PHIL 321 Exam 3

John/Anne, Lisa/Helen examples

• The "Problematic" Ones (John and Helen): They approach their relationships through a consequentialist lens. They are constantly evaluating their behavior to see if it produces the "best" result or maintains the relationship's utility.

• The "Natural" Ones (Anne and the alternative to Helen): They interact with their partners or friends spontaneously. Their actions are driven by direct care and loyalty, not by a mental check of what maximizes happiness.

• If John is constantly thinking, "I should do this for Anne because it maximizes our long-term happiness," he is alienated from the relationship itself. His motivation is a calculation, not the person he loves. This "transactional" way of thinking—which the outline notes Helen exhibits—is often viewed as incompatible with deep human bonds.

Paradox of hedonism

Hedonism says pleasure or happiness is the highest good. The paradox points out that actively chasing pleasure can backfire: when you focus too much on “being happy,” you may become anxious, self-conscious, or disappointed, which makes happiness harder to attain.

Subjective consequentialism

This view holds that an action is right if it is the action that the agent reasonably expects to produce the best consequences based on the information they have available at the time.

Objective Consequentialism

• This view holds that an action is right if and only if it actually produces the best consequences (the most good/happiness). The problem here is that we often lack perfect foresight—we don’t always know for sure what the outcome of our actions will be.

Sophisticated consequentialism (Juan’s case)

• A sophisticated consequentialist is someone who has a "standing commitment" to leading an objectively consequentialist life, but does not necessarily seek to lead a subjectively consequentialist life.

  • The Key Shift: They don't try to make every single decision by asking, "Which choice produces the most utility?"

  • The Alternative: Instead, they might adopt certain dispositions, character traits, or deep commitments (like being a loyal friend, or pursuing beauty/knowledge) because they recognize that, in the long run, having these traits creates a better world and a better life.

Juan’s Case

• Although your provided text doesn't detail the specifics of Juan’s story, the concept is that Juan is the "sophisticated" agent. He doesn't go around calculating utility before deciding to help a friend or pursue a hobby.

• Instead, he acts based on his commitments and his character. He does these things because they have intrinsic value to him. However, he keeps a "standing commitment" to the consequentialist perspective: he would not act in a way that violates his overall commitment to creating the best consequences. Essentially, he is a consequentialist who has figured out that the best way to achieve good consequences is to not be an obsessive "calculating" person all the time.

Truth-Conditions

• In Railton's framework, the truth-condition for moral correctness is Objective Consequentialism.

• An action is right if and only if it actually produces the best overall consequences (the most happiness, well-being, etc.).

• This is the "big picture" standard. It defines the goal: a world with the best possible outcomes.

Acceptance Conditions

• Crucially, Railton argues that for a sophisticated consequentialist, the acceptance-condition does not have to be "I must calculate consequences before every action."

• Instead, the "acceptance-condition" might be: "I will be a loyal friend, I will pursue my passions, and I will be a person of integrity."

• Why? Because the sophisticated consequentialist recognizes that living a life governed by direct, constant calculation leads to worse outcomes (due to alienation, inefficiency, or unhappiness).

Agent-centered restrictions

• These function as constraints that forbid an agent from performing certain types of actions, even if performing those actions would produce a better overall outcome. In other words, they are prohibitions that focus on what the agent themselves is doing, rather than just the final outcome.

Agent-centered prerogative (what does it allow?)

• The ACP allows you to devote energy to your own personal stuff, that is out of proportion to the weight from an impersonal perspective 

• Often consequentialist

Hybrid account

It is always permissible to bring about the best consequences, but you are not always required to do so.

Independence

• Commitment to ACP does not imply commitment to ACR 

• You could theoretically accept one without the other. For instance, you could believe that there are strict rules against certain actions (restrictions) without necessarily believing that individuals are allowed to give their own projects extra weight (prerogatives), or vice versa.

Asymmetry

• Considerations that give us a rationale for accepting ACP do not apply to ACR

• It suggests an asymmetry between what we are required to do and what we are permitted to do

• It is generally considered "always permissible to bring about the best consequences," but it is not always required to do so.

Importance of a good will

the "good will" is considered the only thing that is good without qualification. Its importance stems from the idea that while other positive qualities—such as intelligence, courage, or wealth—can be used for either good or evil, a good will is inherently valuable regardless of the outcome it produces.

Moral worth of actions and the irrelevance of outcomes

an action only possesses true moral worth if it is done from duty. If you do the right thing, but you do it because you want to, because you enjoy it, or because it benefits you, you have acted in accordance with duty, but you have not acted for the sake of duty.

Shopkeeper example

• it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty

• highlights the divide between deontology (Kant’s view, which cares about the purity of the motive) and consequentialism (which focuses on the outcome).

• For the consequentialist, the outcome is the same in all three cases: the customer gets a fair price. But for Kant, the "moral worth" is only present in the third scenario because the motivation is pure.

The natural philanthropist

• Imagine a person who has a natural, warm-hearted temperament. This person genuinely enjoys helping others and derives pleasure from spreading joy. Because of this disposition, they are naturally inclined to act in ways that are helpful, kind, and generous.

• If this person helps others simply because they enjoy the feeling of being helpful, their actions are driven by their own emotional satisfaction (an inclination). In Kant's view, this is certainly "praiseworthy" and "amiable," but it does not have moral worth. It is essentially the same as acting out of self-interest; they are doing what they want to do, rather than what they must do.

What does the “plain man” think (and why)?

• The "plain man" generally believes that there are several distinct duties that we have toward others, rather than just one single, overarching moral duty (such as the utilitarian obligation to maximize total happiness). These are what Ross calls prima facie duties.

• Ross argues that the "plain man" thinks this way because moral principles are not deductions from a single abstract theory; rather, they are grounded in the complex reality of human relationships.

Prima-facia duties

• You have specific duties that seems to be intrinsic

What do you do when these duties conflict

The duty to keep a promise when it conflicts with the duty not to tell a lie, outweighs the duty not to tell a lie

• moral obligations that are "self-evident" and carry significant weight, but they are not absolute. They represent the various claims that different moral situations make upon us.

• The fundamental issue with prima facie duties is that they frequently clash. For example, you might have a duty of fidelity to keep a promise to meet a friend for coffee, but suddenly encounter a situation where you have a duty of beneficence to help a stranger who has fallen and is injured. You cannot do both simultaneously.

Duty sans phrase

• The single, definitive moral obligation you have after you have assessed the situation (e.g., "Given the emergency, my duty sans phrase is to ignore the promise and help the person").

• While "prima facie duties" describe the various moral claims you have at first glance (like the duty to keep a promise vs. the duty to help someone in need), they are not absolute—they are conditional. They are only "apparent" duties until they are weighed against one another in a specific situation.

• Once you have done that weighing process and determined which duty is the most stringent or important in that specific moment, the resulting conclusion is your duty sans phrase.

How do we acquire moral knowledge?

• Ross argues that moral knowledge is not acquired through a complex, scientific-style calculation, nor is it deduced from a single, abstract principle. Instead, he believes we acquire it through reflection and intuition.

• Ross suggests that prima facie duties are "self-evident." Much like in mathematics, where you grasp the truth of an axiom once you understand the terms, Ross believes that a mature, educated mind can grasp the validity of these moral duties once the situation is presented clearly.

• As we grow and live in a society, we naturally acquire the capacity to discern right from wrong in specific contexts. It isn't learned from a textbook; it is something that becomes clear to us as we reflect on our duties as "plain men" and women living in a community.

Neutral reasons

• Neutral reasons are those that can be justified independently of the specific individual acting. They provide a reason for anyone to act in a certain way, regardless of their personal perspective, desires, or special relationships.

• Consequentialist, a reason that anyone has to be concerned about the common good

• Reasons deriving from the general goodness of the obtaining of certain states or affairs 

autonomous reasons

• Autonomous reasons are reasons that depend on the specific perspective or situation of the individual agent. They are "agent-relative" because the reason exists for a specific person in a way that it doesn't necessarily exist for others.

• Agent relative reason

• Reasons stemming from our own desires, projects and commitments

deontological reasons

• Nagel explores how deontology introduces specific "agent-relative" constraints on action. These act as restrictions on what an individual is allowed to do, even if doing otherwise would produce better consequences (or satisfy more "neutral" reasons).

• Reasons of obligation stemming from our obligations not to mistreat others oneself (as opposed to neutral reasons to bring it about that instances of mistreatment are reduced)

Mountain climbing and monument builder examples

• Some of our interests generate reasons for people, and others do not

  • Each of us has a reason to give significant weight to the simple sensory pleasure or pain of others as well as to his own 

• The way that we rank our own interests is not reflected in sphere of impersonal reasons

Monument Builder

• The Scenario

  • Someone is willing to forgo a decent diet in order to build a monument to their god.

• The Conflict

  • Does this person have the same claim on society to help them build their monument as they would to help them get enough to eat?

• The Verdict

  • No. Even if the builder feels the monument is vitally important, our "neutral" reason to help them avoid starvation is much stronger than our reason to help them build the monument.

• The Insight

  • The value of the monument is "idiosyncratic"—it is tied to the subject’s specific desires. It cannot be "impersonally detached." It doesn't carry the same universal weight as basic human needs like health, pleasure, or pain.

Mountain Climber

• The Scenario

  • A person wants to climb a mountain simply for the sake of the challenge.

• The Point

  • Like the monument builder, the climber has a strong "autonomous" reason to pursue this project. However, they have very little "neutral" claim on others to facilitate this. If they lack the funds or resources, society is not generally obligated to provide them because their goal is not a "basic impersonal good."

Arm-twisting example

• You have good consequentialist reasons for violating a deontologist constraint

  • From an impersonal perspective it is bad when a child gets his arm twisted, but it is worse to let 4 people die by not twisting the child’s arm.

  • Why do we still feel that it is bad to twist the child’s arm

    • Whatever your reason is for not twisting the arm, it cannot just be that it is bad for one to violate a deontological restriction

    • You would not let people die to stop someone from twisting the child’s arm

    • What you are feeling is that you in particular do not want to twist the child’s arm 

    • You have a reason not to do it, but it is not the same reason they I have not to do it  

Double effect and “swimming head-on against the normative current”

• A violation of a deontological constraint must be constituted by some international act, “something that one does, or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather than something one’s actions merely cause or fail to prevent but that one doesn’t aim at

  • Intended vs merely forseen

    • You can not intend to kill civilians, but you can do something that you know might kill civilians 

• According to the DDE, you are held more responsible for what you do intentionally (as a means or an end) than for what your actions merely cause or fail to prevent. This is why you might be prohibited from twisting the child's arm as a means to get to the hospital, even if you would be permitted to cause some harm if it were just an unintended side effect of your rescue mission.

• The "Normative Current"

  • There are values, principles, and norms that generally guide moral life (e.g., "don't harm the innocent," "respect others").

• "Swimming Head-On"

  • When you intend to violate one of these norms (like intentionally twisting the child's arm), you aren't just bumping into a rule. You are actively setting your will against the value that the rule protects. You are making your will the enemy of that value.