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Patent Remedies
Overview of Patent Remedies A patent owner can get money damages and court orders (injunctions), and damages must be enough to make up for the infringement, measured by lost profits or a reasonable royalty. Damages can be tripled for willful infringement, courts can block future infringement, and there are no criminal penalties.
How Money Damages Are Measured Damages are usually the owner's lost profits or, if those can't be proven, a reasonable royalty based on a real or imagined license fee. The chapter uses Rite‑Hite and Grain Processing for lost profits and Trio Process and Lucent for royalties.
The Panduit Test for Lost Profits Lost profits look at what the patent owner lost, not what the infringer earned. Under Panduit, the owner must show demand for the product, no acceptable non‑infringing substitutes, the ability to meet demand, and the amount of profit lost.
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Background
Rite‑Hite: The Question on Appeal The trial court gave Rite‑Hite lost profits on sales of a competing product that the patent in the case didn't cover. The full appeals court took the case to decide whether the law allows that kind of recovery.
Rite‑Hite: The Products Rite‑Hite's patent covers a device that holds a truck to a loading dock, and Rite‑Hite sold both the patented MDL‑55 and the more expensive ADL‑100, which other patents covered. Kelley's infringing Truk Stop was designed to compete mainly with the ADL‑100.
The Parties' Positions Kelley argued that lost profits are only available for lost sales of the patented product itself, and anything else gets only a royalty. Rite‑Hite argued the only limit is proof that the infringement actually caused the loss.
Procedural Posture
Rite‑Hite: The Lost Sales Found Kelley sold 3,825 infringing units, and the court found that without them Rite‑Hite would have sold 80 more MDL‑55s, 3,243 more ADL‑100s, and 1,692 more dock levelers. The court awarded Rite‑Hite its wholesale profits on those lost sales.
Rite‑Hite: Kelley's Challenge Kelley accepted the MDL‑55 award but argued the law doesn't allow lost profits on the ADL‑100 because the patent in the case didn't cover it. The appeals court upheld the ADL‑100 award.
Trial Court's Reasoning The trial court said full compensation required paying Rite‑Hite for ADL‑100 sales that Kelley expected to take. It found Kelley could have foreseen that liability, so the award didn't stretch the patent too far.
Legal Standard
Broad Statutory Language The statute requires "adequate" damages and sets a reasonable royalty only as a minimum. The court read the text as broad, not limiting.
Supreme Court Guidance on Full Compensation The Supreme Court has said Congress wanted patent owners fully paid for any damages they can prove. It also warned against adding limits that Congress didn't write into the law.
The "But For" Standard Under Aro, the question is what the patent owner would have made if the infringement hadn't happened. To get lost profits, the owner must show a reasonable probability it would have made the infringer's sales.
Panduit as a Useful Tool Panduit is a helpful but not required way to show that the infringement caused the lost sales. Once the owner meets it, the burden shifts to the infringer to show the inference is unreasonable.
Limits on Recoverable Harm Not every harm caused by infringement can be recovered; distant effects like an inventor's heart attack or a stock price drop are excluded. Courts use ideas like "proximate cause" and "foreseeability" to cut off harms that are too remote.
Court Reasoning
Applying Panduit Here The trial court found Rite‑Hite proved causation, and Kelley didn't dispute that. Kelley argued only that the ADL‑100 losses aren't recoverable because that product isn't covered by the patent in suit.
The Foreseeability Test The court held that a harm an infringing competitor could reasonably foresee in the market is generally recoverable. The lost ADL‑100 sales, of a directly competing product, were foreseeable.
No Express Language Needed Losing sales of a competing product is plainly foreseeable and fits within normal proximate‑cause limits. The statute doesn't need to mention such losses specifically for them to be recoverable.
Rejecting Kelley's Antitrust Argument Kelley argued the award would let a patent restrict competition in unpatented goods, citing antitrust cases. The court said this case is only about making the owner whole after a proven infringement, not about extending the patent.
No Duty to Use the Patent Kelley argued the law should push inventors to use their inventions, but a patent is granted for disclosing an invention, not for using it. Courts may decline to block infringement if public need requires it, but whether the owner sells the invention doesn't control lost profits.
Panduit Is Not the Only Path Kelley argued Panduit requires lost profits to rest only on the patented invention. The court said other ways of showing causation are acceptable, and failing Panduit doesn't automatically bar recovery.
The Second Panduit Factor Was Met The only substitute was Rite‑Hite's own ADL‑100, which customers could buy only from Rite‑Hite. So Rite‑Hite wouldn't have lost those sales to an outside competitor.
Holding on the ADL‑100 If the ADL‑100 had been unpatented and available from others, Rite‑Hite would have had to prove customers wouldn't have bought it elsewhere. The court found the competing sales foreseeable and affirmed the lost‑profits award.
Dissent Reasoning: Foreseeability not correct
The Dissent's Core Objection Judge Nies, joined by three judges, argued that the majority used damages to expand the property rights a patent grants. She asked which injuries actually call for compensation.
Injury Must Be to the Patented Market The dissent said a patent owner's protected right is only the exclusive market for goods using the patented invention. Rite‑Hite should get lost profits only on the 80 MDL‑55 sales and a royalty on the rest.
Historical Limits on Damages Pre‑1946 Supreme Court cases limited damages to interference with the market for the patented goods. A patent makes an inventor's existing right to sell exclusive; it doesn't create a new right.
Disclosure, Use, and Damages Inventors don't have to sell their inventions to get a patent or an injunction. But the dissent said that doesn't mean failing to sell is irrelevant to damages.
The Purpose Is Getting Products to the Public The dissent said the patent system aims to get new products into the market, not just to collect information. It would be odd to reward an owner who leaves an invention unused as much as one who brings it to market.
Foreseeability Is the Wrong Test The dissent said the majority wrongly cut damages off from patent rights and relied only on foreseeable competitive harm. The relevant market should be limited to goods made under the patent, not all truck restraints.
Infringement Is Not Unfair Competition The dissent said the majority treats infringement like general unfair competition, but it's a separate federal claim. Lost profits on patented goods are meant to encourage bringing new products to market during the patent term.
Innocent Infringers Show the Flaw Even infringers who don't know about a patent are liable for up to six years of damages, so foreseeability doesn't fit. Under the majority's rule, these infringers would also owe for unprotected competing products.
Kelley Couldn't Have Foreseen This Kelley designed around the ADL‑100 patents, and the '847 patent issued only after Kelley launched its product. The dissent said Kelley would have needed to see the future to predict this liability.
Unbroken Contrary Precedent The dissent noted no court in over 200 years had protected a business line that didn't use the patented technology. The Supreme Court and other circuits had rejected so broad a view.
Bad Incentives The dissent said owners would gain more from protecting established products than from investing in new ones. Without a loss in the patented market, Congress provides a royalty instead.
The Untested ADL‑100 Patents The majority relied on the ADL‑100 being patented without examining what those patents cover. The dissent said other alternatives existed and that if those patents are invalid, the majority's reasoning falls apart.
Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co. 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Background
Grain Processing: Introduction The trial court denied Grain Processing lost profits and awarded a 3% royalty on American Maize's infringing sales. It found an acceptable non‑infringing substitute was available, even though it wasn't on sale, and the appeals court affirmed.
Background on Maltodextrins The patent covers maltodextrins, bland, clear food additives made from starch and sold in huge volumes. They improve texture and stability in foods like frostings, drinks, and cereals.
How Maltodextrins Are Made Producers break down starch with water, and adjusting the process yields more dextrose. "Dextrose equivalence" (D.E.) measures how far the starch was broken down and affects sweetness and binding.
The Patent Claim Grain Processing owns the '194 patent, and claim 12 covers a waxy‑starch maltodextrin with specific measurements, including a "descriptive ratio" above about 2. Grain Processing's own Maltrin products don't fall within claim 12 because they use non‑waxy starch.
American Maize's Product and Processes American Maize sold Lo‑Dex 10, a waxy maltodextrin, throughout the patent period. It used four different production processes over time, which is central to the dispute.
Dueling Measurement Tests Grain Processing used the Schoorl test, while American Maize used the Lane‑Eynon test, which gives different results. Lane‑Eynon showed no infringement, but Schoorl showed a ratio above 2.
Process III American Maize designed Process III to produce uniform, non‑infringing output, and its Lane‑Eynon tests showed it worked. Customers saw no difference, but Grain Processing's Schoorl tests showed infringement, and it moved for contempt.
Process IV Process IV added a second, well‑known enzyme and took only two weeks to put into full production. American Maize hadn't used it earlier only because that enzyme was expensive.
Process IV's Product Everyone agreed Process IV produced non‑infringing Lo‑Dex 10 that customers saw as identical. American Maize used it until the patent expired in 1991 and then went back to the cheaper Process III.
How the 3% Royalty Was Set Process IV cost only 2.3% more, and buyers viewed the two products as the same. The court found American Maize would not have paid more than 3% and would otherwise have switched to Process IV.
First Appeal and Remand On the first appeal, the court said switching to a substitute years later doesn't prove it was available during the infringement. A substitute must have been "available or on the market" at the time.
Availability Found on Remand On remand, the trial court found Process IV was available throughout, based on detailed facts. American Maize had the materials, equipment, and know‑how and delayed only for cost reasons.
No Demand for the Claimed Features The trial court also found no real customer demand for the specific patented features, such as waxy starch and the ratio. Grain Processing didn't have a patent on 10 D.E. maltodextrins generally, so it couldn't get lost profits.
Procedural Posture
Processes I and II and the Lawsuit Grain Processing sued in 1981, and American Maize then switched to Process II, which used less enzyme to cut costs. American Maize argued Lo‑Dex 10 didn't infringe because its descriptive ratio was below the claimed level.
Infringement Finding and Injunction The appeals court reversed a no‑infringement ruling and found Lo‑Dex 10 infringed claims 12–14. The trial court then barred American Maize from making the infringing product.
Contempt and the Test Ruling The trial court first held American Maize in contempt but then let it use any accepted test and found no infringement. The appeals court reversed and held the Schoorl test controls, so American Maize adopted Process IV.
The Damages Trial Grain Processing sought lost profits and a 28% royalty, but the court denied lost profits and set a 3% royalty. It found that American Maize "could have produced" a non‑infringing substitute with Process IV.
Legal Standard
Legal Framework Full compensation includes foreseeable lost profits, but the owner must show a reasonable probability of "but for" causation. The burden then shifts to the infringer to show that claim is unreasonable.
Two‑Supplier Market Rebutted In a two‑supplier market, the court can assume buyers would have turned to the patent owner. But American Maize proved an available, acceptable substitute, which defeated lost profits.
Rebuilding the "But For" Market Damages require imagining the market without the infringement, supported by sound economic proof. Courts have let patent owners recover many kinds of lost profits in this hypothetical market.
The Infringer's Likely Alternatives Count An honest reconstruction must also consider what the infringer would likely have done instead, such as offering a lawful alternative. Comparing the invention to its next‑best alternative shows the patent's true market value.
Slimfold Precedent In Slimfold, a non‑infringing alternative not on the market still defeated lost profits. The infringer had used that old hardware before, and buyers found it acceptable, so only a small royalty was awarded.
Market‑Sales Cases Earlier cases treated actual market sales as strong evidence of a substitute. They didn't address substitutes that were available but not actually on sale.
Distinguishing Zygo Zygo was remanded because the trial court's findings were too thin. Its statement that unavailable devices can't count went beyond what the case needed and didn't change the law.
Court Reasoning
A Royalty Is Adequate Compensation Grain Processing argued it was undercompensated, but the statute treats a reasonable royalty as adequate. Full compensation doesn't mean lost profits without causation, and there was no willful infringement.
Timing and Burden of Availability Availability is judged during the infringement period, and a substitute not on the market is presumed unavailable. The infringer must overcome that with concrete proof, not speculation.
Concrete Proof Here The trial court relied on unchallenged facts: the materials, knowledge, equipment, and experience were all on hand. American Maize didn't need to invent anything new, only add an enzyme.
Cost and Demand Support Availability The enzyme's cost wasn't prohibitive given American Maize's large profit margins. Because buyers didn't care about the claimed features, a substitute was easier to make.
No Clear Error on Availability Grain Processing couldn't block Process IV because its patent covered only one variety of the product. The court found no clear error and upheld that Process IV was available throughout the period.
Acceptability Depends on Demand Whether a substitute blocks lost profits also depends on whether customers would accept it. Intended use, physical similarity, and price shape customer demand.
A Perfect Substitute To customers, Process IV Lo‑Dex 10 was the same product at the same price from the same seller. That made the dispute over market definition irrelevant.
Market Evidence of Acceptability American Maize's margins and price‑sensitive buyers meant it wouldn't have raised prices. Sales didn't change after the switch, and witnesses confirmed buyers saw no difference.
Causation Fails A Process IV American Maize would have kept all its sales. Grain Processing would have sold the same amount either way.
Summary and Holding A substitute doesn't have to be on sale to affect the hypothetical market if there is good economic proof. The court affirmed the denial of lost profits.
Reasonable Royalty
Reasonable Royalty Overview A royalty is used when lost profits are too hard to prove or aren't claimed, and it is the most common award. Courts look to existing royalties or imagine a negotiation at the time infringement began.
Established Royalty Issues Common questions include what counts as an established royalty and how many similar licenses are needed. Courts also ask how closely existing licenses match the parties' situation.
Trio Process Corp. v. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc. 612 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1980) Background
Trio Process: Introduction Infringement was settled, and this appeal concerned whether the recalculated damages followed the court's earlier instructions. The court held they didn't and vacated them again.
The Patent and Prior Ruling Trio's patent covers a process for removing insulation from copper wire. In 1972 the court upheld the patent and found Goldstein's infringement willful.
The Master's Approach The master measured Goldstein's labor savings of $52,791 per furnace year and halved them to set the royalty. That produced damages of $1,564,804.
Procedural Posture
The District Court's First Approach The court instead started from Trio's actual $2,600 license fee and raised it to $7,800, then $15,000. After doubling the damages and adding interest, the total was $1,726,525.
The Earlier Appeal The appeals court approved focusing on Trio's loss and accepted that the license rate might have been depressed. It required a single rate and an evidence‑based explanation for any departure from the actual license rate.
Goldstein's Benefits The court found four benefits to Goldstein but could put a dollar value only on labor savings. It adjusted those savings to $41,652 per furnace year.
The Court's $15,000 Figure The court thought the parties might split the savings at about $20,000 but cut that to $15,000. With doubling and interest, the award reached $2,901,336.
Legal Standard
Georgia‑Pacific Factors A reasonable royalty must be at least the statutory minimum, and Georgia‑Pacific lists the relevant factors. The trial court found several relevant, such as profitability, advantages over older methods, and expert opinions.
Court Reasoning
Ignoring the License Fees The court disregarded Trio's license fees as depressed by the infringement. The appeals court found no evidence for that and said the actual rate is an important factor.
The Existing Rate Is Probative The rate was steady before and after the infringement, which suggests an established royalty. There was still no evidence that Goldstein's infringement depressed it.
Distinguishing Tights In Tights, widespread industry infringement clearly drove rates down. Here, the rate was freely negotiated before the infringement, with no industry‑wide infringement.
No Depressing Effect Rates didn't fall, and Trio even offered Goldstein the same terms after learning of the infringement. So the court had to vacate the damages.
Trio's Licensing History Trio only licensed its process, at about $2,600 per furnace year, in packages with furnaces. That rate stayed roughly constant across many sales.
The Pre‑Infringement Rate Controls The rate was freely negotiated before the infringement, and it didn't fall afterward. That Trio might have charged more doesn't matter, and the rate is highly persuasive.
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) Background
Lucent: Introduction Microsoft appealed a $357,693,056.18 jury award for infringing the Day patent. The court vacated it for lack of evidence.
History of Personal Computing The opinion describes the early days of PCs and graphical interfaces from Apple and Microsoft. AT&T engineers filed the Day patent application in 1986.
The Day Patent The patent covers filling in on‑screen fields with tools like menus, an on‑screen keyboard, or a calculator instead of typing. It can also use touch‑screen stylus input.
The Competing Damages Theories Microsoft sold about 110 million units worth about $8 billion. Lucent sought 8% of sales ($561.9 million), while Microsoft said $6.5 million was right.
Microsoft's Arguments Microsoft challenged the use of the entire market value rule and argued damages should be limited to proven uses. The court rejected those arguments as presented but found the award unsupported.
Lump Sum vs. Running Royalty Lucent wanted a running royalty, but the jury chose a lump sum. The question was whether evidence supported about $358 million, with a focus on Outlook.
Procedural Posture
The Lawsuit and Verdict Lucent sued over Microsoft Money, Outlook, and Windows Mobile. The jury awarded a single lump sum of $357,693,056.18.
Legal Standard
Royalty Basics Damages aim to make the owner whole, and the owner bears the burden of proof. A reasonable royalty is the minimum.
Two Royalty Methods The analytical method looks at the infringer's expected profits. The more common method imagines a negotiation just before infringement began, assuming the patent is valid and infringed.
Factor 2: Comparable Licenses This factor asks whether other licenses are comparable and whether the deal would be a lump sum or running royalty. Running royalties tie payments to use and shift risk to the licensor.
Lump‑Sum Features A lump sum gives the owner cash up front and caps the licensee's cost. It also removes underreporting risk and means no refunds.
Lump‑Sum Risks The technology might prove more valuable than the price paid. Or the licensee might overpay.
Later Evidence Can Help Under Sinclair and Fromson, later events can inform the hypothetical negotiation. Usage data and estimates should get proper weight.
No Rigid Usage Requirement Damages aren't always limited to proven instances of use. Tech companies often license without tying payments to use.
Supreme Court History Early cases like Garretson required owners to separate the value of the patented feature. Westinghouse limited recovery to the part of the profits the patent created.
Two Objectives The goals are finding the invention's value and what the parties would have agreed to. Those two numbers don't always match.
Court Reasoning
Lucent's Weak Lump‑Sum Evidence Lucent's expert argued only for a running royalty, and there was no evidence of expected usage. The jury heard little about how to convert running‑royalty deals into a lump sum.
Usage Drives Lump‑Sum Value Expected usage affects how much a lump sum is worth. Lucent offered no evidence that the date‑picker feature would be valuable enough to justify 8% of Outlook's price.
The Expert's Speculation Lucent's expert admitted a lump sum involves guessing about future use. Speculation alone is often not enough.
Problems with Lucent's Eight Licenses Some licenses were very different, and others were unclear in subject matter. Only four were lump‑sum agreements.
No Comparability Shown Lucent admitted none of the licenses matched the hypothetical deal. Listing royalty numbers without analysis can't support the award.
Running‑Royalty Licenses Running‑royalty deals can be relevant to a lump sum, but only with a basis for comparison. The jury had almost no testimony to make that comparison.
The Award Far Exceeded the Evidence A jury could have awarded $6.5 million or more. But $358 million was three to four times the average comparable lump sum, so Factor 2 weighed strongly against the award.
Factors 10 and 13: Value of the Feature These factors look at how much of the value comes from the invention. The date‑picker is a tiny feature of the huge Outlook program.
Most Profit Comes from Other Features Other features account for most of what customers want, and the date‑picker is only a tiny part of the code. So only a very small share of the profit comes from the invention.
Factor 11: Extent of Use This factor considers how much the infringer used the invention. Microsoft argued later usage data was irrelevant.
No Data on Date‑Picker Use The record had no data on how often people used the patented feature. Lucent wrongly relied on all form use, and only date‑picker use infringes.
Other Factors Offset High profit margins favored a higher royalty. Non‑exclusivity and the feature's slight advantage favored a lower one.
Conclusion on the Lump Sum The award was based on speculation and not supported by substantial evidence. Trial judges must look closely at damages evidence after trial.
Entire Market Value: Microsoft's Argument Microsoft argued the jury must have applied a percentage to total sales. An award calculated to the penny suggests a running‑royalty calculation.
First Flaw: No Demand Link No evidence showed anyone bought Outlook for the date‑picker. Lucent's own expert admitted it, so the rule didn't apply.
Remand Guidance The court said Windows Mobile and Money might come out differently. It suggested analyzing each product separately on remand.
Second Flaw: Inflated Rate After being barred from using the computer price, Lucent's expert used the software price and raised the rate from 1% to 8%. That trick improperly tried to recreate the barred number.
Base and Rate Work Together The royalty base can be the whole product if the rate is low enough. Royalties tied to the sale price can be justified even for small components.
The Entire Market Value Rule Can Still Play a Role Some scholars want to limit the rule. The court said licensing practice often uses a percentage of the product's price.
Rate Must Reflect the Feature's Share Using the whole product's value is fine. The rate just has to reflect the feature's share of the product.
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Background
Uniloc: Introduction Uniloc appealed the grant of a new trial on damages. The court affirmed because the damages method was legally flawed.
The '216 Patent The patent fights software copying by checking registration codes before unlocking full use. If local and remote codes match, the software runs fully, and otherwise it runs in demo mode.
Microsoft's Product Activation Users enter a product key, and the software creates IDs. Activation sends data to Microsoft for processing.
The Expert's Starting Value The jury awarded $388 million based on Dr. Gemini. He began with an internal Microsoft document valuing product keys at $10 to $10,000 and used $10.
Applying the 25% Rule Gemini took 25% of $10 to reach $2.50 per license. He multiplied that by about 226 million licenses, for $564,946,803.
The $19 Billion "Check" He compared his figure to $19.28 billion in revenue, about 2.9%. He called that reasonable compared with typical software rates.
What the 25% Rule Is The rule assigns the patent owner 25% of the licensee's expected profit. For example, a 16% profit rate yields a 4% royalty.
Origins and Support It assumes the licensee keeps 75% for its risks and contributions. It grew out of observations of one company's licenses, and supporters cite studies backing it. Past Tolerance The court had never squarely ruled on the rule. Lower courts routinely admitted it.
Procedural Posture
The District Court's Rulings The court allowed the 25% rule as widely accepted. But it granted a new trial because the $19 billion figure tainted the jury.
Legal Standard
Expert Testimony Standards Daubert and Kumho Tire require reliable expert testimony tied to the case. Irrelevant testimony isn't helpful.
Lucent and ResQNet Those cases rejected licenses that weren't comparable. Owners can't pick unrelated licenses to inflate the royalty.
Court Reasoning
The Holding The court held the 25% rule is fundamentally flawed and inadmissible. It fails to tie the royalty to the facts of the case.
Must Be Tied to the Facts The owner must tie the expert's testimony to the facts. Licenses unrelated to the invention can't be used to support the royalty.
Wordtech The court rejected licenses that differed in type or lacked explanation. There must be a factual link between the prior licenses and the case.
The Rule Is Worse Than Unrelated Licenses The 25% rule says nothing about any particular technology, industry, or parties. It would apply the same split to vastly different deals.
Adjusting Doesn't Cure the Flaw Starting from a flawed number leads to a flawed result even after adjustments. The Georgia‑Pacific factors remain valid if they are tied to the facts.
Gemini's Testimony Fails Gemini used the rule only because it is "generally accepted," not because of the facts of this case. That tainted the verdict, so Microsoft gets a new trial.
The Entire Market Value "Check" Gemini compared his royalty to $19.28 billion and called 2.9% reasonable. That figure is the subject of the second issue.
Rule and Microsoft's Argument The rule applies only when the patented feature drives demand. Microsoft said Product Activation didn't drive demand, so the figure tainted the jury.
Uniloc's Responses Uniloc claimed Microsoft waived the objection, a low rate makes it fine, and the figure was only a check. The district court found the figure irrelevant and tainting.
No Waiver Microsoft's earlier objection was clear and preserved the issue. Uniloc had even said it wouldn't rely on the entire market value.
The Low‑Rate Argument Uniloc relied on Lucent's statement that a low rate can justify using the whole product as the base. The court said that passage, read in context, doesn't help Uniloc.
A Low Rate Isn't Enough You can't use the whole product's value for a minor feature just by picking a low rate. The patented feature must drive demand.
The $19 Billion Danger Revealing huge revenue skews how the jury thinks about damages. Uniloc's questioning of Microsoft's expert made it worse.
"Just a Check" Fails The check gave false legitimacy to Gemini's number and may have led the jury to reject Microsoft's expert. The new trial was properly granted.
Class Notes
Three potential violators of patent rights
Infringer (direct or indirect)
Provisional rights: Reasonable Royalty
Patent rights: Reasonable royalty, lost profits, punitive damages, attorney fees, injunction
PTO: Reissue (can look at any issue and prior art) or disclaiming patent term: Specific performance
Gov’t: Sovereign Immunity
Fundamental issue: Patent rights as property v. liability rights: injunction or making party whole with damages
Reasonable royalty: Determination of judge of a rational agreement
Past Infringement: Reasonable royalth and lost profits two theories
Los profits: parties must directly comete
Reasonable Royalty: don’t have to compete
If they haven’t adequately proved lost profits, complex economic analysis, have to prove the lost profits, and need reasonable royalty