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Intent
D acts with the purpose of causing a consequence or knows with substantial certainty that it will occur.
Purposeful Intent
D desires to cause the consequences of their act.
Substantial Certainty
D knows that the consequences of their actions are substantially certain to occur.
Single Intent Rule
D only needs to intend the contact; the contact must be harmful or offensive.
Dual Intent Rule
D must intend the contact AND intend that the contact be harmful or offensive.
Transferred Intent
Intent can transfer from one victim to another or from one traditional intentional tort to another.
Transferred Intent: Person to Person
D intends to harm one person but instead harms another; intent transfers to the actual victim.
Transferred Intent: Tort to Tort
D intends one traditional intentional tort but commits another; intent may transfer.
Mistake and Intent
Mistake or good faith generally does not negate intent.
Mental Disability and Intent
Mental disability does not automatically prevent D from forming the intent necessary for an intentional tort.
Children and Intent
Children can form the requisite intent for intentional torts.
Malice and Motive
Malice or bad motive is generally unnecessary to establish intent.
Voluntary Act
Intentional tort liability generally requires an affirmative, voluntary act.
Battery
Intentional harmful or offensive contact with another person.
Battery Elements
(1) Intent to cause contact; (2) harmful or offensive contact results.
Harmful Contact
Contact that causes physical injury or bodily harm.
Offensive Contact
Contact that offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.
Indirect Contact
Battery can occur through objects or substances that make contact with P.
Extended Personality Doctrine
Contact with objects closely connected to P's body can satisfy battery's contact requirement.
Battery and Physical Injury
Physical injury is not required if the contact is offensive.
Battery and Apprehension
P does not need to anticipate the contact before it occurs.
Presumed Consent to Everyday Contact
Ordinary, socially accepted touching is generally not battery.
Eggshell Skull Rule
D takes P as found and is liable for the full extent of injuries caused, even if unusually severe.
Battery and Transferred Intent
Intent to commit a traditional intentional tort may transfer to an unintended battery victim.
Assault
Intentional creation of apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.
Assault Elements
(1) Intent to cause apprehension; (2) apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact actually occurs.
Apprehension
Awareness or anticipation of imminent contact; fear is not necessarily required.
Imminence
The threatened contact must appear immediately forthcoming rather than at an indefinite future time.
Words Alone and Assault
Mere words generally do not constitute assault without accompanying circumstances or conduct.
Conditional Threat
Words may negate apparent imminence or demonstrate that contact is not immediately threatened.
Assault and Physical Contact
Physical contact is not required.
Assault and Awareness
P must be aware of the threatened contact to apprehend it.
Intent may transfer between victims or traditional intentional torts.
Intentional confinement of P within a bounded area without lawful privilege.
(1) Intent to confine; (2) actual confinement; (3) P is aware of confinement or harmed by it.
Restricting P's freedom of movement within a bounded area.
Walls, locked doors, or other physical obstructions can establish confinement.
Express or implied threats may establish confinement.
Coercion sufficiently restricting P's ability to leave may constitute confinement.
False claims of legal authority can establish confinement.
No false imprisonment if P has a reasonable, known, safe means of escape.
P is not required to use an escape route that presents unreasonable danger.
P generally need not escape through a route involving unreasonable humiliation.
Preventing entry into a place is generally not false imprisonment.
Guilt, embarrassment, or fear of losing a job generally does not establish confinement.
P must either know of the confinement or suffer actual harm from it.
Failure to provide a means of leaving may create liability when D has a duty to release P.
Unlawful confinement through an arrest without proper legal authority.
Intentional or reckless extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.
(1) Intentional or reckless conduct; (2) extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) causation; (4) severe emotional distress.
Conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in civilized society.
Distress so serious that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure it.
Ordinary insults, indignities, and annoyances generally do not establish IIED.
Misuse of authority or power over a vulnerable person can support outrageousness.
D's knowledge of P's unusual susceptibility can make conduct outrageous.
Physical injury is generally not required.
Traditional transferred
IIED may provide recovery for severe distress when another traditional tort does not apply.
Constitutional free
Intentional entry onto, remaining on, or causing a tangible thing to enter land possessed by another without permission.
(1) Intentional act; (2) entry or remaining; (3) land possessed by another.
D must intend the act of entry, not necessarily know the land belongs to another.
Mistakenly believing the land is yours generally does not defeat trespass liability.
Causing a tangible object to enter another's land may constitute trespass.
Staying after permission ends can constitute trespass.
Failure to remove an object when under a duty to do so may constitute trespass.
Actual damage is not required; nominal damages may be available.
Possessory protection can extend above and below land, subject to modern limitations.
Trespass includes intentional entry, remaining on land, or failure to remove an object when obligated.
Movable personal property, as distinguished from real property.
Intentional interference with another's personal property causing legally recognizable harm.
(1) Intentional interference; (2) another's chattel; (3) dispossession or recognizable harm.
Intentionally using or interfering with another's chattel.
Depriving the rightful possessor of possession of the chattel.
Reduction in the property's condition, quality, or value.
Preventing the possessor from using property for a substantial period.
Generally measured by actual damage, loss of use, or diminished value.
Trespass to chattels includes intentional dispossession or intermeddling.
Liability may arise from dispossession, impairment, substantial loss of use, or specified resulting harm.
Intentional exercise of substantial dominion or control over another's chattel that seriously interferes with their rights.
(1) Intentional dominion or control; (2) serious interference with another's right to control the chattel.
Control sufficiently serious to justify requiring D to pay the property's full value.
Good
Generally the full fair market value of the chattel at the time of conversion.
Extent and duration of control, intent, good faith, harm, and inconvenience.
Conversion involves serious interference warranting full
Return may mitigate damages but does not necessarily eliminate liability.
Permission that may prevent otherwise tortious contact or interference from creating liability.
Permission communicated through words or affirmative conduct.
Permission explicitly stated.
Permission inferred from conduct, circumstances, customs, or prior dealings.
Consent reasonably understood from P's outward conduct even if P did not subjectively agree.
Consent inferred in qualifying emergencies when actual consent cannot be obtained.
(1) P cannot consent; (2) no substitute available; (3) genuine emergency; (4) reasonable person would consent.
Consent protects only conduct within the permission given.
Material fraud can invalidate consent.
Consent obtained through qualifying coercion is invalid.
P must possess sufficient capacity to understand and agree to the conduct.
Consent may generally be withdrawn, subject to applicable circumstances.
Consent may be ineffective when recognizing it would violate protective public policy.