Cog Sci Quiz 2

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87 Terms

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Turing Test (Imitation Game)
A behavioral test proposed by Alan Turing in 1950 for whether a machine is intelligent. A human interrogator talks to a machine and a human and tries to tell which is human
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Passing the Turing Test
If a machine wins the Imitation Game at least 30% of the time then we should conclude it is intelligent
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Who proposed the Turing Test and when
Alan Turing in 1950
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Turing's 1950 prediction
In about fifty years computers would play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator would have no more than a 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes
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Jones and Bergen (2025) result
When prompted to adopt a humanlike persona GPT-4.5 was judged to be the human 73% of the time in 5 minute Turing Test conversations
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LLMs tested by Jones and Bergen (2025)
ELIZA and GPT-4o and LLaMa-3.1-405B and GPT-4.5
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The consciousness objection
Machines are not intelligent because they do not have subjective experiences (they cannot truly feel pleasure or grief)
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Turing's response to the consciousness objection
We cannot be 100% certain other people are conscious but we infer it from their behavior. If a machine passes the test we would have the same evidence it is conscious so we should accept the test
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The originality objection
True intelligence requires genuine originality but everything a computer does is wholly determined by its program (Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate anything)
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Turing's replies to the originality objection
Human novelty may also be wholly determined by genes and experience. Programmers often cannot predict what a machine will do and machines surprise us (e.g. AlphaGo's surprising Go moves)
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Question for Turing about originality
Is surprisingness the same as originality?
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Universal decision procedure
Following a fully deterministic algorithm to decide mathematical questions (asked about by mathematicians in the 1930s)
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Turing Machine
A hypothetical idealized computing device that Turing used in 1936 to define what it means to follow an algorithm
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Ingredients of a Turing Machine
An infinite tape of discrete cells each holding one symbol and a read/write head and an alphabet of symbols and a set of instructions (machine table/program)
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Configuration (Turing Machine)
The current state and the symbol being scanned
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Automatic machine (a-machine)
A Turing machine runs on its program without external input (automatic) and its behavior is fully determined by its configuration and program (determinate)
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Automaticity
Running on the program without external input
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Determinacy
Behavior is fully determined by the current state and symbol and the program
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Church-Turing Thesis
Every effective computation (anything calculable by a clear step-by-step algorithm) can in principle be carried out by a Turing machine
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Algorithm (Turing's definition)
A procedure that can be executed by a Turing machine
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Computability
Can be computed by a Turing machine
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Turing's impact
The Turing Machine formalized and made precise notions like algorithm and computability
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Does a Turing Machine need to understand addition to do it
No. It just follows the machine table without understanding what addition is
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Weak AI
The claim that the computer is a powerful tool used to study the mind and simulate cognitive processes
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Strong AI
The claim that an appropriately programmed computer really is a mind that possesses real mental states
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Searle's position on Strong AI
There is no computer program such that running it is sufficient for the computer to be a mind. What is missing is semantic understanding
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Semantic meaning
The meaning of representations such as the objects and concepts they refer to
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Searle's Chinese Room
A monolingual English speaker in a room follows an English rulebook to match incoming Chinese character strings with outgoing ones. He mimics a fluent Chinese speaker without understanding Chinese
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Searle's Room analogy
The person in the room is like AI running a program and the rulebook is the computer program. The person lacks understanding of Chinese so AIs lack real understanding of the symbols they manipulate
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Upshot of the Chinese Room
Running a computer algorithm only requires manipulating symbols according to rules and does not require understanding their semantic meaning
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Why mental representations matter in the Chinese Room
Mental representations are about things but for the person in the room the Chinese characters are not about anything. They are just symbols
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The System Reply
The person does not understand Chinese but the whole system (person and rulebook and slips of paper) does
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Searle's response to the System Reply
Imagine the person memorizes the rulebook. They still would not understand Chinese so the system as a whole does not understand it
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Stats student analogy
A student who memorizes the steps to compute standard deviation can follow the algorithm without understanding the concept. A computer is like this student
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The Robot Reply
Attach a camera and limbs to the computer so it connects the word cat with real cats and can touch them. This should give it understanding of the word
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Searle's response to the Robot Reply
Camera images and sensory inputs are just more symbols added to the rulebook. The robot still only manipulates symbols without knowing their meaning
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Churchland and Churchland Objection (1990)
Searle's thought experiment relies on untutored intuition that the person does not understand and that intuition is unreliable because of the extremely slow processing speed in the room
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Churchland analogy for unreliable intuition
Waving a magnet in a dark room intuitively seems not to produce light but according to electromagnetic theory it does. Similarly processing 1000 sentences at once could change our intuition
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Searle's argument against Strong AI (premises)
P1 Intelligence requires semantic understanding. P2 No computer program running is sufficient for semantic understanding. C No computer program running is sufficient for intelligence
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Other factors Searle's argument allows intelligence to require
Factors beyond computation such as consciousness and free will
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Marr's three levels
Computational level (most abstract) and algorithmic level and implementational level (most concrete)
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Where cognitive architecture sits in Marr's levels
Between the algorithmic and implementational levels
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Cognitive architecture
The underlying infrastructure of an intelligent system (Langley et al. 2009). It identifies the basic operations available and how information is encoded and stored and retrieved (Pylyshyn 1999)
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Cognitive architecture vs knowledge
Architecture is the aspects of an agent that are constant over time and across domains (how the mind is structured). Knowledge is the contents being stored and processed which can change
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Building analogy for cognitive architecture
Permanent features (foundation and roof and room layout) are like architecture. Non-permanent features (furniture and decoration and appliances) are like knowledge
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Examples of elements of cognitive architecture
What types of memory the agent has (short-term and long-term) and what kinds of representations can be stored in them
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Example NOT in cognitive architecture
The contents of the agent's memory because they change over time
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Pylyshyn's (1999) question
For any pattern of cognitive behavior does it reveal a property of the mental machinery (architecture) or does it arise because of the information the machinery is using (knowledge)?
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Von Neumann architecture
The standard model of a computer's architecture
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ACT-R
An architecture of the human mind that is compared with the Von Neumann architecture of a computer
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Working memory
A type of memory that temporarily holds and manipulates a small amount of information for immediate use. It lasts 10-30 seconds without active rehearsal
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Miller's Magical Number (1956)
7 plus or minus 2 items in working memory
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Cowan's updated estimate (2010)
4 plus or minus 1 chunks
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Fixed information hypothesis
There is a fixed amount of information we can store in working memory
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Fixed slots hypothesis
There is a fixed number of slots in working memory but each unit can hold a varying amount of information. Miller's evidence supports this
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Prediction of fixed information vs fixed slots
Fixed information predicts that 839 234 175 118 is harder to store than 7 3 4 9. Fixed slots predicts they can be equally easy
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Chunking
A process through which small individual pieces of information are bound together to create a meaningful whole
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Why 839 234 175 118 is harder to store than 7 3 4 9
We cannot easily chunk the three-digit numbers so they do not fit into the slots
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Chunking letter example
N F L C I A F B I M T V is easier than a random 12 letters because it chunks into NFL and CIA and FBI and MTV
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Why working memory limits are architecture and not knowledge
The limit holds no matter what information you store
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Why cognitive architecture is between the algorithmic and implementational levels
Working memory limits restrict what algorithms the mind can run (such as limited parallel processing)
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Modularity
The idea that parts of the mind are organized into distinct modules rather than operating as one undifferentiated system
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Mental modules
Independent information-processing systems that specialize for certain functions
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Who proposed modularity
Jerry Fodor (1983) who taught at Rutgers 1988-2016
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Five features of a mental module
Fixed neural architecture and domain specificity and mandatory operation and limited central accessibility and informational encapsulation
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Does a module need every feature perfectly
No. It must exhibit most of them to some interesting extent and some features carry more weight than others
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Most important feature of modularity
Informational encapsulation
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Why the Müller-Lyer illusion motivates modules
We cannot change what we see with what we believe or know which supports a separate visual module (Hypothesis 2) over visual processing mixed with central cognition (Hypothesis 1)
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Hypothesis 1 of cognitive architecture
Sensory input goes through visual processing plus central cognition together to produce what we see
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Hypothesis 2 of cognitive architecture
Sensory input goes through a separate visual module to produce what we see and central cognition is separate
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Fixed neural architecture
A system implemented in neural circuitry that is (a) relatively limited in extent and (b) dedicated to that system and nothing else
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Fixed neural architecture example (vision)
Visual perception uses a specific pathway that does not perform other functions like audition or olfaction or general reasoning
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The where pathway
Visual pathway (green) for detecting motion and location
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The what pathway
Visual pathway (purple) for object identification
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Specialized areas in the what pathway
Face recognition (fusiform gyrus) and word recognition (visual word form area)
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Domain specificity
A module only computes over a certain type of input and only performs a restricted type of computation
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Domain specificity example (vision)
The visual system answers questions about color and shape and motion and whose face it is. It does not process sounds or smells or solve problems like 23+73
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Mandatory operation
The computations in a module are automatic so you cannot will yourself into not processing the stimulus
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Mandatory operation example
Beta movement. Color in neighboring locations creates the illusion of a moving object and you cannot stop seeing the motion once you look at the animation
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Limited central accessibility
We have conscious access to the outputs of a module's computations but not to the intermediate representations and computations that produced them
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Limited central accessibility example
We can recognize faces but we do not know what algorithm our mind uses to do it
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Informational encapsulation
The system has limited access to information in higher cognition
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Informational encapsulation example
Knowing the two Müller-Lyer lines are equal does not change your perception that the left one looks longer
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Informational encapsulation vs limited central accessibility
Encapsulation is restricted information flow from central cognition to the module. Limited central accessibility is restricted information flow from the module to central cognition
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Color constancy
The ability of the visual system to perceive the intrinsic color of an object as relatively stable even when the lighting intensity and spectral composition change
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How color constancy shows informational encapsulation
Knowing two blocks are the same color does not eliminate the illusion that one looks darker
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Checker-board illusion
An optical illusion published by Edward Adelson (MIT) in 1995 that shows the context-dependent nature of human color perception