Philosophy of Perception and Mental Representation

0.0(0)
Studied by 0 people
call kaiCall Kai
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
GameKnowt Play
Card Sorting

1/33

flashcard set

Earn XP

Description and Tags

Vocabulary practice flashcards covering rich vs. thin perception, affective perception, intentionalism, mental imagery theories, amodal completion, and cognitive impenetrability.

34 Terms

1
New cards

Strong Rich View

The view that perceptual experience necessarily represents high-level properties for any perceiver, whether human or non-human.

2
New cards

Weak Rich View

The view defended by Bayne stating that the perceptual experiences of typical adult human beings represent high-level properties.

3
New cards

Thin View

The view that perceptual experience represents low-level properties only.

4
New cards

Associative Visual Agnosia

A condition characterized by intact processing of form alongside impaired recognition and categorization of objects.

5
New cards

Apperceptive Visual Agnosia

A condition characterized by impaired perceptual processing of form, which leads to impaired object recognition.

6
New cards

Bayne's Argument from Associative Agnosia

The argument that because associative visual agnosia patients share our representation of low-level properties but have a different phenomenal character, the phenomenal difference must stem from high-level properties, showing that perception represents high-level properties.

7
New cards
<p>Perceptual Model vs. Doxastic Model</p>

Perceptual Model vs. Doxastic Model

Two opposing models of object recognition: the perceptual model places recognition inside perception (built upon color, shape, and texture processing) before cognition, whereas the doxastic model situates recognition entirely within cognition above perceptual processing.

8
New cards

Doxastic Model of Object Recognition

A model of object recognition where recognition occurs at the cognitive level rather than the perceptual level, undermining Bayne's argument by implying agnosics differ cognitively rather than perceptually.

9
New cards

Phenomenal Contrast Argument

An argument maintaining that a difference in phenomenal character between two experiences (E1E_1 and E2E_2) is best explained by the hypothesis that E1E_1 represents a rich property that E2E_2 does not.

10
New cards

Byrne's Greeble Argument

An argument supporting the Thin View via an analogy between expert perception of greebles and high-level kinds (such as pine trees), showing that expert phenomenal contrast is most parsimoniously explained by the perceptual representation of low-level shape gestalts.

11
New cards

Shape Gestalt

A complex low-level property of shape, size, and arrangement that can explain phenomenal contrast in expert perception without appealing to high-level properties.

12
New cards

Affective Perception

The thesis that visual experience itself possesses an intrinsic affective charge, contrasting with post-perceptual emotion where emotional responses occur after or about the experience.

13
New cards

Content-Based View of Affective Perception

The view that perceptual experience directly represents evaluative properties (such as good, bad, disgusting, or scary) alongside low-level sensory properties.

14
New cards

Attitude-Based View of Affective Perception

The view that affective charge is built into the attitude through which perceptual experience represents its content, altering the state's functional role in human psychology.

15
New cards

Rich-Content Model of Affective Perception

A model proposing that affectively charged visual experience consists in visual content representing thin evaluative properties alongside shape, color, and motion.

16
New cards

Thin Evaluative Properties

Simple, purely evaluative categories such as 'good' or 'bad', which contrast with thick, more informative evaluative properties like 'disgusting', 'generous', or 'cowardly'.

17
New cards

No Sensory Look Objection

An objection to the Rich-Content Model arguing that thin evaluative properties (valence) do not have a unique sensory appearance because valence either does not look like anything or looks like too many things.

18
New cards

Layered-Attitude Model

de Vignemont's model proposing that affectively charged visual experience consists of a visual experience representing the world bound with a primitive evaluative attitude (such as a bare 'thumbs up' or 'thumbs down') directed toward a perceived object.

19
New cards

Pautz's Exclusion Law for Color

The law stating that no experience can represent a single region as both pure red and pure blue at the same time.

20
New cards

Pautz's Exclusion Law for Shape

The law stating that no experience can represent an object as both determinately square and determinately circular at the same time.

21
New cards

Intentionalism

The view that experiencing is analogous to believing, such that to experience XX is simply to represent an XX-like thing before you.

22
New cards

Existence Neutrality

The intentionalist commitment holding that it can visually appear to a subject that something is FF even if no FF exists in their vicinity, thereby rejecting the phenomenal principle.

23
New cards

Rock's Inferential Approach to Perception

The theory that perceptual systems construct environmental representations through an intelligent, reasoning-like problem-solving process by applying rules to sensory input.

24
New cards

Apparent Motion

The visual perception of continuous movement created by flashing stimuli successively in distinct spatial locations, analyzed by Rock as rule-based problem-solving.

25
New cards

Descriptive Theory of Mental Imagery

The theory that visual mental imagery relies on sentence-like representations composed of arbitrary symbols that refer without resembling the objects they depict.

26
New cards

Depictive Theory of Mental Imagery

The theory that visual mental imagery consists of picture-like (iconic) representations realized as physical brain states.

27
New cards

Image Scanning Experiment

An experimental paradigm demonstrating that scanning time increases positively with distance across a visualized map, supporting the depictive view's claim that the mind's eye shifts across intermediate spatial locations.

28
New cards

Mental Rotation Experiment

An experiment showing a linear relationship between reaction time and the angular separation between depicted objects, supporting depictive theories over sentential descriptions.

29
New cards

Amodal Perception

The perceptual representation of a complete object even though portions of that object are occluded from view and provide no sensory stimulation.

30
New cards

Perception Account of Amodal Perception

The account claiming that occluded features of objects are literally and veridically seen, which Nanay rejects because perception requires sensory stimulation.

31
New cards

Belief Account of Amodal Perception

The account asserting that occluded portions are represented via post-perceptual beliefs formed from visible parts and prior knowledge, rejected by Nanay due to perceptual inflexibility and early visual cortex activity.

32
New cards

Nanay's Imagery Account of Amodal Perception

The theory that occluded parts of an object are perceptually represented via automatic mental imagery, implying ordinary perceptual experience is ubiquitously suffused with imagery.

33
New cards

Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception

The architectural thesis endorsed by Firestone and Scholl asserting that perceptual systems are modular and cannot have their experiential contents altered directly by higher cognitive states.

34
New cards

El Greco Fallacy

The error of assuming that an internal perceptual distortion will lead to an equivalent distortion in outward production, failing to realize that the external medium would be perceived with that same distortion.