PH300: Aristotle Exam

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109 Terms

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Katagorein

Originally a legal term meaning "to accuse"; later "to predicate X of S" (attribute a property to a subject). About things, not words

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Copula

The verb "to be" linking subject and predicate (Gina IS smart)

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Predication (Aristotle's view)

Language is a window to reality: "the leaf is red" means a leaf exists and redness exists

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Secondary qualities

Qualities depending on perception (color, heat). Moderns say not real; Aristotle says they are real (heat exists independent of my feeling it)

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Substance

A unit of being; the anchor of predication (to imagine "green" you imagine a thing that is green)

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Primary substance

The individual (Socrates, Gina); the most real kind of thing

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Ontological

Related to being; the study of what is / reality

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Ontologically prior

The category of reality that is most real (Socrates is prior to "human," which is prior to "animal")

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Generality and reality

The more general the category, the less real and less informative (individual > species > genus)

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Categories

The "elements of predication"

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Aristotle vs. modern view of reality

Moderns say atoms are real and persons aren't; Aristotle says a person is a unit and a reality

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Natural vs. non-natural

Natural = earth, water, fire, air and what they make up; non-natural = products of human making

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Materialism

Everything is made of the same stuff (Democritus: all atoms). Aristotle disagrees

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Form over matter (cat vs. dog)

Nearly identical chemically, yet totally different animals, so form matters more than matter

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Formal cause

What is it?

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Material cause

What is it made of?

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Efficient cause

What moved it / made it?

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Final cause (telos)

What is it for?

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Teleology

Assuming things have a purpose; Aristotle thinks it is built into nature and is the best explanation of life; moderns object

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Psuche (psyche)

Soul; the only difference between a living and dead person. Not the modern religious sense

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Life as unity

Being alive is being held together; death is literally falling apart (decomposition)

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Potentiality (power)

(1) Capacity to be acted upon / change; (2) active capacity to effect change in others or oneself

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Actuality

The realization of a potentiality (bronze is a statue in potentiality; the statue is the actuality)

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Activity (act)

The active realization of a power (the act of seeing, thinking)

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Natural body

A substance; compound of matter (potentiality/substrate) and form (actuality)

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Soul (definition)

The actuality of a potentially living natural body; the form of the body as "essence," not "shape"

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Soul and teleology

Body's organization exists for staying alive and reproducing; without soul it falls apart

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Soul separable from body?

No, except possibly the active intellect

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Soul as cause (3 ways)

(1) Substance/being-what-it-is of the body; (2) source of motion; (3) final cause (telos) of the body

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Perceptive soul

Present in all animals (all have at least touch); in mobile animals also responsible for locomotion

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Animal capacities

Imagination/appearance and desire (driven by pleasure and pain)

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Perception vs. appearance

Contrary to appearances, perceptions are always true

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Faculty of desire

Comes with perception; includes appetite, emotion, and wish

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Potential (passive) intellect

Like a blank writing tablet; receives information from sense perception; not mixed with body; becomes what it grasps; never damaged by excess of understanding; perishable

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Active intellect

Actualizes the potential contents of passive intellect; alone eternal and separable from body; unclear if divine or part of the human mind

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Unmoved mover (De Anima)

The goal (telos) of an action, a good we want to attain

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Moved mover

The desiring faculty of the soul

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What moves us?

Desire + intellect. Desire can move alone (animals); intellect alone cannot move us; intellect reasons about goals and devises plans

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Nicomachean Ethics I.1

Every action, knowledge, and inquiry aims at some good

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Two kinds of activities

Those with an end external to them vs. those that are ends in themselves

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Chief good argument (I.2)

There must be an end chosen for itself, or else infinite regress/circularity makes desire empty and vain

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Problem with chief good argument

Missing premise: could be a plurality of ends chosen for themselves rather than one chief good

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Politics as architectonic

Political science aims at the human good (same for city and individual), so ethics is a political inquiry

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Method of ethics (I.3)

Precision should fit the subject; human action lacks natural regularity, so the account is only "in outline"

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Goal of the Ethics

Action, not knowledge; so the young and the acratic are not the right audience

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Knowable to us vs. knowable simpliciter

Ethics starts from what is knowable to us (obvious phenomena); asks why things are good/bad, not whether

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Well brought up reader

Needed so reader already has the intuitive sense of good/bad as a starting point

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Endoxa

Reputable opinions: what the majority thinks, what predecessors think, what authorities think

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Endoxa on the good

Most agree it is eudaimonia (living and acting well)

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Why not pleasure

Life of cattle

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Why not honor

People want honor as reward for virtue, so virtue is more important

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Why not virtue alone

One has virtue when asleep or inactive or suffering misfortune, but wouldn't call that eudaimonia

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Why not money

Wanted for the sake of something else

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Eudaimonia (I.7)

Complete end, always desirable in itself, never for something else; all other goods (honor, self-sufficiency) are for its sake

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Ergon (function)

The thing that defines a thing; for humans it is rational activity (not life, shared with plants; not perception, shared with animals)

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Logos

Speech/language, or reason/thought

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Definition of happiness

Activity of the soul in accordance with virtue/reason in a complete life

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Happiness is a doing, not a feeling

Aristotle stresses activity over state or feeling

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Goods of soul, body, external goods (I.8)

People disagree, since each view captures part of the truth about happiness

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Aristotle on pleasure in happiness

Partially agrees: virtuous actions are themselves pleasurable to the excellent person

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Aristotle on external goods (I.8-9)

Necessary as tools/conditions for action; lacking them stains happiness. Virtue comes from learning and training, not chance

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Rational vs. non-rational soul (I.13)

Non-rational has (i) nutrition/growth (not human excellence) and (ii) part that can listen to and obey reason

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Intellectual virtues

Belong to the part with reason itself; acquired by learning (mathematics, science, ethics)

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Character (moral) virtues

Belong to the non-rational part that obeys reason; acquired by habituation

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Habituation

Virtue through repeated action; good actions build good dispositions, bad actions bad ones

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Hexis

Stable disposition or state of the soul

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Virtue and excess/deficiency

Dispositions are ruined by excess and deficiency and grow through correct measure

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Pleasure and pain as sign of character (II.3)

The virtuous person enjoys doing virtuous actions; must be trained since childhood to enjoy and dislike the right things

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Virtue and pathos

Virtue isn't the absence of feeling; it is feeling the right thing at the right time, way, and circumstance

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Three objects of choice (II.3)

Fine/shameful, advantageous/damaging, pleasant/painful (pleasure is hardest to fight since it is ingrained from childhood)

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Crafts vs. virtues (II.4)

Craft: outcome matters. Virtue: state of agent matters (knows what he does, decides it, acts from firm unchanging disposition)

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Just action vs. just person

Doing just acts the way a just person does them; mere talk doesn't produce excellence

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Feelings, capacities, states (II.5)

Virtues are none of the first two: not feelings (no praise/blame, no decision involved) and not capacities (those are natural)

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Virtue is a state (II.6)

A state by which one is excellent and performs one's function well

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Doctrine of the mean (intermediate)

Virtue aims at the intermediate between excess and deficiency, relative to us; one way to get it right, many to go wrong

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Objective vs. subjective mean

Objective = arithmetical middle; subjective = intermediate relative to us

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Actions with no mean

Some actions are simply bad (or good) and allow no intermediate

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Definition of virtue (II.6)

State issuing in decisions, depending on the mean relative to us, and on rational prescription

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Involuntary action (III.1)

Done by force or by ignorance

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Involuntary by force

Origin is external and the agent contributes nothing, merely undergoes it

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Involuntary by ignorance

Not knowing particulars: who, what, in relation to what, with what, for what, how

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Acting by vs. in ignorance

Acting in ignorance (drunk, drugs, blind anger, ignorance of moral rules) is NOT involuntary and reveals a character deficit

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Condition for involuntary by ignorance

Agent ought to feel regret or remorse

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Appetite and voluntariness

Appetite-driven actions are voluntary (bring pleasure); involuntary ones bring distress

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Voluntary action

Principle of action is in the agent, who knows the particulars; agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy

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Mixed actions

Seem both voluntary and involuntary (done under coercion but chosen); Aristotle says they are voluntary

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Mixed action features

Normally shameful act you'd never choose otherwise, but judged choiceworthy given circumstances with no better alternatives

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Decision (prohairesis) (III.2)

Voluntary, but not all voluntary things are decisions (children, animals, and spur-of-the-moment acts are voluntary without decision)

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Decision vs. wish

Decision: possible things that depend on us, about means. Wish: can be for impossible things, about ends

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Decision vs. belief

Decision concerns what depends on us and pursuit/avoidance; belief concerns anything and truth/falsity; one can have good beliefs and be a bad person

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Deliberation (III.3)

About things that depend on us, are possible, and have indeterminate outcomes; about means, not ends

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What we don't deliberate about

Eternal things, chance, precise knowledge, other communities' affairs, already given facts

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Wish + deliberation

Equals decision

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Wish (III.4)

Desire for an end; Aristotle says the object is the real good, but what appears good varies (Protagoras says only apparent good exists)

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Excellent man and the good

What appears good to him coincides with what is truly good; the many mistake the pleasant for the good

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Vice is voluntary (III.5)

We are responsible for forming our character; once fixed, can't stop being bad by wishing; also responsible for mistaking apparent good for real good

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Sophia (VI.7)

Wisdom; two senses: craft skill and general wisdom (most precise knowledge: scientific knowledge of the highest objects plus understanding of first principles)

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Sophia vs. phronesis

Sophia: universals, highest objects (universe). Phronesis: universals and particulars, human affairs

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Why phronesis is "inferior" but needed

Humans aren't the highest objects; phronesis is inferior knowledge but more necessary to us