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Vocabulary practice flashcards covering rich vs. thin perception, affective perception, intentionalism, mental imagery theories, amodal completion, and cognitive impenetrability.
Strong Rich View
The view that perceptual experience necessarily represents high-level properties for any perceiver, whether human or non-human.
Weak Rich View
The view defended by Bayne stating that the perceptual experiences of typical adult human beings represent high-level properties.
Thin View
The view that perceptual experience represents low-level properties only.
Associative Visual Agnosia
A condition characterized by intact processing of form alongside impaired recognition and categorization of objects.
Apperceptive Visual Agnosia
A condition characterized by impaired perceptual processing of form, which leads to impaired object recognition.
Bayne's Argument from Associative Agnosia
The argument that because associative visual agnosia patients share our representation of low-level properties but have a different phenomenal character, the phenomenal difference must stem from high-level properties, showing that perception represents high-level properties.

Perceptual Model vs. Doxastic Model
Two opposing models of object recognition: the perceptual model places recognition inside perception (built upon color, shape, and texture processing) before cognition, whereas the doxastic model situates recognition entirely within cognition above perceptual processing.
Doxastic Model of Object Recognition
A model of object recognition where recognition occurs at the cognitive level rather than the perceptual level, undermining Bayne's argument by implying agnosics differ cognitively rather than perceptually.
Phenomenal Contrast Argument
An argument maintaining that a difference in phenomenal character between two experiences (E1 and E2) is best explained by the hypothesis that E1 represents a rich property that E2 does not.
Byrne's Greeble Argument
An argument supporting the Thin View via an analogy between expert perception of greebles and high-level kinds (such as pine trees), showing that expert phenomenal contrast is most parsimoniously explained by the perceptual representation of low-level shape gestalts.
Shape Gestalt
A complex low-level property of shape, size, and arrangement that can explain phenomenal contrast in expert perception without appealing to high-level properties.
Affective Perception
The thesis that visual experience itself possesses an intrinsic affective charge, contrasting with post-perceptual emotion where emotional responses occur after or about the experience.
Content-Based View of Affective Perception
The view that perceptual experience directly represents evaluative properties (such as good, bad, disgusting, or scary) alongside low-level sensory properties.
Attitude-Based View of Affective Perception
The view that affective charge is built into the attitude through which perceptual experience represents its content, altering the state's functional role in human psychology.
Rich-Content Model of Affective Perception
A model proposing that affectively charged visual experience consists in visual content representing thin evaluative properties alongside shape, color, and motion.
Thin Evaluative Properties
Simple, purely evaluative categories such as 'good' or 'bad', which contrast with thick, more informative evaluative properties like 'disgusting', 'generous', or 'cowardly'.
No Sensory Look Objection
An objection to the Rich-Content Model arguing that thin evaluative properties (valence) do not have a unique sensory appearance because valence either does not look like anything or looks like too many things.
Layered-Attitude Model
de Vignemont's model proposing that affectively charged visual experience consists of a visual experience representing the world bound with a primitive evaluative attitude (such as a bare 'thumbs up' or 'thumbs down') directed toward a perceived object.
Pautz's Exclusion Law for Color
The law stating that no experience can represent a single region as both pure red and pure blue at the same time.
Pautz's Exclusion Law for Shape
The law stating that no experience can represent an object as both determinately square and determinately circular at the same time.
Intentionalism
The view that experiencing is analogous to believing, such that to experience X is simply to represent an X-like thing before you.
Existence Neutrality
The intentionalist commitment holding that it can visually appear to a subject that something is F even if no F exists in their vicinity, thereby rejecting the phenomenal principle.
Rock's Inferential Approach to Perception
The theory that perceptual systems construct environmental representations through an intelligent, reasoning-like problem-solving process by applying rules to sensory input.
Apparent Motion
The visual perception of continuous movement created by flashing stimuli successively in distinct spatial locations, analyzed by Rock as rule-based problem-solving.
Descriptive Theory of Mental Imagery
The theory that visual mental imagery relies on sentence-like representations composed of arbitrary symbols that refer without resembling the objects they depict.
Depictive Theory of Mental Imagery
The theory that visual mental imagery consists of picture-like (iconic) representations realized as physical brain states.
Image Scanning Experiment
An experimental paradigm demonstrating that scanning time increases positively with distance across a visualized map, supporting the depictive view's claim that the mind's eye shifts across intermediate spatial locations.
Mental Rotation Experiment
An experiment showing a linear relationship between reaction time and the angular separation between depicted objects, supporting depictive theories over sentential descriptions.
Amodal Perception
The perceptual representation of a complete object even though portions of that object are occluded from view and provide no sensory stimulation.
Perception Account of Amodal Perception
The account claiming that occluded features of objects are literally and veridically seen, which Nanay rejects because perception requires sensory stimulation.
Belief Account of Amodal Perception
The account asserting that occluded portions are represented via post-perceptual beliefs formed from visible parts and prior knowledge, rejected by Nanay due to perceptual inflexibility and early visual cortex activity.
Nanay's Imagery Account of Amodal Perception
The theory that occluded parts of an object are perceptually represented via automatic mental imagery, implying ordinary perceptual experience is ubiquitously suffused with imagery.
Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception
The architectural thesis endorsed by Firestone and Scholl asserting that perceptual systems are modular and cannot have their experiential contents altered directly by higher cognitive states.
El Greco Fallacy
The error of assuming that an internal perceptual distortion will lead to an equivalent distortion in outward production, failing to realize that the external medium would be perceived with that same distortion.