Torts Law: Nuisance, Negligence Elements, Defences, and Remedies

Comprehensive vocabulary flashcards covering key tort law case authorities, legal principles, and tests across private nuisance, negligence elements (duty of care, breach, causation, and remoteness), defences, and personal injury damages.

St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (Material Damage to Property)

The legal principle that material damage to physical property will be unreasonable, and therefore constitute an actionable private nuisance, provided that the physical damage is not trivial.

Sturges v Bridgman (Locality of Interference)

The legal principle that whether an act constitutes a nuisance depends on the surrounding circumstances and locality; what would be considered a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be one in Bermondsey.

Munro v Southern Dairies (Public Interest Defence)

The legal rule that the mere fact that a defendant's business or activity is useful to the public is legally insufficient to justify what would otherwise be an actionable nuisance.

Domachuk v Feiner (Intensity of Interference)

The principle that strong and unpleasant smells emanating from a facility (such as a mushroom farm) can constitute an actionable nuisance to private residences even when taking into account the nature of a semi-rural environment.

Robinson v Kilvert (Plaintiff's Sensitivity)

The principle that a plaintiff carrying on an exceptionally delicate trade cannot complain of nuisance if the injury results from a neighbour doing something lawful that would not injure anything other than an exceptionally delicate trade.

Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett (Defendant’s Malice)

The legal principle that malice on the part of the defendant renders unreasonable an interference with the plaintiff's land that might otherwise have been considered reasonable.

Lester-Travers v City of Frankston (Defence of Statutory Authority)

The principle that statutory authority does not protect a defendant where the statute is merely permissive rather than mandating an inevitable nuisance, and where reasonable steps could have been taken to avoid the nuisance.

Miller v Jackson ('Coming to a Nuisance')

The rule that the fact that a plaintiff moved next door to an existing activity (came to the nuisance) is not a defence in itself to liability, though it may be relevant in determining remedies or injunctive relief.

Oldham v Lawson (No 1) (Standing to Sue in Nuisance)

The rule that only individuals who hold proprietary or legal property rights in the affected land have standing to sue in private nuisance; a mere licensee lacking ownership does not possess standing.

Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (Exclusive Possession Requirement)

The principle that a person can only sue for private nuisance if they possess a right to exclusive possession of the land (such as a freeholder, tenant in possession, or licensee with exclusive possession); mere licensees without property rights cannot sue.

Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd (Creators of Nuisance)

The legal principle establishing that liability in private nuisance can be incurred by an active party who creates a nuisance on land that is owned or occupied by another entity.

Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan (Continuing and Adopting Nuisance)

The rule that an occupier of land 'continues' a nuisance if, with actual knowledge or presumed knowledge of its existence, they fail to take reasonable means to bring it to an end.

Donoghue v Stevenson (Neighbour Principle)

The foundational negligence test establishing that a party must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions reasonably foreseeable to injure persons closely and directly affected by the act or omission.

Sullivan v Moody (Conflict of Duties)

A salient feature pointing against a duty of care in negligence where imposing such a duty to the plaintiff would conflict directly with the defendant's existing statutory duties owed to another party.

D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (Advocate’s Immunity)

The legal rule establishing that advocates (barristers and solicitors) are immune from suit in negligence for work done in court or conduct intimately connected to court proceedings, grounded in public policy preventing the reopening of resolved cases.

Cran v New South Wales (Police Duty of Care)

The rule that police officers and investigating authorities do not owe a common law duty of care in negligence to persons who are under their criminal investigation.

Caltex Oil v The Dredge (Pure Economic Loss from Negligent Act)

The precedent confirming that a defendant can owe a duty of care to avoid pure economic harm to a plaintiff arising from a negligent act, even in the absence of physical injury to the plaintiff's own property.

Perre v Apand (Salient Features for Pure Economic Loss)

The multi-factor test for imposing a duty of care for pure economic loss, evaluating factors such as an ascertainable class, defendant's control, plaintiff's vulnerability, and defendant's knowledge of the specific risk.

Johnson Tiles v Esso Australia (Indeterminate Liability)

The principle precluding a duty of care for pure economic loss when imposing liability would expose the defendant to indeterminate liability across an extensive, unbounded class of affected commercial and domestic customers.

Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring (Pure Mental Harm - Relational Proximity)

The principle that an employer owes a duty of care to avoid causing recognizable psychiatric illness to the children of an employee killed in the workplace, even if the children did not directly perceive the accident or its immediate aftermath.

Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (Witnessing Danger at the Scene)

The rule that first responders satisfy the statutory requirement of witnessing victims 'being killed, injured, or put in danger' when assisting victims who remain trapped, traumatised, or in continuing peril at the accident scene.

Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (Pure Mental Harm - Assumption of Responsibility)

The principle that a duty of care for pure psychiatric harm arises without direct sensory perception of an event where the defendant gave specific assurances to parents regarding supervision, establishing an assumption of responsibility and vulnerability.

Tame v NSW (Pure Mental Harm - Reasonable Foreseeability)

The principle denying a duty of care for pure mental harm where it is not reasonably foreseeable that an administrative reporting error would induce psychiatric injury in a person of normal fortitude, alongside a conflict of statutory duties.

Vaughan v Menlove (Objective Standard of Prudence)

The foundational standard of care principle dictating that negligence liability is determined objectively in reference to a person of ordinary prudence, rejecting a subjective standard based on individual judgment.

McHale v Watson (Standard of Care for Children)

The modification of the objective standard of care for minors, reducing liability to the standard of care expected of a reasonable child of comparable age.

Carrier v Bonham (Mental Illness and Standard of Care)

The legal rule establishing that a defendant's mental illness (such as schizophrenia) does not diminish or alter the objective standard of care owed to others in negligence.

Imbree v McNeily (Inexperience and Standard of Care)

The principle establishing that the standard of care owed by an inexperienced or unlicensed driver remains the objective standard of a reasonable driver and is not lowered by inexperience or the supervisor's knowledge thereof.

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (Foreseeable Risk)

The test establishing that a risk of injury, even if unlikely to occur, is legally foreseeable provided that it is not far-fetched or fanciful.

Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd (Standard of Care for Special Skills)

The principle that the standard of care applied to an individual providing a commercial service is that of a reasonable person possessing that specific trade's skill (e.g., a jeweller), rather than a higher specialized profession (e.g., a surgeon).

Roe v Minister of Health (Hindsight Bias in Standard of Care)

The rule that the standard of care must be evaluated based on the state of knowledge existing at the time of the incident, strictly avoiding the application of hindsight.

Bolton v Stone (Negligence Calculus - Probability of Harm)

The calculus of negligence principle holding that where the probability of harm eventuating is extremely small (e.g., a ball hit over a fence $6$ times in $30$ years), a reasonable person is not required to take further precautions.

Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Dederer (Reasonable Care vs Elimination of Risk)

The principle confirming that a defendant's obligation is to exercise reasonable care, not to entirely prevent injury or eliminate all conceivable risks.

Paris v Stepney (Negligence Calculus - Likely Seriousness of Harm)

The rule that the more serious the potential consequences if a risk eventuates (such as complete blindness for an employee with only one sighted eye), the greater the degree of care required of a reasonable person.

Graham Barclay Oysters v Ryan (Negligence Calculus - Burden of Precautions)

The principle that where the burden and economic disruption of taking preventive precautions are exceptionally high, a reasonable entity is less likely to be found in breach for failing to adopt those measures.

Watt v Hertfordshire County Council (Negligence Calculus - Social Utility)

The rule that the social utility and urgency of saving human life in an emergency can outweigh the risks associated with taking imperfect precautions, precluding a finding of breach.

Tucker v McCann (Breach of Legislative Standards)

The principle that a defendant's breach of statutory or regulatory traffic rules is not conclusive proof of negligence, but rather one relevant piece of evidence considered among all circumstances.

Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (Common Practice)

The rule establishing that common or standard industry practice does not necessarily establish the legal standard of care; conforming to widespread practice is not an absolute defence if that practice itself is negligent.

Rogers v Whitaker (Doctor's Duty to Warn of Material Risks)

The principle requiring medical practitioners to warn patients of material risks inherent in proposed treatments, including risks to which a reasonable person or that specific patient would attach significance.

Strong v Woolworths (Factual Causation / 'But For' Test)

The application of factual causation establishing that a defendant's failure to maintain a periodic inspection and cleaning system is a necessary condition of the harm if, on the balance of probabilities, timely action would have eliminated the hazard.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital (Necessary Condition of Harm)

The rule establishing that a breach of duty does not causally produce harm under the 'but for' test if the plaintiff would inevitably have died or suffered the exact harm regardless of the defendant's care.

March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (Causation and Created Risk)

The rule that where a defendant's negligence generates the very risk of injury that occurs through a plaintiff's or third party's subsequent carelessness, that subsequent negligence does not sever the chain of causation.

Wallace v Kam (Scope of Liability - Failure to Warn)

The policy principle that a medical practitioner's scope of liability does not extend to physical harms resulting from risks that the patient would have chosen to accept even if fully warned.

Haber v Walker (Novus Actus Interveniens - Voluntary Human Action)

The test establishing that an intervening act severing causation must be either a truly voluntary human action or an extremely unlikely coincidence; an act undertaken without capacity for free choice due to mental illness is not voluntary.

Mahoney v Kruschich (Novus Actus Interveniens - Medical Negligence)

The principle that subsequent medical negligence only breaks the chain of causation between an original tortfeasor and the plaintiff's ultimate injury if it is grossly negligent and inexcusably bad.

The Wagon Mound No. 1 (Remoteness - Kind of Damage)

The remoteness test establishing that a defendant is liable only for damage of a class, kind, or type that was reasonably foreseeable to a reasonable person at the time of the negligent act.

Hughes v Lord Advocate (Manner and Extent of Harm)

The principle that as long as the general kind or type of harm (such as burn injuries) was reasonably foreseeable, the precise sequence of events or the unexpected extent of the injury does not render the harm too remote.

Mount Isa Mines v Pusey (Foreseeability of Like Kind Harm)

The rule confirming that reasonable foreseeability requires foresight only of some mental disturbance or harm of a like kind, rather than foresight of the specific psychiatric illness (such as acute schizophrenia) that eventuated.

Tremain v Pike (Distinction in Kind of Damage)

The decision finding an employer not liable for a rare disease contracted via rat urine because it was deemed entirely different in kind from foreseeable injuries like rat bites or food poisoning.

Metrolink Victoria v Inglis (Broad Categorisation of Harm)

The approach holding that in ordinary remoteness inquiries, courts apply a broad categorization to the class of harm foreseeable as a consequence of the breach (e.g., loss of revenue resulting from service disruption).

Stephenson v Waite Tileman (Thin Skull Principle - Susceptibility)

The principle that once the initial kind of physical injury is reasonably foreseeable, the tortfeasor is liable for the full, escalated extent of the harm, regardless of whether it stemmed from pre-existing or subsequent susceptibility.

Nader v Urban Transit Authority (Thin Skull - Environmental Context)

The rule extending the eggshell skull principle beyond physical vulnerabilities to encompass a plaintiff's social, economic, psychological, and family environment.

Kavanagh v Akhtar (Thin Skull - Cultural and Religious Context)

The principle holding that the tortfeasor must take the victim as found within their unique cultural and religious context, making foreseeable consequences flowing from cultural breakdown non-remote.

Caterson v Commissioner for Railways (Contributory Negligence - Sudden Emergency)

The doctrine providing that when a plaintiff acts in a sudden emergency or dilemma created by the defendant's negligence, less care is expected of them when assessing contributory negligence.

Joslyn v Berryman (Contributory Negligence - Intoxication Standard)

The objective standard dictating that contributory negligence for riding with an intoxicated driver is assessed from the perspective of an ordinary sober person, without allowing subjective impairment to reduce the required standard of care.

Allen v Chadwick (Contributory Negligence - High Burden of Precautions)

The ruling that a plaintiff is not contributorily negligent for accepting a ride with an intoxicated driver where the immediate alternatives (such as being stranded in a rural, dark environment) present greater risks.

Froom v Butcher (Contributory Negligence - Causation of Harm)

The principle that contributory negligence applies where the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct (such as failing to wear a seatbelt) contributed to the severity of the harm suffered, even if it did not cause the underlying collision.

Pennington v Norris (Apportionment of Responsibility)

The statutory apportionment rule directing courts to compare the parties' relative culpability, defined as the degree of departure from their respective standards of care, to reach a just and equitable reduction in damages.

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell (Voluntary Assumption of Risk)

The defence principle establishing that volenti non fit injuria succeeds where a plaintiff fully appreciates that a risk might eventuate, even if remote, and freely undertakes the action without required precautions.

Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (Illegality of Plaintiff)

The principle holding that the mere fact that a plaintiff was committing an unlawful act at the time of injury does not automatically disentitle them from recovering in negligence or negate a duty of care.

Miller v Miller (Joint Illegal Enterprise and Withdrawal)

The rule that while participants in an illegal joint enterprise do not generally owe each other a duty of care, a plaintiff who effectively communicates their withdrawal from the enterprise is thereafter owed a duty of care.

Sharman v Evans (Reasonable vs Ideal Personal Injury Damages)

The common law assessment rule establishing that damages for future nursing and medical care are governed by what is reasonably required rather than what provides the ideal standard of living.