Philosophy 181 First Exam

What is privileged access? (L1)

Privileged access is the direct, non-inferential access we have to our own mental states. For example, I experience my headache directly, while another person must infer that I am in pain.

What is authoritative access? (L1)

Authoritative access means that a person's first-person reports of their mental states ordinarily have special authority. For example, my report that I feel anxious carries special weight compared with someone else's inference about my feelings.

What is an epistemic difference? (L1)

How something is known/knowledge Example: I know my pain directly, while a doctor investigates my brain.

What is a metaphysical difference? (L1)

What something actually is/reality. Example: The bitterness of coffee or the feeling of fear.

What is qualitative character (qualia)? (L1)

Qualia are the subjective, qualitative features of conscious experience—what an experience feels like from the inside. For example, the bitterness of coffee or the painful feeling of a headache.

What is intentionality? (L1)

Intentionality is the aboutness or directedness of mental states toward objects or contents. For example, worrying about tomorrow's exam is a mental state directed toward that exam.

What is the first mind-body problem? (L1)

The problem is how one subject can possess both mental and physical properties when they seem to require incompatible kinds of subjects.

What are the three mind-body problems? (L1)

The three problems concern how one subject has mental and physical properties, how mental states cause physical events and how thoughts are about things.

What is causal closure of the physical? (L1)

Causal closure is the principle that every physical event that has a cause at a given time has a complete physical cause at that time. It raises the question of what causal role mental states play if physical events already have complete physical causes.

Why does causal closure create a problem for mental causation? (L1)

If physical causes already fully explain a bodily movement, philosophers must explain what causal role mental states such as pain or desire play.

How do mental and physical properties differ? (L1)

Mental properties involve first-person access, qualitative character and intentionality, while physical properties are publicly investigable and quantitatively describable.

Study Guide #2: How should you explain and assess the first mind-body problem? (L1)

Difference → Same Subject → Conflict → Assessment. Mental and physical properties appear different, yet humans possess both. The problem is whether their requirements really are incompatible.

Study Guide #1 (adapted, L1): Explain authoritative and privileged access; intentionality; qualia; and causal closure of the physical.

Privileged access is direct, non-inferential access to your mental states. Authoritative access means your first-person reports have special authority. Intentionality is what thoughts are about. Qualia are what experiences feel like. Causal closure means every caused physical event has a complete physical cause.

Study Guide #2 (L1): State, explain, and assess the mind-body problem situated in a categorial difference between the mental and physical (= our first mind-body problem).

The first mind-body problem asks how one person can have both mental and physical properties when they seem to require different kinds of subjects. Mental properties involve private experiences, feelings and thoughts, while physical properties are publicly observable and measurable. The problem arises because humans possess both, even though these properties appear incompatible. However, having different properties does not automatically mean they are incompatible. We must determine whether the differences are genuinely incompatible before concluding that one person cannot possess both.

What is Cartesian substance dualism? (L2)

Cartesian substance dualism is Descartes's theory that the mind and body are two distinct kinds of substance. The mind is nonphysical and responsible for thinking, while the body is physical and occupies space. Descartes argues that the mind is not identical to the body, even though they interact.

What is Leibniz's Law in both directions? (L2)

Leibniz's Law states that two things are identical if and only if they share all the same properties. The Indiscernibility of Identicals means that if two things are identical, they must share all properties. The Identity of Indiscernibles means that if two things share all properties, they are identical. Descartes uses the contrapositive of the first principle: if two things differ in a property, they cannot be identical. Example: If two objects have genuinely different weights at the same time, they cannot be one and the same object.

What is the difference between extensional and intensional contexts? (L2)

An extensional context allows us to replace two names referring to the same thing without changing a sentence's truth. An intensional context involves expressions such as believing, knowing or doubting, where replacing names might change the truth of the statement. Example: Mr. Smith and John Brown are the same person, but I might believe Mr. Smith is a professor without believing John Brown is a professor because I don't know they're the same person.

What is substitutivity salva veritate? (L2)

Substitutivity salva veritate means replacing one name with another name referring to the same thing while preserving the truth of a sentence. This works in extensional contexts but can fail in intensional contexts involving someone's beliefs or knowledge. Example: Superman is Clark Kent, so replacing one name with the other in "Superman is a journalist" preserves the truth.

What is existential generalization? (L2)

Existential generalization is reasoning from a statement about a particular existing thing to the conclusion that something exists with that property. Example: If Sarah is studying philosophy, we can conclude that someone is studying philosophy. However, we must be careful when making such inferences within intensional contexts.

State, explain, and assess the Cartesian argument for dualism appealing to epistemic differences between the mental and the physical (= Descartes's most basic argument). Be sure to explain how Leibniz's Law functions in this argument. (L2)

The Cartesian epistemic argument begins with Descartes's claim that he can doubt his body exists but cannot doubt his mind exists, because doubting requires thinking. He treats this as a difference in properties. Using the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which states that identical things share all properties, he concludes that mind and body are distinct. However, doubts involve intensional contexts, so different doubts may reflect differences in knowledge rather than real differences between objects. Therefore, his argument does not necessarily establish substance dualism.

State, explain, and assess the Cartesian argument for dualism appealing to modal differences between the mental and the physical (= the Modal Cartesian argument). Be sure to explain how Leibniz's Law functions in this argument. (L2)

The modal Cartesian argument claims that it is possible for Descartes's body not to exist, but impossible for Descartes himself not to exist. He treats this as a difference in modal properties, meaning properties about what is possible or necessary. According to Leibniz's Law, identical things must share all properties, so he concludes that he is not identical to his body. However, his inability to imagine his own nonexistence does not prove that he necessarily exists. Therefore, the argument may fail to establish dualism.

State, explain, and assess the Cartesian argument for dualism appealing to conceivability and possibility (= the Subtler Argument, simple version). (L2)

The simple subtler argument begins with the principle that if pain is identical to a particular brain state, such as neural state n237, then that identity must hold necessarily. However, the argument claims it is possible for pain not to be identical to that neural state. Therefore, pain and that neural state cannot be identical. The main objection is that the argument must actually establish this possibility rather than simply assume it.

State, explain, and assess the Cartesian argument for dualism appealing to conceivability and possibility (= the Subtler Argument, slightly more complicated version). (L2)

The more complicated argument begins by claiming that we can conceive of experiencing pain without having a physical body. It then assumes that anything genuinely conceivable is possible. If pain were identical to a physical state, it would be impossible to experience pain without that physical state. Therefore, the argument concludes that pain is not identical to any physical state and that dualism is true. However, imagining something does not automatically prove it is metaphysically possible, so the argument's key assumption can be challenged.

Why might Cartesian dualism be thought to be a solution to the mind-body problem? (L2)

Cartesian dualism might solve the first mind-body problem because it argues that mental and physical properties belong to two distinct substances rather than one kind of substance. Since mental and physical properties appear to require different kinds of subjects, dualism gives each a separate subject and avoids their apparent incompatibility. However, dualism creates another problem because it must explain how a nonphysical mind can interact with and influence a physical body.

State, explain, and illustrate the distinction between intensional and extensional contexts; explain why this distinction matters to Cartesian arguments for dualism. (L2)

In an extensional context, replacing two names that refer to the same thing preserves the sentence's truth. In an intensional context, such as a statement about belief or doubt, the substitution might not preserve truth. For example, Mr. Smith and John Brown may be the same person, even if I believe Mr. Smith is a professor but do not believe John Brown is one. This matters because Descartes's doubt statements are intensional, so different doubts about mind and body do not necessarily prove they are different substances.

The three Cartesian arguments — Explained simply

Epistemic	What can I doubt?
Modal	What is genuinely possible or necessary?
Subtler	Can pain exist without a physical state>

What is the ghost in the machine? (L3)

The ghost in the machine is Ryle's description of Cartesian dualism, which treats the mind as a separate, nonphysical substance associated with the physical body. The ghost represents the mind, while the machine represents the body. Ryle criticizes this idea because he believes thinking and feeling do not require a separate invisible substance.

What is a category mistake? (L3)

What is a category mistake? (L3)

What is analytical behaviorism? (L3)

Analytical behaviorism is the view that mental states can be explained in terms of actual behavior and dispositions to behave, rather than as private events in a separate mind. For example, believing it will rain might be explained through a person's tendency to carry an umbrella when they want to stay dry. Behaviorism attempts to explain the mental through publicly observable behavior.

What are the three main problems with analytical behaviorism? (L3)

The first problem is qualia, because behavior cannot fully explain what mental experiences feel like. The second is incompleteness, because defining a mental state requires an open-ended number of behavioral conditions and exceptions. The third is circularity, because explaining behavior often requires referring to other mental states, such as desires or beliefs, which behaviorism was supposed to explain without relying on mental concepts.

State, explain, and assess the problem of the ghost in the machine. (L3)

The ghost in the machine describes Cartesian dualism, which treats the mind as a nonphysical substance connected to the physical body. Ryle argues that this picture mistakenly treats thinking and feeling as activities of a separate invisible thing instead of capacities of a person. This creates a philosophical problem because it assumes the existence of another substance when describing mental abilities may not require one. However, Ryle must still explain how his alternative accounts for subjective experiences such as pain.

State, explain, and assess Ryle's contention that Cartesian dualism is implicated in a category mistake. (L3)

Ryle argues that Cartesian dualism commits a category mistake by treating mental capacities, such as thinking and feeling, as evidence of a separate mental substance. A category mistake means confusing one kind of thing with another. For example, someone who sees Oxford's colleges but asks to see the university as another building misunderstands what a university is. Likewise, Ryle argues that the mind should not be treated as another thing alongside the body. However, Ryle must show that Descartes actually confuses capacities with substances rather than merely distinguishing the two.

State, explain, and assess Behaviorism. What are the three main problems associated with this view? (L3)

Analytical behaviorism explains mental states through observable behavior and dispositions to behave, rather than a separate private mental substance. For example, believing it will rain might involve carrying an umbrella if one wants to stay dry. However, it faces three major problems. First, it cannot fully explain qualia, or what experiences like pain feel like. Second, behavioral definitions are incomplete because they require indefinitely many conditions and exceptions. Third, they risk circularity because explaining one mental state often requires referring to another, such as using desires to explain beliefs. These objections challenge whether behavior alone can adequately define mental states.

What is reductive materialism? (L4)

Reductive materialism is the theory that mental states, such as pain and thoughts, exist but are actually identical to more basic physical states, such as brain states. This means that mental experiences aren't separate nonphysical things. They are physical events that can, in principle, be explained through physical science. Example: Just as water is H2O, a reductive materialist might argue that pain is a specific kind of neural activity.

What is non-reductive materialism? (L4)

Non-reductive materialism is the theory that mental states are real and physical, but they cannot be identified with other, more basic physical states. In other words, the mind is part of the physical world, but mental states are not simply identical to particular lower-level brain states. Example: The theory can treat pain as a real physical state without identifying it with one specific neural-state type.

What is eliminativism? (L4)

Eliminativism is the theory that the mental events or states under discussion do not actually exist, even though people believe they do. Rather than explaining mental states as physical events, eliminativists argue that the supposed mental states were never real in the first place. Example: Your professor compares this with witches: witches don't turn out to be some scientifically identified kind of person; the supposed witches simply don't exist.

What is type-type identity theory? (L4)

Type-type identity theory says that every type of mental state is identical to a particular type of physical state. A type means a general category, rather than one individual experience. Example: The theory might claim that pain, as a general mental-state type, is identical to a particular neural-state type called N237. N237 is just a hypothetical example from your lecture.

What is multiple realizability? (L4)

Multiple realizability means that the same kind of mental state could exist in different physical systems. For example, a human and an alien might both experience pain even though their bodies and nervous systems work differently. This challenges the idea that pain must always be identical to one specific kind of brain state.

Why might the mind-brain identity theory be thought to be a solution to the mind-body problem? Here, be sure to explain how this theory appeals to the type-type identity theory of mental and physical properties. (L4)

The mind-brain identity theory argues that mental states are identical to physical brain states rather than existing as separate nonphysical substances. Specifically, type-type identity theory claims that each type of mental property is identical to a particular type of physical property. For example, pain might be identical to neural state N237. This might solve the mind-body problem because humans don't have to possess two fundamentally different substances; mental experiences are themselves physical brain events.

What is eliminativism about the mental? Why might one be tempted by such a position? Is it true? (L4)

Eliminativism is the view that mental events do not actually exist. Someone might support it because mental states are difficult to explain scientifically and seem incompatible with a completely physical world. Rather than identifying mental states with brain events, the eliminativist denies that the supposed mental states exist. However, the view is questionable because experiences such as pain and conscious awareness seem undeniable. Therefore, eliminating all mental events is difficult to defend.

State and explain the difference between reductive and non-reductive materialism. (L4)

Reductive and non-reductive materialism both accept that mental states exist and belong to the physical world. However, reductive materialism claims that mental states are identical to other, more basic physical states, such as brain states. Non-reductive materialism argues that mental states are physical but cannot be identified with those other, more basic physical states. The main difference is whether mental states can be reduced to lower-level physical states.

What is meant by the term 'qualia'? What problem do qualia pose for reductive materialism? (L4)

Qualia are the subjective qualities of conscious experience, or what something feels like from the inside. For example, the painful feeling of a headache or the bitterness of coffee is a quale. Qualia challenge reductive materialism because mental experiences have distinctive felt qualities that brain states do not seem to have. Using Leibniz's Law, critics argue that if experiences and brain states have different properties, they cannot be identical. However, reductive materialists can question whether the difference is genuine.

What are after images? Why have these been thought to pose a difficulty for reductive materialism? Do they? (L4)

Afterimages are visual experiences that remain after the original image or object is no longer present. For example, after looking at a bright colored shape, you might see a lingering green image. Critics argue that because the afterimage looks green but no brain state is literally green, the experience cannot be identical to a brain state under Leibniz's Law. However, this objection may fail because experiencing green is different from the brain itself being green. A brain state doesn't need to be green to produce a green visual experience.

What is the multiple realizability of the mental? What problem does this pose for reductive materialism? (L4)

Multiple realizability means that the same mental-state type can be produced by different physical-state types. For example, humans and aliens might both feel pain even if their nervous systems are completely different. This challenges strict type-type identity theory because pain cannot be identical to one specific neural-state type if pain can occur without it. However, this doesn't necessarily disprove all physicalism because mental states might still be physical without being identical to one particular brain-state type.

What is functionalism? (L5)

Functionalism is the theory that mental states are defined by their causal roles—what causes them, how they relate to other mental states and what effects they produce.

What is an example of functionalism? (L5)

Pain is typically caused by injury, interacts with beliefs and desires, and leads to behaviors such as avoiding danger. Its causal role is what matters to functionalism.

What are the three objections to Functionalism? (L5)

Profligacy suggests functionalism counts too many systems as minded. Inverted qualia suggests identical functions but different feelings. Absent qualia suggests identical functions but no conscious feelings in one system.

What is Functionalism? What are the best motivations for Functionalism?

Functionalism is the theory that mental states are defined by their causal roles, meaning what causes them, how they relate to other mental states and what effects they produce. For example, pain may be caused by injury and lead to avoiding danger. Functionalism is motivated by multiple realizability because different beings could experience the same mental state despite having different physical structures. Unlike strict type-type identity theory, functionalism does not require one particular brain-state type for every mental-state type. It also avoids treating the mind as a separate nonphysical substance.

Is Functionalism defensible? What problems do qualia pose for Functionalism?

Functionalism is attractive because it explains mental states through their causal roles and allows multiple realizability. However, qualia, or what experiences feel like, create problems. Profligacy suggests too many systems might count as minded. Inverted qualia suggests functionally identical systems might have different feelings. Absent qualia suggests one system could have no conscious experience at all. These objections challenge whether functional roles are sufficient for consciousness. Functionalism remains defensible if these possibilities can be rejected or adequately explained.