Psychology – Schemas, Cognition & Memory

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80 Terms

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Piaget

Jean Piaget was a developmental psychologist whose theory describes how children organize knowledge into schemas and adapt those schemas through assimilation and accommodation.

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Mental representations

Internal representations of objects, events, concepts, and knowledge. They can guide interpretation, expectations, decisions, and behavior.

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Pruning

Synaptic pruning is the elimination of weaker, less-used, or excess neural connections as neural networks become refined.

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Paradigm

A shared framework of theories, assumptions, concepts, and methods that guides a scientific community in asking questions and interpreting evidence.

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Neuron

A specialized nerve cell that receives, integrates, and transmits information. Neurons communicate using electrical signals within cells and chemical signaling at many synapses.

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Reconstruction

Memory reconstruction is the process of actively rebuilding an event during recall rather than replaying a perfect recording. Current knowledge and schemas can influence the result.

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Cognitive load

The amount of information-processing demand placed on limited working-memory resources at a given time.

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Inattentional blindness

Failure to notice an unexpected, visible object or event because attention is focused on another task.

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Top-down processing

Processing in which prior knowledge, context, expectations, and goals influence how incoming sensory information is interpreted.

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Assimilation

In Piagetian theory, interpreting new information through an existing schema without changing the schema itself.

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Accommodation

In Piagetian theory, revising an existing schema or creating a new one when new information cannot be adequately handled by the old framework.

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Synaptogenesis

The formation of new synapses, the specialized junctions through which neurons communicate.

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Resistant to change

Schemas often preserve familiar expectations. People may reinterpret, discount, or overlook information that conflicts with an established schema, although schemas are not impossible to change.

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Closure

A Gestalt principle of perceptual organization in which people perceive incomplete shapes as complete by mentally filling in missing parts.

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Priming

Prior exposure to a stimulus or concept increases the accessibility of related information and can bias a later response or perception.

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Cognitive dissonance

Aversive psychological tension produced by inconsistency among beliefs, attitudes, values, or behavior. People may reduce it by changing beliefs or behavior, adding justifications, or minimizing the conflict.

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Anomaly

A finding or observation that does not fit expectations generated by the accepted scientific paradigm.

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Gestalt

An approach to psychology and perception emphasizing organized wholes and patterns rather than treating experience as only a collection of isolated parts.

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Cognitive miser(s)

The idea that people often conserve mental effort by relying on simple rules, habits, schemas, or heuristics when those are sufficient.

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Selective attention

The process of selecting some information for focused processing while other available information receives less attention.

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Long-term potentiation

A relatively enduring increase in synaptic efficacy after repeated or appropriately timed neural activity. It is one mechanism studied in relation to learning and memory.

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Hebbian postulate

Donald Hebb's proposed principle that repeated or correlated activity between a presynaptic cell and a postsynaptic cell can strengthen the connection.

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Neuroplasticity

The nervous system's capacity to change its connections, organization, or function in response to experience, learning, development, or injury.

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Schema

An organized knowledge structure or mental framework built from experience. It helps people categorize, interpret, predict, and remember information.

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Synapse

A specialized junction where a neuron communicates with another neuron or target cell. It includes the presynaptic side, synaptic cleft, and postsynaptic side.

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Change blindness

Failure to detect an alteration in a visual scene, especially when the change occurs during a brief interruption, eye movement, or other disruption.

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Cognitive equilibrium

A relatively balanced state in which existing schemas adequately organize experience. In Piagetian theory, surprising information can disturb equilibrium and encourage adaptation.

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Equilibration

The ongoing process of restoring cognitive balance by coordinating assimilation and accommodation as a person encounters new information.

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Perceptual set

A readiness or expectation to perceive an ambiguous stimulus in a particular way. It can be shaped by context, prior experience, and priming.

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Script

A type of event schema representing the usual sequence of actions in a familiar situation, such as ordering food in a restaurant.

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Prototype

The most typical or representative example of a category, used as a reference point when categorizing new items.

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Self-schema

An organized set of beliefs and knowledge about oneself that influences attention, interpretation, memory, and behavior.

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Social schema

A knowledge structure about people, roles, groups, or social situations that guides expectations and interpretation.

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Schema activation

The process by which a cue, context, or goal makes a relevant schema accessible for interpreting current information.

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Schema-consistent information

Information that fits an existing schema. It may be processed fluently and can sometimes be falsely supplied during recall.

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Schema-inconsistent information

Information that conflicts with an existing schema. It may attract attention because it is unusual, but it can also be overlooked, distorted, or remembered less well.

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Working memory

A limited-capacity system that temporarily holds and manipulates information while a person performs a task.

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Encoding

The processes through which incoming information is transformed into a form that can be retained in memory.

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Retrieval

Accessing information that has been stored in memory. Retrieval cues and the currently active schema can influence what comes to mind.

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Retrieval cue

A prompt or piece of associated information that helps bring a stored memory to mind.

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Misinformation effect

A memory distortion in which misleading information encountered after an event influences later reports or recollections of the event.

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False memory

A recollection of an event that did not happen or a materially inaccurate recollection of an event that did happen.

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Endogenous attention

Voluntary, goal-directed attention guided by internal intentions or task instructions, such as deliberately counting passes.

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Exogenous attention

Stimulus-driven attention captured automatically by an external event, such as a sudden flash or fast-moving object.

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Paradigm shift

A major change in a scientific field's basic framework after persistent anomalies or conceptual developments make the established paradigm inadequate.

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Hippocampus

A brain structure important for forming and organizing certain memories and for spatial navigation; it is associated with the taxi-driver study.

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Bruner and Postman (1949), Anomalous playing cards: what was the method?

"Twenty-eight Harvard and Radcliffe students viewed ordinary playing cards and ""trick"" cards in which suit and color were mismatched, such as a red spade or a black heart. Cards were flashed briefly in a tachistoscope at progressively longer exposure durations. Participants reported what they saw."

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Bruner and Postman (1949), Anomalous playing cards: what were the findings and implication?

Normal cards were recognized at a much shorter average exposure threshold than incongruous cards: about 28 milliseconds versus 114 milliseconds in the reported analysis. Participants often initially reported a familiar, expected card, or gave a compromise description, rather than immediately identifying the mismatch. Interpretation: Perception is not determined by the stimulus alone. Expectations built from experience can shape the interpretation of sensory input, and people can resist recognizing information that violates an established perceptual schema.

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Bugelski and Alampay (1961), Rat-man figure: what was the method?

Participants first saw a series of pictures that were predominantly animals or predominantly people. They were then shown an ambiguous drawing that could be interpreted as either a rat or a human face and asked what they saw.

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Bugelski and Alampay (1961), Rat-man figure: what were the findings and implication?

Participants primed with animal pictures were more likely to interpret the ambiguous figure as a rat. Participants primed with human faces were more likely to see a man. Interpretation: Prior exposure can prime a category and create a perceptual set. The active expectation makes one interpretation of ambiguous sensory information more accessible than another.

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Bransford and Johnson (1972), Laundry passage: what was the method?

"Participants listened to a deliberately vague passage describing a familiar procedure without naming it. In different conditions, they received the topic ""washing clothes"" before the passage, after the passage, or not at all. They rated comprehension and then recalled the passage."

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Bransford and Johnson (1972), Laundry passage: what were the findings and implication?

The group given the useful topic before hearing the passage understood it better and recalled more ideas. Giving the same topic afterward did not provide the same benefit; it came too late to guide comprehension as the passage unfolded. Interpretation: Activating a relevant schema before information arrives gives the listener an organizing framework. The schema helps the listener interpret otherwise disconnected details and encode a coherent meaning.

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Bransford and Johnson (1972), Balloon passage: what was the method?

In Experiment I of the paper, participants heard a passage about balloons, distance, windows, electricity, a wire, and a musical accompaniment. One group saw the appropriate context picture before the passage; comparison groups saw the picture afterward, saw a partial picture with the objects arranged in an unhelpful way, or received no context. The original experiment included 50 high-school volunteers, with 10 per condition.

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Bransford and Johnson (1972), Balloon passage: what were the findings and implication?

The appropriate picture shown before the passage produced much higher comprehension ratings and recall. In the original results table, the context-before group averaged 6.10 out of 7 for comprehension and 8.00 out of 14 idea units recalled; the no-context group averaged 2.30 and 3.60, respectively. The context-after and partial-context groups did not match the context-before group. Interpretation: A schema requires meaningful relationships among details, not merely exposure to the same objects. The correct context lets the listener build a coherent mental model while processing the passage.

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Findling et al. (2025), Prior information in mouse decision-making: what was the method?

Mice performed a visual decision task. A grating stimulus appeared on the left or right, and the probability of each side changed across blocks of trials, with prior probabilities alternating between 0.2 and 0.8. Researchers analyzed decision behavior and brain-wide neural recordings and imaging.

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Findling et al. (2025), Prior information in mouse decision-making: what were the findings and implication?

Mice learned or estimated the current prior probability and used it to improve decision accuracy. Neural representations of prior information were found across multiple brain areas. Interpretation: The brain uses prior information about the environment when interpreting current sensory evidence and making decisions. This is a modern neuroscience example of how expectation can influence processing.

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Speisman et al. (1964), Film soundtracks: what was the method?

Participants watched a silent film depicting a culturally unfamiliar and potentially disturbing ritual. Researchers compared the silent version with three voice-over soundtracks: one that emphasized threat and harm, one using denial and reaction-formation framing, and one encouraging intellectualization through detached explanation.

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Speisman et al. (1964), Film soundtracks: what were the findings and implication?

The threat-emphasizing soundtrack increased evidence of stress, particularly skin-conductance responses. Defensive or intellectualized framings changed the appraisal of the same visual material and reduced some stress responses relative to the threatening framing. Interpretation: The physical stimulus alone does not determine emotional response. The meaning assigned to an event, guided by information and framing, can influence appraisal and physiological stress.

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Simons and Chabris (1999), Invisible gorilla: what was the method?

Participants watched a video of people passing basketballs and were instructed to count passes, often focusing on one team. An unexpected person in a gorilla costume walked through the scene. Researchers asked whether participants noticed the unexpected event.

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Simons and Chabris (1999), Invisible gorilla: what were the findings and implication?

Many participants failed to report the gorilla despite it being plainly visible. Whether it was noticed depended in part on the attentional task and viewing condition. Interpretation: Selective attention is limited. Focusing on one task can produce inattentional blindness, in which a visible but unexpected stimulus is not consciously noticed.

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Simons and Levin (1998), Person-switch demonstration: what was the method?

An experimenter approached a pedestrian and asked for directions. During a brief interruption, such as workers carrying a door between the pedestrian and the experimenter, the original experimenter was replaced by another person. Researchers checked whether the pedestrian noticed the substitution.

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Simons and Levin (1998), Person-switch demonstration: what were the findings and implication?

Only about half of pedestrians detected the change in the key demonstration. Detection also varied with social-group similarity between the pedestrian and the experimenters. Interpretation: Change blindness can occur in real-world interactions, not only when people passively view pictures or screens. People do not maintain a complete, continuously detailed representation of every person and scene.

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Wallisch et al. (2023; manuscript received 2022), Visible-gorilla follow-up: what was the method?

Across three high-powered experiments with a combined sample of 4,493 participants, researchers varied properties of unexpected moving objects while participants performed attention-demanding tasks.

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Wallisch et al. (2023; manuscript received 2022), Visible-gorilla follow-up: what were the findings and implication?

Unexpected fast-moving objects were readily noticed, whereas slow-moving objects were much more likely to be missed. Fast motion acted as a strong external attentional cue. Interpretation: Inattentional blindness is not simply determined by whether an object is visible or unexpected. Stimulus properties, especially motion speed, can capture attention and override the ongoing task.

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Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956), When Prophecy Fails: what was the method?

Researchers conducted an observational field study of a small group led by a woman who predicted an imminent catastrophe and extraterrestrial rescue. The group's beliefs and behavior were observed before and after the predicted event failed to occur.

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Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956), When Prophecy Fails: what were the findings and implication?

The classic published account argued that some members maintained or strengthened their beliefs and sought social support by spreading the message after the prediction failed. Interpretation: The case became a famous illustration of cognitive dissonance: a contradiction between a strong belief and reality can create pressure to reduce discomfort, sometimes through rationalization or seeking agreement from others.

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Darley and Batson (1973), Good Samaritan study: what was the method?

Forty seminary students were told they needed to go to another building to give a short talk. Some were preparing to speak about the Good Samaritan story and others about a different topic. On the way, each encountered a person slumped by the roadside. The urgency of the participant's schedule varied.

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Darley and Batson (1973), Good Samaritan study: what were the findings and implication?

Time pressure strongly affected helping. About 63% of the low-hurry group helped, compared with about 10% of the high-hurry group. Being assigned the Good Samaritan topic did not significantly increase the likelihood of helping. Interpretation: Immediate situational demands can override a person's stated values or the topic currently on their mind. Hurry may narrow attention and reduce responsiveness to an unexpected need.

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Maguire et al. (2000), London taxi drivers: what was the method?

Researchers used structural MRI to compare licensed London taxi drivers, who had extensive knowledge of city streets, with control participants who did not drive taxis.

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Maguire et al. (2000), London taxi drivers: what were the findings and implication?

Taxi drivers had larger posterior hippocampi than controls; the anterior hippocampal region showed the opposite pattern. Posterior hippocampal volume was positively associated with time spent as a taxi driver, while anterior volume was negatively associated. Interpretation: The hippocampus is involved in spatial memory and navigation. The findings are consistent with experience-related brain plasticity and the idea that sustained learning is associated with changes in brain structure.

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Anderson and Pichert (1978), Burglar and homebuyer perspectives: what was the method?

Participants read a story about a house from the perspective of either a burglar or a prospective homebuyer. After an initial recall attempt, they were told to switch perspectives and recall the story again.

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Anderson and Pichert (1978), Burglar and homebuyer perspectives: what were the findings and implication?

On the second recall, participants produced more details relevant to the new perspective, including details they had not recalled under the first perspective. They also produced fewer details that were unimportant to the new perspective. Interpretation: Schemas influence retrieval, not only initial perception or encoding. A change in perspective can supply different retrieval cues and make different parts of an existing memory accessible.

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Loftus and Palmer (1974), Car-crash wording: what was the method?

"Participants watched films of traffic accidents and answered questions about them. The critical question used different verbs, including ""smashed,"" ""collided,"" ""bumped,"" ""hit,"" or ""contacted."" In a later test, participants were asked whether they had seen broken glass, although no broken glass appeared in the film."

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Loftus and Palmer (1974), Car-crash wording: what were the findings and implication?

"The word ""smashed"" produced higher speed estimates than ""hit"" (about 40.8 mph versus 34.0 mph in Experiment I). One week later, people given the ""smashed"" question were more likely to say they had seen broken glass, even though none was shown. Interpretation: Post-event wording can influence how an event is reconstructed and reported. This is a classic example of the misinformation effect and the reconstructive nature of memory."

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Loftus and Pickrell (1995), Lost in the mall: what was the method?

Twenty-four participants received descriptions of four childhood events supposedly supplied by a relative. Three were true events; one fabricated story described getting lost in a shopping mall or department store around age five, being distressed, receiving help from an older woman, and being reunited with family. Participants wrote about the events and took part in follow-up interviews.

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Loftus and Pickrell (1995), Lost in the mall: what were the findings and implication?

Most participants rejected the fabricated event. Seven of 24 reported some degree of recollection at some point; the original report described partial or varying levels of recollection rather than seven equally vivid, complete memories. The case is commonly summarized as roughly one-quarter showing some false recollection. Interpretation: Autobiographical memory can be influenced by suggestion, plausible details, and repeated retrieval attempts. The study helped establish the modern false-memory implantation paradigm.

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Brewer and Treyens (1981), Office schema, expected and unusual objects: what was the method?

Participants were taken into a room arranged to look like a graduate student's office and were told to wait. The room contained ordinary office items, unusual items such as a skull and toy top, and deliberately omitted expected objects such as books. Participants later completed recall, drawing, or recognition tasks.

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Brewer and Treyens (1981), Office schema, expected and unusual objects: what were the findings and implication?

Memory was related to how expected an object was in that kind of room. Participants sometimes recalled or inferred expected objects that had not been present, including books. Unusual objects such as a skull could attract attention, but their recall was not simply determined by whether they fit the office schema. Interpretation: A schema helps organize memory for a place, but can also lead people to reconstruct details that were likely in that place rather than details they actually saw. Both schema expectancy and object salience matter.

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Tuckey and Brewer (2003), Crime schemas and eyewitness memory: what was the method?

Researchers examined eyewitness memory across interviews, varying the ambiguity of crime-related stimulus information and the delay before interviews and between later interviews. They analyzed correct recall as well as intrusions that fit a crime schema.

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Tuckey and Brewer (2003), Crime schemas and eyewitness memory: what were the findings and implication?

When the crime stimulus was ambiguous, witnesses used their crime schema to interpret unclear details. This produced more schema-consistent intrusions, fewer correct responses for some details, and more reports of false memories involving conscious recollection. Schema-irrelevant details also tended to decay more over time than schema-related details. Interpretation: Eyewitness reports are not neutral recordings. Expectations about how crimes usually happen can shape interpretation and later recollection, especially when the original evidence is ambiguous.