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What are the two central functions of a board of directors?
Monitoring: oversee senior executives on shareholders’ behalf, reduce agency problems and encourage value-maximising behaviour. Advisory: provide counsel, expertise and resources to improve strategic decisions.
How do executive directors (EDs) differ from non-executive directors (NEDs)?
EDs, such as the CEO and CFO, participate in day-to-day operations and major strategic decisions, and provide information to the board. NEDs are not employed as executives; they have no day-to-day operational role, monitor senior executives and scrutinise major decisions.
What are the board’s main responsibilities under the lecture and Companies Act 2006?
The board sits at the apex of the firm’s internal control system. It sets senior executive pay, monitors performance, hires and dismisses senior executives, and advises on strategic decisions such as restructuring. Companies Act 2006 s.172(1) requires directors to act in good faith to promote the company’s success for members as a whole.
What is the separation of ownership and control, and why does it create an agency problem?
Shareholders (principals) own the company, while executives (agents) control its operations. Managers may use discretion to pursue personal wealth, power, job security or other benefits rather than shareholders’ interests, creating agency costs.
Why are agency problems difficult to eliminate through contracts?
Managerial decisions are often non-routine and require judgement. Contracts are incomplete because it is difficult to specify every possible future decision or action, making it difficult for shareholders to hold executives fully accountable.
Why does dispersed share ownership weaken direct shareholder monitoring?
Individual shareholders may have little incentive to bear monitoring costs because the benefits of improved governance are shared with all shareholders. This creates a free-rider problem, allowing management greater discretion.
How does agency theory explain the purpose of the board?
The board monitors executives on shareholders’ behalf, reduces agency problems and encourages managers to act in ways that maximise firm/shareholder value. Independence is important because directors must be able to challenge management.
What is resource dependence theory’s view of the firm and the board?
The firm is an open system dependent on external organisations and environmental contingencies. The board helps manage external dependencies, reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and acts as a provider of resources and external links.
What four resources do boards provide under Lynall, Golden and Hillman (2003)?
(1) Advice and counsel; (2) legitimacy; (3) communication channels between the firm and external organisations; and (4) assistance in obtaining resources or commitments from important external parties.
What are human capital and social capital in the context of boards?
Human capital is directors’ knowledge, skills, expertise and experience, supporting advice and decision-making. Social capital is their networks and relationships, providing contacts, information, legitimacy and access to resources.
How do agency theory and resource dependence theory differ in explaining board composition?
Agency theory prioritises independent directors who monitor management and protect shareholders. Resource dependence theory prioritises directors whose expertise, relationships and external links match the firm’s resource needs. The theories are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
How does institutional theory explain board composition? (Lynall et al., 2003)
Firms adopt governance practices in response to institutional rules, norms and expectations. Similar firms may adopt similar visible board structures to gain legitimacy, even where adoption does not necessarily improve technical efficiency or performance.
What is institutional isomorphism and how can it affect boards?
It is the tendency for organisations in the same institutional environment to become similar. Boards may adopt accepted structures because regulators, professional norms or societal expectations make them appear legitimate.
How does social network theory explain board formation? (Lynall et al., 2003)
Board composition reflects existing social and inter-organisational networks of influential stakeholders, such as the CEO and external financiers. Trust, reputation and prior relationships shape who is selected and which resources can be accessed.
What is the multitheoretic argument of Lynall, Golden and Hillman (2003)?
No single theory explains every board. Agency, resource dependence, institutional and social network theories have different explanatory value depending on the firm’s life-cycle stage and the relative power of the CEO and external financiers.
What is board independence and why does it matter?
Independence is the extent to which directors are free from dependence on the CEO or organisation. It matters because directors who are less dependent are more able to challenge management, monitor executives and reduce agency costs.
What circumstances can compromise NED independence?
Interlocking board relationships, director entrenchment or long tenure, CEO influence over appointments, and affiliations through business, family or social ties can create dependence and weaken objective monitoring.
What is the difference between an outside director and an independent director?
An outside director is not part of executive management. An independent director is an outside director sufficiently free from relationships or circumstances that could compromise objective judgement. Therefore, not all outsiders are independent.
What is the agency-theory argument about affiliated outside directors?
Affiliation can weaken monitoring because directors may depend on the CEO or organisation, making them less willing to challenge management. From this perspective, affiliation can undermine independence and harm governance.
What is the resource-dependence argument about affiliated outside directors?
Affiliated directors may possess better firm-specific information and stronger external contacts than fully independent directors. These relationships can improve advice and access to resources, creating a potential benefit.
What is the central trade-off between independence and affiliation?
Greater independence can strengthen monitoring, while affiliation can improve information flows and access to contacts. The board must balance objective oversight against the informational and resource benefits of relationships.
What are the arguments for and against larger boards?
Larger boards can provide more monitoring capacity, advice, diverse expertise and committee specialisation, benefiting complex firms. However, they can slow decisions, increase coordination costs and create free-riding, reducing individual effort.
What is the free-rider problem on a large board?
An individual director may reduce monitoring effort because they expect other directors to do the work. If many directors behave this way, collective monitoring can weaken despite the board’s greater size.
How does cognitive diversity affect board decision-making?
Diverse knowledge, experiences and perspectives can challenge assumptions, reduce groupthink and improve scrutiny. However, less cohesion or greater disagreement can make consensus and decision-making more difficult.
What is groupthink and why is it a governance concern?
Groupthink occurs when the desire for consensus or cohesion suppresses critical evaluation and dissent. It can cause boards to accept weak proposals, overlook risks or fail to challenge executive decisions.
What arguments are presented for greater female and ethnic-minority representation?
Diversity broadens the talent pool, brings varied experiences and perspectives, and may improve challenge and decision-making. The lecture reports 45% female FTSE representation (FTSE Women Leaders Review, 2025) and 20% ethnic-minority representation on FTSE 100 boards (Parker Review, 2026).
What concerns are raised about quotas and board diversity?
Quotas may attract accusations of tokenism if appointments are perceived as symbolic. However, restricting recruitment to a narrow group also limits the available talent pool and risks excluding the best candidates.
What is board endogeneity? (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010)
Board structure is not simply an external cause of firm outcomes: it is chosen and evolves in response to governance problems, performance, CEO power and other circumstances. Board composition and board actions are jointly determined.
Why does endogeneity make it difficult to interpret correlations between board structure and performance? (Adams et al., 2010)
Performance may influence board composition as well as board composition influencing performance. For example, poor performance may prompt a firm to increase independence. A simple correlation can therefore be misleading and does not establish causation.
What do Figures 1 and 2 in Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) illustrate?
Figure 1 warns against drawing a causal conclusion from a simple relationship between a governance attribute and performance. Figure 2 shows firms may face different optimisation problems and each may have a different optimal governance structure.
What does endogeneity imply when a firm appears to have a poor governance structure?
Researchers should ask why the structure was chosen and what constraints the firm faces. It may be a second-best response to particular circumstances rather than an obvious mistake that can be quickly corrected.
What did Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue about CEO bargaining power and board independence?
A CEO who performs well may become a ‘rare commodity’ and gain bargaining power. The CEO can bargain for greater compensation and a less independent board, reducing the board’s willingness or ability to monitor.
What did Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) identify as a key problem in studying boards?
Board makeup and board actions are jointly endogenous. Many empirical studies use structural characteristics as proxies for behaviour, even though actual monitoring and advice are difficult to observe directly.
What did Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) find about outsiders and CEO dismissal?
They found no evidence that the insider/outsider distinction affected CEO exit when firms underperformed. Formal outsider status alone did not explain dismissal sensitivity.
What further finding did Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) report about CEO-appointed directors?
CEOs faced a significantly lower risk of dismissal when a larger proportion of the board had been appointed during their tenure. This supports concern that CEO influence over appointments can compromise monitoring.
What did Dalton et al. (1999) and Coles et al. (2008) find about board size?
Dalton et al. examined 131 studies and found a positive board-size/performance relationship. Coles et al. showed it depends on complexity: performance falls with board size in simple firms but rises in complex firms.
What did Yermack (1996) find about board size and firm value?
Yermack found a negative relationship between board size and firm performance, measured using average Tobin’s Q. This is consistent with arguments that smaller boards may monitor more effectively and avoid coordination/free-rider costs.
What did Dalton et al. (1998) and Knyazeva et al. (2013) report about outside directors and independence?
The lecture reports that outside directors were associated with higher performance, while affiliation had no effect (Dalton et al., 1998). Knyazeva et al. (2013) found independence associated with higher firm profitability and share value.
What did Post and Byron (2015) find about female board representation?
Their meta-analysis of 140 studies found female board representation positively associated with accounting returns but had no overall impact on stock-market performance. The relationship differed by performance measure.
What did Guest (2019) find about ethnic diversity?
The lecture reports no evidence of a relationship between ethnic board diversity and firm performance, and no relationship with post-acquisition performance. This does not establish that diversity has no other governance or social value.
What did Cotter et al. (1997) find about independent target boards in takeovers?
Independent target-company boards were more likely to resist takeover bids to obtain a higher price for shareholders. This illustrates the board’s role in protecting shareholder interests during takeover negotiations.
What did McDonald et al. (2008) find about directors’ acquisition experience?
Outside directors with prior acquisition experience in the same product market had a positive effect on post-acquisition performance. Relevant expertise can improve evaluation and oversight of acquisition decisions.
What did Levi et al. (2014) find about female directors and acquisition behaviour?
Each additional female director was associated with 7.6% fewer acquisition bids; each additional female director on a bidder board was associated with a 15.4% reduction in the bid premium paid. The lecture links this to lower overconfidence.
How can board characteristics affect M&A through agency and resource dependence theories?
Agency theory predicts independent directors challenge managerial overconfidence and value-destroying deals. Resource dependence theory predicts directors with acquisition expertise and external contacts improve evaluation, negotiation and post-deal outcomes.
What is the overall conclusion about board characteristics and firm performance?
Board size, independence and diversity may influence monitoring, advice and strategic decisions, but findings are mixed and context-dependent. There is no universally optimal board; firm complexity, resource needs and governance circumstances matter.