econ midterm ii

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91 Terms

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pigouvian tax

per-unit tax imposed on a market activity that generates a negative externality

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how does a pigovian tax work?

without intervention, firms only consider their private marginal costs (PMC) and overproduce

the tax forces firms to internalize the external cost of their production

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what should the pigovian tax be equal to?

marginal external cost (MEC)

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collusion

an agreement among firms about quantities, prices, or other dimensions of competition

these firms may try to behave collectively like a monopolist and increase their joint profits

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cartel

a group of firms that coordinates its behavior in an attempt to exercise market power

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what problem do cartels face?

incentive to cheat: once other firms restrict output, an individual member may increase its own profit by producing more

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oligopoly

market structure in which a small number of dominant firms control the majority of an industry's production, supply, and pricing

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how does oligopoly output relate to a monopolist’s?

total output is greater than monopoly output

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how does oligopoly output relate to a competitive’s?

total output is less than competitive output

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how does oligopoly market price relate to a monopolist’s?

market price is lower than the monopoly price

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how does oligopoly market price relate to the marginal cost?

market price is higher than marginal cost

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quantity of monopoly, oligopoly, and competitive

Qm < Qo < Qc

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price of monopoly, oligopoly, and competitive

Pm < Po < Pc = marginal cost

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as the number of sellers in an oligopoly increases…

  1. the market becomes more competitive

  2. price approaches marginal cost

  3. total output approaches the socially efficient quantity

(moves towards the competitive outcome)

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nash equilibrium

the end result of a prisoner’s dilemma where each player is choosing their best response to the strategies chosen by the other players

no player can improve their payoff by changing their strategy alone

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prisoner’s dilemma

a foundational game theory concept showing how rational choices made by individuals in self-interest lead to a worse outcome for the group

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how does the prisoner’s dilemma explain why collusion can be difficult to sustain?

incentive to cheat: an individual firm can increase its own profit by secretly producing more; every firm faces this same incentive to cheat

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when is a good rival?

if one person’s use reduces the amount available to others

(example: cup of coffee)

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when is a good excludable?

if nonpayers can be prevented from using it

(example: a movie ticket)

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private goods

rival and excludable

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club goods

excludable and nonrival

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common resources

nonexcludable and rival

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public goods

nonexcludable and nonrival

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finding market demand for private goods

horizontal summation: adding quantities demanded by individuals at each price

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finding market demand for public goods

vertical summation: add individual marginal benefits (or WTP) at each quantity

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social marginal benefit formula (SMB(Q)) of a public good

MBA(Q) + MBB(Q)

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socially optimal quantity (Q*) of a public good

SMB(Q*) = MC(Q*)

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the core problem with majority voting

counts people, not the strength of their WTP

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revealed preference

valuation methods that infer people’s WTP by observing their actual behavior and real-world choices in related markets

example: to valuate travel cost, observe actual trips taken and expenditures (including opportunity cost of travel time)

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stated preference

survey-based valuation methods that directly ask people about hypothetical policies, chances, or bundles to elicit their stated WTP

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revealed preference vs. stated preference

revealed preferences use observed behavior; stated preferences capture nonuse values that behavior may not reveal

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criticisms of stated preferences

  1. hypothetical bias

  2. WTP vs WTA gap

  3. unformed preferences & survey framing

  4. scope insensitivity (people fail to scale their financial valuation of a problem in proportion to its actual size or magnitude)

  5. adding-up inconsistency


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hedonic property values

a revealed preference method that infers WTP for environmental quality (like cleaner air, less noise, or nearby open space) by comparing housing prices while controlling for other home and neighborhood characteristics (size, location, schools)

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hedonic wages

a revealed preference method that infers the compensation workers require for greater workplace risk by comparing wages across jobs while controlling for worker and job characteristics (such as skills and working conditions)

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what is the main empirical caution when using hedonic property or wage methods?

correlation does not equal causation

if confounding factors (like environmental amenities or job risks) aren’t controlled for, the estimated WTP will be biased

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value of a statistical life (VSL)

WTP for a small mortality-risk reduction, scaled to one expected death avoided

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VSL formula

WTP per person/risk reduction per person

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where does demand come from?

consumers maximizing satisfaction subject to budget constraint

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<p>budget graph interpretation: on the line</p>

budget graph interpretation: on the line

all income spent

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<p>budget graph interpretation: inside the line (shaded blue)</p>

budget graph interpretation: inside the line (shaded blue)

affordable, money left

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<p>budget graph interpretation: outside the line</p>

budget graph interpretation: outside the line

not affordable

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slope of the budget line

opportunity cost

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what happens to the budget line when income changes?

fall in income: budget line shifts inward in parallel

rise in income: budget line shifts outward in parallel

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what happens to the budget line when one price changes?

pivots around the intercept of the good whose price did not change

price rises: intercept moves inward

price falls: intercept moves outward

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properties of indifference curves (derived from bundles)

  1. every bundle on the same indifference curve yields equal satisfaction

  2. higher indifference curves mean more satisfaction (if both goods are desirable)

  3. curves cannot intersect (if preferences are consistent)

  4. downward sloping (because giving up one good requires gaining more of the other)


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marginal rate of substitution (MRS)

the amount of good Y a consumer is willing to give up for one more unit of good X (holding utility constant)

absolute value of the indifference curve’s slope

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diminishing marginal rate of substitution (MRS)

along a typical indifference curve, the more X you already have, the less Y you are willing to give up for another unit of X

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<p>perfect substitutes</p>

perfect substitutes

constant tradeoff

straight-line indifference curves

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<p>perfect complements</p>

perfect complements

fixed proportions

L-shaped indifference curves

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graphically finding the optimal bundle

chose the bundle on the budget line that reaches the highest attainable indifference curve (may not be the actual highest curve, as it might lie outside of the budget and be unaffordable)

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mathematically finding the optimal bundle

tangency condition: willingness to trade = ability to trade

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tangency condition formula

MRSx, y = pricex/pricey

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movement along the demand curve

caused only by a change in the good’s own price (px), holding income, other prices, and preferences fixed

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shift in demand

caused by a change in income, preferences, or prices of related goods

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absorptive capacity

the environment’s ability to absorb pollutants

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stock pollutants

persist and accumulate because absorptive capacity is little or absent

(example: carbon dioxide)

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fund/flow pollutants

the environment can absorb some of the pollution flow

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local, regional, and global pollutants

classified by how far damages extend from the emission source

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abatement

the amount of pollution a firm prevents from entering the environment comapred to its unregulated baseline

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marginal control cost (MCC)

the additional cost a firm or society incurs to reduce pollution, emissions, or waste by one extra unit

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marginal damage (MD)

additional economic or environmental harm caused by one extra unit of an emission, pollutant, or activity

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MCC(E*) =

MD(E*)

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below E*

extra pollution saves more control cost than the damage it causes

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above E*

extra pollution causes more damage than the control cost saved

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cost effectiveness

achieving any given pollution reduction target at the lowest possible total cost

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efficiency

choosing the socially optimal level of pollution (E*) where marginal cost equals marginal damage AND achieving that reduction cost-effectively

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equimarginal principle

to minimize total abatement costs across multiple polluters, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of the last unit abated must be equal across all firms

MAC1 = MAC2

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tradable permits (cap-and-trade)

fix the total quantity of emissions (the cap)

market determines permit price (p)

firms trade permits until MAC = p

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who buys vs. sells permits?

high-MAC firms (expensive to clean up) buy permits and abate less

low-MAC firms (cheap to clean up) sell permits and abate more

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tax vs. permits

tax fixes the per-unit price

permit fixes total emissions

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non-uniformly mixing pollutants

pollutant in which location matters (1 ton emitted upwind of a major city or right upstream of a drinking water intake causes way more damage than 1 ton emitted far away)

(examples: particulate matter, nitrous oxide, smoke from fires)

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transfer coefficient (ai)

measures how much pollution concentration at a specific receptor (R; e.g. city or lake) changes when source i emits 1 additional unit

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KR (concentration at R) =

background pollution (B) + each source’s emissions weighted by its transfer coefficient (ai)

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new equimarginal rule (when location matters)

MAC1/a1 = MAC2/a2

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intuition behind new equimarginal rule (when location matters)

  1. a source with a larger transfer coefficient (ai) delivers more improvement at R (specific receptor) per ton abated

  2. equalizing costs per ton of emissions is generally not cost-effective when transfer coefficients differ


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coase theorem

if property rights are well defined and bargaining costs (transaction costs) are low, private parties can negotiate to an efficient allocation, regardless of who initially owns the property rights

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how should we evaluate public policies?

efficiency and distribution

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when is a change a pareto improvement?

at least one person becomes better off

no one becomes worse off

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when is a policy a kaldor-hicks improvement?

winners could compensate the losers and still be better off

compensation need not actually occur

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net benefits

total benefits = total costs

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decision rule

adopt a policy when its social net benefits are positive when accounting for opportunity costs, subject to relevant distributional considerations

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opportunity cost of capital

money available today can be invested and earn a return

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time preferences

people may value consumption today moret han the same consumption later

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changing consumption levels

a future dollar may have different value if future generations are richer or poorer

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future value (FVt): interest rates move dollars foward in time

PV(1 + r)t

PV = present value

r = interest rate

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prevent value (PV): discounting reverses compounding

FVt / (1 + r)t

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what does a more distant payment mean for the present value?

lowers the present value when r>0

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what does a higher discount rate mean for the present value?

lowers the present value for a fixed future payment

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social discount rate: descriptive approach

look to observed market interest rates and returns to infer how people trade off consumption today against consumption later

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social discount rate: prescriptive approach

use ethical judgments and economic reasoning to determine how society ought to value future welfare

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ramsey formula

r = p + ng

p = pure rate of time preference

n = elasticity of marginal utility

g = growth rate of consumption per person