Property Law & Economics: Coase, Entitlements, and Efficiency

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86 Terms

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Efficiency

Law should promote resource allocation that maximizes value. Efficiency = Kaldor-Hicks: gains outweigh losses. Legal rules aim to minimize social cost. Efficiency may conflict with fairness or distributional goals.

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Coase Theorem

Bargaining leads to efficiency if transaction costs are low. Coase Theorem assumes zero transaction costs, well-defined property rights, and no wealth effects. Initial allocation affects distribution, not efficiency. High transaction costs can prevent bargaining and justify legal intervention.

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Coase Theorem Limitations

In reality, transaction costs are often high, bargaining may be blocked by strategic behavior, holdouts, or coordination failures, initial allocation affects distribution even if efficiency is preserved.

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Holdouts

owners demanding excessive compensation for their property

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Normative Coase Theorem

Law should reduce transaction costs to enable bargaining.

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Normative Hobbes Theorem

Law should minimize harm from failed bargaining.

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Transaction Costs

Costs of searching, negotiating, and enforcing agreements. Transaction costs include search, bargaining, enforcement, and coordination costs. High costs may justify liability rules or government action instead of private bargaining.

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Calabresi & Melamed Framework

Legal entitlements (e.g., property) can be protected by one of three rules:

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Property Rule

The entitlement holder decides whether to transfer the right. Transfer occurs only through voluntary exchange. Entitlement protected unless holder voluntarily transfers it.

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Liability Rule

The entitlement may be taken without the holder's consent, but only if the taker pays an amount determined by a court or regulator. Entitlement may be taken if taker pays court-assessed damages. When transaction costs are high, bargaining between parties may be impractical or impossible. In such cases, liability rules can promote efficiency by allowing entitlements to be transferred without consent, as long as compensation is paid. This avoids delays, breakdowns, or strategic refusals that can occur under property rules, and enables courts or regulators to approximate market outcomes when bargaining fails.

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Inalienability Rule

The entitlement cannot be transferred, even with the holder's consent. An inalienability rule prohibits the transfer of certain rights regardless of consent or price, often to protect public welfare or moral values (e.g., organs, votes).

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Threat Value

Fallback position if bargaining fails.

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Cooperative Surplus

Value created when parties reach agreement. Typically arises in bargaining or joint ventures where two or more parties can generate a total payoff greater than the sum of their individual fallback options (known as disagreement or threat points). Refers to the additional value or benefit created when individuals or groups collaborate, which exceeds what they could achieve independently.

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Bundle of Rights

Property as a set of legal rights: possess, use, exclude, transfer.

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Right to Exclude

Central feature of property law.

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Ownership Structure & Incentives Ownership structures

(e.g., employee ownership) align incentives by giving stakeholders residual claimancy, encouraging productivity and long-term investment.

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Residual Claimancy

receives the net profits after all obligations are paid. This role incentivizes efficient decision-making and cost control.

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Unclear Property Rights

Economic Downside Ambiguity in property rights leads to underinvestment, excessive litigation, and inefficient resource use due to increased transaction costs and reduced predictability.

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Redistribution via Property Law Using property law for redistribution (e.g., through takings or adverse possession)

can distort incentives and reduce efficiency. Redistribution is better handled through tax and transfer systems.

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Adverse Possession

Hostile, open, continuous use of land leads to ownership.

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Torrens System

Simplifies land title verification. Not really used in the USA anymore. Instead, it uses the Deed Recording System, often referred to as the Abstract of Title System or the Abstract System.

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Quiet Title Actions

Legal process to clarify ownership.

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Tragedy of the Commons

Overuse of shared resources. No one excludes over-users. Solutions include privatization, regulation, and collective governance. Property law defines boundaries to prevent depletion

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Tragedy of the Anticommons

Underuse due to fragmented ownership.

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Public Goods

Non-excludable, non-rivalrous (e.g., clean air, national defense) create free rider problems. Government provision may be necessary. The Takings Clause and eminent domain help overcome holdouts in public projects. Public goods are non-rivalrous (one person's use does not reduce availability) and non-excludable (hard to prevent others from using).

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Takings Clause

Government must compensate for public use of private property. The Takings Clause ensures compensation to promote efficient government action. "Public use" includes infrastructure and redevelopment. The economic rationale for just compensation is to preserve investment-backed expectations and prevent government overreach, maintaining trust in property systems.

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Regulatory takings assessed via Penn Central multi-factor test

economic impact, expectations, and character of action.

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Secure property rights

Secure property rights reduce uncertainty and encourage productive investment. Strong entitlements promote innovation, development, and efficient resource use by aligning individual incentives with long-term value creation.

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Jacque v. Steenberg Homes

Right to exclude emphasized even without physical harm.

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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement

Damages awarded, plant allowed to continue.

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Damages

Monetary remedy for harm.

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Injunction

Court order to stop harmful behavior and future harm

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Patent Expiration

Ends monopoly, allows generics.

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(Overly) Broad Patents

May block follow-on innovation.

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Follow-on innovation

builds upon an existing technology, drug, or process to create improvements or entirely new applications for that original innovation. This process enhances innovation's features, such as improving a drug's safety and efficacy, making a new drug formulation, or finding new uses for an established treatment. Follow-on innovation is a cumulative process where one advancement leads to others.

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Improvement patent

protects a novel enhancement or modification to an existing invention, rather than a completely new creation. It allows inventors to secure rights over added features or substituted components that make a product or process more effective, efficient, or valuable.

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Residual Claimancy

Right to profits after costs.

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Fair Use Doctrine

Limited use of copyrighted material without permission. Allows limited use of copyrighted material without permission for purposes like criticism, teaching, or parody. Balances innovation with creator rights.

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Doctrine of Equivalents

Legal test for patent infringement based on similarity.

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Compensable vs. Regulatory Takings

Determines whether compensation is owed for government action.

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Unclear Ownership

Increases bargaining costs by making threat values ambiguous; public registration systems reduce these frictions.

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Adverse possession

Michigan requires 15 years of continuous, hostile, open, notorious, and exclusive possession to claim title.

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Least Cost Avoider

Liability should fall on the party best positioned to prevent harm at lowest cost — promotes efficiency in tort and property disputes. Promotes efficiency in remedy allocation. Party best positioned to prevent harm at lowest cost. Example: In nuisance cases, courts may favor remedy that burdens the least cost avoider.

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Tragedy of the anticommons

Sometimes, too many people or companies own small pieces of the rights to a single medical discovery or technology. Because everyone has to agree before research can move forward, it ends up getting stuck. This problem — where too many owners slow things down — is called the "tragedy of the anticommons," and the term was introduced by legal scholar Michael Heller.

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Externalities

uncompensated effects on third parties. Property law internalizes externalities by assigning entitlements. Example: nuisance law allocates rights to minimize social cost.

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Nuisance law

uses economic analysis to weigh social benefit vs harm. Courts may apply property or liability rules depending on transaction costs and bargaining feasibility.

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Learned Hand formula:

B < PL Liability if burden of prevention is less than probability Ă— loss. Used to assess efficient precautions.

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Externality (Definition)

An externality is a cost or benefit incurred by a third party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit. Negative externalities (e.g., pollution) justify legal intervention.

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Remedy Preferences:

When bargaining fails, courts may prefer monetary damages for efficiency, but may use injunctions when rights are clear and transaction costs are low.

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Property Law Goals

Facilitate voluntary exchange, reduce transaction costs, internalize externalities.

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Bundle of Rights

Possess, use, exclude, transfer—property is a legal construct with divisible entitlements.

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Right to Exclude

Reinforced in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes; even symbolic trespass warrants protection.

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Coase vs. Hobbes

Bargaining vs. legal intervention—law should either enable negotiation or minimize harm when bargaining fails.

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Normative Coase Theorem

Law should reduce transaction costs to enable bargaining.

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Normative Hobbes Theorem

Law should minimize harm when bargaining fails by allocating rights directly.

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Adverse Possession

Encourages productive land use; clears title uncertainty.

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Tragedy of the Commons

Overuse of open-access resources (e.g., oyster beds).

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Tragedy of the Anticommons

Fragmented ownership blocks innovation (e.g., Soviet apartments). Fragmented control leads to underuse. Example: overlapping patent rights, divided land ownership. Coordination failure leads to economic waste.

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Takings Clause

Government must compensate taking for "public use" (e.g., Nollan, Penn Central).

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Redistribution

better handled through taxation than property law. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics supports separating efficiency (property law) from equity (tax policy).

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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement

Permanent damages awarded instead of injunction—efficiency vs. pollution control.

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Remedies, Injunctions, and damages

Remedies shape bargaining. Injunctions assign clear entitlements, increasing the plaintiff's threat value. Damages compensate, but they may leave entitlements ambiguous, affecting how surplus is divided.

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Spur Industries v. Del Webb

Feedlot vs. developer—externalities and relocation costs shared. Courts weigh transaction costs against information costs. If it's cheaper for courts to determine who values a right most, they allocate directly (Hobbesian). If cheaper for parties to negotiate, law facilitates bargaining (Coasean).

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Intellectual Property (IP) Law Goals

Balance innovation (dynamic efficiency) and dissemination (static efficiency).

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Nonappropriability

Information is costly to produce, cheap to transmit—leads to underinvestment.

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Public Goods in IP

Ideas are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.

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Trade Secrets vs. Patents

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) offer limited protection; patents offer exclusivity but risk disclosure.

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Patent Breadth & Duration

Narrow patents encourage development; broad ones incentivize pioneering research.

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Orphan Drug Act

Extends exclusivity for rare diseases—example of tailored patent duration.

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Compulsory Licensing

Courts may force licensing to prevent underuse or abuse of patent rights. A legal mechanism allowing use of intellectual property without the owner's consent, typically with compensation. Used to reduce monopoly power or promote access.

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Copyright & Fair Use

Balances creator rights with public access (e.g., Sony v. Universal).

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Public access

refers to the ability of the general public—individuals, businesses, researchers, educators, and consumers—to freely use, benefit from, or build upon an invention, idea, or work without legal restrictions or payment obligations.

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Trademark Law

Signals quality, reduces search costs; genericization risks (e.g., Aspirin, Xerox).

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Copyright

protects original works of authorship (books, music, software).

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Trademark

protects symbols, names, and slogans that distinguish goods/services. Both aim to encourage innovation and prevent consumer confusion.

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Creative Commons

alternative copyright model—supports open dissemination.

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Jacque v. Steenberg Homes:

A mobile home crosses private land without damage—court upholds exclusion rights and awards punitive damages.

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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement:

Cement plant causes nuisance—damages awarded, injunction denied. Permanent damages are awarded instead of injunction due to economic impact of potential of lost jobs.

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Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb

Indemnification despite nuisance ruling — the developer must pay to relocate the feedlot even though it was there first.

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Penn Central v. NYC

Grand Central Terminal's air rights restricted—regulation upheld, no compensation. Introduced a multi-factor test for regulatory takings: economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and character of government action. Investment-backed expectations and air rights as key factors in the regulatory takings test.

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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

Public easement across beachfront ruled a taking—compensation required to be given to the private homeowners. 5-4 Supreme Court decision which held that it was a taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

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Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Bell Craig Pharmaceuticals (Librium Patent Expiration)

Canadian case. Librium is a sedative that was the forerunner of Valium. When its patent expired, it saw a price drop from $15 to $1.10—illustrates dissemination benefit.

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Moore v. Regents

Focused on fiduciary duty and informed consent rather than conversion. Illustrates limits of property law in biomedical contexts. Court declined to recognize property rights in excised human cells, citing policy concerns. Emphasized fiduciary duty and informed consent over conversion. No property rights in excised cells, but raises bioethics and commodification concerns

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Amazon's One-Click Patent

Raised concerns about overly broad "business methods" patents. Courts scrutinize scope to avoid monopolizing basic ideas.

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Kelo v. City of New London

The city seized private homes for economic development, and the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld the taking of houses via eminent domain as "public use," sparking debate over property rights and government power.

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U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. (2nd Cir., 1947):

This case involved the barge Anna C, owned by Conners Marine Co. and loaded with flour for the U.S. government, which was moored at Pier 52 in New York Harbor. Carroll Towing Co. attempted to reposition nearby vessels, and during this maneuver, the mooring lines were readjusted, causing the Anna C to break free, drift into a tanker, and ultimately sink after its hull was punctured. No bargee was aboard during working hours to intervene, which became central to the court's negligence analysis. Judge Learned Hand introduced a formula for determining negligence based on expected costs and benefits. This formula—known as the Hand Formula—states that a party is negligent if the burden (or cost) of taking precautions (B) is less than the probability that harm will occur (P) multiplied by the severity of the cost of the harm or potential loss (L), or B < P × L