FPTP + analysis

Plurality

• When the winner of the election has won more votes than any other candidate, but not necessarily the majority of the votes

  • E.g. in FPTP a party will get a majority of the seats on a plurality of the votes

Safe seats + usual number of vote majority

• Seats where parties certain to win

• 20 000+ majority

3 impacts of safe seats

1. Can breed complacency among voters and parties

2. Ignored by election campaigns (‘dyed in the wool’ voters) → apathy

3. Low turnout as a guaranteed winner- no point in voting if your party is sure to win, or no other parties have a chance

Marginal seats

• Seats where incumbent (current) party has a small majority so other parties have a chance

• Resources focused here as they allow for a swing in the vote share and could influence the overall outcome

1 impact of marginal seats

1. Turnout high as voters want to promote their own interests if they are unsure about the result

2024 — number of seats won by margin of 5% or less

115 (+ 48 from 2019)

2024 — number of seats won by a margin of 50% or more

5 (was 37 in 2019)

Winning % margin of x marginal seats in 2024

In 40 seats, less than 2%

Said marginal seats in 2019

• Relatively safe 2019

  • All but 7 won by >20% of the vote

How many of the most marginal seats in 2024 were won by the Tories in 2019?

33 of 40

How many of the safest seats had a Labour hold in 2024?

34/40

40 ‘safest seat’ margin

36.8% - 56.5%

Name of most marginal seat in 2024

• Hendon (15 vote majority)

Name of 2nd most marginal seat in 2024

• Poole (18 vote majority)

Name of safest seat in 2024 (not including speaker’s seat)

• Bootle

Name of 2nd safest seat in 2024 (not including speaker’s seat)

• Liverpool Walton

Two-party system

A system in which two parties hold most of the votes and/or power

2 party features favoured by FPTP

1. Major parties

2. Nation-wide support (able to win constituencies, instead of just votes here and there)

1 example of a major party splitting

SDP (Social Democrat Party) split in 1981 from Labour

SDP outcome of 1983 general election — % vote and seats

• 25% of the vote (alliance with Liberals)

• Only 23 seats

‘Outsider’ parties finding it hard to break through — UKIP % vote v seats 2015

• 12.6% of the vote

• Only 1 seat

Combined Lab/Con % vote share in 2010

65% (post-war low)

2015 % support for parties other than the 3 main ones

25%

Combined Lab/Con % vote share in 2017

82%, largest since 1970

2017 % support for smaller parties

18%

2019 % support for smaller parties

25%

Combined Lab/Con % vote share in 2024

57.4%

Smaller parties % combined vote share and % seats in 2024

• 52.6% vote

• 18% seats

Winner’s bonus

• ‘Landslide effect’

• Exaggeration of performance of most popular party, very common with FPTP

1 impact of winner’s bonus

1. Tyranny of the majority

• Gov’t has false sense of entitlement and impression of huge mandate (Johnson’s disregard for convention etc)

2 Conservative landslide victories

1983, 1987

2 Labour landslide victories

• 1997

• 2024

1997 — L % seats and % votes

• 63% seats

• 43% votes

2024 — L % seats and % votes

• 63% seats

• 34% votes

• Most disproportionate on record

2 examples of major party bias

• 1997-2010- Labour

  • 1997-2005- proportion of Tory seats lower than share of vote

• 2010- Tory 7% more votes than Labour, 19 seats short of majority

3 reasons for major party bias

1. Tactical voting (benefited Labour 1997-2005)

2. Constituency size differences

3. Turnout differences (turnout lower in Labour-held seats- Labour needed fewer votes to win seats 1997-2010)

2025 — electorate in L-won constituencies av. x lower than Tory + reason

• 2015- electorate in Labour-won constituencies av. 3850 lower than Tory-won

• Due to population mvmt from urban to suburban/rural areas

2015 — % turnout in L hold and C won seats

• 62% turnout in Labhold seats

• 69% in Torywon seats

2 reasons for discrimination against smaller parties (ones w/out geographical concentration of support)

1. Mechanics (no reward for coming second)

2. Psychology (credibility problems → ‘wasted vote’)

Libdem losses under FPTP — 1983 % vote % seats

• 25.4% vote

• 3.5% seats

1 smaller party with regional concentration — 2015 SNP % seats v % vote

• 95% Scottish seats

• 50% vote

Votes per seat in 2015 for C, UKIP and SNP

Tory - 34 243

UKIP - 3 881 129

SNP - 25 972

2024 — % of L seats with C 2nd

53%

2024 — % of C seats with L 2nd

83%

% seats with Labour & Con in 1st and 2nd — 2017

89%

% seats with Labour & Con in 1st and 2nd — 2019

71%

% seats with Labour & Con in 1st and 2nd — 2024

47%

Reform 2nd place 2024 number of constituencies

98 constituencies (89 of which 2nd to Labour)

Green 2nd place 2024 number of constituencies

40 constituencies

2015- UKIP — votes, seats, constituencies in 2nd

2nd in 120 constituencies

4m votes

1 seat

2 places in which FPTP is used

1. House of Commons

2. England & Wales for local govt

Proportionality/party representation — 3 evaluative points

1/5 :(

1. Fosters a 2 party system

2. Isn’t proportional if party lacks regional concentration

3. There aren’t any rewards for coming second

Voter choice — 5 evaluative points

2/5

1. Simple system

2. Aspect of false choice and wasted vote

   • Tactical voting can remove voter choice, especially in marginal seats

   • No choice in safe seats

   • No rewards for coming 2nd

   • If you don’t vote for the winning party, your vote essentially did nothing

3. Lots of parties on ballot but smaller parties have little opportunity to influence policy

4. More choice in marginal seats, but only between main parties

5. Votes not all of equal value- are arguably worth more in marginal seats

Votes per seat

• Inversely proportional- the bigger the party, the fewer votes per seat

Strong and stable govt — 4 evaluative points

3.5/5

• Manifestos can be carried out due to the electoral mandate in a way they cannot in PR systems

• Majority control (caused by the winner’s bonus) allows for stability and easy passing of laws

  • Also causes tyranny of the majority

• Ideologically united parties/govts can stay in office for a full term

• Coalition govts often weak as have to have legislative support from 2 or more parties

Strong and stable gov’t — 5 examples

1. Johnson ran a tyranny of the majority, with the PPE and partygate scandals

2. Minority govts, such as Wilson 1974 and May 2017 were weak

3. Most govts last a full term, and ideologically united ones such as Blair last even longer (on the other hand, May and Cameron’s ideologically divided govts did not last long)

4. The 2010 coalition was unstable

5. Majorities have a huge effect, May and Johnson struggled to pass any legislation until Johnson gained the majority and managed to pass the Brexit bill

Constituency-voter link — 6 evaluative points

4/5

1. Visible channel of communication lost under PR

2. MPs represent the interests of their constituents to the govt

3. Transparency and accountability achieved

4. Mandate democracy- govt confirms post if does well

5. Not truly representative due to representation on plurality, not majority

6. More constituents vote against their MP than for them

Constituency-voter link — 5 examples

1. Ellie Reeves sent a letter to her constituents post-3-day water outage to show her support and actions she took to get the water back, and then did this during an extended period of water works that were disrupting both roads and water access

2. Zarah Sultana and other MPs were suspended for supporting the abolition of the 2 child benefit cap

3. Sultana has been outspoken about Gaza in support of her majority muslim constituency

4. Zac Goldsmith, Tory MP, said he would stand down to protest the 3rd runway and did

5. Nicky Morgan voted against gay marriage due to the views of her constituents despite that not aligning with her view or that of her party

2019 — % voters that said they voted tactically

32%

2019 — 2 examples of tactical candidate-standing on behalf of the parties that erode voter choice

1. Brexit Party did not stand in any 2017 Cwon seats to not split Brexit vote

2. LD, Greens and PC only stood one of the 3 of them in 60 seats in 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 and 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁷󠁬󠁳󠁿 to stop splitting Remain vote

2017 — % votes cast effectively wasted (aka made no difference at all to result)

68%

% of people that don’t think voting for their preferred party will make a difference

33%

% of people that don’t think the UK Plmt is capable of understanding and effectively representing their concerns

44%

Change in Green votes in Brighton Pavillion

1995 (ish) — 3%

2015 (ish) — 50%+

2015 — C % of eligible vote

24%

Policy continuity

• Way better in countries with PR

Yale Uni’s environmental performance index

• PR systems score much higher

% public that believe politics is working well in the UK

16%

% public that think they have a sig. influence over decision-making

2%

2018 — Lewisham — L seats v L votes

• 54/54 council seats

• 54% votes

2019 — 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 — C+L combined % vote and % seats

• 81% vote

• 98% seats

2019 — 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 — other parties (not L/C) % vote and % seats

• 19% vote

• 2% seats

2019 — C % seats and % votes in N.E.

• 88% seats

• 54% votes

2019 — L % seats and % votes in NE

• 66% seats

• 43% votes

2019 — NI — % seats % votes for Unionist and Sinn Féin parties

• 83% seats

• 53% votes

2019 — number of voters completely unrepresented due to picking someone other than the winner in their seat

14.5m

2019 — proportion of seats “unearned” due to disproportionality

1/6