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Katagorein
Originally a legal term meaning "to accuse"; later "to predicate X of S" (attribute a property to a subject). About things, not words
Copula
The verb "to be" linking subject and predicate (Gina IS smart)
Predication (Aristotle's view)
Language is a window to reality: "the leaf is red" means a leaf exists and redness exists
Secondary qualities
Qualities depending on perception (color, heat). Moderns say not real; Aristotle says they are real (heat exists independent of my feeling it)
Substance
A unit of being; the anchor of predication (to imagine "green" you imagine a thing that is green)
Primary substance
The individual (Socrates, Gina); the most real kind of thing
Ontological
Related to being; the study of what is / reality
Ontologically prior
The category of reality that is most real (Socrates is prior to "human," which is prior to "animal")
Generality and reality
The more general the category, the less real and less informative (individual > species > genus)
Categories
The "elements of predication"
Aristotle vs. modern view of reality
Moderns say atoms are real and persons aren't; Aristotle says a person is a unit and a reality
Natural vs. non-natural
Natural = earth, water, fire, air and what they make up; non-natural = products of human making
Materialism
Everything is made of the same stuff (Democritus: all atoms). Aristotle disagrees
Form over matter (cat vs. dog)
Nearly identical chemically, yet totally different animals, so form matters more than matter
Formal cause
What is it?
Material cause
What is it made of?
Efficient cause
What moved it / made it?
Final cause (telos)
What is it for?
Teleology
Assuming things have a purpose; Aristotle thinks it is built into nature and is the best explanation of life; moderns object
Psuche (psyche)
Soul; the only difference between a living and dead person. Not the modern religious sense
Life as unity
Being alive is being held together; death is literally falling apart (decomposition)
Potentiality (power)
(1) Capacity to be acted upon / change; (2) active capacity to effect change in others or oneself
Actuality
The realization of a potentiality (bronze is a statue in potentiality; the statue is the actuality)
Activity (act)
The active realization of a power (the act of seeing, thinking)
Natural body
A substance; compound of matter (potentiality/substrate) and form (actuality)
Soul (definition)
The actuality of a potentially living natural body; the form of the body as "essence," not "shape"
Soul and teleology
Body's organization exists for staying alive and reproducing; without soul it falls apart
Soul separable from body?
No, except possibly the active intellect
Soul as cause (3 ways)
(1) Substance/being-what-it-is of the body; (2) source of motion; (3) final cause (telos) of the body
Perceptive soul
Present in all animals (all have at least touch); in mobile animals also responsible for locomotion
Animal capacities
Imagination/appearance and desire (driven by pleasure and pain)
Perception vs. appearance
Contrary to appearances, perceptions are always true
Faculty of desire
Comes with perception; includes appetite, emotion, and wish
Potential (passive) intellect
Like a blank writing tablet; receives information from sense perception; not mixed with body; becomes what it grasps; never damaged by excess of understanding; perishable
Active intellect
Actualizes the potential contents of passive intellect; alone eternal and separable from body; unclear if divine or part of the human mind
Unmoved mover (De Anima)
The goal (telos) of an action, a good we want to attain
Moved mover
The desiring faculty of the soul
What moves us?
Desire + intellect. Desire can move alone (animals); intellect alone cannot move us; intellect reasons about goals and devises plans
Nicomachean Ethics I.1
Every action, knowledge, and inquiry aims at some good
Two kinds of activities
Those with an end external to them vs. those that are ends in themselves
Chief good argument (I.2)
There must be an end chosen for itself, or else infinite regress/circularity makes desire empty and vain
Problem with chief good argument
Missing premise: could be a plurality of ends chosen for themselves rather than one chief good
Politics as architectonic
Political science aims at the human good (same for city and individual), so ethics is a political inquiry
Method of ethics (I.3)
Precision should fit the subject; human action lacks natural regularity, so the account is only "in outline"
Goal of the Ethics
Action, not knowledge; so the young and the acratic are not the right audience
Knowable to us vs. knowable simpliciter
Ethics starts from what is knowable to us (obvious phenomena); asks why things are good/bad, not whether
Well brought up reader
Needed so reader already has the intuitive sense of good/bad as a starting point
Endoxa
Reputable opinions: what the majority thinks, what predecessors think, what authorities think
Endoxa on the good
Most agree it is eudaimonia (living and acting well)
Why not pleasure
Life of cattle
Why not honor
People want honor as reward for virtue, so virtue is more important
Why not virtue alone
One has virtue when asleep or inactive or suffering misfortune, but wouldn't call that eudaimonia
Why not money
Wanted for the sake of something else
Eudaimonia (I.7)
Complete end, always desirable in itself, never for something else; all other goods (honor, self-sufficiency) are for its sake
Ergon (function)
The thing that defines a thing; for humans it is rational activity (not life, shared with plants; not perception, shared with animals)
Logos
Speech/language, or reason/thought
Definition of happiness
Activity of the soul in accordance with virtue/reason in a complete life
Happiness is a doing, not a feeling
Aristotle stresses activity over state or feeling
Goods of soul, body, external goods (I.8)
People disagree, since each view captures part of the truth about happiness
Aristotle on pleasure in happiness
Partially agrees: virtuous actions are themselves pleasurable to the excellent person
Aristotle on external goods (I.8-9)
Necessary as tools/conditions for action; lacking them stains happiness. Virtue comes from learning and training, not chance
Rational vs. non-rational soul (I.13)
Non-rational has (i) nutrition/growth (not human excellence) and (ii) part that can listen to and obey reason
Intellectual virtues
Belong to the part with reason itself; acquired by learning (mathematics, science, ethics)
Character (moral) virtues
Belong to the non-rational part that obeys reason; acquired by habituation
Habituation
Virtue through repeated action; good actions build good dispositions, bad actions bad ones
Hexis
Stable disposition or state of the soul
Virtue and excess/deficiency
Dispositions are ruined by excess and deficiency and grow through correct measure
Pleasure and pain as sign of character (II.3)
The virtuous person enjoys doing virtuous actions; must be trained since childhood to enjoy and dislike the right things
Virtue and pathos
Virtue isn't the absence of feeling; it is feeling the right thing at the right time, way, and circumstance
Three objects of choice (II.3)
Fine/shameful, advantageous/damaging, pleasant/painful (pleasure is hardest to fight since it is ingrained from childhood)
Crafts vs. virtues (II.4)
Craft: outcome matters. Virtue: state of agent matters (knows what he does, decides it, acts from firm unchanging disposition)
Just action vs. just person
Doing just acts the way a just person does them; mere talk doesn't produce excellence
Feelings, capacities, states (II.5)
Virtues are none of the first two: not feelings (no praise/blame, no decision involved) and not capacities (those are natural)
Virtue is a state (II.6)
A state by which one is excellent and performs one's function well
Doctrine of the mean (intermediate)
Virtue aims at the intermediate between excess and deficiency, relative to us; one way to get it right, many to go wrong
Objective vs. subjective mean
Objective = arithmetical middle; subjective = intermediate relative to us
Actions with no mean
Some actions are simply bad (or good) and allow no intermediate
Definition of virtue (II.6)
State issuing in decisions, depending on the mean relative to us, and on rational prescription
Involuntary action (III.1)
Done by force or by ignorance
Involuntary by force
Origin is external and the agent contributes nothing, merely undergoes it
Involuntary by ignorance
Not knowing particulars: who, what, in relation to what, with what, for what, how
Acting by vs. in ignorance
Acting in ignorance (drunk, drugs, blind anger, ignorance of moral rules) is NOT involuntary and reveals a character deficit
Condition for involuntary by ignorance
Agent ought to feel regret or remorse
Appetite and voluntariness
Appetite-driven actions are voluntary (bring pleasure); involuntary ones bring distress
Voluntary action
Principle of action is in the agent, who knows the particulars; agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy
Mixed actions
Seem both voluntary and involuntary (done under coercion but chosen); Aristotle says they are voluntary
Mixed action features
Normally shameful act you'd never choose otherwise, but judged choiceworthy given circumstances with no better alternatives
Decision (prohairesis) (III.2)
Voluntary, but not all voluntary things are decisions (children, animals, and spur-of-the-moment acts are voluntary without decision)
Decision vs. wish
Decision: possible things that depend on us, about means. Wish: can be for impossible things, about ends
Decision vs. belief
Decision concerns what depends on us and pursuit/avoidance; belief concerns anything and truth/falsity; one can have good beliefs and be a bad person
Deliberation (III.3)
About things that depend on us, are possible, and have indeterminate outcomes; about means, not ends
What we don't deliberate about
Eternal things, chance, precise knowledge, other communities' affairs, already given facts
Wish + deliberation
Equals decision
Wish (III.4)
Desire for an end; Aristotle says the object is the real good, but what appears good varies (Protagoras says only apparent good exists)
Excellent man and the good
What appears good to him coincides with what is truly good; the many mistake the pleasant for the good
Vice is voluntary (III.5)
We are responsible for forming our character; once fixed, can't stop being bad by wishing; also responsible for mistaking apparent good for real good
Sophia (VI.7)
Wisdom; two senses: craft skill and general wisdom (most precise knowledge: scientific knowledge of the highest objects plus understanding of first principles)
Sophia vs. phronesis
Sophia: universals, highest objects (universe). Phronesis: universals and particulars, human affairs
Why phronesis is "inferior" but needed
Humans aren't the highest objects; phronesis is inferior knowledge but more necessary to us