Political Violence Midterm 2 Study Set

0.0(0)
Studied by 0 people
call kaiCall Kai
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
GameKnowt Play
Card Sorting

1/36

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

37 Terms

1
New cards

Aksoy, Deniz “Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups.”

Can the type of electoral institutions we have in a country shape patterns of political violence?

  • Electoral institutions influence the emergence of within-system groups, which seek policy changes, but do not influence the emergence of anti-system groups, which seek a complete overthrow of the existing regime and government.

  • Within-system groups are significantly less likely to emerge in democracies that have a proportional representation system and higher levels of district magnitude, while neither of these factors affects the emergence of anti-system groups.

Uses two data sets - one on 648 different terrorist groups from 1968 to 2006 (8-9) containing their names, primary goals, and dates of emergence. Second comes from TWEED Project containing information on all domestic groups that emerged in Western Europe

2
New cards

Aksoy Variations in Electoral Institutions

Proportional representation

First past the post

Mixed systems - could be like two tiers with legislature being PR and other sections being plurality

3
New cards

Aksoy Proportional representation

A district magnitude that is always greater than 1, meaning the number of representatives in each district is more than one, there is sharing of votes, the vote shares determine how many candidates of each party go to be represented.

4
New cards

Aksoy Majoritarian Representation

System in which district magnitude = 1, so each district selects one representative and the seat that wins is determined by the plurality of majority of the votes, it depends, but whoever gets this wins the seat, winner takes all. Nothing to share.

5
New cards

Electoral threshold - types of elections

the number of votes a political party has to win to be assigned any seat, happens in pr systems, where in turkey and spain there is a pr system, which should be good for minority, but in turkey you need at least 10% of the votes nationally to hold seats, which decreases electoral permissiveness. Puts a cap on what small parties can do.

6
New cards

Electoral permissiveness (Aksoy Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups)

Characteristics of electoral institutions that make it easier for small marginalized groups to gain representation. Some systems have lower levels of permissiveness, others have higher.

1. In general, democracies with less permissive electoral systems experience a higher number of domestic attacks

2. Low electoral permissiveness combined with the increased level of political competition around election times cause an increase in the volume of attacks close to elections


7
New cards

What determines permissiveness?

The type of electoral institutions we have, pr versus majority. Also a function of electoral thresholds and district magnitudes.

8
New cards

District Magnitude (Aksoy)

Not all PR is the same, the ones with high district magnitude better, if there aren’t many seats, not very permissive. Countries can also implement thresholds that bolster or limit how representative a PR system is. Means parties have to consolidate to sometimes pass the threshold.


9
New cards

Should countries with majoritarian institutions experience more pv and instability, and vice versa with pr?

Group goals: (Aksoy Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups)

Within-system vs anti-system groups

Some armed groups have goals that can be achieved with representation, such as autonomy but not a fully independent state, this group would be a within-system group. Groups that do not want to stay in the existing system, overthrow it, are anti-system groups.

Systems that are more permissive lead to within-system groups not being as violent, but doesn’t have an effect on anti-system groups.

Permissive matters for emergence of groups permissive on group goals.

10
New cards

PR vs Majoritarian/Plurality

Good things about PR is that it can help give representation to smaller groups, but could also lead to large numbers of political parties, discord, can have lower durability, not able to agree and unable to pass legislation, lead to party fragmentation

Plurality can be good for electoral accountability, you know who’s responsible and you have clarity of responsibility on who to vote out

  • Votes in plurality cast for the party that loses does not necessarily get translated then into direct representation. The winning party has the right to control the government.

  • If minorities are highly concentrated, plurality systems can let them gain seats, if they are spread out it is very difficult.


11
New cards

Within-system versus anti-system groups (Aksoy Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups)

Some armed groups have goals that can be achieved with representation, such as autonomy but not a fully independent state, this group would be a within-system group. Groups that do not want to stay in the existing system, overthrow it, are anti-system groups. 

  • Systems that are more permissive lead to within-system groups not being as violent, but doesn’t have an effect on anti-system groups. 

  • Permissive matters for emergence of groups permissive on group goals.


12
New cards

Aksoy, Deniz. 2014. “Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks.”

How do electoral institutions influence patterns and timing of violence?

Elections are not always affiliated with an increase in the volume of terrorist activity. Electoral permissiveness, an important feature of democratic electoral systems, influences the extent to which periods close to elections are periods of heightened terrorist activity.


Approaching elections are affiliated with an increase of the volume of attacks in democracies with the least permissive electoral systems, but not in democracies with permissive electoral systems.


When electoral permissiveness is low, approaching elections will have a strong positive influence on the volume of attacks.

13
New cards

Aksoy on puzzling debate

Democracies and high volume of terrorist activity (Chenoweth 2013)

A lot of studies looking at terrorism find that democracies experience high levels of terrorism, which is puzzling because democracies give people a way to express grievances.

Why? Lower costs, susceptibility, executive constraints, media freedom

14
New cards

Aksoy on Transition Regimes

Focus on in-between regimes

ANOCRACY - has elements of democratic and dictatorships, lots of the world lives in between, fully fledged of either side are rare.

Research shows that there is an inverted u-shape between regime type and violence. Less on either end but huge peak in the middle of them.

Put aside big black box of regime types and think more specifically about the institutions under each regime might influence violence.

For example - electoral institutions is one such variation. Not every democracy experiences lower levels of violence, same with dictatorships.

15
New cards

Aksoy, Deniz, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright. 2012. “Terrorism in Dictatorships.”

  • Concept of co-optation - dictators pursue this to purchase the loyalty of opponents, such as sharing oil revenues and fill pockets of potential opponents, satisfy them by giving them goods and resources, but not everyone is a saudi king flush with resources, usually have limited. In these instances, political bargaining is the next step:

  • Legislatures - allow these to exist and give opponents a buy-in to this

  • Parties - allow opposition parties to exist

The paper shows that in countries where there are opposition parties or legislatures, the likelihood of observing violence was lower.

16
New cards

Aksoy on Transition Dictatorships “Terrorism in Dictatorships.”

Countries with multiple parties and no legislature experience a 20% probability of mobilization through violence

17
New cards

Fearon and Laitan

Terrain can be an equalizer, can shape capabilities

18
New cards

Chenoweth, Erica. 2013. “Terrorism and Democracy.”

“since 9/11, terrorism may be shifting from democracies to nondemocracies—particularly to partial autocracies and countries under military occupation.” 357

Reasons that it’s been reported lower in non-democracies: Civil liberties, Publicity, Underreporting, Institutional Design, Strategic Approach, Organizational, Political,

19
New cards

Carter, Shaver, Wright, “Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict”

Terrain can shape the emergence of excluded minorities.

In places with rough terrain and variable terrain, if territory has places to hide and places to help you survive and keep surviving into the future, these places have higher ethnic minority group populations that keep their distinctiveness and survive a long time, usually politically-excluded, countries with these characteristics may experience more ethnic civil wars.

In the case of Peru - Quechua people - the Andes mountains are rough and give them opportunities to hide from assimilation and state policies, mountains also contain big valleys that let them sustain themselves.


20
New cards

Quechua People Carter, Shaver, Wright, “Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict”

Quechua villages in the Andes, these people tortured or suppressed by governments wanting to increase their power, banned their language and decreased representation, but despite all attempts, these peoples have still survived and more recent governments have taken efforts to make them freer.

Relation to Carter - able to survive due to roughness of terrain, the terrain also varied significantly allowing them to sustain themselves for centuries. Also punished by the governments for suspected association with Shining Path.

Not just crazy rough mountains, but inclusion of rough terrain and fertile land important for sustainable living of these groups.

21
New cards

Carter Shaver and Wright Key Quotes “Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict”

“Up to 40% of rugged terrain’s effects on civil war are mediated by its indirect effect on the exclusion of politically relevant ethnic groups.” 1446

“If we hold all variables at their mean and increase variance in ruggedness by 1 standard deviation, the expected number of ethnic groups in a province increases by around 27%.” 1455

“We produce the predicted number of ethnic groups in the Cuzco region given its actual values for all variables in our model, then change its values for variance in ruggedness and mean ruggedness to the value of La Pampa in Argentina. The result is that the expected number of ethnic groups decreases by around 99%, essentially lowering to zero.” 1455

22
New cards

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2002. “Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration and Ethnic War.”

Settlement patterns over territory can motivate and facilitate conflict.

Idea of indivisibilty

If both sides view territory as indivisible, conflict is likely.

Israel and Palestine, Kashmir.

“82 percent of all independent states comprise two or more ethnic groups, which are often involved in disputes either with each other of with the state itself” 82

23
New cards

Toft - when does territory become indivisible?

Settlement patterns. Ethnic groups will seek to rule territory in which they are geographically concentrated, especially if that region is a historic homeland. They will show little interest in controlling territory when they are either widely dispersed across the state, or are concentrated only in cities. 86

  • When ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in a piece of territory, they have both legitimacy and capability to fight secessionist wars against the state. 

  • What determines a group's capabilities and legitimacy? Settlement patterns.

  • First, a group must calculate that its capabilities give it a reasonable chance of gaining control of the territory it desires. Second, the group must believe that its cause is legitimate. 88



24
New cards

Toft Concentrations

  • Concentrated majorities have second highest capacity.

  • Concentrated minorities: intermediate capacity.

  • Dispersed: low

  • Idea of majority rule

  • Concentrated have highest legitimacy, more likely to claim homeland as under their rule. Concentrated minorities have mixed. Urbans weak on legitimacy - recent arrivals lacking strong ties to land they are on. Dispersed lowest.

“Concentrated majorities most prone to violence. Of all groups engaged in large-scale rebellion, 78 percent were concentrated majorities” 100


25
New cards

Toft Legitimacy and Capability



Capability

Homeland Security

Majority rule legitimacy

Likelihood of sovereignty Demand

Concentrated majority

High

High

High

High

Concentrated minority

Intermediate

High

Low

Moderate

Urban

High

Low

Low

Low

Dispersed

Low

Low

Low

Low


26
New cards

Toft - When are states likely to view territory as indivisible?

Precedent-setting, view a piece of territory as indivisible because concerned about reputation, don’t want to be seen as a weak state, often claim a piece of territory indivisible even if it’s not economically valuable or really important to them.

27
New cards

Ross, Michael. 2004. “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases.”

Examines thirteen civil wars to explore the mechanisms behind the resource-conflict correlation. 35

There is evidence in five of the thirteen cases that resource wealth made conflict more likely, and in eight of the thirteen cases that resource wealth made conflict last longer.

Little evidence of looting (looting lets rebels start wars) or grievance (grievances from resource extraction by the country taking minerals) mechanisms

Also studies incentives for secession mech (when resources can sustain a group alone) and weak state mech (if the state is extracting resources and heavily depends on this, it makes the state weak which leads to civil war)

28
New cards

Ross on new findings

“Booty futures” - the right to exploit off future materials that have not been made accessible yet.

Democratic Republic of Congo - richest minerally but poorest people.

29
New cards

Ross Implications

Helps us understand how to predict civil wars and prevent them, if there’s evidence for one mechanism over the others.

If grievance - get local buy-in from locals

If looting - protect natural resources

If state weakness - strengthen bureaucracy, look after civilians and institute control

Access to resources can change the way armed groups fight - Fortna

30
New cards

Cohen, Dara Kay. 2013. “Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009).”

Wartime rape as a method of socialization, in which armed groups that recruit by force—through abduction or pressganging—use rape to create unit cohesion.

Tests three explanations of rape: Opportunism/greed, Ethnic hatred, Gender inequality, but does not find evidence for them.

Sierra Leone - Captured and kidnapped fighters into its ranks, individuals do not know much about one another, and being abducted is itself a violent act - strangers who feel no loyalty to each other and are traumatized

31
New cards

Cohen on Percentages in Civil Wars

“62% of the conflicts (53 of 86) in the study period involved significant rape in at least one conflict-year…wartime rape is a major problem in many conflicts, but is not a ubiquitous (not everywhere) feature of conflict.” 467


32
New cards

Cohen Methods (Rape)

Uses interviews with ex-combatants of Sierra Leone, the 2004 Sierra Leone Crimes Documentation which is a nationally-representative sample of about 3,600 randomly selected households, and a nationally representative survey of ex-combatants with data on their demographics and recruitment patterns 474 Uses interviews because the methods below weren’t enough to suggest strong causation.


86 major civil wars 1980-2009: Unit of analysis: actor type, conflict year: Main IV: recruitment mech: Abduction or pressganging


33
New cards

Cohen RUF (Sierra Leone)

Majority of perpetrators identified with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was only 34% of the 700,000 demobilized fighters, suggesting this wasn’t just because of high group numbers relative to everyone else 474

RUF fighters “typically knew no one in their factions” 474

RUF lost almost two thirds of the battles they fought, despite being involved in 75% of the battles, indicating they were constantly needing to recruit

Civilian Defense Forces - at the start, only 7% did not know anyone.

34
New cards

Manekin, D., Wood, R. M. (2020). “Framing the Narrative: Female Fighters, External Audience Attitudes, and Transnational Support for Armed Rebellions”

“Female fighters positively influence audience attitudes toward rebel groups by strengthening observers’ beliefs about their legitimacy and their decision to use armed tactics.”

People become more interested in conflicts when women fighters are involved, more likely to see the goals of the group as more legitimate and more likely to think that violence used by these groups is legitimate because women don’t like using these things, so if they are doing it they must be legit.

Across 268 groups, ones with female combatants receive more non-state international support.

35
New cards

Woman Fighter Example (Goes w Manekin discussion)

PKK with Turkey - holds huge ceremony in which the fighters were coming down from a mountain and lit weapons on fire, one of the striking things was the dominance of women fighters in the process, almost half the fighters were women in the frontlines.

  • Conscious effort to portray women as they were disarming.

  • PKK, Columbia, and other groups use women fighters in operations, convey the public image of female fighters in their ranks.


36
New cards

Thomas, Jakana, and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. “Women’s Participation in Violent Political Organizations.”

Supply-side explanations

  • Reasons why women might want to supply their labor for armed groups

  • Why they want to join

Protection for sexual violence or violence, might want to join. Might also have grievances, take revenge on behalf of ethnic groups or victimized groups. A way of gaining representation, like Kurdish society and the rally to increase participation and liberation by doing something and gaining social roles beyond the house.

Demand-side explanations

  • Focus on the group-side

  • Why would groups prefer or desire to have women as participants?

Groups that use terrorism tend to recruit women because it could legitimize their cause, easier for women to enter spaces because less suspicious, suicide terrorism can pretend you’re pregnant, group‘s gender ideology also matters, disseminate more gender equality ideology and recruit more women.

Bigger factors are tactics (use of terrorism) and gender ideology (left-wing) end up with more women in their ranks.


37
New cards

Thomas Important Quotes

“When groups adopt positive gender ideologies, the probability of women participating in combat increases by 129%.” 499