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momentum effect/hot-hand belief
success breeds success; failure brings more failure
gambler’s fallacy
recent run makes opposite outcome “due” to happen to balance outcomes (despite no underlying processes forcing the correction)
random sequence
well-mixed sequence in which outcomes alternate w no conspicuous patterns
clustering
when outcomes bunch together
law of small numbers
mistaken belief that a small sample should resemble its source almost as faithfully as a large one
small sample doesn’t have much stability
sample size neglect
makes temporary variation look like a stable regularity
regression toward the mean
following attempts are closer to ordinary performance (back to more typical/expected result); esp important when a case is selected bc its result is unusual
regression fallacy
attributing the natural return toward the average to an intervention
creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop
counterfactual
what probably would’ve happened w/out the proposed cause
usually unseen/unknown
sampling process
how the sample was chosen
survivorship bias
studying only the cases that endured a process while overlooking those that did not
MPG illusion
bc MPG doesn’t change in direct proportion to fuel consumption, apparently large gains at the efficient end of the scale can save less gas than much smaller gains at the inefficient end
denominator neglect
focusing on absolute # of occurrences (numerator) while ignoring the total # of possibilities (denominator), leading to distorted probability assessments
description invariance
requires choice to remain stable across equivilant descriptions
if not, the change is informative
broad framing
evaluating a series of related choices together rather than judging each one in isolation
one-way doors
choices that, once crossed, are difficult, expensive, or impossible to undo
ex. accepting a position that requires relocating across the country
two-way doors
choices that allow easy return passage
conditional probabilities
probabilities calculated under a specified condition
ex.: probability that someone is hospitalized, given that they are in a coma = very high
probability that someone is in a coma, given that they’re hospitalized = very low
sensitivity
the proportion of people with the condition who correctly receive a positive test result
formula = true positives / true positives + false negatives
specificity
the proportion of people without the condition who correctly receive a negative test result
formula = true negatives / true negatives + false positives
base rate/prevalence
proportion of comparable people with the condition before the test result is known
frequency tree
method of working through base rate, sensitivity, & specificity
natural frequencies
counts of people within the population
useful when conditional properties become difficult to interpret
positive predictive value
the probability that a person actually has the condition (disease) given that they received a positive test result
formula = true positives / true positives + false positives
base-rate neglect
ignoring the starting proportion (base rate)
bayesian updating
new evidence revises an initial probability rather than replacing it
overdiagnosis
finding is real, but detecting or treating it may create burdens w/out improving the patient’s life
takeaway: info gained through testing must be evaluated as part of a decision process, not treated as automatically benefici
affective forecasting
trying to predict how we will feel after an outcome
emotions can distort judgment when particulary vivid emotionally possibility dominates alternatives that’re more probable but easier to overlook
status quo bias
tendency to favor an existing arrangement simply bc it is already in place
“staying” just appears neutral but is indeed a decision you’re making
action effect
bad outcomes following an action generate more regret than comparable outcomes following inactivity
reinforces status quo bias
anticipated regret
expected regret following a decision/outcome
causal hypothesis
an account of the process that produced the facts
WYSIATI — what you see is all there is
cognitive shortcut where brain makes quick judgments using only facts it has right now, ignoring any missing info
coherence
hypothesis elements supported one another & fit into a unified account
ex. physician needs some account of what is causing a patient’s symptoms
underdetermination
the evidence available so far doesn’t uniquely identify the explanation that produced it
a coherent fit is NOT sufficient
cognitive ease
the feeling that the pieces belong together & the situation makes sense
familiarity makes info easier to process — still not proof tho
diagnosticity
extent to which a piece of evidence favors 1 possibile explanation over its plausable rivals
the quality of a judgment lies in the PROCESS
confirmation bias
tendency to seek, notice, or interpret evidence in ways that support an existing belief
selective attention
in a crowded scene, some actions receive attention while others remain in the background
basking in reflected glory — BIRGing
tendency to associate onself with the success of others
cutting off reflected failure — CORFing
attempt to distance oneself from an unsuccessful group
motivational reasoning
thinking pulled toward a desired conclusion
identity protection
conclusion helps defend a valued affiliation
changing one’s mind feels like surrendering to the other side
biased assimilation
new info is judged partly according to how comfortably it joins the belief already in place
easily accept favorable info but subject unwelcome info to more demanding scrutiny
naive realism
tendency to experience one’s own view as a different reading of reality while treating a conflicting view as the product of ignorance, irrationality, or bias
feels like perception rather than judgment
simulation heuristic
mental shortcut, substitutes ease of constructing a mental sequence for a careful assessment of whether that sequence will actually succeed
detailed plan; involved attribute substition
inside view
when planners concentrate on the project’s particular design, personnel, sequence, & challenges
planning fallacy
tendency to underestimate time, money, & effort future tasks will require — even when comparable tasks have repeatedly failed to follow their plans
optimism bias
broader tendency to expect desireable outcomes to be more likely, & undesireable outcomes less likely, than the evidence warrents —> unrealistic starting point
reference class
broad group of past projects similar enough to provide a meaningful comparison
don’t exclude unsuccessful projects!
outside view
supplied by reference class—> changes burden of proof for adjustment
shows how far projects like it usually stray from path
reference-class forecasting
systematic use of comparable projects
strategic misrepresentation
presents favorable estimate bc it improves the project’a chance of approval, even while suspecting final estimate will be worse
decision quality
concerns the process used to choose
outcome quality
concerns what happens after a decision
hindsight bias
once people know the outcome, they overestimate how predictable it would’ve been—> distorts remembered certainty
hindsight even harder to resist when we’re evaluating a choice we made ourselves
counterfactual thinking
allows either story to be compared w/what actually happened
evaluation across cases can reveal what a single outcome cannot
considering the opposite
before choosing, ask what could make the preferred option disappoint & what could make the alternative succeed
after outcome is known, reverse the exercise (alternate endings restore some of the uncertainty that the actual outcome erased)
risk transfer
paying insurance companies to assume much of the financial risk of an accident
self-insurance
instead of paying premiums to an insurer, they retain the risk, reserved money for accidents, & paid claims from own resources
risk pooling
combining risks so larger group (all those who don’t make claims) can cover the losses of smaller group (those who made a claim)
narrow framing
presenting something with a specific outcome
ex. when buying a new laptop, narrow framing is salesperson presenting just 1 frightening option of what could happen to it (to encourage you to buy warranty)
risk policy
a rule chosen in advance for deciding which risks to transfer to someone else & which to retain
over-insurance
buyer repeatedly pays someone else to assume losses that accumulated savings could have covered more cheaply
self-insurance makes the opposite trade
catastrophic loss
when an unpredictable loss would be too large for a household to absorb
low probability doesn’t make them safe to ignore bc consequences could be ruinous
absorbable loss
loss can be paid from savings or ordinary income w/out causing lasting financial damage
sunk cost
an investment of time or money once spent & unrecoverable
sunk cost fallacy
“we’ve spent too much time/money to stop now” — fallacy = allowing that loss to govern next investment
past remains powerful psychologically
mental accounting
people often organize outcomes into separate psychological accounts associated w/a purchase, project, goal, career, or relationship
escalation of commitment
an initital commitment creates pressure to continue, & continuation strengthens that pressure
fresh-start test
if we inherited this problem today, w/no responsibility for its history, would we invest the next dollar?
no personal need to prove something
stopping rule (not from frugal tree)
safeguard to establish before commitment becomes difficult to reverse
creates deliberate opportunities to reconsider (ex. temporary laws)
unconscious bias
occurs when automatic attitudes, associations, or expectations systematically shape judgment outside a person’s awareness
halo effect
a favorable impression created by 1 characteristic colors judgments of other qualities that should be evaluated separately
algorithmic decision making
using an algorithm like 5pt scales to make decisions easier
can still be influenced by bias — but limits its influences
equal weighting
adding every weighting gives each attribute equal weight
there are other decisions that call for unequal weights — weighting simply means deciding that some attributes should count more
conformity
people often adjust what they say, or choose not to say, to fit what appears to be the group’s consensus
groupthink
result of when pressure for agreement becomes strong enough to discourage criticism + narrow the consideration of alternatives
premortem
imagines the failure has already occurred + asks participants to explain what caused it while the plan can still be changed (after first generating their explanations independently before discussing)
alters the social meaning of criticism — ideantifying risks is the assignment
devil’s advocate
appoint 1 person to challenge the emerging consensus
psychological safety
when team members believe they can admit mistakes, ask questions, & raise concerns w/out humiliation or punishment
strongest protection comes from combining climate w/procedure
superforecasters
prediction success persisted across different questions & successive rounds of the tournament
approached uncertainty systematically, examined competing possibilities, + remained willing to change their minds
decomposition
breaking 1 intimidating question into smaller questions that can be investigated more clearly; located uncertainty inside the larger problem
reveals a chain of events w/multiple prerequisites — each creates a more manageable inquiry
forecast trajectory
the path a prediction follows as evidence accumulates
each revision must be justified by what the new evidence actually changes
resolution
ability to distinguish events with different probabilities
good forecasting requires both calibration & resolution
active open-mindedness
treating contrary evidence as info to investigate rather than an obstacle to defeat
intellectual humility
keeping confidence proportionate to the evidence + allowing revision to count as learning rather than failure
experiencing self
lives through each successive moment — each hour is real while it occurs, whether or not it’ll later become memorable
remembering self
looks back and answers Q: how was the trip?
memory compresses — selects scenes, emphasizes turning points, + constructs an account w/a beginning, development, & end (problem when this is mistaken for a complete record of the experience)
peak-end rule
tendency to build an overall judgment around an experiences most intense moments & its ending
these moments don’t always determine verdict, but can stand in for much longer streak of experience
duration neglect
when judging an extended experience, people may surprisingly give little weight to how long its pleasure or pain lasted
ending can transform what came before, even when not necessarily representative or useful (matters when used to forecast
opt-in rule
defaul = no; need to register to become organ donor
opt-out rule
default = yes; treated as potential donors unless they registered an objection
default
option produed when no one acts
opt-in/out rules assign opposite consequences to inaction
active choice
no one forced to donate; required only to state a preference
asks everyone to make a decision, but can make expressing either preference very easy (little effort)
choice architeecture
all the design elements + how they’re arranged
no environment is completely neutral — arrrangement may help shape the preference it appears merely to record
nudge
a change in choice architecture that predictably influence behavior w/out prohibiting options or substantially changing economic incentives
libertarian paternalism
requires people remain free to choose & supports design choices to help people act consistently w/their own goals, values, and preferences (like a parent knowing what’s best for their child)
sludge
excessive or unjustified friction that makes it harder for people to obtain an outcome they want
ex. repeated cancellation screens designed to discourage customers from leaving)
present bias
extra pull of immediate costs & rewards
ex. when trying to lose weight, comfy bed is more appealing than going to gym early