1/143
Looks like no tags are added yet.
neorealism
theory that anarchic international system forces self-interested states to prioritize security and power, making sustained international cooperation difficult
John Mearsheimer
neorealist who argues that international institutions have little independent influence over state behavior because states remain concerned with relative gains and cheating
relative gains
state’s concern with how much it gains compared with another state, rather than simply whether cooperation benefits it
cheating
realist concern that states have incentives to violate agreements when doing so improves their relative position, making cooperation unstable
anarchy
absence of central authority above states in the international system
institutional liberalism
theory that self-interested states can achieve meaningful cooperation through international institutions despite international anarchy
Keohane & Martin
Institutionalists who argue against Mearsheimer that institutions matter because they can reduce obstacles to cooperation, including fears of cheating and unequal gains
absolute gains
benefits a state receives from cooperation regardless of whether another state receives even greater benefits
transaction costs
costs associated with negotiating, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements between states
reciprocity
cooperation based on expectation that one state’s cooperative behavior will be met by cooperation from others
focal point
common rule, expectation, institutional framework around which states can coordinate their behavior
functions of international institutions
institutions facilitate cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, making commitments credible, establishing focal points, facilitating reciprocity
Mearsheimer vs. Keohane/Martin
Mearsheimer believes relative gains and cheating severely limit institutions, while Keohane and Martin argue institutions can mitigate those problems and make mutually beneficial cooperation rational
legalization
framework developed by Abbott and others for measuring how strongly international rules possess three characteristics: obligation, precision, delegation
obligation
degree to which states are legally bound by rule or commitment
precision
degree to which a rule clearly defines what conduct is required, permitted, prohibited
delegation
degree to which third parties, such as courts/international orgs, have authority to interpret, apply, enforce rules
ideal legalization
maximum levels of obligation, precision, delegation
hard law/hard legalization
international rules with relatively high levels of obligation, precision, delegation
hard law advantages
greater certainty, credibility, predictability, enforceability, clarity about states’ obligations
hard law disadvantages
high contracting and sovereignty costs, rigidity, greater difficulty persuading states to accept agreement
soft law/soft legalization
rules with lower levels of obligation, precision, delegation, allowing states greater flexibility
soft law advantages
easier negotiation, greater flexibility, lower sovereignty costs, greater willingness of states to participate
soft law disadvantages
less certainty, weaker enforcement/credibility, more opportunity for states to avoid compliance
Finnemore & Toope
Constructivist scholars who criticize Abbott’s legalization framework for reducing law to formal institutional characteristics rather than explaining what actually gives law authority
legal bureacratization
Finnemore and Toope’s criticism of Abbott’s legalization framework: obligation, precision, delegation describe characteristics of formalized legal systems but do not define what law is, distinguish law from other forms of normativity, therefore cannot fully explain law’s power
law as authoritative
law creates recognized obligations that actors understand as legimitate and binding
law as transformative
law can change identities, interests, expectations, social norms
Finnemore & Toope on CIL
international law cannot be understood only through formal treaties and institutions because customary international law is also genuine law, despite lacking characteristics emphasized by legalization theory
Four Sources of international law
treaties, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions/teachings of scholars
treaty
written international agreement creating legal obligations between states that become parties to it
international custom
international law arising from general state practice accompanied by belief that practice is legally required
general principles of law
fundamental legal principles recognized across legal systems that can be applied internationally
judicial decisions, scholarly teachings
subsidiary means used to help identity and interpret international legal rules
post-WWII development of international law
major expansion of international law to incorporate human rights, rather than focusing almost exclusively on relations between sovereign states
Hugo Grotius
early international-law theorist who combines natural-law reasoning with consent-based conception of the law of nations
natural law
universal principles discoverable through human reason whose authority comes from their rational and moral character
Grotius’s Natural law
“a dictate of right reason,” reason allows humans to determine whether actions conform to human nature and justice
Grotius on domestic law
domestic law ultimately rests upon natural law principles
Grotius on international law
international law is primarily positive/volitional law particuarly the law of nations created through the will or consent of nations
volitional law
law arising from act of will rather than directly from natural reason
human volitional law
includes municipal law and law of nations
municipal law
positive law governing particular political community or state
law of nations
rules expressing will or consent of nations and governing relations among them
divine volitional law
law arising from divine will
Just War theory
idea that war may be morally and legally permissible under certain conditions, such as legitimate self-defense
Thomas Hobbes
thinker who views individuals without government, and states without superior international authority, as existing in state of nature
state of nature
condition without common sovereign authority in which insecurity and competition create persistent potential for conflict
Hobbes’s natural law
rational principles directing individuals toward peace and self-preservation
Hobbes on domestic law
once sovereign established, domestic law becomes positive law determined by sovereign authority
Hobbes on international law
because states have no sovereign above them, they remain in state of nature; therefore, Hobbes does not recognize a developed international legal system comparable to domestic law
Hobbes and realism
his image of sovereign states existing without superior authority resembles realist conception of international anarchy
John Locke
natural-law theorist who argues that people possess rights prior to government and political authority is legitimate only when it protects those rights
Lockean state of nature
state of nature contains morality because individuals can understand natural law through reason, unlike Hobbes
natural rights
rights inherently possessed by individuals rather than granted by government
Locke’s fundamental natural rights
life, liberty, property
congruence
requirement that civil or positive law be consistent with natural law
Locke on civil law
government-created law must remain congruent with natural law and protect natural righs
Emer de Vattel
natural-law theorist who argues that states themselves are moral persons subject to natural law
States as moral persons
Vattel’s idea that states possess agency, rights, duties, moral responsibilites comparable in important ways to individuals
Vattel on domestic law
domestic law should be based on natural law
Vattel on international law
international law combines positive and natural law
Vattel vs. Hobbes
Hobbes views states as existing in state of nature without a genuine international legal system, whereas Vattel argues natural law still creates obligations among states because states are moral persons
John Austin
legal positivist who argues genuine laws are commands issued by sovereign and backed by force
legal positivism
theory separating legal validity from morality and grounding law in recognized human authority or legal sources
Command Theory of Law
law = command of sovereign + force/sanction
sovereign
supreme political authority capable of issuing and enforcing legal commands
Austin on international law
international law is not genuine law under his theory because there is no international sovereign capable of commanding states
H.L.A. Hart
positivist who defines developed legal systems through combination of primary/secondary rules rather than simply sovereign commands
law and morality independent
Hart’s position that whether something is legally valid does not necessarily depend upon whether it is morally good
primary rules
rules governing behavior by requiring, prohibiting, permitting actions
secondary rules
rules governing how primary rules are recognized, changed, adjudicated
rule of recognition
determines how valid laws are identified
rule of change
establishes how laws can be created, modified, repealed
rule of adjudication
establishes who can authoritatively resolve disputes about legal rules
Hart on international law
international law is a primitive legal system because it largely consists of primary rules without developed system of secondary rules
Hans Kelsen
positivist who develops “pure theory” of law in which law is independent normative science rather than extension of morality or politics
Pure theory of law
theory examining law independently from morality, sociology, politics
normativity
law concerns what actors ought to do rather than simply what they actually do
grundnorm
hypothetical basic norm providing ultimate validity to hierarchy of legal norms
hierarchy of norms
structure in which lower legal rules derive validity from higher rules, ultimately leading to the Grundnorm
Kelsen on international law
international law is primitive but domestic and international law belong to one unified legal system
customary international law
international law arising from general state practice and opinio juris
state practice
general behavior of states that is sufficiently widespread and consistent to contribute to creation of customary law
opinio juris
states’ belief that a particular practice is followed because international law legally requires it
CIL is not based on consent
customary rule can generally bind states without each state explicitly agreeing to it
persistent objector
state that consistently objects to an emerging customary rule while it develops and may therefore avoid being bound by that rule
jus cogens
fundamental peremptory international norms binding all states without exception
peremptory norm
rule so fundamental to international law that states cannot contract out of it or create valid treaties contradicting it
Lotus Case
early international case recognizing customary international law and examining relationship between state sovereignty and limits imposed by international law
Lotus Principle
controversial presumption favoring state freedom of action where international law has not established restriction
flag state
state whose nationality a ship possesses, on the high seas, ship is legally associated
concurrent jurisdiction
situation where multiple states can exercise jurisdiction over the same event or offense
Lotus concurrent jurisdiction
crime began aboard French Lotus but produced effects aboard Turkish Boz-Kourt, creating jurisdictional connection to both states
Paquete Habana
U.S. Supreme Court case in which Court recognized customary international law as part of U.S. law
Goldsmith and Posner
scholars who argue that customary international law is better understood as product of states rationally pursuing their interests than as legal rules independently causing state behavior
behavioral regularity
CIL reflects patterns produced by state self-interest; rules are result of state behavior rather than cause of it
coincidence of interest
states independently behave similarly because doing so happens to serve each state’s interests
coercion
one powerful state causes another state to behave in particular way through threats, pressure, power
cooperation
states alter their behavior to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that would be difficult to achieve independently