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Trust God
SMJ: What is subject-matter jurisdiction?
The power of a court to hear a particular type of case.
Diversity (§1332): two requirements?
(1) Complete diversity: the parties have different state citizenship; (2) amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Diversity: requirement for class actions (per outline)?
Minimal diversity: at least one citizenship is different, and at least one plaintiff meets the amount in controversy.
Diversity: test for an individual's citizenship (domicile)?
Physical presence in the state + intent to remain indefinitely, measured by objective, not subjective, factors. [Mas v. Perry]
Diversity: corporate citizenship (nerve center test)?
A corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation AND the state of its headquarters, where major decisions are made. Doing a lot of business in a state doesn't make it a citizen there. [Hertz v. Friend]
Who bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction?
The party seeking the federal forum (e.g., a removing D) must prove jurisdiction is proper. [Harshey v. Advanced Bionics]
Amount in controversy: effect of a post-removal stipulation?
Not binding, but persuasive. [Harshey v. Advanced Bionics]
Amount in controversy: legal certainty test?
Once a party establishes the amount, the other side must show it is legally certain (legally impossible) that the claim can't reach that amount. [Carroll v. Stryker]
Federal question jurisdiction (§1331): basic requirement?
The civil action must arise under a federal hook: the Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty.
Well-pleaded complaint rule?
The federal issue must appear in the plaintiff's complaint as a legitimate part of P's own cause of action. An anticipated federal defense doesn't count. [Mottley]
Grable test: when does a state-law claim with an embedded federal issue arise under federal law? (4 elements)
The federal issue is (1) raised; (2) disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) resolvable in federal court without disturbing the state/federal balance. [Grable; Empire HealthChoice]
Grable applied: state legal malpractice claim built on a hypothetical patent-law question?
Not a federal question. Fails Grable (3) and (4): a hypothetical federal issue isn't substantial, and states have a strong interest in regulating their own lawyers. [Gunn v. Minton]
§1367: structure in one line?
(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction → (b) takes it away for certain claims in diversity-only cases → (c) lets the court decline it anyway, at its discretion.
§1367(a): test for supplemental jurisdiction?
A claim that couldn't independently get into federal court comes in if it arises from the same case or controversy (common nucleus of operative fact) as a claim already properly before the court on diversity, FQ, or another basis.
§1367(b): when does it apply?
ONLY in cases where original jurisdiction rests on diversity.
§1367(b): claims blocked when brought by the ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF?
Claims against parties joined under Rule 14 (third-party Ds), Rule 19 (required parties), Rule 20 (permissively joined), or Rule 24 (intervenors).
§1367(b): claims blocked when brought by someone joining AS A PLAINTIFF?
Claims by persons joining as plaintiffs under Rule 19 or intervening as plaintiffs under Rule 24.
§1367(c): grounds to decline supplemental jurisdiction (4)?
(1) Novel or complex state-law issue; (2) the state claim predominates; (3) the claims with independent jurisdiction have been dismissed; (4) exceptional circumstances. Available whatever the basis of original jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction: diversity case where only some plaintiffs meet the amount in controversy?
Allowed. If one P's claim meets the amount (and diversity exists), the court has original jurisdiction over the civil action and §1367(a) covers the rest. §1367(b) doesn't list Rule 20 or Rule 23 plaintiffs, so it doesn't block them. [Exxon v. Allapattah]
Removal: §1441(a)?
D may remove a state-court case to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction. It goes to the federal district court embracing the place where the state action is pending.
Removal: §1441(b) forum defendant rule?
Diversity-based removal is barred if any D is a citizen of the forum state.
Removal: order of operations (3 steps)?
(1) Is there original jurisdiction (§1331 or §1332)? (2) If so, D may remove under §1441(a). (3) If diversity is the basis, check the §1441(b) forum defendant rule.
Removal: can a plaintiff remove?
Never. Removal is exclusively a defendant's action.
Removal: is a case that satisfies §1332 always removable?
No. Removability and diversity jurisdiction are separate questions. The forum defendant rule can block removal even though jurisdiction exists.
Personal jurisdiction: what is it, and what requires it?
The court's power to make decisions affecting a particular party. Required by Due Process (5th and 14th Amendments).
PJ: express vs. implied consent?
Express: D agrees (contract clause, appearance). Implied: D's conduct triggers a legal fiction of consent (e.g., driving in-state under a nonresident motorist statute).
PJ: long-arm statute?
A state statute that lets its courts reach out-of-state defendants.
PJ: general vs. specific jurisdiction?
General: D is 'at home' in the forum (continuous and systematic activity), so any claim can be heard. Specific: the claim must arise out of or relate to D's forum contacts, and jurisdiction is limited to that activity.
Specific jurisdiction: two-step test?
(1) Purposeful availment (minimum contacts); (2) fair play and substantial justice (reasonableness factors).
Purposeful availment: two requirements?
(1) Contacts must proximately result from D's own actions, not the unilateral acts of P or a third party; (2) D's actions must create a substantial connection with the forum. Physical presence isn't required.
Fair play & substantial justice: 5 reasonableness factors?
(1) Burden on D; (2) forum state's interest in adjudicating; (3) P's interest in convenient, effective relief; (4) interstate judicial system's interest in efficient resolution; (5) states' shared interest in furthering substantive social policy.
Specific jurisdiction: can a D with sufficient minimum contacts still defeat jurisdiction?
Yes, if exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the Step 2 fair play factors.
Rule 4(k)(1): service establishes PJ over which Ds (3)?
(A) A D subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts where the district court sits (borrows the state's long-arm statute); (B) a Rule 14 or 19 party served within 100 miles of where the summons issued (100-mile bulge); (C) a D covered by a federal statute.
Rule 4(k)(2): federal long-arm requirements?
For federal-law claims: (1) D isn't subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts (typically foreign Ds), and (2) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with Due Process.
Rule 4(k): does service by itself create PJ?
No. Service never creates PJ that isn't constitutionally available. 4(k) only says how to establish PJ you already have a basis for.
Pennoyer framework for PJ?
In personam requires in-state service or appearance; quasi in rem requires attaching property before judgment. If neither, the judgment is void under Due Process. [Pennoyer v. Neff]
International Shoe test?
Replaces the territorial rule: D needs minimum contacts with the forum such that jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Physical presence isn't required. [Int'l Shoe]
PJ: can the presence of D's property alone support jurisdiction?
No. All jurisdiction, including quasi in rem, must satisfy Int'l Shoe minimum contacts. Property unrelated to the claim isn't enough. [Shaffer v. Heitner]
PJ: can a contract alone establish minimum contacts?
Yes, if it creates a substantial, continuing relationship with the forum (deliberate negotiation, forum choice-of-law clause, foreseeable forum consequences). [Burger King]
Stream of commerce: the question and the state of the law?
Whether placing a product into a nationwide distribution network, without more, is purposeful availment of every state it reaches. No majority test: courts split between requiring 'something more' (targeting) and finding mere awareness of nationwide distribution enough.
Stream of commerce: Nicastro plurality?
Placing a product in the stream of commerce alone isn't purposeful availment. D must target the forum state specifically, not just the U.S. market. [J. McIntyre v. Nicastro]
Specific jurisdiction: must the claim 'arise out of' D's forum contacts?
No. It's enough that the claim 'relates to' them. Extensive in-state activity serving the market for that product type suffices without a causal link to the specific unit. [Ford v. Montana]
PJ: interactive website with a regular flow of sales into the forum?
Purposeful availment, even without specific targeting. [Plixer v. Scrutinizer, under 4(k)(2)]
General jurisdiction over a corporation: where?
Only where it's 'essentially at home': its place of incorporation and principal place of business (the paradigm forums), except in exceptional cases (e.g., wartime relocation in Perkins). [Goodyear; Daimler]
General jurisdiction: are purchases and training in the forum enough?
No. [Helicopteros]
General jurisdiction: does substantial in-state business create it?
No. Substantial business ≠ 'at home.' Without incorporation or HQ in the forum, the in-state contacts must be exceptional relative to the company's nationwide operations. [BNSF v. Tyrrell]
Notice: actual vs. constructive?
Actual: D genuinely receives or knows of the suit (subjective). Constructive: a legally sufficient substitute when actual notice isn't obtained or guaranteed (objective, reasonable person).
Notice: Mullane due process standard?
Notice must be reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties. Publication is OK for unknown parties, but for known parties with known addresses it's a 'mere gesture.' Use direct means like mail. [Mullane]
Notice: posting a summons on a door where posted notices are often removed?
Inadequate. Notice must account for real-world circumstances, and relying only on a known-unreliable method fails when better alternatives (mail) exist. [Greene v. Lindsey]
Rule 4(c)(2): who can serve process?
Anyone 18 or older who is not a party.
Rule 4(e): ways to serve an individual in the U.S.?
(1) Follow state law where the district court sits or where service is made; OR (2) federal methods: personal delivery; leaving it at the dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or delivery to an authorized agent.
Rule 4(m): time limit for service?
90 days after filing the complaint, or the case is dismissed without prejudice, unless P shows good cause for an extension.
Service analysis: two steps?
(1) Rule 4 compliance: was one of Rule 4's methods followed? If not, service is defective and you stop. (2) Mullane due process: even if Rule 4 was followed, was the method reasonably calculated, under these circumstances, to give notice? [Greene]
Service: leaving papers with a third party (e.g., a building's security guard)?
Valid only if that person has express or customary authority or duty to accept and relay documents to the resident. [Kolker v. Hurwitz]
Service: can a person have more than one 'dwelling or usual place of abode'?
Yes, if each has sufficient indicia of permanence (owned, furnished, staffed), especially where D was actually staying there when served. [Nat'l Development v. Triad]
Due process: what's required before the state deprives someone of property?
Notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Usually arises with prejudgment remedies (attachment, garnishment, replevin).
Mathews v. Eldridge factors?
(1) The private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of added safeguards; (3) the government's interest (in private disputes, P's interest).
Prejudgment remedies: safeguards that can save a statute?
Judicial (not clerk) review; specific factual affidavits; a bond; exigent circumstances; a prompt post-seizure hearing.
Prejudgment attachment without notice or a hearing?
Violates Due Process absent exigent circumstances, under the modified Mathews test (private interest, risk of error, P's interest). A non-possessory lien still counts as a deprivation. [Connecticut v. Doehr]
Venue: what does it decide, and how does it relate to SMJ and PJ?
Which district within a court system hears the case. It's separate from SMJ and PJ, and all three must be satisfied.
Venue: §1391(b), where is it proper (3)?
(1) Where any D resides, if all Ds reside in the same state; (2) where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property is located; (3) fallback: wherever any D is subject to PJ.
Venue: §1404(a) vs. §1406(a)?
§1404(a): venue is proper but another district is more convenient → transfer. §1406(a): venue is wrong → the court must dismiss or transfer.
Forum non conveniens: remedy and test?
Dismissal (not transfer) when the better forum is a foreign country or a state court. Courts balance the Gilbert private and public interest factors.
Venue: local action rule for injury to out-of-state land?
Abolished: such suits are transitory and can be heard wherever the court has PJ over D. [Reasor-Hill v. Harrison]
Venue §1391(b)(2): broad view of 'substantial part of the events'?
Venue is proper where the harm occurs (e.g., where a collection notice was received), even if D didn't target that district. Venue asks where events occurred, not about D's purposeful contacts (that's PJ). There can be more than one proper venue. [Bates v. C&S Adjusters]
Venue §1391(b)(2): narrow view of 'substantial part of the events'?
Only events that directly give rise to the claim count, focusing on D's wrongful conduct. Rejects a minimum-contacts-style venue analysis. A 'place of execution' clause ≠ a forum-selection clause. [Jenkins Brick v. Bremer]
Forum-selection clause: how is it enforced in federal court, and how much weight does it get?
By §1404(a) transfer, not dismissal. It gets controlling weight except in extraordinary cases. [Atlantic Marine]
Atlantic Marine: the modified §1404(a) analysis (4 changes)?
(1) P's choice of forum gets no weight; (2) private interests are ignored; (3) only public interests count; (4) the original forum's choice-of-law rules don't follow the case.
FNC: does less favorable law in the alternative forum bar dismissal?
No, unless the remedy there is so inadequate it's no remedy at all. A foreign P's choice of forum gets less deference. [Piper Aircraft v. Reyno]
Rule 8(a)(2): complaint standard?
A short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 9(b)?
Fraud and mistake must be pleaded with particularity. This is the exception to notice pleading.
Rule 12(b)(6): what is it, and how does the court treat the facts?
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts well-pleaded facts as true.
Pleading standard: how has it changed over time?
Conley's 'no set of facts' (1957) → Twombly (2007) and Iqbal (2009) plausibility.
Pleading: must an employment discrimination complaint plead a prima facie case?
No. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only fair notice of the claim and its grounds. McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Heightened pleading applies only where a Rule (e.g., 9(b)) requires it. [Swierkiewicz]
Twombly plausibility standard?
The complaint must allege enough facts to make the claim plausible, not merely conceivable. Parallel conduct alone doesn't plausibly suggest a Sherman Act agreement. Retires Conley's 'no set of facts.' [Twombly]
Iqbal two-step test?
(1) Disregard legal conclusions and bare recitals of the elements; (2) ask whether the remaining facts plausibly show entitlement to relief, using judicial experience and common sense. Applies to all civil actions. [Iqbal]
Iqbal: what defeats plausibility?
An 'obvious alternative explanation' for the alleged conduct.
Rule 8(b): what must an answer do?
Admit, deny, or state lack of knowledge for each allegation. An allegation that isn't denied is admitted (8(b)(6)).
Rule 8(c)?
Affirmative defenses must be pleaded in the answer.
Answer: can a party claim lack of knowledge and also deny the same allegation?
No. Denials must fairly respond to the substance and meet Rule 11(b) good faith: admit what's true and deny only the rest. You can't deny a document attached to the complaint. [Infiniti v. Elk Lighting]
Negative pregnant?
A denial that tracks the allegation's literal wording and so hides an admission. [Infiniti v. Elk Lighting]
Rule 15(a): amending a pleading?
Once as of right within 21 days. After that, only with the opponent's consent or leave of court, which is 'freely given when justice so requires.'
Rule 15(a): grounds to deny leave to amend (Foman factors)?
Undue prejudice to the opposing party, undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or futility. The burden is on the party opposing amendment. An expired SOL alone ≠ prejudice. [Beeck v. Aquaslide]
Rule 15(c): relation back, basic test?
An amendment relates back to the original filing date (avoiding the SOL) if it arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
Rule 15(c)(1)(C): extra requirements when changing a party?
Within the Rule 4(m) period (90 days), the new party (i) received notice and won't be prejudiced, and (ii) knew or should have known it would have been sued but for a mistake about the proper party's identity.
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) 'mistake': whose knowledge matters?
The new defendant's (what it knew or should have known), not P's knowledge or diligence. Knowing a party exists ≠ knowing its role, so a mistake about its role still counts. [Krupski]
Amendments: order of analysis (15(a) vs. 15(c))?
Start with 15(a). Reach 15(c) only if the opponent argues futility because of the SOL or moves to dismiss on that ground. [Krupski]
Rule 15(d)?
Supplemental pleadings cover events that happen after the original pleading.
Rule 11(b): four certifications?
After a reasonable inquiry: (1) no improper purpose; (2) legal contentions are warranted; (3) factual contentions have evidentiary support; (4) denials are warranted.
Rule 11(c) sanctions: mandatory? purpose?
Discretionary. Their aim is deterrence, not compensation.
Rule 11: safe harbor and timing?
The motion must be served at least 21 days before it's filed, and both service and filing must occur before final judgment or the court's rejection of the contention. Rule 11 imposes a continuing duty not to persist with a contention once it lacks support. [Ridder]
28 U.S.C. §1927?
An attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings is personally liable for the excess costs. No safe harbor; can be raised after judgment; objective standard with no bad-faith finding required, but mere negligence isn't enough. [Ridder]
Joinder: what does each claim against each party need?
Its own basis for joinder under a Rule, plus its own SMJ and PJ.
Joinder: remedy for misjoinder?
Not dismissal. Severance, or dropping or adding parties, under Rule 21.
Rule 18?
A party may join any claims it has against an opposing party, related or not.
Rule 13(a): compulsory counterclaim?
A counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim must be asserted, or it's forfeited.
Rule 13(b)?
Any other counterclaim may be asserted (permissive counterclaim).
Rule 13(g): crossclaim?
A claim against a coparty arising from the same transaction or occurrence. Crossclaims are always permissive.
Compulsory counterclaim: logical relationship test (2d Cir.)?
Compulsory if the essential facts are so logically connected that economy and fairness require one suit. But-for causation alone isn't a logical relationship. [Jones v. Ford Motor Credit]
Compulsory counterclaim: four-factor test (4th Cir.)?
(1) Largely the same issues of fact and law; (2) res judicata would bar a later suit; (3) substantially the same evidence; (4) a logical relationship. Not all four must be met. [Ginwright v. Exeter Finance]