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Section 168(1) Companies Act 2006
The statutory right of shareholders to remove a director by ordinary resolution before the expiration of their term of office, notwithstanding anything in the articles or any agreement.
Resolution type and procedure required to remove a director under s 168 CA 2006
An ordinary resolution passed at a general meeting; a written resolution cannot be used pursuant to s 288(2)(a).
Default board power to remove a fellow director
The board has no inherent power to remove a director unless the articles expressly grant that authority (the Model Articles provide no such power).
Model Article 18 (MA 18)
The provision governing automatic termination of a director's appointment upon specific events such as bankruptcy, medical incapacity, or resignation.
Special notice requirement under s 312(1) CA 2006
Notice given by proposing shareholders to the company of the intention to move a resolution at least 28 days before the general meeting.
Section 312(4) Companies Act 2006
The provision stating that if the company calls a meeting for a date 28 days or less after special notice is received, the special notice is deemed properly given.
Section 169(1) Companies Act 2006
The statutory obligation requiring a company to immediately send a copy of the special notice of removal to the director concerned.
Notice period required to convene a general meeting to remove a director
At least 14 clear days' notice given to all members under ss 307 and 360 CA 2006.
Pedley v Inland Waterways Association Ltd [1977]
The case establishing that receipt of special notice alone does not legally oblige directors to call a general meeting or place a removal resolution on the agenda.
Shareholding threshold to requisition a general meeting under s 303 CA 2006
Members representing at least 5% of the paid-up capital carrying voting rights.
Statutory deadlines for directors upon receipt of a valid s 303 request (s 304(1))
Call the general meeting within 21 days of the request, and hold it on a date no more than 28 days after the notice convening it.
Shareholder rights under s 305 CA 2006 upon board failure to call a requisitioned meeting
The requisitioning members, or any holding over half of their total voting rights, may convene the general meeting themselves within 3 months of the board's default.
Section 305(6)–(7) Companies Act 2006
The statutory rules requiring the company to reimburse reasonable expenses of members calling a meeting under s 305 and recover those costs from the defaulting directors' fees.
Recommended tactic for shareholders to ensure a director removal resolution is considered
Serve the s 312 special notice and the s 303 meeting requisition on the company simultaneously so the directors cannot simply ignore the resolution.
Cooperative timeline for a s 303 requisition with special notice
Notice served on Day 1; board calls the meeting by Day 22; general meeting held by Day 50 on at least 14 clear days' notice.
Uncooperative timeline under s 305 CA 2006
Requisition served on Day 1; board's 21-day period lapses on Day 22; shareholders issue notice on Day 23 for a meeting held around Day 38 (respecting 28-day special notice and 14 clear days' notice), within 3 months maximum.
Director's statutory rights of protest under s 169 CA 2006
Right to receive immediate notice, submit written representations to be circulated to members or read out at the meeting, and speak at the general meeting.
Section 169(5) Companies Act 2006
Allows the court to order that representations not be circulated or read out if the director is abusing the right to secure needless publicity for defamatory matter.
Bushell v Faith clause
A provision in the articles granting weighted voting rights to a director-shareholder on any resolution concerning their removal, effectively preventing the passing of a s 168 resolution.
Effect of s 168 removal on a director's share ownership
Removal as a director does not automatically affect their shares, unless the articles or a shareholders' agreement contain compulsory transfer or leaver clauses.
Remedies for breach of a shareholders' agreement clause barring removal
The director can sue the breaching shareholders for damages in contract or apply to the court for an injunction to prevent them from voting in breach of the agreement.
Section 168(5) Companies Act 2006
Preserves a removed director's entitlement to claim compensation or damages for termination of their service contract or office.
Section 220(1) Companies Act 2006
Exempts payments made in good faith to discharge an existing legal obligation (e.g., damages for breach of contract) from requiring shareholder approval.
Section 217 Companies Act 2006
Requires approval by ordinary resolution of members for any gratuitous payment for loss of office made by a company to a director.
Disclosure requirement under s 217(3) CA 2006
A memorandum detailing the loss of office payment must be sent with the written resolution or made available at the registered office for 15 days before and at the general meeting.
Section 215(3) Companies Act 2006
Anti-avoidance rule providing that payments made to connected persons, or directed to third parties for the director's benefit, are treated as payments to the director.
Statutory derivative claim under s 260 CA 2006
A legal action brought by a shareholder on behalf of the company for acts or omissions involving negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust by a director.
Two-stage permission procedure for derivative claims (ss 261–263 CA 2006)
First, the court dismisses the claim if there is no prima facie case; second, at a full hearing, the court evaluates factors including good faith and whether a director acting under s 172 would pursue it.
Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975]
The decision confirming that a court may order the company to indemnify a minority shareholder for the costs of bringing a bona fide derivative action.
Section 994 Companies Act 2006
The provision permitting a shareholder to petition for relief where the company's affairs have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members.
O'Neill v Phillips [1999]
The leading case establishing that exclusion from management in a quasi-partnership contrary to an informal agreement can constitute unfair prejudice under s 994.
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries [1973]
The case defining a quasi-partnership company by personal relationships of mutual confidence, management participation understandings, and share transfer restrictions.