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Brown v. Kendall
Negligence vs. Intent: A defendant who accidentally injured someone while separating fighting dogs was not automatically liable; liability depended on whether he exercised ordinary care.
Spano v. Perini Corp.
Strict Liability: A defendant conducting blasting operations is strictly liable for resulting property damage even without proof of negligence.
Cohen v. Petty
Unforeseeable Incapacity: A driver who unexpectedly fainted without prior warning was not negligent because he could not reasonably foresee the medical emergency.
Garratt v. Dailey
Substantial Certainty: A child who moved a chair could be liable for battery if he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit and fall.
Wagner v. State
Single Intent: Battery requires intent to make contact, not necessarily intent to harm or offend; mental disability does not automatically prevent formation of intent.
McGuire v. Almy
Mental Illness and Intent: A mentally ill defendant who intentionally struck her caretaker could be liable for battery despite her mental condition.
Ranson v. Kitner
Mistake Doctrine: Hunters who mistakenly shot a dog believing it was a wolf were liable because a good-faith mistake does not eliminate intent.
Vosburg v. Putney
Eggshell Skull Rule: A defendant who unlawfully kicked another student was liable for the full extent of the resulting injury, even though the harm was unexpectedly severe.
Talmage v. Smith
Transferred Intent: When a defendant threw a stick intending to hit one child but injured another, the intent transferred to the actual victim.
Wallace v. Rosen
Implied Consent: Ordinary physical contact reasonably expected in everyday interactions, such as a teacher touching a parent during a fire drill, is not necessarily battery.
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.
Offensive Contact: Snatching a plate from someone's hand constitutes battery because contact with an object closely connected to the person counts as contact.
Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications
Indirect Contact: Intentionally blowing cigarette smoke into someone's face can constitute battery because offensive contact need not involve direct touching.
Richardson v. Hennly
Particulate Contact: Physical contact through smoke particles may satisfy the contact requirement for battery.
Nelson v. Carroll
Unintended Injury: A defendant who intentionally caused offensive contact could be liable for resulting injuries even if the extent of the harm was unintended.
Waters v. Blackshear
Scope of Battery Liability: A defendant who intentionally commits a harmful or offensive contact can be responsible for resulting injuries beyond those specifically intended.
I de S et ux. v. W de S
Assault Without Contact: Swinging a hatchet at someone can constitute assault even without physical contact because the plaintiff reasonably anticipates imminent harm.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill
Apparent Present Ability: Assault requires an apparent present ability to carry out harmful or offensive contact, even if the defendant's actual ability is disputed.
Bouton v. Allstate
Reasonable Apprehension: Apprehension of imminent harmful contact must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Brower v. Ackerly
Future Threats: Threats of future harm generally do not constitute assault because the threatened contact is not imminent.
Cullison v. Medley
Threatening Gestures: Repeatedly reaching toward a holstered gun during a confrontation can create reasonable apprehension of imminent contact even without drawing the weapon.
Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman
Unlawful Confinement: A nursing home was liable for confining a resident against his will without sufficient legal authority.
Hardy v. LaBelle's Distributing Co.
Moral and Economic Pressure: An employee who remained during questioning because she feared losing her job was not falsely imprisoned because economic pressure alone does not establish confinement.
Parvi v. City of Kingston
Awareness of Confinement: A plaintiff may recover for false imprisonment if conscious of confinement when it occurs, even if he later cannot remember it.
Enright v. Groves
False Arrest: Arresting someone for refusing to produce a driver's license when there was no legal basis for requiring it constituted false imprisonment.
Noguchi v. Nakamura
Reasonable Escape: An apparent means of escape does not defeat false imprisonment when it is unsafe or unreasonable to use.
Whirl v. Kern
Failure to Release: A jailer may be liable for false imprisonment when continued detention becomes unlawful and the jailer fails to take reasonable steps to secure release.
Walmart Stores v. Resendez
Shopkeeper's Privilege: A merchant's detention of a suspected shoplifter is privileged only when the suspicion, manner, and duration of detention are reasonable.
Taylor v. Vallelunga
Intent to Cause Emotional Distress: A daughter who witnessed defendants beating her father could not recover for IIED because the defendants were unaware of her presence.
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida
Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: Ordinary insults and rude comments generally do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Harris v. Jones
Severe Emotional Distress: A supervisor's repeated mocking of an employee's speech impediment was insufficient for IIED where the evidence did not establish sufficiently severe emotional distress.
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff
Threats and Emotional Distress: Serious threats and coercion causing substantial emotional distress can support liability even without physical injury.
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger
IIED as a Gap-Filler: Under Texas law, IIED is generally unavailable when another recognized tort provides a remedy for the same conduct.
Miller v. Willbanks
Proof of Severe Distress: Expert medical testimony is not always necessary to establish severe emotional distress.
Herrin v. Sutherland
Airspace Trespass: Firing a shotgun through the airspace above another person's property can constitute trespass because possessory rights extend to usable airspace.
Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners
Continuing Trespass: Leaving a snow fence on another's land after permission expired constituted a continuing trespass.
Dougherty v. Stepp
Nominal Damages: Entering another person's property without permission constitutes trespass even when no actual damage occurs.
Glidden v. Szybiak
Trespass to Chattels: A child who pulled a dog's ears was not liable for trespass to chattels because there was no damage or legally sufficient interference.
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.
Electronic Trespass: Unsolicited mass emails that impaired computer-system resources could constitute trespass to chattels.
Pearson v. Dodd
Conversion of Information: Copying documents without substantially depriving the owner of possession or use generally does not constitute conversion of the physical documents.
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.
Apparent Consent: A passenger who presented her arm for vaccination could be treated as consenting because her conduct reasonably indicated permission.
Mohr v. Williams
Scope of Consent: A surgeon who operated on the patient's left ear after obtaining consent for surgery on the right ear exceeded the scope of consent.
DeMay v. Roberts
Consent Obtained Through Misrepresentation: A patient who allowed an unfamiliar man to attend childbirth without knowing he was not a medical professional had not given informed consent to his presence.
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.
Consent in Sports: Football players consent to ordinary contacts associated with the sport, but not necessarily intentional violence outside accepted rules and customs.
Katko v. Briney
Deadly Force to Protect Property: A property owner was liable for injuries caused by a spring gun because deadly force cannot generally be used solely to protect unoccupied property.
Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store
Shopkeeper's Privilege: A merchant may reasonably detain a suspected shoplifter for investigation when the detention is justified and reasonable in manner and duration.
Surocco v. Geary
Public Necessity: Destroying private property to prevent a spreading fire and protect the community can be privileged without compensation.
Ploof v. Putnam
Private Necessity: A person may temporarily enter or use another's property when reasonably necessary to protect human life during an emergency.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Private Necessity and Damages: A shipowner could keep a vessel tied to a dock during a storm but remained liable for actual damage caused to the dock.
Lubitz v. Wells
Foreseeable Risk: Leaving a golf club in a yard was not negligent because the object was not inherently dangerous and the resulting injury was not reasonably foreseeable.
Vaughan v. Menlove
Objective Reasonable Person: A defendant whose negligently maintained haystack caught fire was liable because reasonable care is measured objectively rather than by the defendant's personal judgment.
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.
Sudden Emergency: A taxi driver who jumped from his vehicle when threatened by an armed robber was not negligent because his conduct was judged under the emergency circumstances.
Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc.
Professional Standard of Care: A pilot's conduct is measured against that of a reasonably prudent pilot under similar circumstances, not the pilot's individual experience or judgment.
Connor v. Carroll
Children and Adult Activities: Children engaged in dangerous activities ordinarily reserved for adults may be held to an adult standard of reasonable care.
Dellwo v. Pearson
Adult Activities Exception: A minor operating a motorboat was held to the adult standard of care because operating motorized equipment creates risks to the public.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
Hand Formula: Negligence exists when the burden of taking precautions is less than the probability of harm multiplied by the gravity of the resulting loss (B < PL).
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl
Risk-Utility Balancing: A railroad's duty of care depends on balancing the likelihood and seriousness of injury against the burden and social utility of precautions.
Boyce v. Brown
Medical Standard of Care: A physician generally is not negligent merely because treatment produces a bad result; the plaintiff must establish a departure from the applicable professional standard of care.
Scott v. Bradford
Informed Consent: A physician may be liable for failing to disclose material treatment risks if a reasonable patient would have declined the treatment and the undisclosed risk caused injury.
Canterbury v. Spence
Patient-Oriented Disclosure: Physicians must disclose material risks that a reasonable patient would consider significant when deciding whether to undergo treatment.
Moore v. Regents of the University of California
Physician's Conflicting Interests: A physician must disclose personal research or economic interests that could affect medical judgment and the patient's informed consent.
Osborne v. McMasters
Negligence Per Se: A defendant's violation of a statute designed to protect against the type of harm suffered can establish negligence when the plaintiff belongs to the protected class.
Gorris v. Scott
Purpose of the Statute: Violation of a statute does not establish negligence per se when the plaintiff's injury is outside the type of harm the statute was intended to prevent.
Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp.
Statutory Protection: Violations of regulations intended to prevent disorderly conduct and violence in bars may establish negligence per se when a patron suffers the kind of injury the regulations address.
Zeni v. Anderson
Excused Statutory Violation: A statutory violation may be excused when compliance would create greater danger or when other circumstances justify noncompliance.
Hughes v. Carter
Statutory Duty: A statutory safety requirement can establish the applicable standard of care when the violation causes an injury within the statute's protective purpose.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman
Judicial Standard of Care: The Court initially imposed a strict requirement that drivers take precautions before crossing railroad tracks when visibility is obstructed.
Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.
Jury Determination of Reasonableness: The Court rejected an inflexible requirement that drivers exit their vehicles before crossing railroad tracks, emphasizing that reasonable precautions ordinarily depend on the circumstances.
Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson Co.
Reasonableness as a Fact Question: Whether a defendant exercised ordinary care generally depends on the circumstances and is ordinarily determined by the jury.
Byrne v. Boadle
Res Ipsa Loquitur: A barrel falling from a warehouse window was evidence of negligence because such an accident ordinarily would not occur without someone's negligence.
Larson v. St. Francis Hotel
Limits of Res Ipsa: A falling chair from a hotel window did not establish negligence against the hotel because guests could have caused the accident.
Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
Circumstantial Evidence of Negligence: A store may be liable for a slip-and-fall when circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that its conduct created an unreasonable risk.
Bond v. Otis Elevator Co.
Res Ipsa and Exclusive Control: An elevator malfunction may support an inference of negligence when the defendant was responsible for maintaining the instrumentality.
Ybarra v. Spangard
Multiple Defendants and Res Ipsa: A patient injured while unconscious during surgery could invoke res ipsa against medical defendants who controlled the instrumentalities potentially responsible for the injury.
Tresemer v. Barke
Continuing Risk: A physician may have a duty to warn a former patient about subsequently discovered dangers associated with a previously inserted medical device.
L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks
Duty to Rescue: A store that had not necessarily caused a child's escalator injury nevertheless had a duty to take reasonable steps to assist once it knew the child was trapped.
Commonwealth v. Peterson
Foreseeability of Third-Party Harm: A university was not liable for a student's shooting because the particular danger was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose the asserted duty.
Taylor v. Olsen
Dangerous Natural Conditions: A landowner generally has no duty to inspect naturally occurring rural conditions for the protection of travelers unless circumstances establish a duty.
Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc.
Activities Affecting Outsiders: A property occupier must exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injuries to people outside the premises from activities conducted on the land.
Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Railway Co.
Trespassers: A landowner generally owes limited duties to trespassers, including refraining from willful or wanton injury.
Barmore v. Elmore
Social Guests and Licensees: A social guest is generally treated as a licensee, and the possessor must warn of known concealed dangers that the guest is unlikely to discover.
Campbell v. Weathers
Invitee Status: A person entering a business for a purpose connected with the business may qualify as an invitee entitled to reasonable care.
Whelan v. Van Natta
Change in Visitor Status: A business visitor's invitee status may end when the visitor remains on the premises for purposes unrelated to the business invitation.
Rowland v. Christian
General Duty of Reasonable Care: A landowner may owe ordinary reasonable care regardless of whether the injured visitor is traditionally classified as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.
Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co.
But-for Causation: A train's excessive speed was not a cause in fact of the accident when the collision would have occurred even at a lawful speed.
Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
Increased Risk of Harm: When negligence substantially increases the likelihood of the injury that occurs, the plaintiff may establish causation despite uncertainty about the precise sequence of events.
Wolf v. Ford
Speculative Causation: A plaintiff cannot establish cause in fact through speculation when the evidence does not sufficiently connect the defendant's negligence to the injury.
Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins
Temporal Relationship: An injury occurring after an accident does not itself prove that the accident caused the injury.
Hill v. Edmonds
Concurrent Negligence: Two defendants whose independent negligence combined to cause a collision could both be liable for the resulting injury.
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.
Substantial Factor Test: When two fires combined to destroy property, a negligently caused fire could be a substantial factor even though another fire might independently have caused the loss.
Doull v. Foster
But-for Causation and Substantial Factor: The court reaffirmed but-for causation as the ordinary negligence standard and rejected the substantial-factor test as an unnecessarily confusing general substitute.
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
Toxic Tort Causation: An asbestos plaintiff may establish causation by proving that exposure attributable to the defendant was a substantial factor contributing to the risk of developing cancer.
Summers v. Tice
Alternative Liability: When two negligent hunters fired toward the plaintiff and it was impossible to determine whose shot caused the injury, the burden shifted to each defendant to prove he was not responsible.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
Market Share Liability: When the plaintiff could not identify which manufacturer produced the harmful DES drug, manufacturers could be held liable according to their shares of the relevant market.
Smith v. Providence Health & Services
Loss of Chance: A patient may recover for a lost opportunity for a better medical outcome when negligence caused the loss, even if the patient cannot prove the negligence more likely than not caused the ultimate injury.
Joshi v. Providence Health System
Traditional Medical Causation: Oregon's earlier approach required proof that the defendant's negligence probably caused the ultimate injury rather than merely reducing the patient's chance of avoiding it.
Frye v. United States
General Acceptance Standard: Scientific expert evidence was admissible under the Frye standard when the underlying scientific principle had gained general acceptance in its relevant field.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Expert Reliability: Federal judges must assess whether expert scientific testimony is relevant and reliable using factors such as testing, peer review, error rates, and general acceptance.
Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co.
Toxic Exposure Causation: The case is discussed in your materials in connection with evaluating evidence of causation and the allocation of proof in toxic tort claims.
Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co.
Remoteness: A railroad was not liable for damage to buildings beyond the first building ignited by its negligence because the later damage was considered too remote.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Daniels
Scope of Proximate Cause: The court considered whether the defendant's negligence was sufficiently connected to the resulting injury to justify liability.