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Exam 3
The public benefit corp
Forming as a public benefit corp allows a company to promote the interests of a corp’s mission rather than just shareholders.
A fear is that a corporation may now harm shareholders.
So, investors and S/Hs must weight their priorities.
So what’s a proxy fight?
Most S/Hs of large corporations DON’T attend the annual meeting where board elections are held.
A S/H is instead given a “proxy” to vote online or via mail-in. But many investors, who are passive, neglect to vote their proxies.
A proxy fight occurs when an activist investor seeks to convince other S/Hs to vote their proxies in the activist’s preferred way (e.g., new directors).
The result is that an activist can take control of a corp, or effectuate other plans, via a proxy fight.
The more shares owned by the activist, the more likely that the proxy fight will be successful (knowing that many people won’t vote at all).
Rudd v. Brown - Facts
Outerwall Inc. operates services like Coinstar and Redbox. With declining sales, an activist investor (“Engaged”) emerged with a reputation of forcing change. It became Outerwall’s second largest shareholder and filed a 13D statement (more to come on this).
The activist sent a letter to shareholder stating that: “[T]he Board MUST publicly announce a parallel process to explore strategic alternatives for the entire business.” … “If the Board continues to fail to act in the best interests of the shareholders, we will give shareholders the opportunity to hold the Board accountable at the upcoming annual meeting by seeking to replace multiple directors.”
The Board hired Morgan Stanley to find an acquiror, engaging 55 suitors.
Then the board struck a “cooperation agreement” with Engaged: “Engaged agreed not to launch a proxy fight and to support Outerwall's Board nominees at the upcoming stockholder meeting in exchange for the ability to appoint one Board member effective immediately.” And later to expand the board and gain more board seats.
The Board agreed to sell to Apollo.
Engaged sues the Board, stating that the board didn’t get enough value for Outerwall. The deal occurred pretty quickly.
Rudd v. Brown - Holding
How did Engaged get enough info to assert that the directors breached their duty?
DGCL 220
Did the directors breach the duty of care?
The Certificate of Incorporation includes a 102(b)(7) provision. Therefore, plaintiffs must show disloyalty.
Were the directors required to get close to top dollar?
Yes, Revlon duties had kicked in.
BJR? Entire Fairness? Or Unocal?
Does a looming proxy fight mean that the directors were conflicted
Delaware courts have so far refused to hold that a looming proxy fight means that directors are always conflicted. Caseby-case analysis.
In fact, no evidence that the directors acted without loyalty
Holding: BJR. The directors win. No breaches of fiduciary duties.
Big Question: Why did the plaintiffs think that a proxy contest, alone, was enough to create a conflict of interest?
In re Edgio - Facts, Issue, and Court
Facts: a company was speculated to be a “prime target” for an activist investor, though no activist investor has yet to emerge. Then company then sold 35% of one of its wings to an acquiror; one term of the deal was that the acquiror’s share could never been transferred to a company on the list of the “Top 50 activist investors.” Shareholders voted to approve the sale.
Lawsuit: A minority shareholder alleged a breach of loyalty
Issue?
Did the restriction of sales to an activist investor create a conflict of interest?
BJR, Entire Fairness, or Unocal?
Court:
Unocal.
Even though there was no actual current threat, it seems like the restricted list served as a defensive measure. And it entrenches the board.
Early stage litigation; no conclusion yet.
Non-passive Shareholders Recap
Activist investors:
Typically, large shareholders who bargain directly with management, or even go through the media, to effectuate change.
See Exxon v. Arjuna Capital where Arjuna Capital endeavors to putforth S/H votes on ESG. And Exxon won’t stop suing Arjuna Capital.
Private Equity
Firms that buy large stakes of corporations
PE uses debt, using the acquired corporation as collateral (the leveraged buyout).
PE will then strip the corporation of inefficiencies, sell off assets, and seek to make the corporation “leaner”
A typical target of PE is an underperforming, inefficient corporation that could potentially be flipped at a profit after overhauling it.
This can involve selling assets and laying off employees
Many investments tank, though, but PE is less exposed to liability by funding the purchase with debt.
The goal is typically short-term, focused on flipping the corporation as opposed to running a more viable company indefinitely.
The SEC’s Role
The Securities and Exchange Commission is the federal agency in charge of regulating the trade of securities such as stock.
The new rule: if an investor acquires 5% or more of a corporation, it must file a schedule 13D within 5 days if the investor intends to take over/control the corporation. A passive investor files a 13G form..
The shrinking of time makes it more difficult for an activist investor to “quietly” buy up shares.
After all, by alerting other shareholders that you, as an activist s/h, are attempting to buy shares to control the firm, it could either raise the price of shares or encourage S/Hs not to sell to you.
Article: A hedge fund bought a significant stake in Wausau Paper. Instead of getting into a proxy battle with the Hedge Fund, Wausau Paper agreed to give the hedge fund 2 board sets. And then 2 more. Eventually, the hedge fund wrested control from Wausau’s management. It was alleged that the Hedge Fund sought for Wausau to pay dividends, buyback shares, and otherwise engage in short-term decisions rendering no benefit to the corporation (whereas Wausau could have reinvested in the corporation). Allegedly, the new directors were “working against” the corp. Wausau shut down, leaving the county in debt and 450 people unemployed.
Thus, the SEC’s rule is supposed to make it more difficult for activist investors to gain significant control/leverage over corporations.
10b Securities Fraud
Stock is considered a security.
Rules 10(b) and 10b-5
makes it illegal to defraud ANY person using the mails or any instrument of interstate commerce or any national exchange Known as the anti-fraud provisions
Requires proof of the defendant’s intent to deceive with respect to a material statement
Applies to ALL securities, whether registered or not, as long as interstate commerce is involved
The elements of the cause of action are: 1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation
Fraud on the Market Theory:
Problem: few investors rely on fraudulent statements.
Based on the efficient markets hypothesis. If fraudulent or misleading statements alter a stock’s price, then investors have presumptively relied on the deception.
Traditional Fraud and the Fyre Festival
Facts: Billy McFarland is the organizer of a proposed festival in the Bahamas. His co-planner, who’s not involved in management, is Ja Rule. At least 6-month before the festival, it became clear that the festival would be impossible. It was also underfunded. To raise money, McFarland advertised musical acts which were not contracted to appear. He paid Instagram influencers to sell the Festival. He also provided misleading financial statements to attract more investments. Ja Rule tweeted the day before the festival: “The stage is set!!! In less than 24 hours, the first annual Fyre Festival begins. #festivallife,” and also: “‘FOMO – inducing’ and one thousand times better than Coachella,”
McFarland: Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud. Misleading statements meant to extract something of value from third parties using the internet
Ja Rule’s liability? (In Re: Fyre Festival)
Civil?
No one RELIED on the statement.
Piercing the Corporate Veil?
No, abided by corporate formalities and was not engaged in the fraud.
Halliburton v. EPJ Fund, Inc. - Facts and Issue
Facts: Halliburton made material misstatements meant to inflate the company’s stock price. When Halliburton corrected its statements, its stock price tanked and investors lost money. EPJ sought to certify a “class action” lawsuit, which is a lawsuit brought by a lead plaintiff (EPJ) and thousands of passive plaintiffs who were similarly harmed. This allows injured people to sue without taking an active role or fronting money; they just become part of the class.
Halliburton: It’s inappropriate to include the passive investors/plaintiffs because none of them relied on the misstatements. Under common law fraud, a person must have detrimentally relied on a misstatement to bring a claim; here, none of the investors had ever heard the misstatements, acted upon the misstatements, or changed their behavior.
EPJ: The presumption under Basic v. Levinson, promoting the “fraud on the market theory,” creates a “constructive” reliance and thus fraud.
Issue: Should the court overrule Basic, given its controversial underpinning? In other words, should courts require ACTUAL reliance on misstatements to sustain a securities fraud claim. This would notably prevent passive investors from ever suing for securities fraud.
Halliburton v. EPJ Fund, Inc. - Court
Court:
The presumption in Basic is that material statements affect a corp’s stock price. When people buy or sell stock, they’re assessing the price. So if misstatements have altered a corp’s stock price, then investors have effectively relied on the misstatements in their decision making.
Key is the efficient market hypothesis that information is incorporated into a stock’s price.
Significant evidence suggests this theory is “junk science” or less predicative than courts assume.
Halliburton v. EPJ Fund, Inc. - Ruling and Holding
Ruling:
No reason to overrule Basic
But a plaintiff can introduce evidence showing that their misstatements had no impact on their stock’s price. If there’s no impact, then investors didn’t rely on the misrepresentations.
More than 25 years ago, we held that plaintiffs could satisfy the reliance element of the Rule 10b–5 cause of action by invoking a presumption that a public, material misrepresentation will distort the price of stock traded in an efficient market, and that anyone who purchases the stock at the market price may be considered to have done so in reliance on the misrepresentation. We adhere to that decision and decline to modify the prerequisites for invoking the presumption of reliance. But to maintain the consistency of the presumption with the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, defendants must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.
Holding: Fraud on the market is still good law.
Grae v. Corrections Corp of America - Facts and Issue
Facts: CCA operates private prisons with a lengthy history of prisoner abuse allegations. An OIG report from the DOJ detailed the problems in private prisons, including CCA’s—the stock price was unaffected. Then AG Yates released a report stating that the US would phase out private prisons, causing CCA’s stock to drop. Investors filed a class action due to CCA’s statements about the success of private prisons.
Class Action Problems with securities fraud claims:
Few investors have relied on misstatements.
Thus Fraud-on-the-Market: The PRESUMPTION that investors have relied on fraud when they bought at a price affected by the fraudulent statements.
Issue: Can the class action Investors rely on the Fraud on the Market theory, or must they individually prove reliance on the misstatements?
Grae v. Corrections Corp of America - Court and Holding
Rebut the presumption?
CCA claimed that misstatements never statistically caused CCA’s stock price to increase
But: Perhaps misstatements can perpetuate a misperception keeping prices at an artificial and incorrect equilibrium
Court:
The DOJ’s report didn’t affect the price which suggests that investors knew the problems of private prisons. The Yates Memo didn’t shed new light on the problem but rather signaled a policy shift, affecting prices.
ruling: a class action may not rely on fraud on the market: “The court stresses that this ruling is not, in any way, based on a determination that CoreCivic and its executives were forthright in their statements about the quality of their facilities. Nor should the court's ruling be read to rule out the possibility that members of the public, including shareholders, may have been misled by the defendants and harmed as a result. Rather, CoreCivic has merely shown that, based on the Supreme Court's current case law regarding reliance in securities fraud cases, the situation at issue here is one for which reliance must be shown individually, rather than collectively.”
Holding: Investors must individually prove reliance since the stock price didn’t seem to be affected
Section 16 of the 1934 ACT
Insider Transactions:
An insider owns more than 10% of any security and is a fiduciary (e.g., director or an officer) of the issuer of the security
Insiders must register a statement of how much interest in the corp they own. Must file changes in interest w/in days of the transaction
Meant to prevent insiders from profiting off non-public info
The goal is “fairness” in that insiders would enjoy an unfair investing advantage relative to regular people.
“Short swing profits” are presumed illegal--profits made w/in 6 months of transaction. One must actually realize the profits
“unlike the required proof of intent to deceive under 10(b), the short swing profits rule of section 16 does not depend on any misuse of information. In other words, short-swing profits by insiders, regardless of state of mind, are absolutely prohibited”
Misappropriation Theory: An outsider who is a fiduciary of the principle uses inside information to exchange securities in a manner profiting off the principle’s information. This is considered a deception of the principle.
Tipper/tippee
Users of nonpublic information are treated as insiders if one is a ”Tippee” which is a person who learns of nonpublic information from an insider.
An illegal transaction will typically require the Tipper to receive a benefit (normally it’s economic) from “selling” or otherwise transferring the information.
A Tippee is liable because the “Tipper” cannot do indirectly what one cannot directly; here, profit off of the non-public information. The Tipper tips the Tippee.
If the Tipper communicated the info for reasons OTHER than (financial) gain, then the tipper and tippee are not liable. This essentially requires a breach of fiduciary duties by the Tipper (personal gain over corp interests).
U.S. v. Martoma
Facts: Martoma traded securities of a pharma company in the business of making Alzheimer’s drugs. Martoma obtained info from a doctor (his close personal friend) employed by the pharma companies about the drugs’ trial—the doctor had a contractual duty to keep the information a secret. No money exchanged hands between Martoma and the doc. Martoma sold his positions before the information became public, netting him $80 million.
Issue:
Did the doctor receive a benefit for the information
More specifically, can their friendship alone create a “benefit”
Court:
We think a jury can often infer that a corporate insider receives a personal benefit (i.e., breaches his fiduciary duty) from deliberately disclosing valuable, confidential information without a corporate purpose and with the expectation that the tippee will trade on it.
Ruling: The close personal relationship of the parties creates a likelihood of personal benefit from tipping the trader
Holding: Guilty of insider trading. The close friendship created enough of a benefit to establish a tipper/tippee relationship.