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Why was the Single Market necessary after the customs union, and what does it aim to achieve?
• The customs union was completed on 1 July 1968, eliminating internal tariffs, but it did not create a genuinely borderless market.
• By the mid-1980s, physical, technical and fiscal barriers remained, alongside national restrictions on services and anti-competitive practices.
• The Internal/Single Market aims to secure free movement of goods, services, capital and people, as well as freedom of establishment.
• Baldwin's 'draining a swamp' analogy: removing tariffs revealed the deeper non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
• Evaluating success means assessing actual trade, investment and mobility; there is no unambiguous 'ideal' integration benchmark.
What are the main non-tariff barriers that prevented the completion of the Single Market?
• Physical/border barriers: customs procedures, origin certificates, visas and foreign-exchange restrictions.
• Regulatory/technical barriers: differing product standards, testing, professional qualifications, permits and authorisations.
• Competition and systemic barriers: cartels, abuse of dominance, state aid, tax systems and pension/social-security rules.
• Slides also classify six NTB types: specific trade limitations; administrative entry procedures; standards; import charges; government trade participation; and other restraints.
• NTBs can raise compliance costs without generating tariff revenue, making their removal especially valuable.
How did the 1985 White Paper and the Single European Act seek to complete the Internal Market?
• The Commission's 1985 White Paper proposed about 300 measures, targeting completion by 31 December 1992; the 1986 Single European Act gave the programme a Treaty basis.
• Institutional reform: qualified-majority voting reduced deadlock relative to unanimity in Single Market legislation.
• Eliminate physical frontiers; tackle technical barriers through mutual recognition and harmonisation of essential requirements.
• Address fiscal frontiers through VAT/excise coordination; the origin principle was proposed but the destination principle remained central for B2B transactions.
• Complement liberalisation with flanking policies: competition policy, structural funds, tax approximation and coordination of standards.
What legal principles underpin the four freedoms, and how can national restrictions be justified?
• Non-discrimination: similar persons, goods or services from other Member States must not be treated less favourably solely because of origin.
• Market access: rules that hinder a fundamental freedom may be unlawful even without explicit nationality discrimination; Member States retain regulatory autonomy within Treaty limits.
• Mutual recognition (Cassis de Dijon, 1979): goods lawfully marketed in one Member State should normally be accepted in another; Dassonville (1974) covers measures capable of hindering trade.
• Art. 36 TFEU permits narrowly construed grounds, including public morality/security and protection of health, life or intellectual property, where applicable.
• Restriction test: legitimate public-interest objective, suitability/necessity, proportionality (no less restrictive equally effective alternative) and non-discriminatory application.
How do the case-law examples illustrate the economic costs or possible justification of market restrictions?
• Libert (Flemish land): excluding buyers lacking a local connection reduces demand and house prices, but may help rich locals rather than the targeted poor; restrictions can miss their objective.
• Italian opticians (Ottica New Line): limiting opticians per 8,000 residents restricts establishment; the graph studies monopoly demand, marginal revenue, output and prices when an additional market opens.
• German firefighter age limit (Wolf): unequal treatment may be defensible if based on objective, proportionate fitness criteria.
• Poland/Lithuania right-hand-drive car bans: safety concerns require evidence of risk and a proportionate restriction, not merely an asserted objective.
• Other examples: Scotch Whisky minimum pricing and posted-worker rules (Laval; Bundesdruckerei) highlight trade-offs between movement and public protections.
How does the graph of restrictions on land purchases explain winners, losers and proportionality?
• Before the restriction, market demand combines poor locals (D_P), rich locals (D_R) and external buyers (D_E); equilibrium is P_unrestricted, Q_unrestricted.
• Exclude external buyers: demand becomes D_P + D_R, reducing the equilibrium price and transaction volume.
• In the slide's configuration, the lower price remains above poor locals' willingness to pay; rich locals, not poor locals, purchase the remaining housing.
• A measure presented as improving poor residents' housing access can therefore fail its stated goal, while reducing access and total transactions.
• Exam method: draw combined demands and supply, mark both equilibria, identify which group actually gains, then consider less restrictive alternatives.
What were the Cecchini Report's ex-ante estimates of the cost of non-Europe, and why are they uncertain?
• Cecchini (1988) estimated potential welfare gains from removing remaining barriers at roughly 4.25–6.5% of EC GDP; one table reports 5.8–6.4%.
• The macro scenario projected GDP +4.5%, prices −6.1% and about 1.8 million extra jobs over 6+ years from 1993 (slides' ±30% uncertainty).
• The largest identified channels were production barriers, unrealised economies of scale and reduced competition, not customs barriers alone.
• It was an ex-ante modelling exercise, not an observed effect: it underplayed regional location, distribution, institutions, technology and quality.
• Compare estimates only with attention to outcome (GDP versus welfare), model, period and counterfactual.
How does removing a frictional technical barrier affect prices, trade quantities and welfare?
• A technical barrier to trade (TBT), e.g. duplicate tests or paperwork, raises foreign suppliers' unit costs by T: export supply shifts from XS_F to XS_F + T.
• With the barrier, import price is P_TBT and imports M_TBT; removing it lowers price to P_FT and increases imports to M_FT.
• The importing country gains area a on previously imported units (price effect) and area b from additional units (quantity effect) in the slide's graph.
• Unlike a tariff, a frictional NTB generates no government tariff revenue: the compliance-resource wedge is a real waste rather than an internal transfer.
• Hence the potential gains of eliminating a frictional barrier can be especially large; distinguish frictional costs from tariff revenues.
How do mutual recognition and harmonisation differ as strategies for removing technical barriers?
• Mutual recognition (Cassis de Dijon; Dassonville foundation): accept products legally sold in another Member State unless a justified exception applies.
• Old approach: detailed harmonisation of national product rules and standards at EU level, often slow and cumbersome.
• New approach: harmonise essential safety/health requirements while leaving detailed technical specifications to standards bodies.
• These instruments combine national regulatory diversity with market access and provide a response to potentially discriminatory technical barriers.
• Supporting policies—competition enforcement, redistribution, tax approximation and regulatory coordination—help the market function in practice.
What did early ex-post studies find about the Single Market's actual achievements?
• By the 1992 deadline, about 90% of the original programme had been implemented; the removal of NTBs had positive effects (Fontagné et al., 1998).
• Commission retrospective estimates include GDP +1.1–1.5% for 1987–93 and +2.2% for 1992–2009; figures refer to different windows.
• Other reported effects: employment gains (up to 2.7 million in the later interval), trade +20–30%, investment +2.7%, productivity +1–2%.
• A wave of cross-border mergers and alliances suggested firms anticipated a larger market.
• These are estimates, not one definitive causal figure: dynamic effects, coverage, horizons and methodologies vary; services remained less integrated.
How can the gains from Single Market integration be estimated, and what are the main trade-offs between models?
• Gravity models explain bilateral trade by economic size, trade frictions and distance; useful for identifying trade effects, harder for welfare translation.
• Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models capture sectoral/economy-wide interdependence and counterfactual welfare but require extensive data and assumptions.
• Partial equilibrium models are simple and isolate one market, but omit economy-wide feedbacks.
• Structural macro models such as QUEST/DSGE simulate dynamic GDP and welfare impacts, sometimes holding euro membership fixed to isolate Single Market gains.
• Every result depends on the baseline/counterfactual (e.g. no Single Market, ordinary RTA, WTO trade or Brexit) and whether dynamic effects are included.
How should we measure actual Single Market integration beyond headline intra-EU trade figures?
• Gross intra-EU trade relative to GDP measures cross-border flows; the slides show intra-SM goods trade growing substantially after 1993, with a 2009 crisis dip.
• Trade in value added avoids some double counting; the RoW share rose markedly from 1995–2018 while the EU cross-border share changed much less.
• Smith (2015) adds establishment: SM integration = [intra-EU imports − re-exports + domestic sales of intra-EU affiliates] / apparent consumption.
• Flow 7 = intra-EU imports; 9 = re-exports to exclude; 3 = sales in the home market by locally established subsidiaries owned by EU firms.
• The measure captures both trade and local affiliate activity but requires hard-to-obtain affiliates' sales data; no ideal integration level is known.
What did Mayer et al. (2018) find about the trade and welfare gains from EU integration?
• Gravity-based scenarios simulate disintegration: replacement of the EU by an ordinary regional trade agreement (RTA) or a return to WTO/MFN trade rules.
• Estimated EU integration effects: +109% on goods imports from EU partners and +58% on tradable services from partners; these are TRADE effects, not GDP gains.
• The Single Market's trade effect is more than three times that of a regular RTA in the comparison highlighted on the slides.
• Weighted-average welfare gain is 4.4% for the EU; alternative scenarios yield 'non-Europe' costs around 3–7% of EU GDP.
• Benefits vary: relatively small, open and geographically central states generally gain more as a share of income; do not confuse bilateral trade gains with welfare gains.
What do the Brexit counterfactuals show about 'taking back control' and alternative trade agreements?
• Mayer et al. model Brexit under alternative EU–UK arrangements, including an RTA or WTO conditions, with/without intermediate-input linkages.
• Estimated UK welfare losses are about 0.8–2.9%; other EU members lose on average roughly 0.2–0.6%; Ireland is especially exposed and can lose more than the UK in some scenarios.
• UK free-trade agreements with the US, Canada and Australia generate gains of at most ~0.48% in the modeled cases—far below the estimated loss from leaving the EU.
• Gravity matters: long distances and persistent behind-the-border obstacles limit the ability of distant agreements to replace deep nearby integration.
• The numbers are ex-ante scenario results, sensitive to assumed barriers, intermediate goods and counterfactual arrangements.
Why do later estimates of the Single Market income premium exceed the original Cecchini predictions?
• Lehtimäki & Sondermann (2020) apply synthetic control: compare a real member's post-1993 GDP per capita with a weighted 'synthetic' country reproducing its pre-1993 path without the Single Market.
• Their estimated Single Market growth/income impact is around 12–22%; alternative macro/DSGE estimates (Allen et al.; in 't Veld) are about 8–9% of GDP.
• These are distinct outcomes and modelling approaches from Cecchini's 1988 ex-ante estimate and Mayer's trade/welfare counterfactuals.
• Later studies can capture longer-run dynamic channels: competition, economies of scale, restructuring, innovation and productivity.
• Not all Member States benefit equally; model choice, synthetic donor group, time horizon and initial openness matter.
How integrated is the EU compared with the US after six decades, according to Head & Mayer?
• Head & Mayer (2021) infer trade/movement frictions and compare flows across EU national borders with flows across US state borders, controlling for factors such as distance.
• Intra-EU goods trade frictions fell strongly over time; the EU28 goods border effect was about 8 (2017), versus about 10 for US states.
• But migration remains much less integrated: the EU migrant border effect is around 1,929–2,300 versus US levels around 233–256.
• Services and capital display their own patterns; 'integration' is not uniform across the four freedoms.
• Comparisons must be cautious: language, culture, preferences and US state regulatory differences affect flows; removing a legal frontier does not erase every border effect.
Why does the Single Market remain incomplete, and what are the economic costs of poor implementation?
• The current 'cost of non-Europe' was estimated in the slides at roughly €2.2 trillion (~12% of EU-28 GDP) in potential gains—an estimate of unrealised opportunities, not an observed loss.
• Remaining problems: fragmented services and other sectors, complex/accumulating EU legislation, inconsistent national rules and uneven enforcement.
• Member States may be unable ('can't') or unwilling ('won't') to transpose/apply EU law: late transposition, incorrect application and infringements create mistrust and missed trade/investment.
• Bureaucratic frictions waste real resources rather than merely transferring tariff revenue; competition and growth suffer.
• Policy challenge: simplify and harmonise where justified, improve monitoring (Single Market Scoreboard), and align enforcement sanctions with non-compliance benefits/damages.