TPOES - AO2

Does Mackie successfully show a logical contradiction?

• If God is all-powerful and all-good, evil seems impossible.

• However, this assumes God has no morally sufficient reason to allow evil.

• Therefore, the contradiction may not be logically necessary.

Does the Free Will Defence solve the logical problem?

1. Free will explains moral evil.

2. God cannot force genuinely free choices.

3. Therefore, no logical inconsistency remains.

Does free will justify natural evil?

1. Natural evil is not directly caused by humans.

2. Linking it to freedom may seem forced.

3. Therefore, the defence may be weaker here.

Can God create free beings who always choose good?

1. Mackie says yes, without removing freedom.

2. Plantinga argues this may be logically impossible.

3. Therefore, the success depends on definition of freedom.

Is omnipotence limited by logic?

• Omnipotence means doing all logically possible things.

• Creating free beings who are determined to choose good may be contradictory.

• Therefore, God’s power is not undermined.

Does evil disprove God logically or probabilistically?

• Mackie claims logical contradiction.

• Many argue evil only lowers probability.

• Therefore, the logical argument may overreach.

Is the value of free will sufficient to justify evil?

• Freedom is a great good.

• However, extreme suffering may outweigh it.

• Therefore, the defence may seem morally troubling.

Does the defence need to explain why this much evil exists?

• A defence only removes contradiction.

• It does not justify the amount of suffering.

• Therefore, it may solve logic but not emotional force.

Does transworld depravity strengthen the defence?

1. It explains why all possible worlds include evil.

2. However, it is speculative.

3. Therefore, critics may question its plausibility.

Is Mackie’s argument too strong?

• He claims outright inconsistency.

• But compatibility may be logically possible.

• Therefore, the argument may fail at logical level.

Does redefining omnipotence weaken theism?

1. Limiting power to logical possibility is standard.

2. It does not reduce meaningful power.

3. Therefore, this move seems reasonable.

Is moral evil easier to explain than natural evil?

1. Moral evil links clearly to free will.

2. Natural evil lacks clear agency.

3. Therefore, it remains more problematic.

Does the logical problem succeed if even one defence works?

• Logical contradiction must be unavoidable.

• One possible explanation removes inconsistency.

• Therefore, the argument collapses if compatibility is shown.

Is the Logical Problem of Evil outdated?

1. Many philosophers accept Plantinga’s defence.

2. Debate has shifted to evidential problem.

3. Therefore, its force may now be limited.

Does emotional reaction strengthen Mackie’s case?

1. Suffering feels incompatible with perfect goodness.

2. However, emotion is not logical proof.

3. Therefore, logical force must be separated from feeling.

Overall, is the Logical Problem of Evil decisive?

1. It highlights tension between God and evil.

2. Defences show compatibility is possible.

3. Therefore, it may challenge belief but not logically refute it.

Does the fawn example successfully show gratuitous evil?

• It appears utterly pointless.

• However, we cannot know all consequences.

• Therefore, the inference may be premature.

Does skeptical theism defeat Rowe’s argument?

1. Humans are cognitively limited.

2. We may not grasp divine purposes.

3. Therefore, apparent pointlessness may not equal real pointlessness.

Does skeptical theism weaken human moral reasoning?

• If we cannot judge God’s reasons,

• We may also struggle to judge evil generally.

• Therefore, it risks moral skepticism.

Is ‘appears pointless’ strong enough evidence?

1. Many evils seem unnecessary.

2. But appearances can mislead.

3. Therefore, the argument may rely on limited perspective.

Is Rowe’s argument stronger than the logical problem?

• It avoids claiming strict contradiction.

• It focuses on probability and evidence.

• Therefore, it is widely seen as more persuasive.

Does the amount of suffering increase probability against God?

• Large-scale suffering seems excessive.

• This intensifies doubt.

• Therefore, probability may decrease further.

Can free will explain all suffering?

• It explains moral evil.

• Natural disasters remain difficult.

• Therefore, the evidential problem persists.

Overall, is the Evidential Problem decisive?

• It shows tension between God and suffering.

• It lowers probability rather than proving impossibility.

• Therefore, it challenges belief but does not logically refute it.