Week 12 - Remedies 2.0: Future Injury in Toxic Torts, Emotional Injury, Punitives, and Indemnity

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26 Terms

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Class Notes

Indemnity- legal mechanism is which one party agrees to pay for another party’s negligent or misconduct

  • Implied Indemnity and Expressed Indemnity

  • Only accrues when there is a judgment or settlement

  • Not finger pointing

  • Don’t need to go about indemnity until everything is settled

  • Implied Indemnity: Question is if mfr is seeking implied indemnity against CPM, mfr can only get that if they are not at fault



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Restatement Rule on C

A defendant who pays more than its fair share can recover the extra from another liable party, unless that party already settled with the plaintiff. A party with a full indemnity right against someone cannot also seek contribution from them.

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Indemnity Rights up the Distributive Chain

Seeking Repayment From Higher Up the Chain Retailers and wholesalers can be held strictly liable even when they did nothing wrong, so they often seek full repayment from parties above them in the chain. A seller that is truly without fault is entitled to that repayment, which can include its legal fees.

The Party Closest to the Manufacturer Pays A woman who lost four fingers in a meat grinder sued the retailer, the distributor and the importer. Because the manufacturer was not in the case, the court made the importer, as the party closest to the manufacturer, repay the distributor below it.

Careless Sellers Lose Full Repayment Illinois refused to let a seller that was itself careless shift its whole loss upstream, and had the jury split responsibility by fault instead. In a related case, the court treated a settlement as enough of an admission of fault to block full repayment, although one justice disagreed.

Assembly Problems Block Full Repayment A Texas truck dealer could not get full repayment from the maker of a defective chassis because the way the truck was assembled helped cause the defect. The parties could presumably still split the loss based on fault.

Courts Allowing Full Repayment Despite Seller Carelessness Some courts still let a careless seller shift the entire loss to the manufacturer, as when a trucking company recovered from the maker of a hitch that failed, because the manufacturer could prevent the harm most cheaply. A battery retailer likewise recovered in full because it reasonably relied on the manufacturer, and its only fault was failing to discover the defect.

Most Courts Favor Sharing by Fault When contribution is based on percentage of fault, there is little reason to let a defendant who helped cause the harm shift its entire loss to someone else. Most cases now follow that approach.

Repayment Rights Must Wait for the Facts A New York court said a retailer of a meat mixer would probably have repayment rights against its distributor, but deciding that was premature because the retailer was accused of careless installation. If both turn out to be at fault, the loss would likely be split between them.

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Third Restatement Rule on Full Repayment (Indemnity)

A party can recover everything it paid plus legal fees if a contract promises it, or if it was liable only for someone else's wrong or only as a blameless seller. A contract right to repayment applies even if the other party would not have been liable to the plaintiff.

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Settlement and Release Between the Plaintiff and Members of the Distributive Chain

Settlement and the End of Automatic Release Settlements are vital because courts would be overwhelmed without them. Under the old rule, settling with one wrongdoer released all of them, which discouraged settlement, and every state has now dropped that rule.

Can a Losing Defendant Go After One Who Settled? A key question is whether a defendant who goes to trial and loses can make a defendant who settled help pay. Allowing that discourages settlement, but forbidding it risks a cheap "sweetheart" deal that leaves the defendant who went to trial paying too much.

Different Legislative and Restatement Solutions The 1939 uniform act left settling parties open to contribution claims, and the 1955 version released them only if they settled in good faith. The Restatement bars contribution against a party who settles, while the 1979 Uniform Comparative Fault Act instead cuts the plaintiff's claim by the settling party's share of fault.

A Settlement Example In a $100,000 case, a plaintiff who is 10% at fault settles for $10,000 with a defendant found 60% at fault, and then wins only $30,000 from the other defendant. That is $40,000 in total instead of $90,000, so settling cost the plaintiff $50,000.

The Plaintiff Bears the Settlement Risk Under this approach, which the Restatement also adopts, the plaintiff gives up the settling defendant's entire share of fault, not just a dollar amount. That makes sweetheart deals pointless, because if the settling party's fault turns out higher than expected, the plaintiff absorbs the difference.

Downsides of This Approach These rules can discourage fair settlements, because plaintiffs may not want to give up an unknown share of their case. For example, a plaintiff may refuse a poorly insured driver's offer of the full policy amount, because accepting could give up a large share the solvent brake maker would otherwise owe.

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ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY COLLECTIVELY TO THE DISTRIBUTIVE CHAIN

Finger-Pointing in Negligence Cases To win a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove a defendant carelessly caused or missed the defect, and each defendant blames the businesses above or below it. All of them will also claim the defect arose after the product was sold.

Strict Liability Reduces Finger-Pointing Under strict liability, a seller is liable for selling a defective product even if it could not have found the defect, so it cannot blame businesses earlier in the chain. Sellers can still claim the defect arose after the product left their hands, which forces plaintiffs to go up the chain when the parties below are broke or cannot be sued.

A Minority Rule Easing the Plaintiff's Burden Most courts require proof that the product was defective from the very start before the whole chain can be held liable. A few, like Colorado, require only proof that the defect existed when the product was bought, and shift the burden to the businesses, which have better information and can protect themselves by contract.

Forcing a Verdict Against Someone When a surgical instrument broke in a patient's spine, New Jersey courts said the jury had to find at least one of the surgeon, hospital, supplier or manufacturer liable. A dissenting judge warned that forcing a verdict without enough evidence turns a trial into a game of chance.

The General Rule Still Applies Despite these cases, the usual rule is that a plaintiff must prove the product was defective while in each defendant's hands. If the evidence cannot point to a particular defendant, the plaintiff loses against that defendant.


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Recovery for Pure Emotional Upset

Pain, Suffering and Family Claims Courts routinely award pain-and-suffering damages along with physical injuries, including a $20 million medical device verdict that was upheld. Claims by family members for harm to their relationship with the injured person follow the usual rules, though Connecticut does not let parents bring them for an injured child.

The Problem of Purely Emotional Harm Courts have struggled with emotional harm that does not come from a physical injury. Product cases make this harder, because one defect can affect huge numbers of people over decades.

Intentional Versus Careless Emotional Harm Most states allow claims for intentionally causing severe emotional distress, but claims for carelessly causing it have a mixed history, and some states reject them entirely. States that do allow them add limits, such as requiring physical harm or requiring a witnessing relative to have been in the "zone of danger".

More Lenient Courts Some courts let close relatives who witness an injury recover even if they were not in danger themselves, though California later required them to actually see the accident. These limits are well settled, and there is little push to loosen them.

Product Cases Mostly Follow the Usual Rules Product-related distress cases usually look like ordinary ones, as when Iowa let a woman recover for watching a forklift crush her brother. Illinois, however, denied a husband's claim for witnessing his wife's death in a strict liability case, even though it would have allowed one in negligence.

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Toxic Torts, Future Disease and Fear of Disease

The Timing Trap in Toxic Exposure Cases Exposure to substances like asbestos can create a risk of disease that may show up years later, or never. Plaintiffs had to sue for all future harm at once without being able to prove it was likely, but if they waited, the deadline to sue might already have run out.

Suing for Increased Risk One response was to sue for the increased risk of future disease itself. Courts hesitated, because the law normally requires an actual injury before someone can sue.

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Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989) Background

The Mauro Case Facts Roger Mauro was exposed to asbestos for years as a hospital plumber, and tests found thickening in his chest walls along with a possible increased risk of lung cancer. The trial court rejected his increased-risk claim but let the jury consider his fear of cancer, his current condition and the cost of future medical testing.

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Legal Standard

Partial Recovery Based on Probability Most courts follow Mauro, but Connecticut allowed recovery for an 8 to 16 percent risk of future harm, reduced to reflect how likely it is to happen. A growing number of courts now base these damages on the percentage chance that the harm will occur.

A New Disease Allows a New Lawsuit Most states now let plaintiffs bring a new lawsuit when a separate disease such as cancer develops after an earlier asbestos condition. Some courts disagree in certain settings, such as treating HIV and AIDS as stages of one illness.

Claims for Fear of Disease Plaintiffs with no physical injury and no right to sue for increased risk turned to emotional distress claims. This let them seek money without waiting until they developed cancer.


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Legal Reasoning

The "Reasonably Probable" Rule New Jersey allows damages for future harm only if that harm is reasonably probable, because merely possible harm is too speculative. Most courts follow this rule, though legal scholars generally favor allowing claims for less likely risks.

Increased Risk Is a Claim for Future Injury The court explained that a claim for increased risk is really a claim for a future injury, like a knee injury that might later lead to arthritis. Since cancer was not shown to be reasonably probable, that part of the claim was properly kept from the jury.

The Court's Solution The court relaxed the filing deadline and the one-lawsuit rule so a plaintiff can sue later if the disease actually develops. Plaintiffs can still recover now for current injury, medical testing and emotional distress, and the judgment was affirmed.

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More on Future Harm Recovery

Partial Recovery Based on Probability Most courts follow Mauro, but Connecticut allowed recovery for an 8 to 16 percent risk of future harm, reduced to reflect how likely it is to happen. A growing number of courts now base these damages on the percentage chance that the harm will occur.

A New Disease Allows a New Lawsuit Most states now let plaintiffs bring a new lawsuit when a separate disease such as cancer develops after an earlier asbestos condition. Some courts disagree in certain settings, such as treating HIV and AIDS as stages of one illness.

Claims for Fear of Disease Plaintiffs with no physical injury and no right to sue for increased risk turned to emotional distress claims. This let them seek money without waiting until they developed cancer.

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Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley 521 U.S. 424 (1997) Background

The Buckley Case Facts Michael Buckley, a railroad pipefitter, was covered in asbestos dust about an hour a day for three years and feared cancer, and his experts put his added risk at 1 to 5 percent. His checkups showed no disease, and he sued his employer under a federal railroad-worker injury law for his distress and the cost of future checkups.


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Procedural Posture

The Lower Court Rulings The trial court dismissed the case, finding too little evidence of real distress and no "physical impact". The appeals court reversed, finding that his heavy exposure counted as a physical impact that would frighten a reasonable person.

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Legal Standard

The "Zone of Danger" Test An earlier Supreme Court case allowed distress damages only for people who suffer a physical impact or face an immediate risk of physical harm. The question was whether simple contact with asbestos counts as that kind of impact.

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Legal Reasoning

Exposure Is Not an Impact The Court held that "physical impact" does not include contact that only raises the risk of a disease years later. Its earlier cases involved threats of immediate harm, and most courts deny recovery to people with no disease or symptoms.

Hard to Tell Real Claims From Weak Ones The Court said policy concerns weighed against recovery, including the difficulty of separating genuine claims from trivial ones, open-ended liability and a possible flood of lawsuits. Buckley's own thin and mixed evidence of distress showed the problem.

Exposure Is Widespread Millions of Americans have been exposed to cancer-causing substances, so exposure alone cannot show whether someone's fear is real or reasonable. Judging an emotional reaction to a statistical rise in the risk of death is a serious problem.

Unlimited Costs and Limited Funds Allowing these claims could create huge costs that the public would pay through higher prices. It could also drain money needed for people who later actually get sick.

Buckley's Arguments Rejected Buckley argued his exposure proved his distress as well as a physical symptom would, but the Court said the law uses fixed categories, not case-by-case review. The Court also held that the federal law's humanitarian purpose did not justify a rule that would do more harm than good, and it reversed.

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More on Emotional Harm for Future Harm

Having an Actual Disease Changes the Result In a later case, workers who actually had asbestosis were allowed to recover for their fear of cancer, because they had a disease and not just exposure. A dissent argued there was no proven causal link between asbestosis and cancer and that such awards would drain limited funds.

Where Courts Draw the Line Some courts accept lung changes such as pleural thickening as enough of an injury to support a distress claim. Most courts, however, do not allow recovery for pleural thickening that causes no symptoms.

Fear-of-AIDS Cases In a case over what looked like a condom in a Coca-Cola bottle, the court required proof that the virus was present, or under a minority view probably present. A court also denied recovery to a blood-transfusion patient who could not prove actual exposure to HIV.

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Legal Standards and Limits of Punitive Damages Under State Law

The Purpose of Punitive Damages Punitive damages punish very bad conduct instead of compensating the plaintiff. Courts award them only on top of regular compensatory damages, never on their own.

Standards Vary by State Maryland rejected "gross negligence" as the test and required proof of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. A dissenting judge agreed with the higher proof standard but thought the malice requirement went too far.

Other State Tests Other states use tests such as "wantonness," "conscious disregard" or "evil mind". All of them require more than carelessness, meaning conduct that is intentional or reckless.

A Medical Device Award Upheld A jury awarded $3.5 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages against the maker of an implanted device that it knew was risky. The appeals court upheld the award because the evidence showed the company understated the risks and misled doctors.

The Conduct Must Be Truly Outrageous A maker of a system for securing cars on transport trucks avoided punitive damages despite knowing of some injuries, because it had worked on a safer design and acted for business reasons. A refinery that sold asbestos-contaminated dirt also avoided them because it had followed environmental regulations.

Evidence That Softens the Picture Courts may let defendants present evidence that makes their conduct look less bad. One tobacco company was allowed to describe its public health campaigns and billions in settlement payments.

State Laws on Punitive Damages Most states regulate punitive damages by statute, usually requiring clear and convincing evidence, and Colorado requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Many states cap the amount, a few do not allow punitive damages at all, and Georgia exempts product cases from its cap.

Court Challenges and Other State Rules Some state courts have struck down damage caps under their state constitutions, such as Missouri on jury-trial grounds. Some states protect drug makers that followed FDA rules, and some have the judge or a separate hearing set the amount.

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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 (2003) Background

State Farm v. Campbell: The Question The Supreme Court asked whether $145 million in punitive damages, on $1 million in compensatory damages, violated the Constitution's guarantee of fair process (due process). The case began with a 1981 crash caused by Curtis Campbell's unsafe pass, which killed one driver and permanently disabled another.

State Farm's Bad-Faith Handling State Farm refused to settle for the $50,000 policy limit and told the Campbells their assets were safe, but the jury returned a verdict of $185,849. State Farm then refused to cover the extra amount and suggested the Campbells put "for sale" signs on their property.

Evidence of a Nationwide Scheme The Campbells argued that State Farm's handling of their case was part of a nationwide plan to cap claim payouts to meet profit goals. The evidence covered 20 years and many states, and most of it had nothing to do with car accident claims like theirs.

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Procedural Posture

The Lawsuit Against State Farm The Campbells agreed to sue State Farm in exchange for the injured parties agreeing not to collect from them, and State Farm eventually paid the full judgment. The Campbells sued anyway, and the trial court allowed evidence of State Farm's conduct in unrelated cases outside Utah.

The Award and Its Reinstatement The jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial judge cut to $1 million and $25 million. The Utah Supreme Court restored the $145 million, pointing to State Farm's wealth and how rarely it would be caught.

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Legal Standard

Why the Constitution Limits Punitive Damages Compensatory damages repay actual losses, while punitive damages aim to punish and deter. Because defendants do not get criminal-trial protections and juries have wide discretion, due process requires fair notice and forbids grossly excessive awards.

The Three Guideposts Courts must consider how blameworthy the conduct was, how the punitive award compares to the harm, and what civil penalties apply to similar conduct. Appeals courts review how these guideposts were applied without deferring to the trial court.

Measuring Blameworthiness Courts ask whether the harm was physical, showed disregard for safety, targeted someone vulnerable, was repeated, or involved deliberate deceit. State Farm acted badly, but a smaller punishment would have met the state's goals.

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Court Reasoning

Wrongly Punishing Nationwide Conduct The Utah courts used the case to punish State Farm's practices across the country instead of its treatment of the Campbells. The Campbells had presented the case that way from the start.

Limits on Using Out-of-State Conduct A state cannot punish conduct that was legal where it happened, and generally cannot punish unlawful acts committed outside its borders. Out-of-state conduct can be used to show intent only if it connects to the plaintiff's specific harm, and juries must be told this.

Unrelated Conduct Cannot Be Punished A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory company. Punishing unrelated acts risks multiple punishments for the same conduct, so only State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells counted here.

The Ratio Guidepost The Court refused to set a fixed limit but said few awards more than nine times the compensatory damages will meet due process. When compensatory damages are large, an award equal to them may be the outer limit.

A 145-to-1 Ratio Is Too High The $1 million compensatory award fully compensated harm that was economic, not physical, and already included an element of punishment. State Farm's wealth and the argument that it would rarely be punished could not justify the award.

Comparable Penalties The most relevant Utah civil penalty was a $10,000 fine for fraud, which was dwarfed by $145 million. Possible criminal penalties carry little weight because punitive damages are not a substitute for a criminal trial.

The Court's Decision An award at or near the compensatory amount was likely justified, so the $145 million award was arbitrary and unconstitutional. The Court reversed and sent the case back to the Utah courts.

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Dissent

Justice Ginsburg's Dissent Justice Ginsburg argued that the nationwide evidence was relevant because it showed a pattern similar to what harmed the Campbells. She also criticized the Court for imposing number-based limits on the states, which she thought only legislatures or state courts should set.

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Philip Morris USA v. Williams 549 U.S. 346 (2007) Background

Philip Morris v. Williams: The Question and Facts The Court asked whether a jury may punish a defendant for harm to people who are not part of the lawsuit, and held that it may not. A smoker's widow had won about $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages for Philip Morris's deceit.

Philip Morris's Arguments Philip Morris argued the jury should have been told not to punish it for harm to other smokers, which the plaintiff's lawyer had urged the jury to think about. It also argued the roughly 100-to-1 ratio was grossly excessive, but the Oregon Supreme Court rejected both arguments.

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Court Reasoning

The Need for Clear Standards Punitive damages serve legitimate goals, but without standards they can be arbitrary and fail to give fair notice. The Court decided only the question about harm to people outside the lawsuit.

No Punishment for Harm to Strangers Due process forbids punishing a defendant for harming people outside the lawsuit, because the defendant has no chance to defend against those claims. It would also force juries to guess how many such victims exist and how badly they were hurt.

Harm to Others Can Show Blameworthiness Juries may consider harm to others when judging how bad the conduct was, but may not punish the defendant directly for that harm. When there is a real risk of confusion, courts must provide protection, such as a jury instruction, if asked.

The Result Because Oregon applied the wrong standard, the Court vacated the ruling and sent the case back without deciding whether the award was excessive. A new trial or a change in the award might follow.

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Dissent

Justices Thomas and Ginsburg Dissent Justice Thomas said the Constitution does not limit the size of punitive awards and called the new rule confusing. Justice Ginsburg argued the Oregon courts had followed the Court's earlier decisions, so setting aside their judgment was unjustified.

Justice Stevens's Dissent Justice Stevens argued that punitive damages, like criminal penalties, punish harm to the public, so harm to others is a fair consideration. He saw no real difference between considering harm to others for blameworthiness and punishing the defendant for it.