International Law Midterm

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144 Terms

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neorealism

theory that anarchic international system forces self-interested states to prioritize security and power, making sustained international cooperation difficult

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John Mearsheimer

neorealist who argues that international institutions have little independent influence over state behavior because states remain concerned with relative gains and cheating

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relative gains

state’s concern with how much it gains compared with another state, rather than simply whether cooperation benefits it

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cheating

realist concern that states have incentives to violate agreements when doing so improves their relative position, making cooperation unstable

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anarchy

absence of central authority above states in the international system

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institutional liberalism

theory that self-interested states can achieve meaningful cooperation through international institutions despite international anarchy

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Keohane & Martin

Institutionalists who argue against Mearsheimer that institutions matter because they can reduce obstacles to cooperation, including fears of cheating and unequal gains

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absolute gains

benefits a state receives from cooperation regardless of whether another state receives even greater benefits

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transaction costs

costs associated with negotiating, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements between states

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reciprocity

cooperation based on expectation that one state’s cooperative behavior will be met by cooperation from others

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focal point

common rule, expectation, institutional framework around which states can coordinate their behavior

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functions of international institutions

institutions facilitate cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, making commitments credible, establishing focal points, facilitating reciprocity

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Mearsheimer vs. Keohane/Martin

Mearsheimer believes relative gains and cheating severely limit institutions, while Keohane and Martin argue institutions can mitigate those problems and make mutually beneficial cooperation rational

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legalization

framework developed by Abbott and others for measuring how strongly international rules possess three characteristics: obligation, precision, delegation

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obligation

degree to which states are legally bound by rule or commitment

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precision

degree to which a rule clearly defines what conduct is required, permitted, prohibited

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delegation

degree to which third parties, such as courts/international orgs, have authority to interpret, apply, enforce rules

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ideal legalization

maximum levels of obligation, precision, delegation

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hard law/hard legalization

international rules with relatively high levels of obligation, precision, delegation

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hard law advantages

greater certainty, credibility, predictability, enforceability, clarity about states’ obligations

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hard law disadvantages

high contracting and sovereignty costs, rigidity, greater difficulty persuading states to accept agreement

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soft law/soft legalization

rules with lower levels of obligation, precision, delegation, allowing states greater flexibility

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soft law advantages

easier negotiation, greater flexibility, lower sovereignty costs, greater willingness of states to participate

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soft law disadvantages

less certainty, weaker enforcement/credibility, more opportunity for states to avoid compliance

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Finnemore & Toope

Constructivist scholars who criticize Abbott’s legalization framework for reducing law to formal institutional characteristics rather than explaining what actually gives law authority

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legal bureacratization

Finnemore and Toope’s criticism of Abbott’s legalization framework: obligation, precision, delegation describe characteristics of formalized legal systems but do not define what law is, distinguish law from other forms of normativity, therefore cannot fully explain law’s power

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law as authoritative

law creates recognized obligations that actors understand as legimitate and binding

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law as transformative

law can change identities, interests, expectations, social norms

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Finnemore & Toope on CIL

international law cannot be understood only through formal treaties and institutions because customary international law is also genuine law, despite lacking characteristics emphasized by legalization theory

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Four Sources of international law

treaties, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions/teachings of scholars

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treaty

written international agreement creating legal obligations between states that become parties to it

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international custom

international law arising from general state practice accompanied by belief that practice is legally required

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general principles of law

fundamental legal principles recognized across legal systems that can be applied internationally

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judicial decisions, scholarly teachings

subsidiary means used to help identity and interpret international legal rules

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post-WWII development of international law

major expansion of international law to incorporate human rights, rather than focusing almost exclusively on relations between sovereign states

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Hugo Grotius

early international-law theorist who combines natural-law reasoning with consent-based conception of the law of nations

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natural law

universal principles discoverable through human reason whose authority comes from their rational and moral character

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Grotius’s Natural law

“a dictate of right reason,” reason allows humans to determine whether actions conform to human nature and justice

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Grotius on domestic law

domestic law ultimately rests upon natural law principles

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Grotius on international law

international law is primarily positive/volitional law particuarly the law of nations created through the will or consent of nations

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volitional law

law arising from act of will rather than directly from natural reason

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human volitional law

includes municipal law and law of nations

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municipal law

positive law governing particular political community or state

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law of nations

rules expressing will or consent of nations and governing relations among them

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divine volitional law

law arising from divine will

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Just War theory

idea that war may be morally and legally permissible under certain conditions, such as legitimate self-defense

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Thomas Hobbes

thinker who views individuals without government, and states without superior international authority, as existing in state of nature

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state of nature

condition without common sovereign authority in which insecurity and competition create persistent potential for conflict

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Hobbes’s natural law

rational principles directing individuals toward peace and self-preservation

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Hobbes on domestic law

once sovereign established, domestic law becomes positive law determined by sovereign authority

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Hobbes on international law

because states have no sovereign above them, they remain in state of nature; therefore, Hobbes does not recognize a developed international legal system comparable to domestic law

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Hobbes and realism

his image of sovereign states existing without superior authority resembles realist conception of international anarchy

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John Locke

natural-law theorist who argues that people possess rights prior to government and political authority is legitimate only when it protects those rights

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Lockean state of nature

state of nature contains morality because individuals can understand natural law through reason, unlike Hobbes

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natural rights

rights inherently possessed by individuals rather than granted by government

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Locke’s fundamental natural rights

life, liberty, property

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congruence

requirement that civil or positive law be consistent with natural law

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Locke on civil law

government-created law must remain congruent with natural law and protect natural righs

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Emer de Vattel

natural-law theorist who argues that states themselves are moral persons subject to natural law

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States as moral persons

Vattel’s idea that states possess agency, rights, duties, moral responsibilites comparable in important ways to individuals

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Vattel on domestic law

domestic law should be based on natural law

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Vattel on international law

international law combines positive and natural law

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Vattel vs. Hobbes

Hobbes views states as existing in state of nature without a genuine international legal system, whereas Vattel argues natural law still creates obligations among states because states are moral persons

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John Austin

legal positivist who argues genuine laws are commands issued by sovereign and backed by force

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legal positivism

theory separating legal validity from morality and grounding law in recognized human authority or legal sources

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Command Theory of Law

law = command of sovereign + force/sanction

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sovereign

supreme political authority capable of issuing and enforcing legal commands

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Austin on international law

international law is not genuine law under his theory because there is no international sovereign capable of commanding states

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H.L.A. Hart

positivist who defines developed legal systems through combination of primary/secondary rules rather than simply sovereign commands

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law and morality independent

Hart’s position that whether something is legally valid does not necessarily depend upon whether it is morally good

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primary rules

rules governing behavior by requiring, prohibiting, permitting actions

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secondary rules

rules governing how primary rules are recognized, changed, adjudicated

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rule of recognition

determines how valid laws are identified

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rule of change

establishes how laws can be created, modified, repealed

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rule of adjudication

establishes who can authoritatively resolve disputes about legal rules

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Hart on international law

international law is a primitive legal system because it largely consists of primary rules without developed system of secondary rules

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Hans Kelsen

positivist who develops “pure theory” of law in which law is independent normative science rather than extension of morality or politics

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Pure theory of law

theory examining law independently from morality, sociology, politics

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normativity

law concerns what actors ought to do rather than simply what they actually do

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grundnorm

hypothetical basic norm providing ultimate validity to hierarchy of legal norms

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hierarchy of norms

structure in which lower legal rules derive validity from higher rules, ultimately leading to the Grundnorm

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Kelsen on international law

international law is primitive but domestic and international law belong to one unified legal system

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customary international law

international law arising from general state practice and opinio juris

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state practice

general behavior of states that is sufficiently widespread and consistent to contribute to creation of customary law

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opinio juris

states’ belief that a particular practice is followed because international law legally requires it

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CIL is not based on consent

customary rule can generally bind states without each state explicitly agreeing to it

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persistent objector

state that consistently objects to an emerging customary rule while it develops and may therefore avoid being bound by that rule

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jus cogens

fundamental peremptory international norms binding all states without exception

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peremptory norm

rule so fundamental to international law that states cannot contract out of it or create valid treaties contradicting it

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Lotus Case

early international case recognizing customary international law and examining relationship between state sovereignty and limits imposed by international law

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Lotus Principle

controversial presumption favoring state freedom of action where international law has not established restriction

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flag state

state whose nationality a ship possesses, on the high seas, ship is legally associated

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concurrent jurisdiction

situation where multiple states can exercise jurisdiction over the same event or offense

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Lotus concurrent jurisdiction

crime began aboard French Lotus but produced effects aboard Turkish Boz-Kourt, creating jurisdictional connection to both states

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Paquete Habana

U.S. Supreme Court case in which Court recognized customary international law as part of U.S. law

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Goldsmith and Posner

scholars who argue that customary international law is better understood as product of states rationally pursuing their interests than as legal rules independently causing state behavior

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behavioral regularity

CIL reflects patterns produced by state self-interest; rules are result of state behavior rather than cause of it

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coincidence of interest

states independently behave similarly because doing so happens to serve each state’s interests

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coercion

one powerful state causes another state to behave in particular way through threats, pressure, power

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cooperation

states alter their behavior to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that would be difficult to achieve independently