight together, and placing troops in the allied country to raise the cost of abandonment (Schelling).