International Security and Diplomacy: War, Strategy, and Coercion

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34 Terms

1
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According to the lecture notes, what is the definition of an anarchic international system?

An international system without a global sovereign that can enforce decisions on everyone.

2
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How does the professor define "politics" in the context of Clausewitz's theory of war?

Who rules and how resources are allocated.

3
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What is "Clausewitzian malpractice" as defined in the lecture?

Allowing the costs of war to exceed the value of the political objective.

4
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What is "absolute war" in Clausewitzian theory?

The theoretical endpoint of escalation, where both sides mobilize everything they possibly can to pursue the stake.

5
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What are the three conditions that produce "friction" during war?

Fear (knowing mistakes have deadly consequences), Fog (an opponent actively concealing plans and trying to mislead), and Fatigue (exhaustion from working extremely long hours).

6
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What is the fundamental difference between "brute force" and "coercion" according to Thomas Schelling's framework?

Brute force obtains the stake without requiring the target's agreement or decision, whereas coercion induces compliance through conditional threats and promises, requiring the target's decision to surrender the stake.

7
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What are the three necessary elements that comprise a coercive strategy?

  1. Demand: What you want the target to do or provide.
  2. Threat: What you will do if the target refuses.
  3. Promise: What you will refrain from doing (assurance) if the target complies.
8
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What is "dual moral hazard" in coercive bargaining?

The difficulty of making the threat and the promise credible at the same time, because actions that strengthen one can weaken the other.

9
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What is the distinction between "deterrence" and "compellence"?

Deterrence is a coercive demand that the target refrain from acting, while compellence is a coercive demand that the target take an action.

10
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Why is compellence generally harder to achieve than deterrence?

Compellence requires visible action, making compliance more public, increasing the political costs of humiliation, and creating greater difficulty in making the promise to halt punishment believable.

11
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How do "punishment", "denial", and "existential" coercive threats differ?

Punishment threatens pain without necessarily preventing the target from achieving its objective; denial threatens to prevent the target from achieving or retaining its objective through force; and an existential threat threatens destruction or catastrophic harm to both the target and the coercer.

12
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What is the difference between direct coercion and extended coercion?

Direct coercion is coercion used to protect yourself or your own interests directly, whereas extended coercion is coercion used to protect another actor.

13
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What distinguishes general deterrence from immediate deterrence?

General deterrence prevents earlier movement toward a confrontation (such as from peace to tension or tension to crisis), whereas immediate deterrence prevents the final step from crisis into war.

14
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How do the deterrent model and the spiral model explain the origins of conflict?

The deterrent model assumes an opponent has aggressive intentions that must be discouraged through credible threats, while the spiral model assumes non-aggressive actors enter conflict because each interprets the other's defensive preparations as offensive threats (the security dilemma).

15
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What is "forceful diplomacy" (or forcible diplomacy) as defined by Alexander George?

Compelling action short of war.

16
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In coercive diplomacy, what distinguishes a "promise" from an "inducement"?

A promise assures that the threatened punishment will not occur or will stop upon compliance ("If you comply, I will not carry out the threat"), whereas an inducement offers an additional side benefit or payment beyond withholding punishment ("If you comply, I will also give you an additional benefit").

17
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What are "audience costs" in crisis bargaining?

Domestic political costs a leader incurs by backing away from an explicit public demand or threat.

18
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How does the lecture define deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental escalation?

Deliberate escalation is an intended, limited increase in pressure for a planned purpose; inadvertent escalation is escalation provoked by your action but deliberately chosen by the opponent; accidental escalation is escalation intended by neither side's leadership.

19
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What is "escalation dominance"?

A condition in which an actor possesses a substantial advantage at a particular rung of escalation and at every higher rung.

20
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What is the "fallacy of the last move"?

Assuming your action will determine the outcome without adequately accounting for the opponent's next response.

21
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What is "bargaining failure" and what role does it play in the outbreak of war?

The breakdown of a negotiating process that could otherwise reach an agreement preferable to the mutual costs and destruction of war; it is the proximate cause of war.

22
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What does the professor mean by the claim that there is "no such thing as military victory"?

Armed force can capture territory and defeat formations, but it rarely eliminates every possibility of surviving resistance; war ends only when surviving opponents make the political choice to stop fighting.

23
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What is "goal displacement" in strategy and war termination?

Mistaking the means for the ends, such as becoming absorbed in tactical military destruction and losing track of the political settlement the violence was intended to produce.

24
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What is "premature cognitive closure"?

Settling a difficult decision and resisting reconsideration even when new information or changing battlefield facts should prompt reassessment.

25
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What is "gambling for resurrection"?

Escalating a conflict in the hope of reversing a deteriorating position because accepting the available settlement would threaten the regime's or leadership's political survival.

26
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What is the "credibility trap"?

Using force primarily to preserve credibility for future confrontations, even when the current use of force makes little sense on its own merits.

27
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What are the two main branches of Just War Theory and what do they govern?

Jus ad bellum (governs the justice of the decision to go to war) and jus in bello (governs the justice of conduct during war).

28
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What are the two essential requirements of the "doctrine of double effect" in Just War Theory?

  1. Proportionality: The expected civilian harm must be proportionate to the military benefit.
  2. Right Intention: The purpose must be to strike a legitimate military target, and civilian casualties must not be the objective.
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What is the principle of "combatant equality" in jus in bello?

Soldiers are held responsible for their conduct in war rather than automatically being held responsible for their state's political decision to go to war.

30
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How does the lecture differentiate deontological ethics from consequentialist ethics in professional conduct?

Deontological ethics judges actions based on duties, rules, norms, and inherent rightness or wrongness; consequentialist ethics judges actions based on the results and outcomes they produce.

31
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How do Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism explain the source of security threats?

Realism sees threats arising from other states' material power under anarchy; Neoliberal Institutionalism argues power is threatening when institutions fail to manage or restrain it; Constructivism argues threats depend on how states interpret each other and socially construct their relationship.

32
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What is "overlearning" in intelligence analysis?

Correcting for a previous analytical failure so aggressively that the correction produces a new mistake in the opposite direction (e.g., underestimating Iraqi WMDs in 1991 leading to overestimating them in 2003).

33
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What is the Fundamental Attribution Error as applied to international security?

The tendency to explain one's own military actions or buildups as purely defensive and required by circumstances, while explaining the opponent's actions as proof of aggressive character or hostile intent.

34
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How are "ends", "ways", and "means" defined in the