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Risk management pipeline (4 stages, in order)
Scope → Business Impact Analysis (BIA) → Threats & Vulnerabilities (T&V) → Countermeasures
Why the pipeline order matters
Each stage needs the previous one: you can't assess impact of unscoped assets or pick controls for unassessed risks
Question the Scope stage answers
What assets are in play / what are we protecting?
Question the BIA stage answers
What would the disruption cost the organisation?
Question the T&V stage answers
What can go wrong, through what weakness, and how bad is the risk?
Question the Countermeasures stage answers
What do we do about each risk, with what control, owned by whom?
Security scopes (4)
Technical, Physical, Personnel, Business
Technical scope
All IT and operational technology resources: hardware, software, network
Physical scope
Tangible physical items: buildings, machinery, equipment, physical locations
Personnel scope
People together with their knowledge, skills, experience and capabilities
Business scope
Information, intangibles (e.g. intellectual property, reputation) and processes
Alternative name for Business scope on some slides
IPR (Intellectual Property Rights)
Scope of: a company's brand reputation
Business
Scope of: the office building and server room
Physical
Scope of: the lead developer's undocumented knowledge of the codebase
Personnel
Scope of: the company's routers and cloud servers
Technical
Scope of: the company's order-fulfilment process
Business
Two alternatives to security scopes
IS components (6) and Asset physical types (3)
IS components (6)
Software, Hardware, Data, People, Procedures, Networks
IS component examples: Software
Browser, messaging (email, WhatsApp), operating system, OneDrive
IS component examples: Hardware
Laptop, printer, CD-ROMs, external HDDs, memory sticks
IS component examples: Data
Personal information, credit card details, banking details, backups
IS component examples: People
Human Resources, IT personnel, system administrators
IS component examples: Procedures
Backup, fire and safety, equipment replacement, reimbursement procedures
IS component examples: Networks
Router, ethernet, WiFi (802.11)
IS component of: a backup procedure
Procedures (procedures are assets too)
Asset physical types (3)
Real, Information, Intangible
Real assets
Money, buildings, hardware, people
Information assets
Client/staff details, payroll, designs
Intangible assets
Brand, reputation, plans, software
Asset type of software (per lecture)
Intangible (NOT Real)
Asset type of payroll records
Information
Asset type of company cash reserves
Real
BIA stands for
Business Impact Analysis
Purpose of BIA
Looks at the disruptive impact to the organisation; an important part of business continuity planning
BIA impact directions (5)
Money, Reputation, Legislation & regulation, Safety, Privacy (Many Rich Lawyers Sue People)
RTO
Recovery Time Objective: how quickly a function must be restored
RPO
Recovery Point Objective: how much data loss (time-based) is acceptable
RTO vs RPO memory trick
RTO = time forward until service is back; RPO = time back to the last good copy of data
"Must lose no more than 15 minutes of transactions" (RTO or RPO?)
RPO
"Website must be back online within 4 hours" (RTO or RPO?)
RTO
Game autosaves every 5 minutes, so players lose at most 5 minutes (RTO or RPO?)
RPO
CIA triad
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (characteristics of information)
Confidentiality
Preventing disclosure or exposure to unauthorised individuals or systems: who has the need and right to see the information
Integrity
Being whole, complete and uncorrupted; up to date within acceptable limits
Availability
Unobstructed access to information for authorised people, when it's needed
Lecturer's integrity example
Investment broker vs someone who buys shares infrequently: acceptable limits differ by business need
Lecturer's availability example
Oxygen-providing device in intensive care units
Why integrity is business-relative
"Acceptable limits" for data freshness/accuracy depend on what the business needs
Three alternatives to CIA
Parkerian Hexad, D3M, STRIDE
Parkerian Hexad
CIA + Possession, Authenticity, Utility
Aim of the Parkerian Hexad
Expand CIA to cover new attacks: lost data control, unverified identity, unusable files
Possession
Having physical or legal control over the data or device
Possession example
Encrypted USB drive is stolen: confidentiality intact, possession lost
Authenticity
Data is real, genuine and comes from a true source
Authenticity example
Deepfake CFO video-call scam (Hong Kong)
Utility
Data is useful and functional for its intended purpose
Utility example
Data encrypted on a USB but you lost the keys (Swiss Post voting issue)
Encrypted USB stolen vs encryption keys lost
Stolen = Possession lost; keys lost = Utility lost
D3M
Denial, Disclosure, Destruction, Modify: threat-focused variant of the DAD triad
DAD triad
Disclosure, Alteration, Denial (the attacks that break C, I, A)
D3M Denial
Blocking access to information; breaks Availability; levels: inconvenient, serious, disastrous
D3M Disclosure
Information is revealed; breaks Confidentiality; categories: insiders, outsiders, contract-workers
D3M Destruction
Loss of information or asset; breaks Availability AND Integrity; levels: since last reasonable backup, total
D3M Modify
Information has been altered; breaks Integrity; levels: accidental, deliberate
D3M element that breaks two CIA properties
Destruction (Availability + Integrity)
D3M: ransomware wipes a server, last backup was last night
Destruction, level: since last reasonable backup
D3M: contractor leaks customer list
Disclosure, category: contract-workers
D3M: employee mistypes a price in the database
Modify, level: accidental
STRIDE
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
Aim of STRIDE
Threat-focused: identifying and analysing threats
Spoofing
Impersonating someone or something (e.g. stolen credentials); breaks Authenticity
Tampering
Modifying code or data without authorisation (e.g. changing database entries); breaks Integrity
Repudiation
Denying performing an action with no proof to the contrary; breaks Non-repudiation
Information disclosure
Exposing confidential data to unauthorised parties (e.g. data leak); breaks Confidentiality
Denial of Service (STRIDE)
Degrading or blocking services for legitimate users; breaks Availability
Elevation of Privilege
Gaining unauthorised capabilities or higher access levels; breaks Authorisation
STRIDE: user gives themselves admin rights via a bug
Elevation of Privilege
STRIDE: attacker logs in with a stolen password
Spoofing
STRIDE: customer denies placing an order and there are no logs
Repudiation
STRIDE: exploiter edits their in-game currency value
Tampering
Threat types (3)
Physical, Personnel, Technical
Physical threat examples
Fire, power failure, water, air conditioning failure, natural disaster
Personnel threat examples
User error, theft/vandalism by insiders or outsiders, terrorism, hacking by insiders or outsiders, staff shortage
Technical threat examples
Applications failure, operations error, OS failure, malicious code, mainframe/storage/printer/LAN/WAN failure
Personal data links to which law
Data Protection Act (slide says DPA 2020; the actual UK Act is DPA 2018)
Payment card data links to which standard
PCI DSS
Natural disaster examples
Fires, floods, earthquakes, lightning, landslides, tornados, hurricanes, tsunamis, solar activity, civil unrest, war
Terrorism contains
Hacktivism/cyberactivism, cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare
Malicious hacking examples
Competitive intelligence, industrial espionage, expert or unskilled hackers, shoulder surfing, password attacks
Password attack types
Cracking, brute force, dictionary, social engineering, rainbow tables
Non-malicious hacking threats (no ill intent by the victim)
Employee mistakes, social engineering, phishing, fake websites, advance-fee fraud
Real example: Facebook and Google
Employees sent fake bills to pay in an email phishing attack
Password cracking takeaway
Length and character variety grow cracking time exponentially (8 letters: under 1s; 16 letters: about 2363 years)
Lock, Carr & Warkentin (1992) four dimensions
Sources (internal/external) → Perpetrators (human/non-human) → Intent (accidental/intentional) → Consequences
Lock, Carr & Warkentin consequences (4)
Disclosure, Modification, Destruction, Denial of use
Willison & Warkentin (2013)
IS Security Threat Vector Taxonomy: splits insider human intent into a continuum
Willison & Warkentin intent continuum (3)
Passive non-volitional noncompliance → Volitional (not malicious) noncompliance → Intentional malicious computer abuse
Passive non-volitional noncompliance examples
Unintentional actions, accidental data entry, forgetful oversights, uninformed violations
Volitional (not malicious) noncompliance examples
Failing to log off when leaving PC, delayed backups, not changing passwords regularly