POLI READING MAIN IDEAS

Samuels 2012, Comparative Politics ch. 1

Comparative politics should move "from opinion to explanation"; avoid arguments built on one case; correlation is not causation.

Use it for: Method; evaluating rival arguments in your counterargument paragraph.

Fukuyama 2004, "The Imperative of State-Building"

Weak states are the root of poverty, AIDS, terrorism and failed development. Separate scope (what the state does) from strength/capacity (how well it does it). Cutting scope often cut capacity too.

Defining state strength; critiquing the Washington Consensus.

Herbst 1990, "War and the State in Africa"

European states were built by war: war raised taxes (and kept them high afterward) and built nationalism. Africa gained independence without war and faces few external threats, so its states stay weak. Peace alone probably can't build them.

The bellicist model; why postcolonial African states are weak (geography, timing, colonialism).

Feinstein & Wimmer 2023, "Consent and Legitimacy"

Revised bellicose theory: wars build states only when (1) institutions let rulers bargain with and gain the consent of the ruled, (2) the population contributes soldiers and taxes, and (3) rulers are legitimized by nationalism or victory.

The "four conditions" in lecture 2.1 (threat, taxes, victory, consent); why war doesn't always build states.

Rodríguez-Franco 2015, "Internal Wars, Taxation, and State Building"

Against the consensus that civil war means state failure: internal wars can build tax capacity when they unite elites behind the state. That happens when elites (1) feel threatened, (2) depend on the state for protection, and (3) feel patriotic. Insurgents' own taxing can undercut it.

The contentious path to state-building; Colombia as a least-likely success.

Sachs, Mellinger & Gallup 2001, "The Geography of Poverty and Wealth"

Geography shapes development: tropical climates (disease, poor soils, low farm yields) and distance from coasts and navigable rivers (transport costs) keep countries poor.

The geography explanation; contrast with institutions.

Acemoglu & Robinson 2012, Why Nations Fail ch. 3

Countries differ in wealth because of institutions. Inclusive political institutions sustain inclusive economic ones (property rights, open markets), which produce prosperity. Extractive institutions can produce growth for a while, but it doesn't last. The institutions explanation; Korea as a method-of-difference case.

Sachs 2012, "Government, Geography, and Growth" (review of A&R)

A&R overstate inclusive political institutions. Geography, technology diffusion and good governance (even by autocracies) matter too.

Counterargument to Acemoglu & Robinson.

Weber, The Protestant Ethic (lecture)

Protestant ascetic work and frugality produced the "spirit of capitalism."

The cultural explanation; critique with South Korea (Confucian) and Catholic growth.

Valenzuela & Valenzuela 1978

Compares modernization theory (internal, traditional to modern, the West as model) with dependency theory (external, Latin America shaped by its place in world capitalism).

Contrasting modernization and dependency.

Gerschenkron 1962, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective"

Late developers industrialize differently: faster spurts, bigger plants, heavy industry, and stronger "institutional instruments" (banks in Germany, the state in Russia) plus ideology. Backwardness can be an advantage.

Relative backwardness; rejecting the single path; why late developers need strong states.

Gunder Frank 1966, "The Development of Underdevelopment"

Underdevelopment is created by capitalism's metropolis–satellite chain, not an original stage. Satellites grow most when ties to the metropolis weaken; the most underdeveloped regions today were the most tied to it in the past.

Dependency theory; critique of modernization.

Seth 2017, "South Korea's Economic Development, 1948–1996"

Korean growth came from war, US aid, land reform, a developmental state under Park, chaebol, investment in education, and a "Confucian ethos."

The East Asian miracle; challenging Weber and Acemoglu & Robinson.

Kuk 1988, "The Governmental Role in the Making of Chaebol"

The Korean state and chaebol were the "two engines" of industrialization. The state used credit, licenses and protection to grow chaebol and steer them into target industries.

State autonomy and discipline of business; why ISI worked in Korea.

Kim & Geisse 1988, "Outward Liberalization: Chile and South Korea"

In 1965 the two looked alike (Chile's industrial exports were similar to Korea's, and its total exports four times larger), but by 1970 Korea's industrial exports were seven times Chile's. Korea combined protection with export promotion under an autonomous state (Keynesian-developmentalist). Chile's ISI was captured by vested interests, and its later shock liberalization was neoliberal.

Why ISI succeeded in Korea and failed in Chile (method of difference).

Dahl 1999, "What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?"

Large-scale (polyarchal) democracy needs six institutions: elected officials; free, fair, frequent elections; free expression; alternative information; associational autonomy; inclusive citizenship.

Defining and measuring democracy; Dahl's 2x2.

Przeworski & Limongi 1997, "Modernization: Theories and Facts"

Rich countries are democratic, but not because wealth causes transitions (the endogenous view). Transitions are mostly exogenous; wealth makes democracies survive.

Modernization and democracy; the professor's model ID.

Huntington 1991, "Democracy's Third Wave"

Three waves and two reverse waves. The Third Wave (from 1974) had five causes: legitimacy crisis, economic performance, military defeat, international actors (Church, US, EC), snowballing. Warns of a third reverse wave.

Use for: Explaining democratization beyond modernization.

Huntington 1991b, "Religion and the Third Wave"

The Third Wave was overwhelmingly Catholic (about three-quarters of transitions from 1974 to 1989). Vatican II turned the Church against authoritarianism.

Use for: Refuting static cultural arguments.

Levitsky & Way 2002, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism"

Many post-Cold War regimes aren't transitional; they're competitive authoritarian. Four arenas of contestation (elections, legislature, judiciary, media) give real chances to win.

Defining hybrid regimes; linkage and leverage.

Levitsky & Way 2025, "The Path to American Authoritarianism"

US democracy will likely break down into competitive (not full) authoritarianism through a weaponized state, while judges, federalism, the military and the 2028 elections remain constraints. Opposition must "stay in the game."

Arguing "yes" in the US debate.

Madlovics & Magyar 2025, "Why America Won't Become Hungary"

Full "Orbánization" of the US is unlikely. Hungary was a "single-compartment ship": a two-thirds majority (from 53% of the vote) let Orbán rewrite the constitution and pack the courts. The US has federalism, a hard amendment process, primaries and independent states.

Arguing "no" (or "not fully") in the US debate.

Folsz 2026, "How Civil Society Defeated Orbán"

Hungary's April 2026 election ousted Fidesz after 16 years. Tisza (Péter Magyar) won with 2,500+ semi-autonomous "Tisza Islands" that (1) built independent information environments, (2) earned credibility through local community work, and (3) supplied campaign infrastructure. Civic capacity was latent, not absent.

How competitive authoritarianism can be defeated; citizen activism.

Svolik 2012, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

Two conflicts shape dictatorship: authoritarian control (elite vs. masses) and power-sharing (dictator vs. allies). Most dictators fall to insiders. Institutions such as parties and legislatures help allies monitor the dictator.

Autocratic survival; why dictators create institutions.

Ang 2022, "How Resilient Is the CCP?"

The CCP's formula: repression, propaganda, patronage, plus post-Mao institutionalization (term limits, meritocracy, collective leadership). Xi has rolled much of it back (term limits ended in 2018, "Xi Jinping Thought," "Chairman of Everything"), bringing back succession risk and big-mistake risk, though a high-capacity bureaucracy remains.

Autocratic persistence in China; whether China will democratize.