PSC 124 midterm SAQ prompts

possible prompts and answers

How does constructivism differ from realism and liberalism?

Realism and liberalism both treat state interests as largely given, driven by material factors like power, security, and economic gain. ask what states want and how they pursue it, constructivists ask where those wants come from.

Constructivism argues that interests and identities are socially constructed through interaction, ideas, and shared understandings. The structure of the international system is made of social relationships, not just the distribution of material capabilities. This means that anarchy has no fixed logic, since, as Wendt puts it, it is "what states make of it."

What are norms, and how do they influence behavior?

Norms are shared expectations about appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. They shape behavior by defining what is considered legitimate, by creating social rewards for compliance and costs (such as shame or reputational damage) for violations, and by becoming internalized so that actors follow them without calculating.

For example, the nuclear taboo has made leaders reluctant to use nuclear weapons even when doing so might offer a military advantage, because use would carry enormous moral and diplomatic costs. At the individual level, officials and leaders internalize such norms as part of their sense of what is acceptable.

Logic of consequences vs. logic of appropriateness

The logic of consequences (associated with rationalist theories like realism and liberalism) holds that actors weigh costs and benefits and choose the action that best serves their interests. behavior is driven by calculation of outcomes

The logic of appropriateness (associated with constructivism, and developed by March and Olsen) holds that actors ask, "What does someone like me do in a situation like this?" and follow rules tied to their identity and role. behavior is driven by rules, roles, and identity.

How shared perceptions of affinity or hostility shape politics

How states perceive each other affects whether the same material capabilities are seen as threatening or harmless. Britain's nuclear arsenal worries the United States far less than a much smaller Pakistani arsenal worries India, because the U.S. and UK see each other as friends with shared identity, values, and history, while India and Pakistan see each other as enemies. These perceptions shape alliance choices, trust, threat assessments, and willingness to cooperate. Hostile identities can sustain rivalry even without a change in material power, and friendly identities can sustain cooperation even when interests diverge.

Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy

Hobbesian culture: states see each other as enemies, so war is common and survival is uncertain.

Lockean culture: states see each other as rivals who accept each other's right to exist and follow basic rules like sovereignty, so conflict is limited and cooperation is possible but competitive

Kantian culture: states see each other as friends, resolve disputes peacefully, and act together against threats, as in a security community like Western Europe.

The key difference is the shift from enmity to rivalry to friendship.

Three levels of analysis and why they matter

The three levels are the individual level (leaders' beliefs, personalities, and decisions), the state or domestic level (regime type, bureaucracies, interest groups, public opinion), and the system level (the distribution of power and structure of the international system).

Distinguishing among them helps identify where the causes of an outcome lie and prevents mixing up different kinds of explanation. It also lets analysts compare what each level explains, since a war might be explained by a leader's ambition, domestic politics, or the balance of power. Using several levels together usually produces a fuller account.

How structural realists like Waltz explain state behavior

Waltz argues that the structure of the international system, especially anarchy and the distribution of capabilities, shapes state behavior more than the characteristics of individual states or leaders. Because there is no higher authority, states must rely on self-help and worry about survival. Structure pressures them to behave similarly, for example by balancing against powerful states, whatever their regime type or leadership. States that fail to adapt to these pressures are punished or eliminated through a process of socialization and competition. Changes in outcomes are explained mainly by changes in the number of great powers (polarity), not by changes in unit-level traits.

How individual-level factors offer different insights

Individual-level analysis looks at leaders' beliefs, personalities, risk attitudes, and misperceptions, which can explain specific choices such as why a particular leader chose war or accommodation. It also helps explain variation, surprises, and cases where states behave contrary to structural expectations. For example, two leaders facing the same balance of power might respond very differently depending on how they perceive threats or tolerate risk.

The main debate about whether leaders matter

One position holds that leaders matter little, because structural forces, domestic institutions, and bureaucratic constraints narrow their choices and would push any leader toward similar decisions.

The opposing position holds that leaders matter substantially, because their preferences, beliefs, skills, and decisions can alter outcomes, especially in uncertain situations or where power is concentrated.

Jervis's three reasons leaders might not matter as much as assumed

First, leaders operate within constraints from the international system, domestic politics, and institutions, which limit the range of feasible choices. (median voter appeal)

Second, leaders are selected and socialized, so those who reach the top tend to share similar views and would often have made similar choices.

Third, leaders are often replaceable in the sense that other plausible leaders in the same position would have faced the same pressures and incentives and responded in broadly similar ways.

Together these suggest that apparent leader effects may be overstated. Jervis also notes that attributing outcomes to leaders is a common bias, since people like personal explanations.

Ways leaders could matter

Leaders may matter through their preferences, since goals such as expansion or restraint differ among individuals. They can matter through personality and beliefs, which shape risk tolerance, perceptions of threats, and responses to crises. They can also matter through political skill, such as building coalitions, persuading publics, or negotiating deals that others could not.

Why counterfactuals are difficult to evaluate

We can only observe what actually happened, so we cannot rerun history with a different leader to check what would have occurred. It is hard to change one factor without also changing others, since a different leader would likely come with different advisers, circumstances, and paths to power. Disagreements about what would have happened often depend on untestable assumptions, and the plausibility of a counterfactual is subject to hindsight bias and analysts' prior theoretical commitments. As a result, claims about leader effects are difficult to confirm or refute decisively.

How the agent–structure debate connects to whether leaders matter

The agent–structure debate asks whether outcomes are better explained by the choices of actors (agents) or by the social and material structures that constrain and enable them. The question of whether leaders matter is a version of this debate, with leaders as agents and the international system and domestic institutions as structures.

Structural theories imply that leaders have limited influence because structure shapes their options. Agent-centered views stress that leaders' choices can change outcomes and even reshape structures.