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What was the traditional view of ‘science’ (AKA natural philosophy at this time) in 17th century Europe?
Based on observations of facts (things that are simply what they are)
Objective → independent of theory, opinion, observer
Facts → general theories
Build up facts to make general/broader claim/theory/law → method of induction
E.g. Newton → gravity as a universal law
Relevant scholars/events in this time
Robert Boyle (Boyle’s law)
Newton
Royal Society was founded → seen as the first scientific institution
What is the problem with the method of induction (as a traditional approach to science in the 17th century)?
Problem of induction (Hume) → inadequate because observations are limited (can never see all the facts)
Need to assume that what we haven't seen is the same as what we HAVE seen e.g all swans are white (but black swans in Australia)
What occurred in the 19th century?
“Scientist” appear as a term → “pseudoscience” also appeared
E.g. phrenology, mesmerism, spiritualism, psychic phenomena = pseudosciences
Defining what it is/isn’t
What was the traditional view of science in the early 20th century? Who developed this view?
Logical positivists → say what science actually is
Science based on observation, induction + verification (by more observation)
Meaningful knowledge must be verifiable by observation
What was wrong with the logical positivist view of science?
Laws, forces etc aren't directly observable → what can science claim?
E.g. can observe something falling BUT NOT gravity itself → infer that something caused that, only observe effect
Doesn't rule out 'unscientific' claims
E.g. astrology → can verify some of what they say BUT does this make it science
What did Popper argue about the logical positivist view of verification? When did this view evolve?
Mid 20th century
Rejected induction + verifiability is too permissive
Was looking for a line of demarcation (problem of demarcation))
Looked for a line/problem of demarcation → science vs other kinds of knowledge
E.g. Einstein's theory of general relativity → verified, not refuted
Main point is that it COULD have been refuted
Falsifiability
"every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it... the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability"
Problem of induction →” all swans are white” falsified by 1 black swan
How did Thomas Kuhn criticise Popper’s falsification?
Too permissive
E.g. astrology → a claim NOT happening makes it falsified
Practice of falsification is not "normal science" → anomalies aren't used to totally refute theories (are resisted)
What was Thomas Kuhn’s argument about what science concerns?
Is a matter of solving puzzles that are consistent with a paradigm (agreed what + how of a science e.g. qs, methods, facts)
Concerns paradigms + social agreement
Paradigm shift → proposes new puzzles (not determined by observation)
Paradigms are incommensurable (incompatible) → cannot compare different kinds of facts
E.g. early psych (data represent human experience + mind) vs behaviourism (data represent behaviour)
Cannot compare facts → don't represent the same thing (aren’t commensurable)
Scientific observations theory-laden → based on theoretical assumptions
What did Larry Laudan argue about the problem of demarcation?
Ought to drop pseudo-science + unscientific as terms (if we want to be on the side of reason)
No real way to separate science from non-science
Applicability of any criteria must be assessed by people → must determine whether something fits into the criteria
What counts as science → must be agreed + sometimes disputed
No self-evident answer
What are the 2 broad categories of viewing the mind?
Monism → either mind OR matter
Dualism → mind AND matter
What are 2 examples of monism?
Idealism → only mind
Materialism → only matter
How does materialism relate to behaviourism? What are the problems with this way of thinking?
Mental concepts = dispositions to behave
E.g. thinking its raining is based on the disposition to get an umbrella
BUT memory of raining, desire not to get wet → occur before disposition
What are 4 examples of dualism?
Substance dualism → mind + matter are 2 different substances
Cartesian dualism → mind + matter interact with each other
Parallelism → no interaction BUT work alongside each other in sync
Epiphenomenalism → interact BUT only in one direction (mind epiphenomenon of brain)
What is type identity theory? What are the weaknesses of this?
Each types of mental state = specific brain state
BUT multiple realisability → if (e.g.) pain/hunger is nothing more than a specific brain state, how can the same thing be realised in multiple different kinds of brains (e.g. animals)
What is token identity theory? How does it deal with multiple realisability (and how is this limited)?
Every token/instance/case is a specific brain state
E.g. burger vs burger with cheese vs past feeling of wanting a burger vs someone else's desire for a burger → all different brain states
Addresses multiple realisability BUT potentially infinite brain states → how do we make general claims, organise knowledge, make theories etc
What is functionalism?
Define mind + brain in terms of function
Mind = what the brain does, function of the brain (not caused by the brain)
How does the computer metaphor relate to functionalism? What are the benefits of this?
Brain as something like hardware, mind as something like software
Mind processes info inside the brain
Deals with multiple realisability → software can work in different hardware + machines, function of the brains can be similar even if the brains are very different
Deals with materialism (only brain) + dualism (what it does) → only one substance (material brain)
BUT there's also what the brain DOES (e.g. mind) (can be studied by psychologists)
How is the problem of qualia a weakness of functionalism?
Subjective, conscious experience are more than neurological/brain processes + info processing
"Raw feels" → e.g. taste of something, love, beauty of something
Quality of experience not captured by these things
How is the problem of intentionality a weakness of functionalism?
Mental phenomena about something → can't be reduced to matter
Physical things are what they are (not about anything) BUT mental things are always about something
Mental things are fundamentally different to matter
What is another weakness with functionalism?
Eind can be understood as more than the brain
E.g.
Embodied (part of our human body)
Embedded (in our context)
Enacted (it interacts with things)
Extended (into the real world)
Memorising something vs writing something down vs setting a reminder vs physically putting something to do as a physical reminder
Function is different BUT done things in a way that involves the world + not just the brain → can be applied to different psych concepts
Mental things aren't just in the brain
Can define it as something the brain does BUT can say that it happens as something between the brain + that interacts with the world
In practice, how does psychology define science?
In terms of methods
In practice, how does psychology define specific mental concepts?
In particular terms relating to particular theories, methods + aims