Collective action 2 W6 P2

Tragedy of the commons

Owners increases their herd to maximise individual benefit, leads to overgrazing of pasture and shared impacts

Governing the commons

Ostrom, individuals cannot overcome collective actions problems PDs, need externally enforced rules

Risky regulation

Ostrom, central agency punishes defection with probability y and fails 1-y, cooperative actions are punished x and not punished 1-x - errors in regulation change game back to prisoners dilemma

Privatization

assign property rights to incentivise private regulation, could lead to exhaustion from property owners - Ostrom

Self-regulation

Ostrom, individuals should make and regulate efficient rules and contractual arrangements, know carrying capacity best

Polycentric governance

Ostrom, advocates for federalism or mirco-governance, smaller political units are better at monitoring and duplication of services are rare