The Supreme Court’s Authority and Role

Marbury v. Madison (1806)

Even though Marbury had right to commission & a remedy, it was not the right remedy. Judiciary Act unconstitutional, no commission for Marbury.  Court has authority to review laws to determine if they are constitutional.

Judiciary Act expanding Court’s original jdx. over writs (Art. III § 2 says only ambassadors, public ministers/consuls, & states as parties are covered, everything else is appellate jdx.). “An act repugnant to the Constitution is void”

Narrow holding: SCOTUS can decide what law trumps when 2 laws are in conflict under the Supremacy Cl.; if conflict with Constitution, Constitution must prevail

Broad holding: SCOTUS = exclusive power to interpret Constitution & have responsibility to police other branches (what has endured over time)

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816)

Land dispute between Martin (title from Lord Fairfax, treaties protect) and Hunter’s lessee (title from VA, redistribution from Loyalists).  Court says Martin wins/relies on treaties, but VA doesn’t listen, claiming appellate jdx. of Court doesn’t apply to states.  Court holds Court’s constitutional interpretation is binding on states.  States can decide federal Q’s, but reviewable by Court (Court has final say).  Lack of uniformity would be against what Framers intended, and practically can’t have 50 states deciding federal law.

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

AR governor opposes Little Rock BOE desegregation plan, BOE gives up, students sue BOE.  State officials are bound by Court’s interpretation of Constitution, despite the fact that you can’t bind a nonparty.  Court = ultimate constitutional interpreter, therefore decisions are also the supreme law of the land.

Dickerson v. United States (2000)

18 U.S.C. § 3501 passed trying to overturn Miranda v. Arizona (only safeguard is that self-incriminating statements must be voluntary, trying to throw away the warnings).  Court holds Congress cannot overrule Court’s constitutional interpretation by statute, can only do so via constitutional amendment (2/3 congressional proposal, 3/4 state ratification)

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)

Endangered Species Act requires Sec. of Int. to create list of endangered species/habitats, federal agencies must consult with Sec. about whether their conduct would put those at risk.  Regs originally applied abroad, then changed to only apply domestically.  Conservationist orgs arguing increased rate of extinction/not being able to see animals (aesthetic injury) will happen if new regs take effect.  Court holds π’s do not have standing b/c π’s do not satisfy injury in fact.  Not concrete (not actual or imminent) b/c loss of species/habitats are not measurable or identifiable – anyone with interest in studying/seeing/professional interest in animals being harmed is too speculative to show they were appreciably harmed.

Future injuries allowed, but they can’t be hypothetical

Congress can create procedural right without meeting redressability and imminence, but only if it protects concrete interest (π can’t sue to generally say Exec. needs to enforce w/o concrete injury).  SOP issue, not Court’s role to impose duty on Exec. to enforce law (only adjudicates disputes about balance of power).

Not particularized b/c no proof that individuals who wrote affidavits are returning to the international locations with endangered species – no way to show they’re among the injured

Plurality: π’s don’t satisfy redressability b/c (1) USAID/other orgs not parties, no way to force them to follow consultation rule; and (2) funding projects play such small role in protecting animals abroad, only a drop in the bucket

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)

State & private π’s suing EPA for not regulating greenhouse emissions in accordance w/ Clean Air Act (increased sea levels, threatened State’s coastline).  EPA claims π’s don’t have standing b/c (1) global warming is too widespread/impacts everyone, not sufficiently particularized; (2) no causation b/c CO2 is raising sea levels but EPA’s role is so slight; and (3) no redressability b/c industrializing nations creating so many emissions that these would offset EPA’s regs.  Court holds State (only need 1 π to have standing for all) satisfies 3 requirements of standing.  Injury in fact satisfied b/c state = quasi-sovereign interest in all resources, “stands behind the titles of its people” (essentially means State can regulate) + State operating as landowner of coastal property

Procedural right for citizens to sue if fed. gov. infringes rights fills in imminence & redressability gaps (opposite of Lujan) – State has concrete interest in coastline

Causation satisfied b/c incremental steps are enough to satisfy chain of causation, especially since legislation is inherently incremental

Redressability satisfied b/c every little bit helps, even if 3rd parties aren’t present.  US is only responsible for 20% of emissions, but still redressable b/c can control in the US while in Lujan was outside of the US.

Controversial – blue states band together to strike down Republican regs (and vice versa), political battle rather than addressing injuries

Has NOT taken off

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013)

Domestic advocacy orgs challenge FISA (fed. gov. can surveil individuals outside US) by arguing overseas contacts would be targeted & own communications would be intercepted.  Argued harm from being surveilled, had well-grounded belief surveillance was occurring, and fear was so significant π’s took additional precautions (increased costs).  Court holds orgs. ¹ standing b/c threat of injury isn’t imminent but rather highly speculative – so many things would need to happen in order for risk of surveillance to be imminent under FISA.  Self-imposed efforts to protect (paranoia) not grounds for imminent injury – if Court considered these, future π’s could fabricate injuries

Spokeo v. Robins (2016)

π sues credit reporting agency for errors in credit report (has statutory duty to be accurate), alleged injury is harm to employment prospects on basis of age discrimination, but π not denied employment yet.  Court holds bare statutory violation without identifiable harm to π NOT concrete.  π had particularized injury, but not concrete b/c based entirely on speculation of being denied employment.  Court divides concrete (actually exists) & particularized sub-elements (affects π in personal & individual way).

π had particularized injury for errors in credit reporting.

TransUnion v. Ramirez (2021)

π sue TransUnion for damages under Fair Credit Reporting Act for tons of mistakes in credit reporting (cross referencing names with federal watchlist of terrorists/criminals).  Class members whose misleading reports sent to 3rd party businesses had concrete reputational harm, but not class members whose reports were never sent.  Congress can’t make bare procedural c/a without concrete injury (separation of powers concern) – Court requires historical analogue of claimed statutory injury.

Allen v. Wright (1984)

“Clapper for causation.”  Parents of Black students in public schools sued IRS for not denying tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools in same district.  Court holds threats to desegregation are legally protected interest, but parents lack standing b/c no causation – decreased ability of Black students to receive desegregated education in public schools is too attenuated from IRS’s violations (π’s need to show # of discriminatory private schools, whether withdrawing status will actually stop discrimination, and once private schools stop discrimination that white families would still choose private over public)

Biden v. Nebraska (2023)

NE & MO sue Biden over student loan forgiveness.  Court holds MO has standing through MOHELA (state-backed student loan processor, corporation) – MO can sue to protect MOHELA’s interests ($44M per year in fees)

United States v. Texas (2023)

TX & LA sue Biden’s DHS for not sufficiently immigration laws through its prosecution priorities (prioritizing deportations of undocumented folks with criminal records over those without).  Creates financial costs to states, but Court holds states don’t have standing – prosecutorial discretion belongs with Executive branch (Court unwilling to tell prosecutors/Executive who/what to prosecute/enforce)

Craig v. Boren

Beer seller sues on behalf of men for violation of EPC in beer selling laws.  Beer seller had 3rd party standing b/c close proximity of interests (privity of K), suffered injury himself due to prohibition on male customers.

Colgrove v. Green (1946)

Redistricting case, Court held PQ b/c Congress charged (textual commitment, Guarantee Cl.) with determining if state seeking admission to Union had republican form of government – no standard for Court to apply

Luther v. Borden (1849)

Trespass dispute required Court to decide which government was proper government during RI insurrection that led to martial law.  Court held PQ b/c Congress decides which government is established one & if it is republican or not under Guarantee Cl.

Baker v. Carr (1962)

TN legislature generally elected districts based on population, but last census was 1901 – urban (predominantly Black) votes diluted, rural (predominantly white) votes augmented. Urban voters sue under EPC of 14th & 5th Amendments, claiming votes count 1/23 as much as rural votes.  Court holds π’s presented justiciable question, not PQ b/c the EPC question is squarely within Court’s role to decide constitutional issues.  Establishes 6 factor test to determine PQ.

Constitutional basis:

1. Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of issue to coordinate political department

Prudential bases:

2. Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

3. Impossibility of deciding w/o initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion

4. Impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution w/o expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government

5. Unusual need for unquestioning adherence to political decision already made

6. Potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question

Coleman v. Miller (1939)

What a reasonable timeframe for states to ratify constitutional amendment under Article V is = PQ

Goldwater v. Carter (1979)

Whether president can abrogate a treaty without Senate approval = PQ, involves foreign relations & coequal branches of governments’ expertise.

Nixon v. United States (1993)

Process for Senators to hear/report evidence during impeachment trial of district judge = PQ.  Art. I §§ 2, 3 & Art. II § 4 = textual commitment to legislature.  Tons of prudential concerns (long appellate process, impeachment = only check on Court, need to adhere to HOR’s political decision already made).

Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)

Partisan gerrymandering = PQ.  Distinguished from Baker b/c everyone’s vote is worth the same (votes aren’t counting less), just have a lesser opportunity to choose preferred candidates.

Powell v. McCormack (1969)

Whether HOR can refuse to seat member for financial impropriety, despite being already elected NOT PQ.  Art. I § 2 cl. 2 lays out requirements (age, citizenship, residency), Art. I § 2 cl. 1 says each house is responsible for determining if rep satisfies cl. 2.  Textual commitment to Congress to determine if cl. 2 is satisfied, but Congress cannot add new requirements, as Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution.

Bush v. Gore (2000)

Whether FL’s recount standards violated equal protection NOT PQ, ultimately results in FL Secretary of State certifying Bush as winner of the election. 

Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012)

Statute gives person born in Israel ability to put “Israel” on US passport, Dept. of State policy says they can only list “Jerusalem” so as to not take a stance on Israel’s status.  Court held recognition of foreign sovereigns justiciable, no PQ.  Art. II § 2 gives Executive recognition power.  NOTE: Court didn’t consider any prudential factors.