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Vocabulary practice flashcards defining core property law concepts, legal doctrines, statutory frameworks, and landmark cases covered across the lecture transcript.
Property
A system of claims to scarce resources and the institutions that support such claims.
Conceptions of Property (Bundle of Rights vs. Essentialism)
The bundle of rights conception (represented by Grey/skeptics) views property as having as many rights as the government chooses to give. The essentialist/Blackstone conception (represented by Penner) views property as fundamentally a right to exclude the world from a thing.
Trespass to Land (Prima Facie Case)
An actor is subject to liability to another for trespass to land if they intentionally: (1) enter or cause entry of a tangible thing or person onto land in another's possession; (2) remain on land in another's possession; or (3) fail to remove a tangible thing duty-bound to remove from land in another's possession.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes (Wis. 1997)
Established that punitive damages can be awarded for an intentional trespass to land even when nominal damages are given and there are no actual compensatory damages, because the legal harm is the violation of the right to exclude and privacy, and punitive damages deter bad faith and violent self-help.
Ad Coelum Doctrine
The traditional common law rule that the owner of the soil owns everything up to the sky (ad coelum) and down into the depths (ad inferos).
Hinman v. Pac. Air Transport (9th Cir. 1936)
Held that the ad coelum doctrine 'is not the law'; an airplane flight through unpossessed airspace above another's land does not constitute trespass unless it substantially interferes with the owner's actual possession and use of the subjacent surface.
Airspace Zones (Restatement on Aerial Trespass)
A three-part framework for airspace rights: Zone 1 (actual possession, where trespass rules operate per se as on the surface); Zone 2 (right to possess unoccupied airspace the owner could occupy in the future, where permanent intrusions are per se trespass and temporary intrusions require substantial interference); and Zone 3 (airspace the owner has no conceivable prospect of occupying, conferring no rights).
Private Nuisance
A substantial and unreasonable interference with the private use and enjoyment of another's land, actionable if intentional and unreasonable, negligent, reckless, or resulting from abnormally dangerous activities in an inappropriate place.
Hendricks v. Stalnaker (W. Va. 1989)
Held that establishing a private nuisance requires balancing the competing interests of both landowners; a water well located within 100 feet of a proposed septic tank was not unreasonable and thus not a nuisance.
Coase Theorem
A zero-transaction-cost thought experiment stating that without transaction costs, the initial legal assignment of liability or property rights will have no effect on the efficient allocation of resources due to reciprocal causation.
Pardee v. Camden Lumber (W. Va. 1911)
Held that land and the things upon it (such as timber) are unique; cutting them causes irreparable harm, making equitable injunctions appropriate rather than mere money damages.
Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (NY 2007)
Recognized an exception to the traditional common law rule barring claims of conversion for intangible objects, allowing conversion claims for intangible electronic records.
First Possession
A mode of original acquisition requiring both an intent to control and an act of control over a previously unowned resource.
Rule of Capture
A rule stating that the first person to take actual physical possession of a fugitive or wild natural resource owns it, even if the resource migrated from beneath or across another person's land.
Pierson v. Post (NY 1805)
Held that mere pursuit of a wild animal is not enough to vest property rights; certain possession is required, which at a minimum requires mortal wounding and continued pursuit.
Keeble v. Hickeringill (England 1707)
Held that a landowner may sue for damages when a competitor maliciously interferes with their lawful, profitable use of property (firing guns to scare ducks from a decoy pond), whereas fair business competition is lawful.
Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production Co. (PA 2020)
Held that the rule of capture applies to hydraulic fracturing (fracking) relying on artificial pressure differentials to drain fugitive oil and gas, provided no physical subsurface trespass occurs across property lines.
Goddard v. Winchell (IA 1892)
Held that a meteorite falling from space becomes part of the soil into which it embeds, belonging to the owner of the land under accession/ad coelum rather than to the first finder.
Edwards v. Sims (KY 1929)
Held under the ad coelum doctrine that a surface owner owns the subterranean cave space directly beneath their surface land, even if that owner has no natural entrance or physical access to it.
Popov v. Hayashi (CA 2002)
Held that when a party takes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of abandoned personal property (a historic baseball) and is interrupted by unlawful acts of others, they establish a pre-possessory interest; the proceeds of the auctioned ball were divided 50/50.
Haslem v. Lockwood (CT 1871)
Held that a person who gathers abandoned, worthless property (manure on a public highway) and expends substantial labor to enhance its value acquires a possessory right to it if removed within a reasonable time.
INS v. AP (SCOTUS 1918)
Held that although current news facts are common property, a news-gathering entity possesses a 'quasi-property' interest in gathered news that lasts beyond first publication, enforceable against commercial competitors who misappropriate it.
Accession
The legal doctrine whereby the ownership of an accessory or secondary thing (A′) is automatically assigned to the owner of the principal thing (A).
Specification
A form of accession in personal property where an improver mistakenly mixes their labor with raw materials owned by another, transforming the identity of the materials.

Wetherbee v. Green (22 Mich. 311 (1871))
Held that an innocent, good-faith improver who converts another's timber into barrel hoops ($700 vs. $25 value) transforms its identity and acquires title, leaving the original owner a damages remedy for unintentional trespass.
Mixture vs. Confusion
Mixture occurs when the personal property of A is joined with distinct personal property of B. Confusion occurs when the personal property of A is mixed with identical, fungible personal property of a collection of others (giving each owner a proportional share in the whole pot).
Doctrine of Increase
The legal rule that the offspring or increase of tame or domestic animals belongs to the owner of the dam (mother), with an ancient exception for baby swans (split equally).
Carruth v. Easterling (150 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1963))
Applied the doctrine of increase to hold that a calf conceived by a wandering cow while on a neighbor's property belonged to the owner of the mother cow.
Fructus Naturales vs. Fructus Industriales
Fructus naturales are perennial plants that rejuvenate year to year without replanting (belonging to the owner of the soil); fructus industriales are annual crops requiring periodic cultivation and replanting (belonging to the possessor/farmer).
Doctrine of Emblements
The right of a tenant farmer to re-enter land and harvest annual crops they planted, even after their lease or lawful possession has terminated without fault.
Fixture
A personal chattel that, by reason of its annexation to or association in use with land, is legally regarded as part of the real property.
Fixture Test (Strain v. Green / Teaff v. Hewitt)
Requires three elements to turn a chattel into a fixture: (1) actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant; (2) application to the use or purpose of that part of the realty; and (3) objectively manifested intent of the annexing party to make a permanent accession to the freehold.
Relativity of Title
The principle that ownership claims are relative rather than absolute; courts compare only the relative strength of the parties before them, barring third-party right defenses (no jus tertii).

Armory v. Delamirie (1 Strange 505 (K.B. 1722))
Held that a chimney sweeper's boy who found a jewel acquired property rights sufficient to keep it against all the world except the rightful owner, successfully maintaining trover against a goldsmith who converted the stones.
Clark v. Maloney (3 Del. 68 (Sup. Ct. 1840))
Established that between sequential finders (F1>F2), the first finder retains a special property interest in lost chattels (floating pine logs) that is not divested by subsequent loss.
Anderson v. Gouldberg (53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892))
Established that between sequential converters or trespassers (C1>C2), bare possession of personal property, even if acquired wrongfully, is sufficient to maintain replevin against a subsequent stranger who takes it.
Adverse Possession (Adjectival Requirements)
The six traditional requirements under Scott v. Anderson-Tully Co.: (1) Exclusive; (2) Open and notorious; (3) Actual; (4) Continuous and uninterrupted; (5) Hostile/adverse; and (6) Under a claim of right.
Hostile/Adverse Prong (State of Mind Standards)
Three jurisdictions approaches: (1) Majority / Connecticut rule: subjective state of mind is irrelevant (only absence of permission matters); (2) Good-faith requirement (Carpenter): possessor must hold an honest, mistaken belief of ownership; (3) Bad-faith / Maine rule: possessor must know the land is not theirs and intend to claim it.
Color of Title
Possession of property under a defective written deed or document purporting to convey title; often optional for adverse possession but may reduce statutory requirements or confer broader constructive possession.
Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman (NY 1998)
Held that the statute of limitations for conversion begins to run at the moment of conversion (when unauthorized dominion inconsistent with the true owner's rights is exercised); conversion is not a continuing harm.
Private Necessity
A privilege to enter or use another's real property to prevent serious harm to human life or property, excusing trespass but obligating the trespasser to pay for any actual damages caused.
Ploof v. Putnam (VT 1908)
Held that necessity caused by an impending storm justified mooring a boat to a private dock to preserve human life; the dock owner was liable for injuries resulting from unmooring the boat.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (MN 1910)
Held that while necessity privileged a steamship to remain tied to a dock during a storm, the shipowner was strictly liable to pay for actual damage inflicted on the dock.
Fisher v. Steward (NH 1804)
Held that for a local custom to create an exception to the law of trespass (such as claiming wild bees discovered in another's tree), the custom must be widespread enough to be uniform across the entire state.
Ghen v. Rich (MA 1881)
Held that a trade custom in whaling assigning ownership to the harpooner who mortally wounded a finback whale washed ashore was legally binding where the entire industry recognized it and it maximized trade welfare.
Public Trust Doctrine
A doctrine holding that sovereign states possess title to navigable waterways and tidelands in trust for the public; the state cannot transfer these lands except to promote public interest in small parcels or without impairing public rights (Illinois Central Railroad Co.).
State v. Shack (NJ 1971)
Held that real property rights and the right to exclude are not absolute and are subject to public policy and human rights limits; a farmer could not bar a legal aid attorney and health worker from visiting migrant farmworkers housed on the farm.
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (SCOTUS 2021)
Held that a California regulation granting labor union organizers a right to access agricultural employers' property for up to three hours a day, 120 days a year, constitutes a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA)
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination in housing transactions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability under 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
Mrs. Murphy Exemption
An exemption under the Fair Housing Act (§ 3603(b)) exempting owner-occupied buildings with four or fewer living units from certain anti-discrimination provisions, though it never exempts discriminatory advertising (§ 3604(c)).
Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com, LLC (9th Cir. 2012)
Held that the Fair Housing Act's prohibitions against discrimination do not apply to the selection of roommates in shared living units, protecting personal intimate relationships and privacy inside the home.
Baker v. Howard County Hunt (MD 1936)
Held that an equity court will grant an injunction against repeated, recurring trespasses (hunting dogs invading a farm and killing research rabbits) because multiple lawsuits and subjective damages render remedies at law inadequate.
Pile v. Pedrick (Penn. 1895)
Adopted the minority rule regarding building encroachments, mandating an injunction requiring the defendant to remove an accidental encroachment of 1.5 inches of underground foundation regardless of hardship or good faith.
Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands (CO 1951)
Adopted the majority rule denying mandatory injunctions for building encroachments if the encroachment is unintentional (good faith), slight, does not affect the land's current use, causes minimal damage, and would cause grave unconscionable hardship to remove.
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co. (WA 1946)
Held that a plaintiff may waive an action in tort and sue in restitution (quasi-contract) to recover the defendant's unjust enrichment (the cost savings of using an egg-washing machine) even if plaintiff suffered no out-of-pocket loss.
Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co. (MI 1878)
Held that an equitable injunction may be denied under the doctrine of abuse of rights when a plaintiff buys land adjacent to a mine solely to extort a high settlement by threatening an injunction that would ruin the mine.
License
A revocable, temporary permission granted by a property owner waiving the right to exclude and allowing another access to use the property on specified terms.
Wood v. Leadbitter (153 Eng. Rep. 351 (1845))
Held that a bare license to enter land (such as a purchased racetrack ticket) is revocable at will by the landowner even if breach of contract damages may be sought, unless coupled with a validly transferred property grant.
Bailment
A legal relationship created when an owner of personal property (the bailor) temporarily transfers possession and custody to another (the bailee) for a specific purpose.
Bailee's Duty of Care (Traditional Tripartite Standard)
The historical standard under Story's treatise: (1) sole benefit of bailee requires utmost care (liable for slight neglect); (2) mutual benefit requires ordinary care (liable for ordinary negligence); and (3) sole benefit of bailor requires slight care (liable for gross negligence).
Misdelivery (Bailment)
A strict liability failure of care where a bailee redelivers bailed property to the wrong person, rendering the bailee liable for conversion, except where goods are claimed via a claim-check system without knowledge of fraud.
Cowen v. Pressprich (NY 1922)
Held (per Lehman's dissent, later adopted) that an involuntary bailee has no affirmative duty of care toward mistakenly delivered property unless they perform an act exercising dominion over it (incompatible with true owner's rights or accepting possession).
The Winkfield (UK 1901)
Held that a bailee in possession of goods can recover their full value from a third-party tortfeasor even if the bailee is not legally liable to the bailor for the loss, because possession serves as a surrogate for ownership.
Abandonment (Elements)
The intentional relinquishment of ownership, requiring: (1) parting with possession to no one in particular; (2) with no intention of resuming possession in the future; and (3) performing an overt act manifesting this intent.
Pocono Springs Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. MacKenzie (PA 1995)
Held that a landowner holding perfect, clear title to real property cannot legally abandon it to escape continuing obligations such as homeowners' association dues and property taxes.
Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. (MO 1975)
Held that a testamentary directive in a will ordering the executor to raze an architecturally significant house upon death is void as against public policy due to the senseless destruction of economic and community value.
Numerus Clausus
The principle that the menu of property forms and estates is closed and standardized; private parties cannot customize novel property forms, channeling major property innovations exclusively to the legislature.
Doctrine of Waste
Law preventing a present possessor (e.g., life tenant) from substantially altering or damaging property to the detriment of future interest holders; categorized into affirmative (active harm/destruction), permissive (negligence/failure to maintain or pay taxes), and ameliorative (substantial alteration that increases economic value).
Brokaw v. Fairchild (NY 1929)
Held that a life tenant cannot tear down a family mansion to build a profitable apartment building over the objection of remaindermen, affirming that altering the identity of the inheritance constitutes actionable waste.
Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano (CA 1967)
Held that while a total restraint on alienating a fee simple is void, a condition restricting the property's use to lodge/charitable purposes is valid, even if it practically impairs alienation.
Condominium
A common interest community where an owner holds their individual unit in fee simple absolute and holds the common areas with other unit owners as tenants in common, managed by an association under a declaration.
Cooperative
A common interest community where a corporation owns the entire building and land, and individual residents own corporate shares coupled with a long-term proprietary lease to their apartment unit.
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n (CA 1994)
Held that use restrictions recorded in a condominium declaration are clothed with a presumption of validity and will be enforced unless arbitrary, imposing burdens that substantially outweigh benefits to the entire development, or violating fundamental public policy.
40 West 67th Street v. Pullman (NY 2003)
Held that courts defer to a residential cooperative board's decision to terminate an objectionable tenant-shareholder's lease under the Business Judgment Rule unless the tenant proves the board acted outside authority, without legitimate corporate purpose, or in bad faith.
Spendthrift Trust (Broadway National Bank v. Adams)
A trust that bars the beneficiary from transferring or assigning their future income interest in advance and prevents the beneficiary's creditors from reaching the trust corpus or income before it is paid out.
Trustee Duty of Loyalty (Rothko v. Reis)
A trustee/fiduciary cannot place themselves in a position of conflict of interest with the trust beneficiaries; executors who sold Rothko's art to an entity with which they had personal ties were assessed appreciation damages.
Doctrine of Cy Pres
An equitable doctrine enabling a court to reform a charitable trust whose specific purpose has become impossible, illegal, or impracticable, redirecting the trust corpus to a related purpose that fulfills the donor's general charitable intent (Wilber v. Owens).
Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet
The foundational legal maxim that one cannot transfer a greater property title than one has; a transferee takes only the rights held by the transferor unless an exception applies.
Void Title vs. Voidable Title
Void title conveys no property rights whatsoever (e.g., stolen goods, forged deeds, fraud in the factum), meaning even a good-faith purchaser for value (GFPV) takes nothing. Voidable title arises when an owner willingly parts with possession due to deception/fraud in the inducement, giving the transferee power to convey good title to a GFPV under UCC § 2-403.
Good Faith Purchaser for Value (GFPV)
A purchaser who buys property for valuable (non-nominal) consideration without actual, record, or inquiry notice of prior unrecorded claims or defects in title.
Johnson v. M'Intosh (SCOTUS 1823)
Held under the doctrine of discovery that European discovery conferred ultimate title to the United States government, leaving Native American tribes with only a right of occupancy; therefore, direct private purchases from Native Americans were void under nemo dat.
Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc. (TX 1992)
Held that a watch buyer was not a GFPV because he had inquiry notice of fraud based on suspicious circumstances, an unreasonably low price, and warning information from the jeweler.
Hauck v. Crawford (SD 1953)
Held that fraud in the factum (misrepresenting the nature of a document signed as a lease when it was a deed) creates void title, but an owner's negligence in failing to read the instrument can raise equitable estoppel favoring an innocent GFPV.
Mugaas v. Smith (WA 1949)
Held that title acquired through adverse possession is superior to the claim of a subsequent GFPV who purchased record title, even if the adverse possessor's title was unrecorded and no physical boundary fence remained visible.
Equity of Redemption
The mandatory right of a mortgagor/borrower in default to pay the full debt and costs prior to the foreclosure sale to clear the lien and prevent forfeiture of the property.
Skendzel v. Marshall (Ind. 1973)
Held that an installment land sale contract is treated in equity as a mortgage; clauses forfeiting all buyer payments and land title upon default are unenforceable because equity abhors forfeitures.
Recording Acts (Race, Notice, Race-Notice)
Statutory mechanisms determining land title priority: Race (the first party to record wins, notice irrelevant); Notice (subsequent purchaser for value without notice wins over prior unrecorded conveyances); and Race-Notice (subsequent purchaser for value without notice wins only if they record before the prior unrecorded interest).
Wild Deed
A recorded deed that is disconnected from the established chain of title (because an intermediate grantor failed to record their deed), providing no constructive or record notice to subsequent purchasers.
Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative (WI 1969)
Held that liability in private nuisance turns on the substantial character of the injury to the plaintiff's land (crop destruction from sulfur dioxide), not on whether the defendant acted with reasonable care; nuisance is distinct from negligence.
Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co. (AZ 1972)
Held that while coming to a nuisance does not preclude enjoining an expanding cattle feedlot as a public nuisance near a new residential development, the developer who brought residents into the agricultural area must indemnify the feedlot for its reasonable costs of moving or shutting down.
Easement (Appurtenant vs. In Gross)
An irrevocable, nonpossessory right to use another's land. An easement appurtenant benefits a dominant tenement parcel and runs with the land; an easement in gross benefits a particular individual and is not tied to a dominant estate.
Easement by Implication from Prior Use
An unwritten easement recognized when: (1) there was former unity of ownership; (2) at the time of parcel severance, one part was openly, continuously, and visibly used to benefit another; and (3) the continued use is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel.
Easement by Necessity (Schwab v. Timmons)
An unwritten easement created upon severance of a unified estate when a parcel becomes strictly landlocked with no physical surface access to a public roadway; it does not arise if an owner voluntarily cuts off their own access.
Easement by Prescription
An unwritten easement acquired through open, notorious, continuous, and adverse (without permission) use along a definite path for the statutory period; it cannot be acquired for light, air, or view (Fontainebleau).
Easement by Estoppel
An unwritten easement arising when an owner permits another to use the land, the licensee reasonably relies on that permission by investing substantial labor or capital in improvements, and revoking permission would be inequitable (Holbrook).
Easement Termination
The formal methods by which an easement is extinguished, including merger (unity of title), written release (Statute of Frauds), estoppel, prescription, end of necessity, eminent domain condemnation, destruction of the servient estate, and abandonment.

Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. (FL 1959)
Held that absent a contractual agreement or statute, a landowner possesses no legal right to the free flow of light, air, or view across a neighbor's property, and such rights cannot be acquired through prescriptive easement.