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What does QOCS stand for?
Qualified One-way Costs Shifting.
It restricts enforcement of adverse costs orders against claimants in qualifying proceedings.
Example: An unsuccessful personal injury claimant may have a costs order made against them which the defendant cannot enforce.
Where are the QOCS rules found?
CPR 44.13-44.17, supplemented by PD 44, paragraph 12.
Example: Check CPR 44.13 for scope, 44.14 for the ordinary enforcement limit, and 44.15–44.16 for exceptions.
Does QOCS prevent the court from making a costs order against a claimant?
No. It principally restricts enforcement, rather than the making of the order. The general costs rules remain relevant.
Example: A losing claimant can be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs even where QOCS prevents recovery of those costs.
How does QOCS interact with CPR 44.2?
The court retains its discretion over costs, including the general rule that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs. QOCS then controls enforceability.
Example: The defendant obtains its costs after successfully defending a PI claim, but must separately establish whether enforcement is permitted.
Which proceedings fall within CPR 44.13?
Proceedings including claims for damages for personal injury, under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, or arising from death or injury and surviving for an estate under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
Example: A qualifying dependency claim following a fatal accident falls within the regime.
Does QOCS apply to applications for pre-action disclosure?
No. CPR 44.13 expressly excludes the specified statutory applications for pre-action disclosure.
Example: A potential PI claimant cannot assume QOCS protects them from the costs of an unsuccessful pre-action disclosure application.
What funding exclusion appears in CPR 44.17?
QOCS does not apply where the claimant entered into a pre-commencement funding arrangement, as defined in CPR 48.2.
Check that definition rather than assuming every old funding arrangement qualifies.
Example: A qualifying pre-April 2013 CFA can exclude QOCS.
What did Catalano v Espley-Tyas Development Group Ltd [2017] establish?
A claimant who had received litigation services under a qualifying pre-April 2013 CFA could not obtain QOCS simply by terminating it and entering a replacement CFA.
Example: Replacing the original CFA after April 2013 does not erase the relevant funding history.
What is the ordinary enforcement limit under the revised CPR 44.14(1)?
Subject to the exceptions, adverse costs can be enforced without permission up to the aggregate monetary value of qualifying orders or agreements for damages, costs and interest in the claimant’s favour.
Example: Damages and costs agreed in settlement can contribute to the enforcement limit.
How is the revised enforcement limit calculated?
Compare the aggregate adverse costs orders with the aggregate qualifying damages, costs and interest in the claimant’s favour. Enforcement ordinarily cannot exceed the latter total.
Example: If damages are £20,000, claimant’s costs £10,000 and interest £1,000, the ordinary ceiling is £31,000.
What happens if the defendant’s costs exceed the ordinary QOCS ceiling?
The excess is ordinarily unenforceable unless an exception permits further enforcement.
Example: With a £31,000 ceiling and a £40,000 adverse costs order, £9,000 remains protected from ordinary enforcement.
Do deemed costs orders count under CPR 44.14(2)?
Yes. The rule includes costs orders deemed to have been made under CPR 44.9, whether against or in favour of the claimant.
Example: A deemed costs order arising from discontinuance can fall within the QOCS framework.
When may adverse costs orders ordinarily be enforced under CPR 44.14(3)?
After proceedings have concluded and the costs have been assessed or agreed.
Example: An adverse interim costs order is ordinarily dealt with for QOCS enforcement after conclusion of the proceedings.
How does set-off operate under revised CPR 44.14(4)?
Where enforcement against a costs order in the claimant’s favour is permitted, CPR 44.12 applies, allowing the parties’ costs liabilities to be set off.
Example: £5,000 payable by the claimant may be set against £12,000 costs payable to them, leaving a £7,000 balance.
How is a costs order treated where it is enforced only to the permitted QOCS limit?
Under CPR 44.14(5), it is not treated as an unsatisfied or outstanding judgment for court-record purposes merely because enforcement is limited.
Example: The protected balance is not recorded as an ordinary outstanding judgment debt.
What distinguishes CPR 44.15 from CPR 44.16?
CPR 44.15 permits full enforcement following specified strike-outs without permission. CPR 44.16 requires permission for its exceptions.
Example: An abuse-of-process strike-out and a fundamental dishonesty finding engage different provisions.
What strike-out grounds permit full enforcement under CPR 44.15?
No reasonable grounds for bringing proceedings; abuse of process; or specified conduct likely to obstruct their just disposal.
Example: Proceedings struck out as an abuse of process can expose the claimant to full enforcement without permission.
Whose obstructive conduct can engage CPR 44.15(c)?
The claimant’s conduct, or the conduct of someone acting on their behalf with the claimant’s knowledge, where it is likely to obstruct just disposal.
Example: Knowingly allowing a representative to obstruct the proceedings may engage the exception.
Does every unsuccessful claim lose QOCS protection under CPR 44.15?
No. Losing at trial is different from proceedings being struck out on one of the specified grounds.
Example: An honestly pursued PI claim dismissed because negligence was not proved does not automatically lose protection.
What does Kite v Phoenix Pub Group [2015] illustrate in your notes?
Discontinuance did not prevent the court setting aside the notice and striking out the claim, enabling enforcement under CPR 44.15.
Example: A claimant cannot assume tactical discontinuance will defeat an existing strike-out application and its potential costs consequences.
What does Renwick and Mitchell v Markerstudy Insurance [2015] illustrate in your notes?
The claimants discontinued after evidence challenged their injury claims. The court set aside the notices and struck out the claims as an abuse of process, allowing enforcement.
Example: Discontinuance after damaging evidence does not necessarily prevent examination of alleged abuse.
Does discontinuance alone establish abuse or fundamental dishonesty?
No. The defendant must establish the relevant exception; abandoning a claim does not itself prove dishonesty or abuse.
Example: A claimant may discontinue an honest claim because new evidence makes success unlikely.
What is the fundamental dishonesty exception under CPR 44.16(1)?
With permission, an adverse costs order may be enforced in full where the claim is found on the balance of probabilities to be fundamentally dishonest.
Example: A finding that substantial losses were deliberately fabricated may permit full enforcement.
Does any mistake or exaggeration amount to fundamental dishonesty?
No. Dishonesty must be established and must be fundamental to the claim; an honest mistake or peripheral inaccuracy is insufficient by itself.
Example:Misremembering an appointment date is different from inventing a substantial care claim.
What did Gosling v Hailo and Screwfix Direct [2014] establish?
Substantial dishonest exaggeration of injury-related disability and losses can amount to fundamental dishonesty, even where an underlying injury is genuine.
Example:Deliberately exaggerating ongoing disability to claim substantial additional compensation can jeopardise QOCS protection.
How should Creech v Apple Security Group [2015] be understood for revision?
Your notes use it to illustrate dishonesty concerning the central accident account. Pursuing a weak claim or losing a factual dispute is not enough by itself: the court must find fundamental dishonesty.
Example: Knowingly inventing the hazard said to have caused the accident differs from an honest mistaken recollection.
Can fundamental dishonesty be determined after discontinuance?
Yes. PD 44 permits the court to determine the issue after discontinuance even without setting the notice aside.
Example: Discontinuing after surveillance evidence emerges does not necessarily prevent a dishonesty hearing.
What is the third-party financial benefit exception under CPR 44.16(2)(a)?
With permission, enforcement may extend up to the full costs order, to the extent considered just, where proceedings include a claim for another person’s financial benefit, subject to the rule’s exclusions.
Example: A claim incorporating a credit hire company’s financial interest may engage this provision.
Which third-party benefits are excluded from CPR 44.16(2)(a)?
The rule excludes the specified dependant’s benefit and claims concerning gratuitous care, earnings paid by an employer, and medical expenses.
Example: A claim for unpaid care supplied by a relative does not trigger this exception merely because the relative provided the care.
What examples does PD 44, paragraph 12.2 give of third-party financial benefit claims?
Subrogated claims and credit hire claims.
Example: An insurer seeking recovery of an indemnity payment through proceedings brought in its insured’s name may have a subrogated financial interest.
Can a costs order be made against the third-party beneficiary?
Yes. CPR 44.16(3), subject to CPR 46.2, permits an order against a person for whose financial benefit all or part of the claim was made. It is not automatic.
Example: The court considers whether a credit hire company should bear costs attributable to its financial interest.
What is the mixed-claims exception under CPR 44.16(2)(b)?
With permission, the court may allow enforcement to the extent it considers just where the claimant also pursues a claim outside the protected categories.
Example: Proceedings combine a psychiatric injury claim with a separate claim for pure financial loss.
How does the court approach mixed claims?
It considers the proceedings as a whole and exercises its discretion, including the nature and significance of the protected and unprotected elements.
Example: A predominantly PI claim with a small additional element may warrant a different outcome from a financial claim with a minor PI element.
What did Jeffreys v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] establish?
The mixed-claims exception does not require the PI and non-PI claims to be factually divisible or independent.
Example: Closely connected claims arising from the same incident can still include both protected and unprotected elements.
What does Siddiqui v University of Oxford [2018] illustrate?
Separate claims for pure financial loss can engage the mixed-claims exception despite a PI element. The claimant was ordered to pay 25% of the defendant’s costs.
Example:Adding a psychiatric injury claim does not necessarily protect the whole of a claim concerning financial loss from allegedly inadequate teaching.
Does Part 36 override QOCS completely?
No. Part 36 determines costs consequences, while QOCS governs enforcement of the resulting adverse costs liability.
Example: Failure to beat a defendant’s offer may produce an adverse costs order, but does not itself authorise unlimited enforcement.
What is the usual costs consequence of accepting a defendant’s Part 36 offer late?
Unless agreed otherwise, the court determines costs. Ordinarily, unless unjust, the claimant receives costs to expiry of the relevant period and pays the defendant’s costs from expiry to acceptance.
Example: Acceptance several weeks late may expose the claimant to the defendant’s costs for that additional period.
Which provisions should be read for late acceptance of a Part 36 offer?
CPR 36.13(4)–(5): paragraph (4) addresses determining costs where they are not agreed, and paragraph (5) supplies the usual allocation, subject to injustice.
Example: Citing paragraph (4) alone does not explain who ordinarily pays the late-acceptance costs.
What happens if a claimant fails to beat a defendant’s Part 36 offer at trial?
Under CPR 36.17(3), unless unjust, the defendant is entitled to costs from expiry of the relevant period and interest on those costs. QOCS still controls enforcement.
Example: A claimant awarded £15,000 after rejecting £20,000 may face the defendant’s post-expiry costs.
Does failing to accept an offer within 21 days automatically remove QOCS?
No. First identify the applicable relevant period, costs consequence and QOCS version. Under the revised rules, adverse costs may consume qualifying damages, costs and interest, but enforcement remains limited unless an exception applies.
Example: A £50,000 costs liability with a £30,000 enforcement ceiling does not automatically expose the claimant’s other assets for the £20,000 excess.
Why was QOCS introduced in April 2013?
It formed part of the civil costs reforms associated with LASPO, alongside the general removal of recoverability of ATE premiums and success fees. It reduced qualifying claimants’ adverse costs exposure.
Example: A PI claimant could receive substantial protection without purchasing insurance covering every adverse costs risk.
What was the ordinary enforcement limit under the former CPR 44.14?
It referred to orders for damages and interest, excluding claimant’s costs and ordinary settlement agreements from the available fund.
Example: A damages judgment could provide an enforcement fund, while a contractual settlement could produce a different result.
What did Cartwright v Venduct Engineering [2018] establish under the former rules?
A settlement in a Tomlin order’s schedule was not an order for damages and interest for CPR 44.14 purposes. Its reasoning also addressed Part 36 settlements.
Example: A defendant could not treat a contractual settlement sum as though it were a damages judgment available for enforcement.
What did Ho v Adelekun [2021] and PME v Scout Association [2023] establish under the former rules?
Ho: costs-against-costs set-off constituted enforcement and could not bypass QOCS. PME: QOCS also restricted enforcement of adverse detailed assessment costs following a settled PI claim; assessment proceedings did not escape that protection.
Example: A defendant could not avoid the old restriction merely by deducting its assessment costs from the claimant’s recoverable costs.
What changed in April 2023, and which proceedings are affected?
The amendments brought qualifying settlement agreements and claimant’s costs into the enforcement calculation and expressly accommodated costs set-off.
They apply to proceedings issued on or after 6 April 2023, not retrospectively to earlier proceedings.
Example: Proceedings issued on 5 April 2023 use the former rule; proceedings issued on 6 April 2023 use the revised rule.