Metaethics Vocab Test

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12 Terms

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Moral realism

The view that there are mind-independent moral properties (good, bad, right, wrong) and facts that exist outside the mind (e.g., they are real properties like blue, square and cold).

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Moral anti-realism

The view that there are no mind-independent moral properties/facts. Good and bad are therefore mind dependent concepts, not objective ones.

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Cognitivism

The view that ethical language expresses belief about the world which can be true or false

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Non-cognitivism

The view that moral language cannot be true or false (because they are attitudes or opinions)

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Naturalism

The view that moral properties like good can be defined in terms of natural properties such as pleasure (utilitarianism is an example). It is a reductive theory which reduces moral properties to natural ones.

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The naturalistic fallacy

The view that naturalism is false because good cannot be reduced to natural properties like pleasure.(GE Moore and Hume both have arguments for this)

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The open question argument

Moore says we can prove the naturalistic fallacy is correct by asking ‘Is pleasure morally good’? Clearly the answer to this depends on what the pleasure is. Some pleasures are morally good, some aren’t. It is an open question. This proves that good is not the same as pleasure.

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The is-ought gap

Hume argues that naturalism is false because what is the case does not say anything about how things ought to be. If we apply the is-ought gap to Mill’s proof it becomes clear Mill’s utility is false. Mill observes that people desire pleasure (a fact), and he therefore concludes that people ought to pursue pleasure (a value). But this is not true. People eat meat, and people sometimes humiliate other people. This does not prove that we ought to do either of these things!

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Non-naturalism/intuitionism

The view that moral properties like good cannot be defined in terms of natural properties such as pleasure. ‘Good’ is unanalysable and indefinable. GE Moore’s intuitionism is an example


The view that moral properties/facts exist (moral realism) and we can know then using intuition (i.e., we can know them as self-evident truths if we think carefully about it) (cognitivism).

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The verification principle

A principle developed by Ayer to establish whether a proposition is meaningful. A proposition is meaningful if it can be verified analytically (by definition) synthetically (by empirical investigation)

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Emotivism

Ayer argues that moral statements are meaningless (non-verifiable). However, the do perform a function which is to express our emotion or feeling. To say ‘stealing is wrong’ means ‘I disapprove of stealing’. 

Stevenson adds another function. Moral statements can be used to persuade people to agree with you by using emotive language. 

This is non-cognitivist because it shows that moral language cannot be true or false because it is just expressing our feelings or attitudes (opinions) not facts.

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The argument from cultural relativism

There cannot be any objective moral properties or facts, because if there were, surely people would know them by now. But cultures around the world disagree on what is moral (this is known as cultural relativism). Therefore, there are no moral facts, what is good is relative to culture, religion etc.