Meow 7

Watts — Definition of Federalism

When government is organized across multiple tiers that combine shared rule with regional self-rule, with at least two governments having equal constitutional legal status.

Wheare — Federal Principle

When two or more governments are independent and coordinate within their own spheres, with neither subordinate to the other.

Wheare — Formal Autonomy

When each order of government has constitutionally guaranteed authority within its own sphere rather than powers delegated by another government.

Wheare — POV on Canada

Wheare viewed Canada as only quasi-federal because the 1867 design did not give provinces complete independence. Reservation and disallowance allowed federal intervention in provincial legislation, and the federal government appointed provincial superior court judges. These centralizing features conflicted with Wheare’s ideal of coordinate, autonomous governments.

Livingston — Sociological Definition of Federalism

When territorially concentrated social, economic, political, or cultural differences are expressed and protected through federal institutions.

Livingston — Common Instrumentalities of Federalism

When diversity is managed through institutions such as a written constitution, distribution of powers, constitutional interpretation, representation, dual citizenship, and a federal executive.

Federal Formula

When the central government governs matters common to all while subnational governments govern regionally distinct matters, with neither order subordinate.

Canada — Intrastate vs Interstate Federalism

Canada has relatively weak intrastate federalism because provincial governments are not strongly represented inside federal institutions. The Westminster form of government concentrates power within the Senate. As a result, provinces rely heavily on interstate federalism to defend their interests. This reinforces Canada’s emphasis on self-rule, and because many intergovernmental agreements are voluntary and non-binding, cooperation often depends on continued political willingness.

Five Models of Intergovernmental Relations

When governments move from acting separately toward greater interdependence: independent government, consultation, coordination, collaboration, and joint decision-making.

Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — Late 1800s

In the late nineteenth century, Canadian federalism was closest to the independent-government model. The Constitution generally assigned subject matters exclusively to either Ottawa or the provinces, with only limited shared jurisdiction. Governments mostly acted separately, although some consultation occurred and Ottawa still possessed tools to influence provincial affairs.

Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — 1930s Onward

When Canadian intergovernmental relations moved toward coordination and joint decision-making. After the Second World War, the growth of the welfare state produced cooperative federalism as federal and provincial governments worked together on social programs in areas such as health care, post-secondary education, and social assistance.

Canada's Intergovernmental Relations — Mid-to-Late 1990s

When Canadian federalism moved further toward collaboration and executive federalism. Federal, provincial, and territorial executives increasingly co-determined broad policies through direct bargaining. The Meech Lake Accord, Charlottetown Accord, and Social Union Framework Agreement illustrate this executive-centred style of accommodation.

Canadian Federalism — Present Context

Contemporary Canadian federalism is shaped by several interacting forces: the federal visions and policy goals of political leaders, persistent territorialism and regionalism, the strength of regional versus brokerage parties, changes in the Canadian political economy, past policy legacies, and system-wide crises. These forces can push relations toward collaboration, competition, or unilateral action.

Legitimacy of Canadian Federalism — Forces For and Against

Affected by conflicts over whether institutions and governing arrangements are seen as fair and appropriate. Major pressures include federal spending in provincial areas, Quebec’s demand for recognition and autonomy, Indigenous claims to sovereign nationhood and self-government, and municipal demands for greater political and fiscal capacity.

Self-Rule

When each order exercises political authority autonomously within its own jurisdiction.

Shared Rule

When federal and regional governments are interdependent and work together in exercising political authority.

Four Institutions of Self-Rule and Shared Rule

Expressed through allocation of powers, fiscal federalism, intergovernmental relations, and the second chamber.

Dual / Exclusive Allocation of Powers

When each order receives separate, exclusive jurisdictions and acts independently within its own sphere.

Shared Allocation of Powers

When both orders have constitutional authority to act in the same policy area.

Shared and Integrated Allocation of Powers

When one order legislates while another implements, dividing authority across governing functions.

Canada — Dual Allocation of Powers

Canada’s 1867 Constitution used a dual-list approach, assigning most powers separately to the federal and provincial orders. This strongly reflected self-rule, but the lists did not precisely define the boundaries of sections 91 and 92. The resulting ambiguity shifted many conflicts to the courts, especially the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to determine how the division of powers worked in practice.

Canada — Second Chamber

Canada’s second chamber is the Senate. Members of Parliament in the House of Commons can represent regional interests because they are elected from ridings across the provinces, but they represent their constituents rather than provincial governments. Senators are also associated with provinces and regions, but provincial governments do not directly appoint, control, or instruct them. As a result, provinces have a relatively weak institutionalized voice inside federal law-making, which contributes to Canada’s weak intrastate federalism and greater reliance on direct federal–provincial bargaining.

Canada — Capacity for Institutional Change

Canadian federalism has shown a strong capacity for adaptation, but major structural reforms that would strengthen shared rule are difficult to achieve. Senate reform repeatedly failed, while many intergovernmental agreements remain non-binding. The Council of the Federation is an example of successful institutional reform, but it still has a relatively weak institutional base. Change is usually easier when it adapts the existing self-rule system rather than fundamentally restructuring it.

Division of Powers — Concurrency

When both orders possess shared jurisdiction or overlapping legislative powers where both central (federal) and regional (state or provincial) levels of government have the authority to make laws on the same subject matter

Division of Powers — Overlap vs Conflict

When both governments legislate in the same area, overlap is not automatically invalid unless there is an actual jurisdictional conflict.

Division of Powers — Subsidiarity

When authority is exercised by the level of government best suited to deal effectively with the issue.

Clear Division of Powers — Certainty, Accountability, Limited Government

When jurisdictional boundaries are clear enough to make authority predictable, assign responsibility, and limit each government’s reach.

Clear Division vs Flexible Federalism

When strict boundaries provide certainty but flexible overlap provides greater adaptability.

Constitution as an Incomplete Division of Powers

When constitutional categories are broad and imprecise, leaving courts to define their practical boundaries.

Interpretive Federalism

When judicial interpretation changes the practical balance of federal and provincial power without formally amending the Constitution.

Interpretation of Peace, Order and Good Government Constitutional Clause

The constitutional wording of the first clause empowers the federal government to legislate in “left over” areas of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the division of powers lacks precision, leaving the courts’ interpretation to influence centralization and decentralization. E.g., provincial civil rights, property, and environmental regulation. While provinces have extensive authority over the local economy, pollution can cross provincial borders and create a broader national issue.

Stare Decisis — Institutional Continuity

When courts follow earlier precedents, allowing past interpretations to continue shaping the division of powers.

Judicial Flexibility/Permissiveness vs Precision

When courts allow substantial jurisdictional overlap instead of enforcing perfectly rigid boundaries.

Formal Change vs Interpretive Change

When constitutional amendment changes the formal rules, while judicial interpretation changes how existing rules are understood.

Formal vs Informal Adaptation

When federalism changes through constitutional amendment, judicial interpretation, political practice, or intergovernmental agreements.

Jurisdiction vs Governing Capacity

When a government has constitutional authority but may lack enough financial or practical resources to exercise it effectively.

Institutional/Formal Adaptation

When federal arrangements evolve through courts, negotiations, agreements, or constitutional change as new issues emerge.

Brokerage Politics in Canada

In the Canadian context, parties historically helped represent regional interests within national politics by building broad coalitions across regional, linguistic, and economic divisions. When this intrastate role weakens, regional conflict is more likely to shift outside federal parties and into direct interstate federal-provincial bargaining.

Party Integration vs Party Fragmentation

When integrated federal-provincial parties facilitate accommodation, while organizational separation weakens that role and increases interstate federalism.

Intrastate → Interstate Shift

In Canada, weaker integration between federal and provincial parties reduces national parties' ability to absorb regional conflict within national institutions. As that intrastate role declines, provincial governments and premiers become more important representatives of regional interests, increasing reliance on interstate federalism.

Economic Cleavages and Federalism

Regional economic differences in Canada can translate into different political and jurisdictional demands. Distinct resource bases, industries, and economic interests give provinces different incentives when responding to federal policies, making economic geography an important source of federal conflict and accommodation.

Concurrency — Definition

When both federal and provincial governments possess valid constitutional authority over the same broad subject or policy area.

Party integration

When federal and provincial parties are closely connected through shared organizations, politicians, personnel, or political networks. These links help regional and provincial interests enter national politics from inside the federal party system. For example, politicians with provincial experience may move into federal politics and bring regional perspectives with them, which can help parties accommodate regional disputes internally, strengthening intrastate federalism.

Party Fragmentation

When federal and provincial party systems become more organizationally separate, contain different political actors, or develop different priorities. Consequently, it is more difficult for national parties to reconcile regional differences, leaving the representation of regional interests to provincial governments through interstate federalism (since there’s no second chamber)