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Comprehensive vocabulary flashcards covering rational choice axioms, menu dependence, bounded rationality, dual-system cognitive theory, and the heuristics and biases program.
Transitivity
A foundational property of rational preferences requiring that for all alternatives x, y, and z, if x bears preference relation R to y and y bears R to z, then x must bear R to z.
Completeness
A condition of rational preferences requiring that for any options x and y, an individual must either prefer x to y (x≥y), prefer y to x (y≥x), or both, meaning an individual cannot fail to have a preference.

Crossing Indifference Curves
A graphical impossibility under rational consumer choice ruled out by transitivity; if two indifference curves cross, an agent would have to be indifferent between bundles lying on distinctly ranked curves.

Convexity of Indifference Curves
The structural property that rules out curly or snake-like indifference curves, guaranteeing a single tangency point and a unique optimum choice on the budget line.
Expansion Condition
A standard axiom of rational choice stating that if option x is chosen from menu {x,y} and the agent is not indifferent between them, the agent must not choose y from expanded menu {x,y,z}.
Menu Dependence
The empirical violation of preference stability wherein an individual's choice among options changes simply as the available menu expands.
Asymmetric Dominance
A relationship where option y is dominated across all dimensions by target option x, but is dominated by no other option on the menu.
Decoy Effect (Attraction Effect)
A menu-dependent effect where adding an asymmetrically dominated third alternative (the decoy) shifts consumer preferences toward the dominating target option, rotating indifference curves and violating the expansion condition.
Compromise Effect
The tendency for consumers to select an alternative that appears as a middle or compromise option in a choice set, driven by extremeness aversion.
Trade-Off Aversion
The psychological aversion to making difficult attribute trade-offs; neuroeconomic fMRI research by Hedgcock and Rao (2009) showed that introducing a decoy decreases amygdala activation (negative emotion) and increases dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activation (decision-rule usage).
Vicarious Consumption Effect
The phenomenon identified by Wilcox et al. (2009) where the mere presence of a healthy item on a menu vicariously fulfills nutrition goals, giving consumers a license to indulge and choose less healthy foods.
Paradox of Choice (Choice Avoidance)
The counterintuitive finding demonstrated by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) where presenting consumers with an extensive array of options (such as 24 jams instead of 6) leads to substantially fewer purchases.
Sagi-Friedland Regret Theory
A model of post-decisional regret proposing that regret arises from comparing a chosen option against the union of all positive attributes of every rejected option combined, rather than solely the next-best alternative.
Homo Economicus (Economic Man)
A fictional economic agent assumed to possess infinite cognitive computation skills and zero deliberation costs, capable of performing endless steps of reasoning to maximize utility.
Bounded Rationality
Rationality that is constrained by finite human cognitive abilities and calculation capacity; distinct from irrationality, which is driven by emotion and deviates completely from reason.
Beauty Contest Game (Nagel's Mean Guessing Game)
A game where participants choose a number in the closed interval (0,100), and the winner is whoever chooses closest to p×X, where X is the average of all chosen numbers and p is a positive fraction such as 1/2 or 2/3.
Level-k Model
A bounded-rationality framework where Level-0 agents choose randomly with an average of 50, Level-1 agents best-respond by choosing 50p, and Level-k agents choose 50pk under the assumption that others reason at Level-(k−1).
Deliberation Cost
The expenditure of time and mental effort incurred by a decision maker to deliberate and solve an optimization problem.
Infinite Regress Problem (Conlisk, 1996)
The theoretical paradox where incorporating deliberation costs into an optimization model requires a higher-stage model to optimize the decision to deliberate, which itself incurs deliberation costs, continuing infinitely.

Two-Tables Illusion
A visual illusion designed by Roger Shepard (1990) in which two identical tabletops appear completely different in length-to-width ratio (3:1 versus 1.5:1) due to orientation and legs.
Automatic System (System 1)
The rapid, instinctive, unconscious, associative, and effortless cognitive system linked to evolutionary older parts of the brain that operates without deliberate thinking.
Reflective System (System 2)
The slow, deliberate, effortful, rule-following, and self-conscious cognitive system responsible for complex computations, conscious decisions, and checking logical coherence.
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
A three-item test developed by Shane Frederick measuring an individual's ability to resist an intuitive, incorrect System 1 answer in order to engage System 2 and compute the correct solution.
Stroop Effect
A cognitive conflict discovered by Stroop (1935) where automatic word reading (System 1) interferes with and delays the conscious task of naming ink colors (System 2) when the word spells a conflicting color name.
Halo Effect
A cognitive bias demonstrated by Solomon Asch (1946) where initial impressions or early traits in a sequence alter and color the interpretation of subsequently presented characteristics.
What You See Is All There Is (WYSIATI)
Kahneman's concept that System 1 builds the most coherent narrative possible from currently activated information, remaining completely insensitive to the quantity or quality of missing evidence.
Logical Rationality
A normative notion of rationality requiring that beliefs, inferences, and probability judgments strictly adhere to the formal axioms of logic and probability theory.
Ecological Rationality
A concept of rationality defining a heuristic or decision rule as rational if it achieves successful real-world performance within the specific environmental structure in which it is utilized.

Conjunction Fallacy
The logical error of judging a conjunction of two events (such as Linda being a bank teller and active feminist) to be more probable than one of the constituent events alone (P(A∩B)>P(A)).
Planning Fallacy
The systematic error where planners construct unrealistically optimistic best-case scenarios by overestimating the joint probability that every individual step of a complex project will succeed.
Disjunction Fallacy
The judgmental bias of underestimating the probability of a disjunctive event, such as failing to realize how quickly the risk of at least one system failure rises across multiple independent elements.
Hot and Cool Thinking
Walter Mischel's self-control framework contrasting the emotion-driven, stimulus-triggered limbic system ('hot' thinking) with the slow, deliberate prefrontal executive function ('cool' thinking) that enables delayed gratification.
Representativeness Heuristic
A judgment shortcut formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) where the probability that an item belongs to a category is evaluated based on how closely it resembles the stereotype or prototype of that category.

London Blitz Strike Misperception
A wartime misperception analyzed by Tom Gilovich (1991) where Londoners saw clusters of V-1 and V-2 missile strikes as purposeful patterns or spy locations, despite statistical analysis demonstrating that the strikes were entirely random.
Base-Rate Neglect (Base Rate Fallacy)
The cognitive error of ignoring prior statistical probabilities (base rates) in favor of specific, individuating information when estimating the probability of an outcome.
Bayesian Updating
The formal mathematical procedure for revising a prior probability belief, Pr(H), into a posterior belief, Pr(H∣E), in light of new evidence E, governed by Bayes's rule.
Law of Small Numbers
The unwarranted belief that small samples will closely replicate the statistical distribution and properties of the broader population from which they are drawn.
Gambler's Fallacy
The erroneous belief that independent chance processes are self-correcting, leading individuals to expect an opposite outcome after a long run of a single result (negative recency).
Hot Hand Fallacy
The mistaken belief in positive autocorrelation in performance, where observers expect an individual who has experienced a run of successes to be significantly more likely to succeed on the next attempt.
Illusion of Validity
An unwarranted confidence in predictions caused by high internal consistency among input data, even when those inputs are redundant, multicollinear, or statistically uninformative.
Misconceptions of Regression
The failure to recognize regression toward the mean, which leads individuals to believe that rewards impair performance and punishments improve it, when extreme performances are naturally followed by more typical ones.
Availability Heuristic
A mental shortcut identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) where people assess the frequency, probability, or likelihood of an event by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind.
Availability Cascade
A self-reinforcing public cycle in which an event gains media visibility, triggering rising concern that drives further coverage and spreads widely through informational and reputational cascades.
Availability Entrepreneurs
Individuals or organized groups who deliberately maintain a continuous stream of alarming information in the media to leverage the availability heuristic and advance a specific political or policy agenda.
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
A decision heuristic where individuals form estimates by starting from an initial numerical value (the anchor) and making adjustments that are typically insufficient, leaving the final estimate biased toward the anchor.