Class11: The Minor Premise & Analyzing Cases G&B 73-88 Loop v. Litchfield &Coughtry v. Globe Woolen

Bennett v. Jeffreys test

• Parents have a superior right to custody

• If a 3rd party non-parent wants to gain custody of a child they must prove the following in a two prong test

1. that “extraordinary circumstances” exist that

allow a nonparent standing in a custody case.

2. once extraordinary circumstances are met the

nonparent must then prove that it is in the child’s

best interest for the nonparent to have custody

in B v J, it is both test and steps combined into one. If plain meaning rule applies based off the language

• literal definition of parents

  • biological or legal def of parent (mother, father, legally adopted)

  • doesn’t include/expand into de facto parents, stepparents, long term caregivers unless statues specifically lists them

• ridged standard for “superior right”

  • “superior right” means the parent’s claim automatically defeats any non-parental claim unless a strict condition is met first (heavy, baseline legal wall

• narrow interpretation of “extraordinary circumstances”

  • extraordinary: highly unusual, rare or catastrophic (ex. death, total abandonment, severe/proven physical incapacity) RATHER THAN general lifestyle differences (ex. cleaner house, high income provided by grandparent/aunt)

  • if the non-parent cannot point to a literal, severe breakdown of parental care fitting the strict definition of extraordinary, the case stops at Prong 1 and is dismissed immediately for lack of standing.

• strict application of best interest (prong 2):

  • even if extraordinary circumstances are proven, the non-parent must still satisfy the literal requirement that custody with them is demonstrably in the child’s best interest.

  • the plain meaning prevents a court from simply balancing emotional bonds or general affection; it requires objective proof that the parent's ongoing custody is actively harmful or deficient compared to the third party.

factors

think sentencing guidelines

• penal law 70.02: this not only lays out all the different types of crimes that make up a violent felony offenses- listing many factual considerations of the crime BUT it also factors that Judges can consider in sentencing under 70.02(3)(4)

spectrum test

• standards of review: preponderance vs reasonable doubt

• 51% - 99.99%

balancing test

criminal law: evidentiary tests are big on balancing

• ex. Do I let this video in even if it may be hearsay because the importance of it outweighs the prejudice

Search warrants, vehicle stops, stopping citizens on a public street are all examples of

balancing test tat a future court will need to weigh in on

certainty

the advocate should try and create an impression certainty

• (bc you want the judge make the only choice they can which is to BUY YOUR ARGUMENT)

how to provide certainty?

• authoritativeness

• content of your minor premise helps

minor premise helps deal with

the facts

minor premise deals with

the statue/law and the courts are almost always bound to that

the minor premise is usually a combination of

facts and law

the combination of facts and law

• allow attorney to

1. ground their argument in the evidence

2. elaborate the meaning of key legal terms (explain and persuade)

example of Socrates syllogism:

1. All Men are Mortal

2. Socrates is a Man.

3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

how do you know? how to prove to court? examples?

• testimony: eyewitness

• biological and physical evidence: DNA, testing

• historical and civil records: registration, being listed as a citizen, born to parents

• admission and behavior (circumstantial proof): how is he acting, participating in society, children, married

by providing those examples you

grounded these premises

• grounded in evidence and lent them authoritativeness that they lacked

• b4 this the fact that socrates was a man was just your ASSERTION

when you offer numerous cites to the evidence,

this is multiple grounding and if these cites are not overly repetitious, if they are relevant (will strengthen your argument)

what types of evidence

• examples

• stats and numerical data

• testimony and expert opinion

• empirical observation and scientific fact

• textual and historical evidence

• analogies and parallel cases

evidence: examples

• Definition: Specific instances, occurrences, or cases that illustrate a general premise.

• Why they work: They offer concrete data points that prove a general rule exists in reality. Multiple, diverse examples provide "multiple grounding," showing that your premise isn't just an isolated fluke.

evidence: stats and numerical data

• Definition: Quantitative data, surveys, demographics, or scientific measurements compiled by credible sources.

• Why they work: They establish the scope, frequency, or scale of a phenomenon. They answer the question, "How often or how broadly is this premise true?"

evidence: testimony and expert opinion

• Definition: Direct quotes, insights, or judgments from acknowledged authorities, scholars, or professionals in a specific field.

• Why they work: They lend institutional authoritativeness. Citing an expert transfers their verified credibility to your specific claim.

evidence: empirical observation and scientific fact

• Definition: Verifiable facts established through the scientific method, laboratory experiments, or direct sensory observation.

• Why they work: They deal with objective realities (e.g., biological processes, laws of physics) that are universally verifiable and difficult to dispute.

evidence: textual and historical evidence

• Definition: Primary sources, historical documents, legal statutes, or specific passages from a text being analyzed.

• Why they work: This is the standard grounding for literary, philosophical, or legal claims. For example, if you claim a text says something, citing the exact page number and text (like your reference to P. 75 of G&B) is the physical proof required.

evidence: analogies and parallel cases

• Definition: Drawing a comparison between the current situation and a different, already accepted situation.

• Why they work: If the two situations share essential similarities, the evidence or logic that applies to the known case can successfully ground the premise of the unknown case.

appeals to common sense

appeals/arguments can resolve a factual issues

appeals to common sense: can represent a simple inference from facts that are unstated because

they are obviously true or otherwise undisputed

ex. baseball bat - dangerous weapon

appeals to common sense: 2nd type of case

the court interprets the law or deliberated on legal policy in a way that requires factual assumptions about the world

ex. Thomas v Win, Loop v Litchfield, Coughtry v Globe

you have to be ___ about your facts

picky

brute facts

about the physical world

• a statement or a state of affairs that is true and exists without a deeper cause, reason, or explanation

• ex. gravity’s basic behavior or fundamental physical law and constants

compound facts

combine reports concerning the physical world inferences based on those facts

• (mixes direct physical observations with hidden interpretations or assumptions leading to fact-inference confusion)

ex. “I just saw Stella cheating on her husband”

• The Raw Physical Fact (What your eyes actually saw): Stella was standing close to, holding hands with, or kissing someone who is not her husband. That is all your senses can physically verify.

• The Hidden Inferences (What you added on top): You inferred that:

1. She is legally or socially bound in a marriage.

2. Her behavior violates the specific rules or agreements of that marriage (e.g., they aren't separated or in an open relationship).

3. Social conventions define this exact physical contact as "cheating".

rejection of brute facts

1. being a liar

2. unreliable reported

• ex. the testimony of children since they must be qualified to maintain that they understand the difference between the truth and a lie OR developmentally disabled witnesses (same reasoning)

3. compound facts

compound facts rejection

a listener might reject a compound fact bc someone has draw a faulty inference

ex. What does it really mean to say Stella is cheating? What did a person really see or observe? Identification of witnesses- this is and was a hot topic- our perceptions..

you want to go for ____

brute facts

stick with just the brute facts

your argument will be most persuasive here (isnt always possible)

when using a compound factual statement you need to

break it down as much as you can to a set of brute fact

Example- Stella is cheating with Bob-

1. establish the physical elements (who and where): Stella and Bob were physically present inside the same room at [Specific Address] on [Date] at [Time].

2. isolate the verifiable physical actions: Stella and Bob were observed holding hands and pressing their lips together for a duration of 30 seconds.

3. state the separate baselines truths (timeline): There is a government-issued marriage certificate filed in the county records bearing the names of Stella and a third individual, Charles.

elaborating legal terms: start with the

common term(s)

starting with the common terms, the legal term appearing in the minor premise that also appears in the

major premise

there will always be something in the statute/law/rule that you will want to

parrot and/or clarify with your facts

example of elaborating key legal terms (common terms)

• Fighting Words are not protected by the First Amendment

• Bob’s words were Fighting Words

• Therefore Bob’s words were not protected by the First Amendment

to elaborate on the legal terms, you have to really think about

your case

• how am i going to build my argument (like a research paper)

beware the conclusory argument

when you dont spell out each step of your reasoning or make assertions about the law or the facts without backing them up (not properly grounded)

• sometimes you dont have facts to help you

you need to read the room (balancing act)

you cant assume that your judge/fact-finder is ignorant but they may be to certain things like DNA evidence

• If you assume they understand complex forensic concepts like DNA amplification or quantitative statistics, they might nod along out of politeness while completely missing the critical vulnerability in the evidence.

sometimes you really need to educate and you are still unsuccessful because your student just doesnt get it

ex. 82 mph itsnt dangerous despite force = mass x acceleration

• to a driver 82 mph is just a number on a highway they have likely touched before. It feels normal, manageable, and everyday

• they lack the conceptual framework to realize that kinetic energy increases exponentially with speed (KE - ½ mv²). A crash at 82 mph carries vastly more destructive force than one at 60 mph

• The Barrier: When academic or scientific reality clashes with a person's "common sense" intuition, intuition usually wins unless you can find a way to make the science visceral rather than mathematical.

as a lawyer you should always be the

teacher/educator for the fact finder

judges may not thoroughly know the law

you are teaching them, but you can be condescending

some judges try to always come at a case with an open mind

you persuading them

G&B analogy

you are playing a long game of why to avoid a conclusory argument

loop v litchfield

Loop v. Litchfield

42 N.Y. 351 (N.Y. 1870) (Hunt, J.)

Facts. Litchfield made a cast-iron fly-wheel for a circular saw. It had a hole, which he filled with lead and

painted over so the repair could not be seen. About 1861 he sold it to Collister and told him about the hole.

Collister used it for years without trouble. About 1864 Collister leased the saw framework, with the wheel, to

Jeremiah Loop. In 1866 the wheel flew apart while Loop was using the saw, and Loop died. His

representatives sued Litchfield for negligent manufacture and sale.

Procedural history. Jury verdict for the plaintiffs (only negligence was submitted to the jury). The General

Term reversed and ordered a new trial. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and

entered judgment absolute for the defendants.

Issue. Is a manufacturer who sold a defective machine, with the defect disclosed to the buyer, liable in

negligence to a third person injured years later when the machine failed in the buyer's hands (no privity),

where the plaintiff argues the machine was a "dangerous instrument" within Thomas v. Winchester?

Rule. Under Winterbottom v. Wright, a negligent maker or seller owes no duty to someone not party to the

contract. Thomas v. Winchester makes a narrow exception for negligence imminently dangerous to human

life, meaning articles dangerous in their nature (poison, gunpowder, loaded rifle, spring gun) where injury is

the natural and expected result.

Application / reasoning.

• Not a dangerous instrument (¶3). Poison and spring guns are made to injure. An iron wheel is not, even

if one part is weaker. Any object (axle, chair) can injure if it fails.

• Thomas distinguished (¶4). Thomas rested on negligent sale of poison being an indictable offense; every

use of the mislabeled medicine would harm. This wheel ran safely for five years.

• No concealment (¶4). The defect was explained to the buyer.

• Verdict (¶5). The jury found negligence only. No dangerous-instrument allegation or question, so the

verdict does not establish it.

• Result (¶¶6-8). Even assuming Loop did not know of the defect and used the machine lawfully, no cause

of action.

The Holding: The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the manufacturer was not liable. [1, 2]

Objective theory. The plaintiffs' theory: danger depends on what a hidden defect can do, not on the category

of object. Hiding a defect under paint is as culpable as mislabeling poison (¶4). The key facts under that

theory are the painting-over and the foreseeable use of a spinning saw wheel.

case citation: loop v litchfield Court of Appeals of NY 42 N.Y. 351 (1870)

• Loop: estate/administrators of Jeremiah Loop; plaintiff

• Litchfield (manufacturer Lyman Litchfield); defendant

• court of appeals of NY: highest court, final ruling on the appeal

• 42 N.Y.351: 42 volume, ny reports, pg 351

• 1870: yr the decision was issued

loop v litchfield players

• Litchfield (Lyman Litchfield and Duandler F. Moore): The defendants and manufacturers of the defective iron balance/flywheel for a circular saw. They concealed a flaw by filling a hole in the rim with lead and disclosed the defect to the initial buyer.

• Collister (Leverett Collister): The buyer who purchased the defective balance wheel directly from Litchfield with knowledge of the flaw. He later leased the saw frame containing the wheel.

• Jeremiah Loop: The deceased user who borrowed or leased the machine setup with the balance wheel from Collister. He was fatally injured five years later when the wheel burst while he was sawing wood (represented by administrators George W. Loop and Richard Bennett).

loop v litchfield facts

Litchfield mad a cast-iron fly-wheel for use with a circular saw. The fly-wheel hole in it and instead of throwing it out, Litchfield filled the hole with lead and painted over it. In 1861 he sold this fly-wheel to Collister who knew about the defect and he used this fly-wheel with a circular saw for several years-no problem. Then poor Jeremiah Loop leased this thing and a bloody death ensues...

loop v litchfield procedural history

The trial jury found for the plaintiffs (Loop's administrators), awarding a verdict based on the defendants' negligence.

The defendants appealed to the General Term, which reversed the trial verdict.

The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order of the General Term and ordered judgment absolute for the defendants (Litchfield and Moore).

loop v litchfield issue

Is the seller, upon this statement of the facts, liable to the representatives of the deceased party?

loop v litchfield 2 things we know from the question

1. facts will drive this decision

2. relief (wanted from loop): monetary damages for negligence and wrongful death

I omit

at this stage of the inquiry the elements, that the deceased had no authority to use the machine; that he knew of the defects and that he did not exercise proper care in the management of the machine- Hunt is looking at this case in the most favorable light to the plaintiff...

i omit

• justice hunt: temporarily setting aside the deceased victim’s own carelessness or unauthorized behavior to test whether the manufacture could possibly be held liable even under the best case scenario for the plaintiff

breakdown of i omit

• "I omit at this stage of the inquiry the elements...": The judge is saying, "Let's pretend for a moment that the victim did nothing wrong."

• "...that the deceased had no authority to use the machine...": The victim (Jeremiah Loop) was borrowing or using the machinery (a circular saw's balance wheel) without permission from the actual owner (Collister).

• "...that he knew of the defects...": The victim personally knew the machine was cracked or defective because the owner had pointed it out to him beforehand.

• "...and that he did not exercise proper care in the management of the machine...": The victim operated it carelessly or unsafely.

• "Hunt is looking at this case in the most favorable light to the plaintiff...": Even if the court ignores all of those fatal flaws in the plaintiff's side of the story—and assumes the manufacturer was negligent in making the wheel—the plaintiff still loses.

How does Thomas V Winchester (1852) come up in this case:

• the privity of contract requirement

• whether a product qualifies as inherently or imminently dangerous

what was the exception established in T v W

privity to things imminently dangerous to human life, such as falsely labeled poisonous or deadly drugs

does Thomas v Winchester apply, whats the distinction?

• NO

• Loop v Litchfield: court rules that the ordinary machine (circular saw balance wheel) is NOT inherently or imminently dangerous like a poison → bc the manufacturer disclosed defect to the original buyer, there was no hidden trap or liability to a remote third party

loop v litchfield horizontal and vert

• horizontal (stare decisis): The court in Loop distinguished Thomas v. Winchester rather than overruling it

• vertical (precedent): in that earlier New York Court of Appeals case, a manufacturer mislabeled a deadly poison (belladonna) as a harmless medicine (dandelion extract) and sold it to a dealer. The court ruled that the manufacturer was liable to a remote consumer despite the lack of privity

• holding of L v L: held that a manufacturer is not liable to a third-party non-buyer for negligence in making a machine, establishing that privity of contract is required unless the product is inherently or imminently dangerous to human life (such as poison)

loop v litchfield vertical (hypothetical) if Winchester had been decided by the US Supreme Court

• federal context

• a lower court is STRICTLY BOUND by the decisions of a higher court within the same judicial system

• application if Winchester (or a related doctrine) had been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court:

  • W v T would be applied instead of just being a consideration

the last portion of the paragraph spells out imminent doom

But, the case in hand stands on a different ground. The defendant was dealer in dangerous drugs. The defendant’s neglect puts human life in imminent danger

Can it be said that there was no duty on the part of the defendant to avoid the creation of that danger by the exercise of greater caution?

the New York Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer is not liable for negligence to a third-party user who has no contractual relationship (privity) with them, unless the product is inherently or imminently dangerous to human life (bad drugs/meds, poison, gunpowder)

• with machinery, a machine flywheel is not an inherently dangerous instrument. Because there was no contract (privity) between the manufacturer (Litchfield) and the injured borrower/user (Loop), and the buyer knew of the defect, the manufacturer owed no duty of care to the third party

loop v l para 3

• ejusdem generis (of the same kind)

• In the context of early products liability and tort law, the court contrasted "inherently dangerous" items—such as poisons, gunpowder, wild beasts, or spring guns—with ordinary manufactured items. The principle ensures that the broader category of "dangerous instruments" cannot be stretched to cover items that are not naturally and imminently lethal in their normal state, such as the defective machine flywheel or carriage in question

ejusdum generis or a list of generous instruments

• Poison (Thomas v. Winchester)

• Gunpowder

• Torpedo

• Spring Gun

• Loaded Rifle

• This could also be called a factor analysis

justice hunt says about these items

inherently dangerous items VS ordinary commercial objects

inherently dangerous

• nature: they are instruments and articles calculated in their very nature to do injury to mankind

• purpose: they are generally intended to accomplish that purpose

• essence: they are essentially, and in their elements, instruments of danger

• legal consequence: Because of this inherent danger, a manufacturer or dealer owes a public duty of care and can be held liable to third parties even without privity of contract (T v W)

Ordinary Commercial Objects

• nature: they are not inherently dangerous by nature

• role of defects or breakage: not alter its character into an inherently dangerous weapon.

• potential for injury: Just like an ordinary carriage wheel, a wagon axle, or a common chair, almost any object in art or nature can cause injury if it is abused by excessive speed, too much weight, or worn-out use, or if it contains a structural weakness. [1]

• legal consequence: Because a balance wheel is not inherently dangerous, the manufacturer owed no contractual duty (privity) to a remote user or borrower who was not the original buyer (especially since the original buyer was already fully warned of the defect)

common law and statue

• T v W based on both - negligent sale of poisons CL negligence but also an indicatable crim offense (manslaughter)

• The bursting of the wheel was not a natural result or expected consequence – and then a fact- it had not broken in 5 years

and the jury got it wrong

then the judge overturns the jury verdict which is rate (the verdict established the defective fly wheel as a dangerous instrument BUT Hunt says that the only question given to the jury was negligence and their jump to dangerous instrument was illogical)

but para 6 has a glimmer of hope

Assuming the facts as stated- that the deceased had not knowledge of the defects complained of and in rightful and lawful use of the machine

judgement

The order of the General Term should be affirmed and judgment absolute given for the defendants. All concur. Judgment Affirmed... (Paragraphs 7 and 8)

Coughtry V Globe Woolen Company

Facts. Same as Brief 2, with facts the court stresses: Globe Woolen built the scaffold itself, on its own

premises, expressly to accommodate the workmen installing the cornice; it was over 50 feet high and, unless

properly built, "a most dangerous trap"; it belonged to Globe Woolen, was in its possession, and was used

with its permission for the purpose it was built.

Procedural history. Nonsuit at trial; affirmed on the no-duty ground by the General Term; reversed by the

Court of Appeals, which ordered a new trial.

Issue. Does a property owner who builds a scaffold on its own premises and invites a contractor's workers to

use it owe them a duty of care in its construction, independent of its contract with their employer, so that a

killed worker can sue without privity?

Rule. An owner who furnishes a structure for others' use, by building it on its own premises and inviting or

licensing them onto it, owes them due diligence in its construction and maintenance. The duty arises from

furnishing the structure, not only from the contract, and applies where death or great harm is the "natural and

almost inevitable consequence" of negligence (Thomas). The privity rule of Winterbottom, Longmeid and Loop

does not apply where the defendant keeps ownership and control and itself induces the plaintiff to use the

thing.

Application / reasoning.

• Duty independent of contract (¶3). Building it on its own land for the workmen, over 50 feet up, "not only

licensed but invited" them, and impliedly held it out as safe or carefully built.

• Distinguishing cases (¶4). Wright had no connection to the coach beyond the contract and no control. In

Longmeid and Loop, the article was sold and delivered and the seller lost control

This case (¶5). Globe Woolen owned, built and possessed the scaffold and used it on its land for its

intended purpose, so the duty arose from furnishing it to induce the men to go on it.

• Thomas applied (¶6). Given its nature and position, death was the natural and almost inevitable result of

negligent construction. The duty is independent of the contract, so a contract clause allowing careless

construction is no answer.

• Not decided (¶7). There was evidence of negligence for the jury; the court says nothing about its weight

and leaves contributory negligence to the jury. The nonsuit was improper.

Objective theory. The alternative theories are Globe Woolen's and the General Term's: rights depend wholly

on the contract with O&M, and going beyond the parties has no limit. The court answers that the limit is control

plus invitation. It invokes Thomas (¶6) only after resting the duty on control and invitation, because Loop had read Thomas narrowly

Coughtry V Globe Woolen Company parties

• Coughtry: A bricklayer employed by the independent contractors Osborn & Martin.

• Osborn & Martin: Independent contractors hired by Globe Woolen Co. to build a mill.

• Globe Woolen Company: The property owner.

What was Mr. Coughtry doing? What
happened to him?

• He was a workman employed by a firm of independent contractors who were hired to put a cornice on the defendant's mill. He was performing this work high up on a scaffold built by the defendant's own employees specifically for this project

• While he was actively working on it, the scaffold collapsed and fell due to its improper construction and defective materials. The fall resulted in his death

Coughtry v Globe Woolen Company: The trial court decided what? The court dismissed the case- When?

trail court decided on nonsuit: the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s case on two main grounds

1. no duty of care: Even if there had been enough evidence of

   negligence, Coughtry could not make a claim

   against Globe Woolen

2. lack of negligence evidence: Not enough evidence of negligence for the

   case to go to a jury

it was decided March 24, 1874

on appeal: 1 Thomps.&C.452 (1873)rev’d, 56 NY 124

(1874)

• 1 Thomps. & C. 452 (1873): original lower court decision (volume 1 of NY Supreme Court Reports on pg 452 in 1873

• rev’d: revered - indicated a higher court stepped in, disagree with the lower court’s decision, and legally overturned it

• 56 NY 124 (1874): The final, binding decision by the highest court. It is printed in Volume 56 of the official New York Reports on page 124, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1874.

appellate decision

talcott - starts out by saying there was sufficient evidence to go the jury on negligence but that doesn’t matter because the plaintiff could not maintain the action-

• no Privity of Contract between the deceased and Globe Woolen

Who should Coughtry Sue? And Why?

• Globe Woolen Company rather than relying solely on a claim against Coughtry’s direct employer (Osborn and Martin)

• reasoning: Even though Coughtry had no direct contract with Globe Woolen Co., the company built and maintained a defective scaffold on its own property for the express use of the workers. This action created a general duty of care that existed independently of any employment contract.

Osborn and Martin

Osborn and Martin and Globe Woolen agreed
to the contract together. Coughtry never was
a party to the contract. Duty of Globe Woolen
comes out of the contract and there was not
duty to Coughtry. Support for this rationale-
Winterbottom v. Wright (the postmaster
general coach case)- Recitations of cases from
England-

• Winterbottom v. Wright

Why quote English cases? Why bring up the Court of Appeals Cases?

• English cases (Winterbottom, Longmeid): They are the source of the privity rule. New York courts inherited English common law, so these cases carry real weight even though they come from another jurisdiction. They are persuasive authority, and Talcott (the General Term judge) says Thomas v. Winchester itself called both “sound expositions of the law” (General Term ¶7). The Rolfe and Alderson quotes also give him the policy reason: without the rule, suits “would stop” nowhere, “one step . . . fifty.”

• Court of Appeals cases (Thomas, Loop): The Court of Appeals is New York’s highest court, so the General Term must follow it. Talcott is showing that the English rule is New York law and that the only recognized exception is “imminently dangerous” acts like mislabeled poison. That strengthens his major premise (binding authority).

• Rapallo (Court of Appeals) then uses the same cases to distinguish them, not to follow them (¶4).

Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 562 (England)

• The defendant made and sold lamps and sold one to a husband for use by himself and his wife.

• The lamp was defectively built, exploded, and burned the wife.

• The wife could not recover because she was not a party to the contract of sale (¶6).

Why these two matter: Both stand for the privity rule. A defendant’s liability for a defective thing runs only to the person who contracted with him, not to others who use it or are hurt by it. Talcott says that Thomas v. Winchester cited both as “sound expositions of the law.”

Rapallo (Court of Appeals, ¶4) names the same two cases. He distinguishes them because in each the defendant had no ownership, possession, or control at the time of injury. Wright never owned or controlled the coach, and the lamp maker had sold the lamp and lost control of it. Globe Woolen still owned, built, and controlled the scaffold.

Two other cases come up in the opinions but are New York cases, not English ones: Thomas v. Winchester and Loop v. Litchfield. Sherman and Redfield on Railways, quoted in ¶2, is a legal treatise, not a case.

we use these british cases bc our county was

still pretty new in 1873 and also allows support through the Common Law

no case put forward

the learned and experience counsel for the plaintiff has failed to direct our attention to any adjudicated case or principle (offered no supporting proof/maybe there wasnt any)

what is the judgement for trial vs appellate?

• Trial: The court granted a nonsuit, which is a dismissal at trial for the defendant, so Globe Woolen won without the jury deciding anything. There were two grounds: not enough evidence of negligence, and no duty owed to Coughtry in any event.

• What we’d expect: The appeal asks whether either ground was legally right. If the nonsuit was wrong, the case goes back for a new trial before a jury. If it was right, the dismissal stands.

Coughtry appeal: 56 NY 124- Court of Appeals case- Highest
court in NY

• What we’d expect: The appeal asks whether either ground was legally right. If the nonsuit was wrong, the case goes back for a new trial before a jury. If it was right, the dismissal stands.

• What we see:

  • The General Term disagreed on ground 1 (there was enough evidence for a jury) but agreed on ground 2 (no privity), so it affirmed the nonsuit.

  • The Court of Appeals also found enough evidence of negligence, but rejected ground 2 and reversed.

para 1 - the plantiff was nonsuited?

when the judge ends the plaintiff’s case during trial, without sending it to the jury, because the plaintiff’s case is legally insufficient.

para 1 and 2 for reason for nonwuit

Why (¶¶1-2):

• ¶1 gives the two grounds: no action lay against Globe Woolen, and not enough evidence of negligence.

• ¶2 explains that the General Term disagreed on negligence but upheld the nonsuit because Globe Woolen’s only duty “arose out of its contract with Osborn & Martin.”

HUGE OMITTED FACT

The omitted fact (¶3): The court did not consider that Globe Woolen built the scaffold itself, on its own premises, specifically for the workmen installing its cornice. The scaffold was over 50 feet high and a “dangerous trap” if badly built. By putting it there for them, Globe Woolen “not only licensed but invited” the workers onto it and impliedly held it out as safe.

ommitted fact (slides)

“The learned Court” did not appear to have
considered that the scaffold was erected by
Globe Woolen Company upon its own
premises for the purpose of doing work on
their building. This scaffold was dangerous-
50 feet from the ground “a dangerous trap” if
improperly constructed

globe woolen invited them and a duty is born

Globe not only licensed but invited the
workmen to use this scaffold and it is implied
that it is a safe structure and that proper care
in its construction and maintenance should
exist- proper due diligence. This duty is
independent of the contract with Osborn &
Martin

how did the appellate court get it wrong?

• It treated the case as a pure contract-privity case like Winterbottom and asked only whether Coughtry was a party to the contract.

• It missed that Globe Woolen’s duty came from its own act of building a structure and inviting workers onto it, a duty independent of the contract (¶3).

• Its authorities are distinguishable. Wright in Winterbottom had no ownership, possession or control of the coach and invited no one onto it. In Longmeid and Loop, the defective article had been sold and the seller had lost control (¶4).

• It also leaned on the fact that counsel cited no case (General Term ¶8). A missing case does not mean no principle exists, and Thomas supplied one.

was the appellate courses case analysis incorrect

• no

• Not analogous in principle to the

  circumstances in Coughtry. The English cases

  and Loop all focus on seller or maker ceasing

  to have control of the item- a tradesman is not

  liable for an injury subsequently sustained by

  a third party if the item sold was believed to

  be sound

how is Coughtry different? para 5

• This case is “entirely different.”

• At the time of the injury, the scaffold belonged to Globe Woolen, had been built by it, was in its possession, and was in use on its premises, with its permission, for the very purpose it was furnished.

• So the duty of due diligence in building it arose “not merely out of the contract,” but from the fact that Globe Woolen furnished it to induce the men to go on it.

• ¶5 is where the court names ownership, possession and control as the distinguishing factors.

• (If you meant Talcott’s ¶5 in the General Term opinion, that is Alderson’s slippery-slope quote: allowing suits by non-parties leaves no stopping point.)

death or great bodily harm

Evident from the nature and position of the
structure that death or great bodily harm
would be natural and almost inevitable if the
scaffold was constructed of defective material
or was insufficiently constructed.- Natural
Death- like in Thomas- Duty was for proper
care because of the risk of death

para 7

• It agrees with the General Term that there was evidence of negligence that should have gone to the jury.

• The court says it expresses no opinion on how strong that evidence is.

• It leaves three questions for the jury: whether Globe Woolen was negligent in building the scaffold, whether the injury came from that, and whether Coughtry was contributorily negligent (his own carelessness helping cause the injury). At that time, contributory negligence generally defeated a claim.

• It concludes this was not a proper case for a nonsuit.

• The division of labor is that the court decides the law (duty), and the jury decides the facts.

judgement? what is it? costs to abide the event? what does that mean?

• Judgment: The nonsuit is reversed (set aside) and the case goes back for a new trial.

• Costs to abide the event: The court costs of this appeal are not awarded now. They go to whoever ultimately wins the case (“the event” means the final outcome). If Coughtry’s representative wins at the new trial, he recovers the costs of the appeal. If Globe Woolen wins, it does.

What ultimate relief does the plaintiff seek in both Loop and Coughtry, and what must be shown to get it?

Money damages for wrongful death; a duty of care owed despite no contract

Both plaintiffs sue for damages for a death caused by negligence. The duty of care is the conclusion of the syllogism, and privity (a contract with the victim) is missing in each case.

Loop: what was the plaintiff's rule (major premise) for why Litchfield owed Loop a duty?

Thomas v. Winchester: negligence imminently dangerous to life creates a duty to third parties; the fly-wheel was a 'dangerous instrument'

The plaintiffs also argued that painting over the repaired hole was as culpable as mislabeling poison (¶¶3-4).

Loop: why did the court (Hunt, J.) say Litchfield owed no duty?

Thomas covers only things dangerous in their nature; the defect was disclosed to the buyer; the wheel ran safely for 5 years; the jury was never asked about a dangerous instrument

So the general rule of Winterbottom applied: no contract with the injured party means no duty. Hunt also recast Thomas as resting on the negligent sale of poison being an indictable offense (¶4).

Coughtry: what rule did the Court of Appeals (Rapallo) supply for why Globe Woolen owed Coughtry a duty?

An owner who builds a structure on its premises and invites others onto it owes them due diligence in its construction, independent of the contract (Thomas principle)

The key facts are ownership, possession and control, a purpose-built structure over 50 feet high, and invitation or license to use it (¶¶3, 5, 6). Plaintiff's counsel had cited no case in the General Term (¶8).

Which of these is NOT one of Globe Woolen's arguments that it owed no duty?

Coughtry invited himself onto the scaffold

Globe Woolen argued no privity, that its only duty ran to O&M under the contract (Winterbottom, Longmeid, Loop), that Thomas is limited to things like poison, and the slippery slope. It also argued insufficient evidence of negligence at trial.

What policy supports the privity rule (Winterbottom)?

Limits liability to those who bargained for it; avoids unlimited downstream suits ('one step . . . fifty'); predictability

The buyer or contractor can inspect, warn and insure. In Loop, Collister knew of the defect and controlled the wheel. Protecting life and deterring carelessness are the policies behind the Thomas exception.